

Order and (Dis)order in the First Christian Century

Supplements to Novum Testamentum

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VOLUME 151

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Order and (Dis)order in the First Christian Century

A General Survey of Attitudes

By

F. Gerald Downing



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2013

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ISSN 0167-9732

ISBN 978-90-04-25175-5 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-25581-4 (e-book)

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quid enim iucundius
quam uxori tam carum esse
ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?

(Seneca, *ep.mor.* civ. 6)

I record my thanks to the editors, Professor David P. Moessner and Dean Margaret M. Mitchell, and Brill, for accepting this collected study for the Novum Testamentum Supplements Series, many of whose volumes have enriched me in the past. And I offer renewed thanks to members of the Ehrhardt Biblical Studies Seminar in the University of Manchester, and to staff of the John Rylands University of Manchester Library, especially in Document Supply

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Chapters 1–4 and 7 are new material, previously unpublished.

Chapter 5, “Order in Composition: ‘καθεξῆς σοι γράψαι’ (Luke 1.3)” also appears here for the first time in print, but an earlier version, “Imitation and Emulation. Josephus and Luke: Plot and Psycholinguistics”, is also due now to appear, with the agreement of Brill, in *The Elijah-Elisha Narrative in the Composition of Luke*, edited by John S. Kloppenborg and Joseph Verheyden, and published in London by T & T Clark, also with the latter’s agreement.

Chapter 6, “Order in Thought: Ambiguity, Ancient Semantics, and Faith”, first appeared as “Ambiguity, Ancient Semantics, and Faith”, in *NTS* 56.1 (2009), 139–162, and appears here by kind permission.

Chapter 8, “Legislation as Social Engineering” first appeared in Michael Tait and Peter Oakes (eds), *Torah in the New Testament. Papers Delivered at the Manchester-Lausanne Seminar of June 2008* (LNTS 401; London: T & T Clark), 218–227. Copyright, hitherto unassigned, now rests with Brill.

Chapter 9, “What, then, of the Law?”, extensively recasts material from ch. 9, “Why then the Law?”, in F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches* (London: Routledge, 1998; © F. Gerald Downing), 54–84, and *idem*, “Law and Custom: Luke-Acts and Late Hellenism”, in Barnabas Lindars (ed.), *Law and Religion* (Cambridge: J. Clarke, 1988), 148–158. Copyright hitherto unassigned; in this version, now rests with Brill.

Chapter 10, “Justification as Acquittal? A Critical Examination of Judicial Parlance in Paul’s World”, first appeared in *CBQ* 74.2 (2012), 298–318, and appears here by kind permission.

Chapter 11 is a re-worked version of “Pliny’s Prosecutions of Christians”, *JSNT* 34 (1988), 105–123, and appears here by kind permission.

Chapter 12 first appeared as “Psalms and the Baptist”, *JSNT* 29.2 (2006), 131–137, and appears here by kind permission.

Chapters 13 and 14 extensively recast F. Gerald Downing, “Jesus and Cynicism”, in Tom Holmén and Stanley Porter (eds), *Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus. 2. The Study of Jesus*. (4 vols; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011) 2. 1105–1136. Copyright, hitherto unassigned, now rests with Brill.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Standard abbreviations are used for Biblical, deuterocanonical, and other ancient Jewish writings; so, too, for quotations from other writers in Greek and Latin; but full titles for the latter will appear in the appropriate indices.

AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	<i>Anchor Bible Dictionary</i> . D.N. Freedman (ed.). 6 vols, New York, 1992.
AC	<i>L'Antiquité Classique</i> .
AGAJU	Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Antike Judentums und des Urchristentums.
ANRW	<i>Austieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> . H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds). Berlin, 1972–
ATR	<i>Anglican Theological Review</i> .
BCE	Before the Common Era.
BeO	<i>Biblia e Oriente</i> .
BETL	Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum lovaniensium.
Bib	<i>Biblica</i> .
Bib.Int.	<i>Biblical Interpretation</i> .
BIS	Biblical Interpretation Series.
BNTC	Black's New Testament Commentary.
BZ	<i>Biblische Zeitschrift</i>
BZAW	Beihefte zur <i>Zeitschrift für Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</i> .
BZNW	Beihefte zur <i>Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft</i> .
CahRB	Cahiers de la Revue Biblique.
CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i> .
CCWJCW	Cambridge Commentaries on the Jewish and Christian World.
CE	Common Era
CNT	Commentaire du Nouveau Testament.
ECL	Early Christianity and its Literature.
ECS	Early Christian Studies
EKKNT	Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament.
emic/etic	insider/outsider (understanding, interpretation).
ESEC	Emory Studies in Early Christianity.
ET	English Translation.
FRLANT	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments.
FzB	Forschung zur Bibel.
GAP	Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudeigrapha.
GTA	Göttinger theologische Arbeiten.
GR	<i>Greece and Rome</i> .
HBS	Herders biblische Studien
HDAC	Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquité classique.

HPT	<i>History of Political Thought.</i>
HTR	<i>Harvard Theological Review.</i>
IB	<i>Interpreter's Bible.</i> G.A. Buttrick et al. (eds). 12 vols; New York, 1951–1957
ICC	<i>International Critical Commentary.</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature.</i>
JEH	<i>Journal of Ecclesiastical History.</i>
JHC	<i>Journal of Historical Criticism.</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</i>
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies.</i>
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review.</i>
JRA	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology.</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies.</i>
JSJ	<i>Journal for the Study of Judaism.</i>
JSNT	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament.</i>
JSNTSS	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series.</i>
JSOT	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament.</i>
JSOTSup	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement.</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies.</i>
JTS NS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies.</i> New Series.
LCL	Loeb Classical Library.
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly.</i>
LNTS	Library of New Testament Studies.
metek	migrant, resident non-citizen; from Fr., from Gk. <i>metoikos</i> .
NCB	New Century Bible.
NHC	Nag Hammadi Codex.
NHMS	Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies.
NIBCNT	New International Biblical Commentary on the New Testament.
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament.
NIGCT	New International Greek Testament
Nov.T.	<i>Novum Testamentum.</i>
NovTSup.	Novum Testamentum Supplement Series.
NTC	New Testament Commentaries.
NTS	<i>New Testament Studies.</i>
NTOA	Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus.
PCNT	Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament.
PTMS	Princeton Theological Monograph Series.
RAC	Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum.
RGG	Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
RPT	Religion in Philosophy and Theology.
SAPERE	Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam Religionemque pertinentia. [cap E, <i>sic</i>]
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series.
SBL SBS	Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study.
SBLSymS	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series.
SBT	Studies in Biblical Theology.
SBWA	The Social World of Biblical Antiquity.

SC	Sources Chr�tiennes.
SCM	Student Christian Movement [Press].
SGU	Studia graeca Upsaliensia.
SNTSMS	New Testament Studies Monograph Series.
SPCK	Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge [Press].
STDJ	Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah.
Stobaeus	<i>Ioannis Stobaei anthologium</i> . Curt Wachsmuth and Otto Hense, eds. 5 vols; Berlin 1884–1912.
<i>StudPhilAn</i>	<i>Studia Philonica Annual</i> .
TDNT	Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, eds. G.W. Bromiley, tr. 10 vols; Grand Rapids, 1964–1976.
THL	Theory and History of Literature.
TLG	Thesaurus linguae graecae.
TLL	Thesaurus linguae latinae.
TPI	Trinity Press International.
TSAJ	Texte und Studien zum antike Judentum.
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen.
TynBul	Tyndale Bulletin.
TZ	<i>Theologische Zeitschrift</i> .
<i>VigChr</i>	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
WAMNT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament.
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WJK	Westminster/John Knox [Press].
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament.
ZTK	<i>Zeitschrift f�r Theologie und Kirche</i> .
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift f�r die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunder der �lteren Kirche</i> .

INTRODUCTION

Many in the first century Mediterranean world, including Jews and then Jewish and Gentile Christians, expressed themselves in favour of unity, peace, harmony, order, in wider society, in their local communities and neighbourhoods, in individuals' own lives, in communication, and in thought (as many people do today). One might justifiably discern a "blessed rage for order".¹ There was also widespread agreement as to the foundations of social order in the patriarchal family and in the rule of law, and in individual harmony gained by rational self-control, extending into orderly communication and the orderly rational thought that (ideally) underlaid it.

Yet there is also evidence of resistance to established order in all spheres, with an awareness of the injustice—even untruth—that it may well involve. For that age can also be characterized as

... an epoch of intense struggle among numerous and heterogeneous religious and philosophical schools and movements, when disputes over "ultimate questions" of worldview had become an everyday mass phenomenon among all strata of the population and took place whenever and wherever people came together—in marketplaces, on the streets and highroads, in taverns, in bathhouses, on the decks of ships; when the figure of the philosopher or wise man (the cynic, the stoic, the epicurean) or of the prophet or wonder-worker became typical ...²

In his recent, richly evidenced *Invisible Romans*, Robert Knapp doubts, however, whether many distinctive ideas urged by such philosophers received much attention among ordinary people, let alone the great mass of those living hand-to-mouth, even though they and the élite did, he allows, nonetheless share many attitudes.³ I am then reassured that Knapp, too, in practice, relies widely for his sketches of urban life on writers such as Dio of Prusa, precisely those authors whose writings provide the main sources for the studies collected here. And Dio himself was quite sure that he could engage

¹ From a poem by Wallace Stevens, taken as his title by David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

² Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (THL 8; ET of 1963; ed. and tr. Caryl Emerson; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984): 119.

³ Robert Knapp, *Invisible Romans. Prostitutes, Outlaws, Slaves, Gladiators, Ordinary Men and Women ... The Romans that History Forgot* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 106.

with ordinary mixed crowds, and especially that variants of the Cynic philosophy he himself at times had espoused had a ready—even a too ready—popular audience.⁴

A particular gain in Knapp's survey is his ready inclusion of early Christian writings, most often those in the New Testament, as evidence for popular attitudes and beliefs. It is something of the extent to which the range and variety of early Christian and second Temple Jewish ideas and attitudes available to us resonate with those evidenced in elite writings, as well as in the popular proverbs and epitaphs usefully culled by Knapp, that this study seeks to display.

Happily, there is less likelihood these days of one being assured that “all Greeks” thought one way, and “all Jews” another; though one may still be assured in effect that all Pharisees agreed together, and all Cynics, all Platonists, all Stoics; all Christians (or all Pauline Christians and all Petrine Christians, respectively); all ‘gnostics’ ... What it is hoped will be gained in this volume is an appreciation of the extent of shared opinions and attitudes across many groups; but also something of the diversity even within the surviving writings of an individual author—something of the ‘polyphony’ that Mikhail Bakhtin has urged us to discern in any effective human reflective interaction, and to welcome when it is acknowledged and articulated (as it is among some of the authors drawn on below, especially Dio).⁵

The first and major topic in chapters 1 and 2 is ‘social order’, touched on by many scholars, but, it seems, surveyed by none (see the *Introduction* to chapter 1): that is, socio-political order as well as perceived tensions in society, as discussed among Greek and Roman authors, among Jews, and among Jewish and Gentile early Christians (the latter as evidenced in the New Testament writings, together with *1 Clement*, *Ignatius' Letters*, and *The Didache*). Reflections on the excision, orderly control, or acceptance of ‘unruly passions’ are surveyed in the same sources, constituting chapters 3 and 4. The issue of ‘orderly narrative’ and compositional freedom follows, as chapter 5, then chapter 6 discusses the ready ancient acceptance of verbal ambiguity (polyphony) held nonetheless capable of expressing orderly rationality. This (longer) first part ends with a sketch (ch. 7) of something of the tensions and contradictions that public speakers such as Dio and Paul could both expect to have to interact with.

⁴ Dio, *Discourses* 32.9; 35.4; 57.10–12; 11.6; 12.1; 42.4. This issue is discussed in more detail in ch. 7, “All Things to All People”, below.

⁵ Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (ET of 1979; ed. Caryl Emerson

The second part, under the heading “Law” is somewhat shorter. It begins with law seen as social engineering (ch. 8), followed by first century critiques of law (ch. 9), and an investigation of distinctive ancient judicial procedures (ch. 10), further illustrated by analysing the *ad hoc* judicial procedures deployed against Christians by Pliny the Younger in the early second century (ch. 11).

The third, and shortest part, “Disruptive Re-ordering”, offers a brief sketch of the Baptist’s new order, then dissident Jesus (in much greater detail), and disorderly Paul.

It could be that the disjunction between order and disorder running through this survey might suggest deliberate echoes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections (in *The Birth of Tragedy*) on Apollonian orderly rationality over against Dionysiac freedom and spontaneity, finding (he argued) a creative unity only in the early Greek tragedians. In fact what is argued for here, rather, is a realisation that any proposed new order disturbs those entrenched in the old, who will see any proposed change as threatening their sense of self, or their status and/or their possessions, with chaos and confusion and loss. Especially was this so in the first century Mediterranean world, where the old was ‘known’ to be best, and any move for reformation was considered στάσις, sedition. Neither John, Jesus, nor Paul, is presented here as proposing chaos; but all three would seem to have been perceived as disturbing.

This volume offers, as its title indicates, a survey of opinions. It ranges widely, and hopes the selection made is representative at least of the range of sources adduced; but it cannot claim to be exhaustive, even there. It is descriptive, and does not attempt an analysis in terms of any of the available sociological, social-psychological or anthropological models currently deployed. For any one of the sources included such analysis would demand a monograph on its own on the scale of such as Gerd Theissen’s *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, John H. Elliott’s, *A Home for the Homeless. A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter. Its Situation and Strategy*, Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation. An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians*, Philip F. Esler, *Conflict and Identity in Romans. The Social Setting of Paul’s Letter*, or Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus in Context. Power, People and Performance*.⁶

and Michael Holquist; tr. Vern W. McGee; Austin TX: University of Texas Press, 1986): 84–88, citing 181, 195; on ‘polyphony’ see 112–113, 149–152; and *Problems, passim*; and ch. 6, below.

⁶ Gerd Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress

The topics of order and law might, nonetheless, seem to invite and in turn confirm the validity of a ‘functionalist’ sociological model, emphasising socially integrative pressures, including the internalisation of order. I would, however, hope that the material assembled would instead prompt a more eclectic approach, one capable of making sense of conflict and dissent as well as of harmony and control in wider society and within smaller communities.⁷ Peter Oakes’ deployment of a “socio-economic” model, one which pays attention to topography, to people at various socio-economic levels living cheek by jowl in so typical a Roman town as Pompeii, might seem hospitable to the approach adopted here.⁸

The topics of ‘self’ and ‘self control’ also attract discussion in terms of diverse approaches to psychology, from variants of behaviourism around to Jung and Freud; but these, too, are here only lightly touched on.⁹

The hope is that this study will be of interest to and useful to students of the history of early Christianity, of late Second Temple Judaism, and of the wider Graeco-Roman world, and also to those concerned with the sources

Press, 1982); John H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless. A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter. Its Situation and Strategy* (London: SCM, 1981); Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983); Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation. An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Tübingen and Louisville KT: Mohr Siebeck and Westminster/John Knox, 1991); Philip F. Esler, *Conflict and Identity in Romans. The Social Setting of Paul's Letter* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2003); Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus in Context. Power, People and Performance* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 2008).

⁷ Among discussions, Richard A. Horsely, *Sociology and the Jesus Movement* (New York: Crossroad, 1989); Bengt Holmberg, *Sociology and the New Testament* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 1990); David G. Horrell, “Models and Methods in Social-Scientific Interpretation: A Response to Philip Esler”, *JSNT* 78 (2000): 83–105, with Philip F. Esler, “Models in New Testament Interpretation: A Reply to David Horrell”, *JSNT* 78 (2000): 107–113; and David G. Horrell, “Whither Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation? Reflections on Disputed Methodologies and the Future”, in Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell (eds), *After The First Urban Christians. The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five years Later* (London: T & T Clark, 2009): 6–20. For further reflections on these issues, F.G. Downing, “In Quest of First-Century Galilee”, *CBQ* 66 (2004): 78–97; revised in *idem*, *God with Everything. The Divine in the Discourse of the First Christian Century* (SBWA 2.2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008): 150–173, and Peter Oakes, *Reading Romans in Pompeii. Paul's Letter at Ground Level* (Minneapolis MN and London: Fortress and SPCK, 2009), 56–68. Also relevant is the recent survey article by Samuel Byrskog, “A Century with the *Sitz im Leben*. From Form-Critical Setting to Gospel Community and Beyond”, *ZNW* 98.1 (2007): 1–27.

⁸ Peter Oakes, *Reading Romans*, 56–68, again.

⁹ See Gerd Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology* (ET of 1983; Edinburgh, TV & T Clark, 1987); and a very helpful survey article, Joanna Collicutt, “Psychology and the Bible”, *JTS* NS 63.1 (2012), 1–48. Itzhak Benyamini, *Narcissistic Universalism. A Psychoanalytical Reading of Paul's Epistles* (LNTS 453; London: T & T Clark, 2012) illustrates the ease with which a model (here, Lacanian) can be imposed on the data.

of and resources for Christian ethical, political and theological reflections. Especially is this so where 'communities of faith' are called on to affirm some politicians' visions of 'the big society', and eschew voicing let alone fomenting disruptive criticism; while courts of law are discouraged from pursuing social justice for minorities when it seems to conflict with the order preferred by the comfortable.

PART ONE

ORDER

CHAPTER ONE

“LET EVERYTHING BE DONE DECENTLY AND IN ORDER (ΕΥΣΧΗΜΟΝΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΞΙΝ)” (1 COR 14.40). UNITY, ORDER AND PROBLEMS OF DIVERSITY

A. Greeks, Romans, Jews

INTRODUCTION

It is clear that achieving and maintaining order, unity, concord, threatened by difference, diversity, discord, were matters of concern in many sectors of Graeco-Roman society at large in late antiquity, as in contemporary Judaism, but also among early Christians, Jewish or Gentile. These latter were themselves each a significantly distinctive minority, and thus at least potentially disruptive in others' eyes, if not in their own. Furthermore, Christians, like Jews (and their 'pagan' neighbours, of course), despite or even because of their concern for order, unity, harmony, could often disagree vigorously about the extent and the terms for achieving and sustaining the harmony, unity, order sought, even among themselves.

Much of our evidence for such concern comes from élite authors in Greek and Latin, and it might seem that this represents a vested interest of the possessors; yet it will be made clear in what follows that such aims and ideals (as well as critical reflections on them) could be taken as obvious among such 'non-élite' groups as the early Christians.¹ Even if among the poor and the

¹ For a well-known presentation of evidence in support, Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*. An unfortunate weakness in Jerry Toner's stimulating and wide ranging *Popular Culture in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), is his scant attention to the ('non-élite') earliest Christian writings, which allows him a sharp distinction itself but grudgingly qualified (3, 186, 193) between the tiny élite and the rest in their demand for harmony, justice and good government. The earliest surviving Christian evidence is surveyed here in ch. 2, and the case for a cultural diffusion is argued in detail in ch. 7, which picks up and expands on F. Gerald Downing, "'À bas les aristos.' The Relevance of Higher Literature for the Understanding of the Earliest Christian Writings," *Nov.T.* 30.3 (1988): 212–230; repr. in *idem, Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century* (JSNTS 200; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000): 21–40. Much better than most in this respect are Peter Oakes, *Reading*

very poor it was a matter of largely inarticulate resigned acceptance, Robert Knapp, in his *Invisible Romans*, is able to show from epitaphs, explanations of dream symbolism, and popular proverbs, the extent to which playing their orderly part in society, as hard, honest workers, evinces an ingrained orderly conservatism.²

The discussion that follows sketches ideals of unity and order with examples of their application in these interconnected and frequently overlapping cultural contexts, and considers the methods there proposed and adopted for achieving harmony in practice, either by enforcing uniformity even at the cost of obvious injustice, or perhaps by co-ordinating diversity so as to preclude just such differences as might appear (at least in potential) destructively divisive. Some differences could be accommodated, albeit selectively, as perhaps unavoidable or even as enriching. Some accepted order could be seen as warranting or even demanding disturbance, a godly disorder.

The particular concern here is the question, In what ways did early Christians in general envisage coping with a perceived call to be coherently distinctive, along with pressures to conform to wider social norms? The joint topic is touched on usefully but only in passing by many scholars of the early Christian movement, but I have not so far been able to find it the focus of a article, let alone of a longer study.³ For sure, the word 'order' appears in three works that are significant for this present study: Ramsay MacMullen's 1967 *Enemies of the Roman Order*; James S. Jeffers', *Conflict at Rome. Social Order*

Romans, Robert Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, as noted in the "Introduction", and Christopher J. Fuhrmann, *Policing the Roman Empire. Soldiers, Administration and Public Order* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); see ch. 11, below.

² Robert Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, e.g., 110–111. Knapp uses extensively Artemidorus of Daldus, second century CE, *The Interpretation of Dreams*; and finds concurrence in his over all use and interpretation of evidence, in Teresa Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), a study which came too late to my attention to be drawn on here.

³ Particularly helpful have been Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, just noted, and Eberhard Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris. Religionsgeschichtliche, traditionsgechichtliche und sozialgeschichtliche Studium zum Epheserbrief* (NOTA 24; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), concentrating on peace and unity, with 'Friede und Ordnung' (conventionally rendered as 'law and order'), touched on, 281; together with Odd Magne Bakke, "Concord and Peace". *A Rhetorical Analysis of the First Letter of Clement with an Emphasis on the Language of Unity and Sedition* (WUNT II 143; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), who, led of course by 1 Clem, examines a wide semantic field, but with little (though that useful) on order and law; Mary Ann Beavis, *Jesus and Utopia. Looking for the Kingdom of God in the Roman World* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006), covers some of the same ground, but with less attention to the non-Jewish sources.

and *Hierarchy in Early Christianity*; and the 2004 collection edited by Richard Horsley, *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*; but none of these three discusses the theoretical or ideological basis for the widespread acceptance of unity, order, harmony as ideals.⁴

1. IN THE WIDER GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD

1.1. *Classical Sources*

For the wider and still older east Mediterranean world the most helpful survey of the issues to come my way is Arlene W. Saxonhouse's 1992 *Fear of Diversity. The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought*, which begins with pre-Socratic philosophers' attempts to make coherent sense of the diversity portrayed by Hesiod and Homer, "to overcome that multiplicity and subdue the world to human understanding by simplifying and organising the world we experience."⁵ The playwrights then widen the enquiry to include an exploration of gender issues, "women and the tragic denial of difference," urging that "the search for unity and purity can extend so far that it destroys what it seeks to protect."⁶ It is a question of deciding, for example, whose order to follow, that imposed by Creon, or the divine order discerned

⁴ Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order. Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press and Oxford University Press, 1967); James S. Jeffers, *Conflict at Rome. Social Order and Hierarchy in Early Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991/2007); Richard Horsley (ed.), *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, noted just above. "Order" also appears in the subtitle of Harold James, *The Roman Predicament. How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire* (Princeton NJ & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), but only with the Roman Empire, and that as seen by Edward Gibbon and Adam Smith, here used to illustrate current international relationships, without further recourse to ancient sources. Although C.J. Furhmann, *Policing*, has "Public Order" in the subtitle, contemporary reflections on order as such are not pursued.

⁵ Arlene W. Saxonhouse's, *Fear of Diversity. The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992): 24. Be it said, Dean Hamer in his "Homer and Political Thought", in Stephen Salkever (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14–41, argues for reading the classic texts as already themselves reflections on constructive cohesion and destructive fragmentation. On the pre-Socratics, see also Eric Brown, "The Emergence of Natural Law and the Cosmopolis," in S. Salkever (ed.) *op.cit.*: 331–363, citing 338–347. Disappointing here is the scant attention to 'order', 'concord', 'unanimity', in Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield et al. (eds), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The theme is touched on by Kurt A. Raufflaub, ch. 2, "Poets, lawgivers, and the beginnings of political reflection," 23–59, there briefly discussing 'isonomia' versus 'stasis' (46), and by M. Schofield, ch. 10, "Approaching the Republic," 190–232, here, 218–219, 232.

⁶ A.W. Saxonhouse, *Fear of Diversity*, ch. 3, here: 88.

by Antigone.⁷ And then even Plato, while urging his hearers on to a unity that is beyond what we sense, has to acknowledge the reality of the diversity which constitutes what we are.⁸

Saxonhouse ends her former study with Aristotle, for whom diversity cannot be thought away, but demands hierarchical organisation, τάξις, order, as its natural end, lest things fall destructively apart.⁹ And not just any order will do, it must be proportionate, like the relationship of parts in a human body.¹⁰ “The city-state (πολιτεία) is essentially a form of community (κοινωνία), and it must at any rate have a common locality: a single city occupies a single site, and its citizens are co-owners (κοινωνοί) of a single city,” insisted Aristotle in his *Politics*, before going on to attempt to analyse the extent and kind of appropriate unity: “It is certain that somehow both the household and the city-state should be a unit, but not each to the same prescription.”¹¹ What is needed for a city-state is a constitution (monarchic, aristocratic or democratic) that discourages perceived injustice, so that all citizens (all adult free males, that is) sense themselves to have a worthwhile stake in the enterprise, leaving minimal encouragement for the kinds of disruptive factionalism that are exemplified in Book 3. Important unifying factors are effective defence and devout state religion, together with assured food, crafts, exchange, legislature and judiciary.¹² Even dress, as it appears in sculpture and painting, and in literary sources, is socially and often regionally prescribed (in the case of the toga, formally), allowing for little individual variation.¹³

⁷ A.W. Saxonhouse, “Foundings vs. Constitutions: Ancient Tragedy and the Origins of Political Community” (2009), in S. Salkever (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought*, 47–51, referring to Sophocles’ Antigone; compare also Gerald Marr, on the Melian’s envisaging the political cosmos as a stable order, “Thucydides and Political Thought” (2009), in S. Salkever (ed.), *op.cit.*, 96–125, here 109.

⁸ On Plato and the acceptance of diversity, A.W. Saxonhouse, *Fear of Diversity*, 191–192; and David Roochnik, “The Political Drama of Plato’s *Republic*” (2009), in S. Salkever (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Political Thought*: 156–177.

⁹ A.W. Saxonhouse, *Fear of Diversity*, 217, 229; on Aristotle, see also Stephen Salkever, “Reading Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* as a Single Course of lectures: Rhetoric, Politics, and Philosophy” (2009), in *idem* (ed.), *Greek Political Thought*, 209–242; compare Ryan K. Balot, “The Virtue Politics of Democratic Athens”, *op.cit.*, 271–300, discussing recorded speeches’ references to ‘orderliness’ (*kosmos*): 288–294.

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Politics*, 5.2.7 (1302b,38–1303a,4).

¹¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.1.2 (1260b, 40–43); 2.2.9 (1263b, 31–33), LCL, adapted.

¹² Aristotle, *Politics*, 5.9.11–16 (1314b); 7.74–75 (1328b).

¹³ For times later than Aristotle’s, Dio, *Discourse* 72.3–10; Larissa Bonafante, “Introduction”, in Judith L. Sebesta and L. Bonafante (eds), *The World of Roman Costume*, (Wisconsin WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994): 3–10; J.L. Sebesta, “*Tunica Ralla, Tunica Spissa*. The Colors and Textiles of Roman Costume”, *op. cit.* 65–76, here 69–71; Douglas R. Edwards,

So we need to ask: Is harmonious order held to demand grading, ‘hierarchy’, subordination, and, if so, of what kind? And, how geographically extensive and ethnically inclusive an ordering is thought desirable or feasible?¹⁴ And, in a little more detail, how is it thought to be achieved, encouraged, enforced, sustained?

1.2. *More Recent Authors*

1.2.1. *Order, Reconciliation and Incorporation*

Later Greek and Latin authors touch on much this same range of topics, though not always with Aristotle’s careful distinctions and critical appraisal; and they are more likely to urge their own preferences. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, late first century BCE, but popular in our period, uses the speeches in his *Roman Antiquities* to debate constitutional issues, including for instance, Menenius Agrippa’s use of the metaphor of the body whose parts need to work together for the common good. Dionysius goes on from there to debate the value of checks and balances, in the face of the threat of military dictatorship (from Coriolanus).¹⁵ The theme is so pervasive that Roman Quintilian, a century later, can readily introduce the topic of bodily, human and cosmic order into a discussion of order in rhetoric.¹⁶

His contemporary, Plutarch, (with Rome in mind) imagined that an idealized Alexander did not follow Aristotle’s advice

to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader and other peoples as if he were their master; to have regard for the Greeks as for friends and kindred but to conduct himself toward other peoples as though they were plants or animals, encumbering his leadership with battles and banishments and seditions ... Instead he brought together into one all people everywhere, uniting and mixing in one great loving-cup, as it were, people’s lives, customs, marriages, life-styles.¹⁷

“The Social, Religious, and Political Aspects of Costume in Josephus”, op. cit. 153–159; Mary T. Boatwright, *Peoples of the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 68–69; A.C. Bouquet, *Everyday Life in New Testament Times* (London: Batsford, 1953): 56–69.

¹⁴ For the period up to and including Cicero, cf. H.C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).

¹⁵ Dionysius, *R. A.*, 6.86.1–5 (Menenius Agrippa); cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, 3.5.22.

¹⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *R.A.*, 6.85.1–5; 7.55–56.4. (Dionysius remains influential throughout our period, witness both Josephus and Plutarch.); Quintilian, *Institutes*, 7. Pref. 2–3; cf. O.M. Bakke, “*Concord and Peace*”: 179–184.

¹⁷ Plutarch, *De Alexandri magni fortuna* 6, *Moralia* 329C. LCL adapted; cf. E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, 301–314, linking this image of Alexander with ‘Cynic-Stoic’ cosmopolitanism; and 386–392, with specific reference to Alexander in Flavian ideology. On Rome as inadvertently enabling “a united Hellenic consciousness”, Giovanni Salmeri, “Dio, Rome and the Civic Life

Alexander had remained an inescapable model, first for his Hellenistic successors, and then for Roman emperors, also expected—or, at least hoped—to be divinely authorized and empowered as the enabling focus of unity and concord, as celebrated, for instance, in subsequent neo-Pythagorean ‘royal theology’, where the ideal king embodies just law, securing social harmony.¹⁸ Now it was Roman rule in our period that offered “peace and security”, if at a price.¹⁹ More realistically than in his sketch of Alexander, Plutarch muses on the limited opportunities for positive social action open to fellow Greeks, even eminent aristocrats such as himself:

Considering the greatest blessings which civic societies can enjoy—peace, liberty, plenty, a flourishing populace, and concord—so far as peace is concerned, our peoples have no need of statecraft, for all war, both Greek and foreign, has been banished from among us and have disappeared; and of liberty, the people have as much as our rulers grant them (and perhaps more would not be better for them); but bounteous productivity of the soil, kindly tempering of the seasons, wives bearing “children like their fathers” ... these are what a wise man will ask the Gods for ... There remains for the local politician ... only this, and it is the equal of all the other blessings: always to instil concord and friendship in those who dwell with him, and to remove strifes, discords and all enmities.²⁰

Although Dio of Prusa can agree, “any peace, as it is said, is better than war, and any friendship is far better than enmity”, and can set this law-observant concord in a cosmic context, he is fully aware of the costs that may have to be born, not only in refraining from antagonizing greedy Roman governors, but also in accepting unfair treatment from neighbouring communities.²¹

Nonetheless, in Stoic mood, Dio could assert “Emperors derive their power and stewardship from Zeus”, though that power must be exercised in accord with the laws and ordinances of Zeus (sc., of nature). Epictetus,

of Asia Minor”, in Simon Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom. Politics, Letters, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 53–92, citing 55. Swain himself read a more critical view of the Roman *imperium* in Dio: Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 187–241.

¹⁸ See, in particular, James R. Harrison, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities at Thessalonica and Rome. A Study in the Conflict of Ideology* (WUNT 273; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 279–287; and Matthew E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song in Antiquity* (WUNT 2.302; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), ch. 4, “Didactic Aspects of the Praises of Human Ruler,” 100–146.

¹⁹ J.R. Harrison, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities*, 61–63.

²⁰ Plutarch, *Praecepta ger. reipub.* 32, *Moralia* 824CD, LCL adapted; cf. Dio, *Discourse* 32.37, praising εὐταξία and ὁμόνοια; 36.31, on τὴν τάξιν καὶ εὐκοσμίαν τῆς διοικήσεως; and 44.10; and O.M. Bakke, “Peace and Concord”: 184–188.

²¹ Dio, *Discourse* 40.26, 35–41; with 36.31–32; 38.36; 34.10, 12, 41; compare also Plutarch, *Praecepta ger. reipub.* 19, *Moralia* 814F–815A, and 20, *Moralia* 816AB.

though critical of individual emperors can insist, in Socratic vein, “I must always obey the laws of the state in every particular”, and much the same is found in Cicero earlier, and in Musonius, and Hierocles.²²

By way of contrast, Dionysius had earlier insisted that a tyrannous imposition of order—order without law and justice—could be counterproductive, its cost too high in inciting desperate unrest.²³ Cynic tradition tends to be even more pessimistic while people at large live to compete in accumulating wealth and power, as denounced for instance by ps.Heraclitus (“those within are hostile, despite being citizens, those without are hostile, despite being guest-strangers. All are enemies, none are friends”); by ps.Anacharsis, and by Crates. “Human beings are worse than cattle at getting on together,” opines Dio in Cynic mood (and especially are they so in towns).²⁴ (Cynic and Stoic “cosmopolitanism”, includes only the complete Cynic or the ‘impossible’ wise man, respectively.)²⁵

There does, however, seem to appear a quite significant additional theme, that of a willingness among some to forgive disruptive dissidents, rebels, foes of all kinds, at least to forgive the penitent and repentant. Dionysius has Veturia confront her son (Coriolanus) with this insistence:

I observe that a refuge for all people, and the means for securing forgiveness of their offences one against another have been devised in the form of suppliant boughs and prayers, by which all anger is softened, and, instead of hating one's enemies, one pities them. I observe also that those who act arrogantly and treat with insolence the prayers of suppliants all incur the indignation of the Gods ...²⁶

²² Dio, *Discourse* 1.45, cf. 3.8, and on civic life, 7.22–32, 103–108, etc.; Epictetus *Diss.* 3.24.108; 1.12.7; 4.7.33; also Cicero, *De nat. deo.* 1.3–4. 118; Musonius 15; Hierocles in Stobaeus, *Anth.* 3.39.36, in Ilaria Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts* (Atlanta GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009): 70–71.

²³ Dionysius, *R.A.* 7.42.2; cf. Dio, *Discourse* 40.23.

²⁴ In the *Cynic Epistles*, ps.Heraclitus 7.9; ps.Anacharsis 2 (cf. Plutarch, *Solon* 5.3); Crates, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.85–86; and Dio, *Discourse* 40.41. On Cynics and politics, John H. Moles, “The Cynics” (2000), in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 415–434.

²⁵ On both see John Sellars, “Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno's Republic”, *HPT* 28 (2007), 1–29.

²⁶ Dionysius, *R.A.* 8.50.3, adapted. The complex theme of forgiveness for the repentant penitent recurs frequently: e.g., 2.35.3; 4.27.5; 7.45.4; 11.12.1, 3. It does not seem to occur at all to Aristotle, either in the *Politics*, or in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, where, discussing choosing to suffer injustice (5.9.1–8 [1136a, 10–1136b 14]), it seems specifically excluded; however, Jill Franks and S. Sara Monoson, “Lived Excellence in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*”, in S. Salkever (ed.), *Greek Political Thought*, 243–270, do note *Constitution of Athens* 40.3–4, Aristotle's admiration for the Athenians who “wiped out all considerations of guilt” on the part of the Thirty: 265.

So, too, Dio to the assembly at Tarsus, on relations with Mallus, “If they have behaved at all stupidly, as indeed they have, lay aside your anger, and graciously forgive them the revenge that you thought your due, and come to terms.”²⁷

Linked with this is Dionysius’ admiration for the Roman practice (at least in the past, and in Italy) of admitting outsiders:

There was yet a third policy of Romulus which the Greeks ought to have practised above all others, it being, in my opinion, the best of all political measures, as it laid the most solid foundation for the liberty of the Romans, and was no slight factor in raising them to their position of supremacy. It was this: not to slay all the men of military age, nor to enslave the rest of the population of the cities captured in war or allow their land to go back to pasturage for sheep, but rather to send settlers thither to possess some part of the country by lot and to make the conquered cities Roman colonies, and even to grant Roman citizenship to some of them.²⁸

It is perhaps worth comparing Dio’s plea on behalf of the excluded ‘*metek*’ linen workers of Tarsus, long deprived of civic rights. “There is nothing more harmful to a city than such conditions, nothing more conducive to strife and disagreement. Take, for example, the human body. If its increase over the years is integrated with the rest, it produces well-being and a desirable stature; but otherwise it is diseased and deathly.”²⁹

Open welcome to incomers, however, was by no means universally approved, especially among the old Roman aristocracy, while dislike and disparagement of ‘the other’ (northern barbarians, Greeks, Egyptians, Jews) could, of course, be a useful tool in cementing purely local unity.³⁰

²⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 34.43. On these themes, cf. Te-Ti Lau, *The Politics of Peace. Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books* (NovTSup 133; Leiden and Boston: Brill 2010), though in Dio he ignores interior discipline and critiques of Rome.

²⁸ Dionysius *R.A.*, 2.16.1 (though cf. 1.89.1–3); and cf. Plutarch, *Romulus* 9.1–3, and *Theseus* 25.1; *Theseus and Romulus* 4.1, 6.3. On this see David L. Balch, “The Cultural Origin of ‘Receiving All Nations’, in Luke-Acts: Alexander the Great of Roman Social Policy”, in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds), *Early Christianity, and Classical Culture. Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (NovTSup CX; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 483–500; but I think Balch confuses forced assimilation (Alexander) with open invitation (Dionysius and Plutarch).

²⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 34.21–22, LCL, adapted; cf. also the concern for the urban poor, *Discourse* 7, *Euboicus*, 103–152; and, in this volume, ch. 7, below, pp. 179–182 and 187–188. He is perhaps, however, distinctive among those with Stoic leanings in taking such ‘externals’ as poverty and civic rights as more than ‘preferred indifferents’ 7.109–110; see, eg, Gustav A. Lehmann, “Einführung” (2012), in idem et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschenwürde, Die Euböische Rede des Dion von Prusa* (SAPERE XIX; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 3–23, citing 19–20; and other contributors in the same volume.

³⁰ Mary T. Boatwright, *Peoples of the Roman World*, e.g., 50–60, 91–94, 120–122, 153. How-

1.2.2. *Households as Basis*

For the rest, in discussing Romulus, Dionysius begins by (in effect) summarising Aristotle:

I will first observe that all who have established constitutions, barbarian as well as Greek, seem to me to have recognised correctly the general principle that every city-state (πόλις), since it consists of many families, is most likely to sail tranquilly when the lives of its citizens are untroubled ... and that every prudent statesman, be he law-giver or monarch, ought to introduce such laws as will make the citizens just and temperate.³¹

How this ethos is spelled out is worth quoting at length:

The Romans ... believed that neither should a master be cruel in the punishment meted out to his slaves, nor a father unduly harsh or lenient in the training of his children, nor a husband unjust in his partnership with his lawfully-wedded wife, nor children disobedient towards their aged parents, nor should brothers strive for more than equal shares; and they thought there should be no banquets and revels lasting all night long, no wantonness and corrupting of young friends, no neglect of ancestral sacrifices and funeral rites, nor anything else contrary to propriety and the interests of the city-state.³²

The appropriate structural foundation for the tranquillity sought was found, according to Dionysius, in property-based patriarchal monogamy, a position echoed by, Cicero:

For since the the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of the city (*urbis*), the nursery, as it were, of the state (*rei publicae*).³³

ever, her quotation, p. 6, from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, given as *R.A.* 2.15.4, and contradicting mine given just above, matches nothing around there in my LCL edition; perhaps Fufetius, ruler of Alba, *R.A.* 3.10.6.

³¹ Dionysius *R.A.*, 2.24.2, LCL, adapted; cf. David L. Balch, *Let Wives be Submissive. The Domestic Code in IPeter* (SBLMS 26; Chico CA: Scholars Press, 1981); E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, 431–441; Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, *Families in the New Testament World. Households and House Churches. The Family, Religion and Culture* (Louisville KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1996); David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (eds.), *Early Christian Families in Context. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue. Religion, Marriage, and Family* (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 2003); and for the political significance of the theme, Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Beyond the Identification of the Topos of Household Management: Reading the Household Codes in Light of Recent Methodologies and Theoretical Perspectives in the Study of the New Testament”, *NTS* 57.1 (2011): 65–90.

³² Dionysius, *R. A.*, 20.13.3, LCL, adapted.

³³ Dionysius, *R. A.*, 2.24–27, on family law; Cicero, *De officiis*, 1.17.54; LCL, adapted; on property rights, *De officiis* 2.21.73–74, 78–79.

On this one might also compare Epictetus, a good century later, dismissing Epicurean quietism: “Your doctrines are bad, subversive of the state, destructive of the family ... [rather accept] the duties of citizenship, marriage, begetting children, reverence for God, care of parents.”³⁴ In this he would seem to have the widespread if tacit agreement of such of the non-élite as have left epitaphs, proclaiming a lasting marriage, children, inheritance.³⁵

At the level of the family, at least among the aristocrats, while Musonius and, later, Hierocles, can insist that husband and wife should be of one mind, having everything in common (that is, ‘friends’, see below), Trajan’s wife may by Dio be termed ‘fellow-worker’ (συνεργός), and Plutarch insists that a wife is not a piece of property but someone with feelings to share, nonetheless the latter (and so, too, Pliny the Younger) make it quite clear that she adapts to him, not each to the other. For Plutarch this is explicitly so in matters of religious practice. Among the more secure poor, the wife’s compliant partnership in the household economy is regularly acknowledged in tomb inscriptions.³⁶

And yet Dio is willing to admit that this ‘natural’ orderly hierarchy is not to women’s advantage: even accepting that men face more dangers outside the home, still “no one on that account would call women better off than men” and that even though, as he allows elsewhere, “there is no rational need for women to be worse treated.”³⁷

Sexual union is for procreation, as already emphasised; and children are there to obey—of course, agrees Musonius, while adding a Stoic caveat. Again, the importance of procreation is emphasised in popular sources.³⁸

The unifying factor of having shared property, at least within the family, and noted above from Musonius, is also deployed as a trope by Dio, in attempting to reconcile Nicomedia and Nicea. In a slightly different vein,

³⁴ Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.7.20, 26, LCL, adapted; cf. Musonius, *Discourse* 15; Hierocles in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.84.23, in Ilaria Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic*, 90–91; cf. O.M. Bakke, “Peace and Concord”: 119–126.

³⁵ R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 20–28, 69–80.

³⁶ Musonius, *Discourses* 13A and 14; Hierocles, 92–93, 94–95 (Stobaeus, *Anthology*, 4.85.21); Dio, *Discourse* 3.122; Plutarch, *Coniugalium praecepta* 33 (142E); 14 (139F), 22 (142AB); 19 (140D); Pliny, *Letters*, 4.19; among the poor, R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 58, 80–90.

³⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 3.70–71 with 74.19; cf. Richard Hawley, “Marriage, Gender, and the Family”, in S. Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom*: 125–139.

³⁸ Musonius, *Discourse* 16. Parents intend ‘the best’ for their children, though the child might know better what really is best. On the ordinary poor, R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 21–22, 41–42, 70–71.

Seneca argues that genuine peace lies in valuing most highly that which is shared in common, not that which is seen as individually owned.³⁹

A linked theme, as contrast and/or complement, then, is friendship, similarly a matter of close relationships among specific individuals, but here elective (however inaugurated).⁴⁰ Although civic community and its shared values provide the most fruitful context for the formation of friendships, it is impossible to be a friend with everyone in the fullest sense accepted, even there. True friends are of one mind in everything, able to be frank with one another, and have all in common, and such communism and unanimity of opinion and purpose is agreed to be impracticable and unobtainable with each and every fellow (male) citizen.⁴¹ Even families have disputes over property.⁴² (Reference to friendship among women appears but rarely in surviving texts, but does appear among the ordinary poor.)⁴³ Only among small groups, such Epicurean or Pythagorean or Cynic communities, might such ideals be thought plausible or attempted.⁴⁴ Indeed, close friendships and associational ones in particular may well themselves conflict with civic obligations and concord.⁴⁵

At just one level are friendships in our period thought of positive value for the community at large, and that is in an emperor or a governor engaging in open and frank discussion with a circle of his aristocratic cultural equals; or, perhaps, in family alliances among the aristocrats in potentially or actually rival cities in the Empire.⁴⁶

³⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 38.44–45; Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 73.6–8.

⁴⁰ On the following see especially David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (NovTSup LXXXII; Leiden and New York: Brill, 1996). Key sources are Aristotle, *Nicomachen Ethics* 8–9 and *Eudemian Ethics* 7–8; Plutarch, *De am. Mult.*, *Moralia* 93A–97B; Cicero, *De amicitia*; Dio, *Discourse* 44, *Philophronetikos*. For the contrast, friend/family, e.g. Cicero, *De officiis* 1.56; Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 99.2–3; Dio *Discourse* 3.113.

⁴¹ See David Konstan, “Are Fellow Citizens Friends? Aristotle versus Cicero on *Philia*, *Amicitia*, and Social Solidarity”, in Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (eds.), *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity* (Mnemosune Sup 323; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 233–248, here esp. 240–242. Unfortunately, Julien M. Ogereau, “The Jerusalem Collection as Κοινωνία: Paul’s Global Politics of Socio-Economic Equality and Solidarity” *NTS* 58.3 (2012), 360–378, here 376, fails to address these critical issues (and ignores Aristotle on ‘proportionate’ equality, *Nic. Eth.* 8.6.6, 7.2, 13.1).

⁴² See D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 147, citing a fragment from Quintilian.

⁴³ See D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 47–49, 90–91, 146; among poor families, R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 71, but without reference to sources.

⁴⁴ See D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 108–115.

⁴⁵ See D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 131–137.

⁴⁶ See D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 105–108, citing Dio, *Discourse on Kingship* 3, Plutarch,

1.2.3. *Ancestral Piety as Cement*

However, there is, of course, from Cicero, again, more to be said: “Our collectivity (*congregata*) was not a state (*civitas*) at a time when the laws had no force, when the courts of justice were laid low, when ancestral custom had been overthrown, when the officers of the government had been exiled ...”⁴⁷ ‘Ancestral custom’, of course, for all our authors (even for Epicureans), involves punctilious religious observance:

Piety, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; but when true piety is gone, respect and religious practice must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; and, in all probability the disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among humans—and of justice itself, the queen of all the virtues.⁴⁸

So Josephus has Nicholas of Damascus argue before Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, friend and representative of Augustus, “... the well-being that the whole human race now enjoys, thanks to you, we measure by the fact that it is possible for people in every country to live and prosper while respecting their own traditions.”⁴⁹ It is the outward form that matters, of course, the public observance; private reservations can be ignored.⁵⁰

It is then worth quoting Robert Knapp:

Religion also provided weapons a woman could use to control her environment. Her exclusion from the male social world and most specifically from leadership in state and community-wide religious rites was partly compensated by social interaction during religious activities. Festivals were occasions for extended families to get together, and so for women to renew ties and mutual support. They were often direct participants in these festivals, not merely bystanders.⁵¹

Precepts of Statecraft, *Moralia* 798A–825F; but cf. also Dio *Discourse* 41, *To the Apameans on Concord*, e.g., 7, 10.

⁴⁷ Cicero, *Paradoxa stoicorum*, 4.27, LCL, adapted; cf. Hierocles, Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.39.36.

⁴⁸ Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.2.3–4, LCL, adapted; cf. Dionysius, *R.A.* 2.18.2, and Epictetus, just above. On Epicurean outward conformity in cultic practice, see Cicero, *De natura deorum*, again, 1.45, 123; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 10.118.

⁴⁹ Josephus, *Ant.* 16.36, LCL, adapted; cf. Dio, *Discourse* 43.11; Tacitus, *History* 5.4.1, 5.5.1, and Lucian, *Peregrinus* 1.13; and, further, John M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora from Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 286–287.

⁵⁰ Compare Plutarch, *De stoicorum* 6, *Moralia* 1034 BC; Cicero, *De nat. deo.* 1.45, 123, again.

⁵¹ R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 93.

However, in the home, too, the husband would expect his own religious commitment to be supported, and certainly not challenged; on which élite Plutarch and non-élite 1 Peter are often cited together.⁵²

Maintaining ancient forms of government—offices, assemblies, procedures—were, of course, also an important way of affirming orderliness, and that so, even if it was without power, as with the Roman Senate and with city councils throughout the empire; so, too, was the reproduction of such patterns by voluntary associations.⁵³

Access to authority figures for help with disputes over administrative or judicial issues also reinforced social order. Petitions would be phrased in terms of the official ethos, on which petitioners inevitably relied to support their claims (concerning property, theft, contract, loans) against one another, or against other officials. Although action could be sought simply maliciously (see ch. 11), calling on someone in authority could help resolve disputes, even without their reaching the courts and explicit litigation, and in doing so helped to affirm and maintain order.⁵⁴

Further, simply sharing a common language (if sometimes a second one), and, even more, a common usage of it, with a recognised ‘canon’ of literature, a shared ‘imaginary’, vocabulary of stories, characters, verbal images, and plastic iconography, statues of Gods, heroes, emperors, and other benefactors, the same ‘social dialect’, could all articulate and reinforce a sense of common belonging.⁵⁵

1.2.4. *Other Ways and Means*

Common observance of ancestral law in general, customary or inscribed, together with other positive (enacted) legislation, was widely believed or

⁵² Plutarch, *Coniug. Prae.*19, *Moralia* 140D again; 1 Pet. 3.1–6.

⁵³ Cf. Yonder Moynihan Gillihan, *Civic Ideology, Organisation, and Law in the Rule Scrolls. A Comprehensive Study of the Covenanters’ Sect and Contemporary Voluntary Associations in Political Context* (STDJ 97; Leiden and New York: Brill, 2012), e.g., 408.

⁵⁴ See Benjamin Kelly, *Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Kelly refuses to extrapolate empire-wide, but specifically notes close analogies in Pliny’s correspondence, 330; on which, see further ch. 11, below. Kelly adduces as significant Mt 5.25–26, Lk 12.57–59, though he overlooks the still more obvious 1 Cor 6.1–11.

⁵⁵ On “social dialect”, cf. Wayne Meeks, *The First Urban Christians*, 93–96; and John M.G. Barclay, “Πνευματικός in the Social Dialect of Pauline Christianity” (2004, repr 2011), in *idem, Pauline Churches*, 205–216. Awareness of this factor can be found in Dio, e.g., *Discourse* 36, *Borysthenicos*, 9; Zeno, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.59 with 7.11–12.

expected to be itself formative of habits of concord and harmony, as is argued below in ch. 8.⁵⁶ Aristotle had insisted,

Excellencies we gain by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the other arts and crafts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them well we learn by doing: e.g., people become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; and so, too, we become just by doing just deeds, temperate by doing temperate deeds, brave by doing brave deeds. And this is confirmed by what happens in city-states: for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them; and this is the wish of every legislator. And those who do not effect it miss their mark; and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.⁵⁷

Aristotle himself at least would have legislators encourage people to ponder and internalize the laws, so their compliance became not simply automatic, but deliberate and voluntary.⁵⁸

Social concord could be evinced and reinforced—but also threatened—by family meals and meals shared with a small number of close friends in a symposium, with a larger number of mixed friends and clients, in cult association cum burial club, or among many more at a sponsored civic feast. Dio is readily able to use the latter as an image for human social life as a whole, with its variations in rank and wealth and possibilities of disorder; but can also deploy the image of a private symposium in the same way, as can others such as Epictetus.⁵⁹ Issues of social precedence in seating and in the food and wine served could embody the host's take on society, as could the guests' reactions.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ F.G. Downing, "Legislation as Social Engineering in the New Testament World," in Michael Tait and Peter Oakes (eds), *The Torah in the New Testament. Papers Delivered at the Manchester-Lausanne Seminar of June 2008* (LNTS 410; London: T & T Clark, 2009), 218–227, repr. as ch. 8, below.

⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1, 1103ab, LCL, adapted; cf. Dio *Discourse* 36.31–32, again.

⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3–5, 112a–113b, etc.; *Politics* 8.1, 1337a.

⁵⁹ Dio *Discourse* 30, *Charidemus*, 29–44; cf. *Discourses* 27.1–4; 32.52; 48.3–4; 66.26–28; Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.26.37–38; *Encheiridion* 25; frag. 36; on associations, John S. Kloppenborg and Stephen G. Wilson (eds), *Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World* (London: Routledge, 1996); Richard S. Ascough, *What Are They Saying About the Formation of the Pauline Churches?* (New York/Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1998); Philip A. Harland, *Associations, Synagogues and Congregations. Claiming a Place in Ancient Mediterranean Society* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2003); John S. Kloppenborg, "Associations in the Ancient World," in Amy-Jill Levine et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus in Context*, 322–336.

⁶⁰ Cf. Peter-Ben Smit, "A Symposiastic Background to James?", *NTS* 58.1 (2012), 105–122, for a useful update and bibliography, here citing 109; and noting especially D. Konstan, *Friendship*, 137–142; Dennis E. Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early*

An important if unreliable affirmation and reinforcement of social order for citizens and subjects was afforded by music, “heard at their public gatherings and at their private dinner-parties, at their ceremonies, both joyful and sad; it was heard at every act of worship ... in their theatres ... and on their sports grounds ... in their schools, on board warships, and even on the battlefield.”⁶¹

Ideally the orderly coherence of sounds, ἀρμονία, should express and encourage order and unanimity, ὁμόνοια, among those hearing them, as Dio explains,

music is believed to have been invented by humans for the healing of their emotions, and especially for transforming souls which are in a harsh and savage state ... and it is with music that we sacrifice to the Gods, for the purpose of ensuring order and stability in ourselves ... And the spell of music has been deemed no less appropriate in social gatherings, because it brings harmony and order (ἀρμονίαν καὶ τάξιν) spontaneously into the soul.

However, to his expressed dismay, in Alexandria at least, music seemed rather to incite frenzy and disorder.⁶²

Music, order and disorder link in older debates with dance, especially in the classic discussion by Plato, for whom communal dances, Dionysiac as well as Apollonian, affords a participatory guiding and controlling image

Christian World (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2003); Oswyn Murray (ed.), *Symptica. A Symposium on the Symposium* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Katherin M.D. Dunbabin, *The Roman Banquet: Images of Conviviality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Eva Ebel, *Die Attraktivität früher christlicher Gemeinden. Die Gemeinde von Korinth im Spiegel griesch-römischer Vereine* (WUNT 2.178; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004); adding Hans Joachim Stein, *Früchrislicher Mahlfeiern. Ihre Gestalt und Bedeutung nach der neutestamentlichen Briefliteratur unter der Johannesoffenbarung* (WUNT 2.255; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). See further, Plutarch, *Moralia* 146B–164D, esp. 3–4, 148B–150D; and 615C–619A; Pliny, *Letters* 1.15; 2.6.

⁶¹ John G. Landels, *Music in Ancient Greece and Rome* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 1; Plutarch, *On Music*, *Moralia* 1131B–1147. It is regrettable that M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, pays so little attention to music as such.

⁶² Dio, *Discourse* 32.20, 54–62, focussing on 56–58; Plutarch, on music in Plato's Republic, *On Music*, 22, *Moralia* 1138CDE, and 25–26, *Moralia* 1140BC; as metaphor, Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.15.6–7, and frag. 1; and cf. Edward A. Lippman, “Theories of Musical Ethics”, in his *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964): 45–86; Warren D. Anderson, *Ethos and Education in Greek Music* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1966) on the difficulty nonetheless of defining the ethos of particular modes; Jocelyn Penny Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind. Cognitive studies of memory and literacy in classical antiquity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 75–76; Rex Winsbury, *The Roman Book. Books, Publishing and Performance in Classical Rome* (London: Duckworth, 2009), 115–116.

of social cohesion.⁶³ Even extreme forms of Dionysiac shared exuberance, though dangerous, could allow the social order, momentarily disrupted, to re-settle cathartically into a stronger unity.⁶⁴

In our period, however, most such accounts of dance as have survived are concerned with individual theatrical performers, rather than with communal dances.⁶⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes some such at a high social level in Rome in his day, and Quintilian mentions that they survive to his (though Cicero had made it clear that he would never join in). Dio suggests that an ideal emperor would institute orderly, martial dance, but only refers nostalgically to choral dance in ancient Athens.⁶⁶ Otherwise the image mainly recurs in relation to the highly orderly ('cosmic') 'dance of the planets' (to which we return below). Choral dance no longer seems 'socially central'.⁶⁷ In practice, a serious public address is the best remaining hope for creating harmony in such a musically fissiparous city such as Alexandria (though it is worth noting how choreographed in stance, gesture, expression and tone that address could be).⁶⁸

Jerry Toner devotes a chapter in his *Popular Culture* to imperial and aristocratic attempts to create an orderly and firmly hierarchical but widely shared visual and auditory experience, in lavish buildings in Rome and elsewhere, as well as in games, efforts in fact largely appreciated, it would seem, by plebeian spectators and audiences. "The crowd intent on the races in the circus, as described by Ammianus, suggests that the games did successfully integrate large sections of Roman society." "The games represented a visual drama of society's hierarchy and the moral values on which elite

⁶³ As argued in relation to Plato, *Laws*, 654–668, 700–701, 799–816, etc., in Steven H. Lonsdale, *Ritual Play in Greek Religion* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 23–29, and in ch. 2, "Dance as an Ordering Force", 44–75, and by Yana Zarifi, "Chorus and Dance in the ancient world", in Marianne McDonald and J. Michael Walton, *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Theatre* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 227–246, citing "Dance and Social Order", 237–239; cf. also, John G. Davies, *Liturgical Dance. An Historical, Theological and Practical Handbook* (London: SCM Press, 1984).

⁶⁴ S.H. Lonsdale, *Ritual Play*, ch. 3, "Dance as a Disruptive Force", 76–110; Dio, *Discourse* 32.4, presumably in this 'cento' of lines from Homer, echoes Plato's warning against purely disruptive dance; cf. 32.58, and 2.56, 60; and, on choral dance in ancient Athens, 32.93.

⁶⁵ The main ones seem to be Plutarch, *Table Talk* 9.15, *Moralia* 747A–748D, and Lucian, *Dance*, together with Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*, 827–829.

⁶⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 7.72.5–12; Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.11.18; Cicero, *Pro Murena* 6.13, as cited by J.G. Davies, *Dance*, 22; Dio, *Discourse* 2.60.

⁶⁷ Pace Y. Zarifi, "Chorus and Dance", 228, who generalises "the Greeks" from before 500 BCE to 200 CE.

⁶⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 32.20–21, with 12.71, and Quintilian, *Inst.* 11.3, 4, 66, with 1.10.22–29 and 11.3.161–184.

society rested ... [and yet] ... There was a limit to imperial power, and it took charisma, persuasion and habit to keep the people buying into the system.”⁶⁹

Very similar kinds of public buildings are erected and then replaced by more prestigious ones throughout the Empire, if with local variations, as peoples ‘negotiated’ their own assimilation of ‘Romanism’, with local élites assimilating fastest, ‘ordinary folk’ lagging well behind.⁷⁰ Emperors came and went, but statues to them and their families, as divine or quasi divine figures, looked very much alike (and like the deities they represented), even if some structures were still in wood, others in stone, others faced with marble.⁷¹ Towns could ‘civilise’ subjected barbarians, concentrate populations in manageable units, affording their leaders a solid and settled basis for prestige.

Though getting land back under cultivation was important for Nerva and Trajan, according to Dio (for the revenues raised), as noted above, civic rights and full employment (though especially on the land) were also crucial factors in sustaining a peaceful civic society.⁷²

Sanctions on individual disturbers of order varied. An aristocrat might be fined and simply decide whether to pay up or not; a freedman might be beaten by the slaves of a wealthy citizen acting for the court; a slave might well be beaten, even crucified, for obeying his or her owner’s illegal command.⁷³ Slave-owning intellectuals could allow that there could, on reflection, be no reasonable justification for it; conditions may have marginally improved in our period, but no one worked for the abolition of slavery.⁷⁴ Slavery was an important supportive—or threatening—constituent at the base of the graded system.

⁶⁹ J. Toner, *Popular Culture*, 118–122, citing 122, and ch. 4, “Common Scents, Common Senses”, 123–161, citing 157; the reference seems to be to Ammianus Marcellinus 15.7.2. Toner, as noted, ranges widely (in fact, in time and space), while returning to the city of Rome as his main focus.

⁷⁰ Louise Revell, *Roman Imperialism and Local Identities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 12–13, with reference to Antony Giddens, and 74, on Caerwent.

⁷¹ Richard Hingley, *Globalizing Roman Culture. Unity, Diversity and Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), esp. 49–71 and 91–116; L. Revell, *Roman Imperialism*: 55.

⁷² Dio, *Discourse* 7.103–152; cf. Elizabeth Herrmann-Otto, “Armut, Arbeit, Sklaverei und Prostitution in der römischen Kaiserzeit im (Spannungs-)Verhältnis zur dionischen Menschenwürde” (2012), in Gustav Adolf Lehmann et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschenwürde*, 213–233, citing 222.

⁷³ R. MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations*, ch. 4, 88–120; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London: Duckworth, 1981), 457–462; illustrated in my “Justification as Acquittal?” ch. 10, below; cf. 2 Cor 11:23–25; Acts 12:1–5; 16:19–24; 18:17; 22:24.

⁷⁴ Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 47.10; Dio 15.26, 33; cf. Philo, *Quod om. prob.* 79; Jennifer A. Glancy, *Slavery in Ancient Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–38.

How these forms of socio-political control worked out in practice may be illustrated from Pliny the Younger's well-known correspondence with the Emperor Trajan, early in the second century CE, and from Dio of Prusa.⁷⁵ Order in urban communities is held to be precarious but essential. Rome is not able to support an imperial police force, and Pliny's request for a few extra soldiers for a junior colleague's escort is firmly turned down. The Empire relies on the threat of future massive violence to persuade wealthy and eminent locals to ensure order, safety and security, by deploying the city's and/or their own slaves, bringing those accused of wrong-doing to court, and imposing the punishment the court determines.⁷⁶ Taxes are raised to pay for the army that constitutes the threat that maintains the order that secures the Emperor and the Empire's aristocracy. In theory and in practice the Emperor ruled by the consent, if grudging and cowed, of the Roman senatorial and then the provincial aristocracies and the populations under their lead, to everyone's supposed benefit.⁷⁷

There were no general legal sanctions compelling participation in civic festivals, processions, sacrifices (nor even in the imperial cult).⁷⁸ But dissidents, individuals and groups, might well find themselves socially and economically punished: slaves and family members physically maltreated or the latter at least ostracised, free craft-workers finding themselves unemployed or shopkeepers losing their customers.⁷⁹ Epicureans, similarly

⁷⁵ Cf. Dorit Engster, "Fiction oder Realität? Dions *Euboikos Logos* in althistorischen Forschungsdiskussion seit Edward Meyer" (2012), in Gustav Adolf Lehmann, et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschenwürde*, 143–165, citing 162–165.

⁷⁶ Pliny, *Letters*, e.g., 10.19–22, 31–34; cf. Acts 16.19–24. See further, F.G. Downing, "Pliny's Prosecution of Christians. Revelation and 1 Peter", *JSNT* 34 (1988), 105–123, repr. here as ch. 11. On the threat of violence to ensure order, see R. MacMullen, *Enemies*, 163–167; Susan P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy. Imperial Strategy in the Principate* (Berkeley CA and London: University of California Press, 1999): 69, 115–116, 171–180.

⁷⁷ Martin Goodman, *The Roman World 44 BC–AD 180* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997): 100–107, 125, 135; of Rome itself, "It seems that Augustus and his successors wanted the inhabitants of Rome to view themselves as part of a decent, ordered, tidy society", 166.

⁷⁸ See Pliny the Younger, *Letters* 10.52, 53. There is no hint of a check-list. For further debate, David G. Horrell, "The Imperial Cult and the New Testament. Introduction", *JSNT* 27.3 (2005); Peter Oakes, "Remapping the Universe. Paul and the Emperor in 1 Thessalonians and Philippians", *JSNT* 27.3 (2005), 301–322; John M.G. Barclay, "Paul, Roman Religion and the Emperor", in his collection, *Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews* (WUNT 275; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 345–362, with his "Why the Roman Empire was Insignificant to Paul", *ibid*, 363–387; but also the recent survey in J.R. Harrison, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities*, 14–19, the latter responding among others to the above, but perhaps too ready to take the occasional expressed loyalty of the élite as indicative of the practice of the whole community.

⁷⁹ Cf. Peter Oakes, *Philippians. From People to Letter* (SNTSMS 110; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 89–96.

charged with 'atheism' could get by in conforming outwardly, and in good conscience.⁸⁰ Cynics on the whole could get away with their very public anti-social teaching and practice, even if they risked being roughed up; and very persistent criticism of an Emperor could be deathly for individuals.⁸¹ Simple cliquishness and general unpopularity (among Jews and then Christians) could trigger general accusations of subversion.

Individual occupational or cult associations could exist within this framework, but only by ensuring the orderly behaviour of their meetings, and preferably by securing patronage from among civic or provincial notables.⁸²

It is worth quoting at length, from a decision by Trajan:

You may well have had the idea that it should be possible to to form a company (*collegium*) of firemen at Nicomedia on the model of those existing elsewhere, but we must remember that it is societies like these which have been responsible for political disturbances (*factiones*) in your provinces, particularly in its towns. If people assemble for a common purpose, whatever name we give them and for whatever purpose, they soon turn into a political club (*hetaeria*) ...⁸³

He grants a very guarded permission for the free city of Amissus to retain its 'benefit society', so long as no suspicion of political unrest attaches to its meetings, but there is point-blank refusal to extend this to any other town.⁸⁴ It is in this light that we must read Pliny the Younger's oft cited *Letter* 10.96, where he notes that interrogated Christians claimed to have given up meetings when he had banned such clubs (*hetaeriai*, again), and assures the Emperor that since he had begun prosecuting those informed on, "people have begun to throng the temples which had been almost entirely deserted for a long time; the sacred rites which had been allowed to lapse are being performed again, and flesh of sacrificial victims is on sale everywhere, though up till recently scarcely anyone could be found to buy it." Renewed traditional religious observance is proof enough that all is now in good

⁸⁰ Compare Cicero's Epicurean, Velleius, *De natura deorum* 1.45, 123.

⁸¹ Cf. F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992), 6–7, and passages cited there: Lucian, *Demonax* 11; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 2.21; Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 71.7; Dio of Prusa, *Discourse* 9.8–9 and 73.5–7; but also noting Dio Cassius, *Rom. Hist.*, 15.3–5, where one Cynic is flogged and another executed.

⁸² Cf. Philip A. Harland, *Associations, Synagogues and Congregations*, ch. 2, "Internal Activities and Purposes", 55–87, and esp. 75–83; Eva Ebel, *Die Attraktivität früher christlicher Gemeinden*, esp. 66–72, 94–103; R. MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations 50 B.C. to A.D. 284* (New Haven and London: Yale, 1974): 17–19, 71–80; and n. 52, above.

⁸³ Pliny, *Letters*, 10.34.

⁸⁴ Amissus, Pliny, *Letters*, 10.92–93; the Christians, 10.96.

and reliable order. Further, it is also worth noting that Trajan allows for forgiveness for those who prove their change of heart (*veniam ex paenitentia impetret*).⁸⁵

This policy, of very conditional leniency, remained the same for wider communities within and without the very permeable boundaries of the empire, as in Vergil's "*parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*".⁸⁶ The obstinate are to be devastated, only those accepting abject humiliation are to be spared, maintaining Rome's ferocious reputation and so its peace and order—as had earlier been explained by Augustus himself, in his *Res Gestae*: "Tribes I considered it safe to pardon I kept alive rather than eradicated."⁸⁷ The most detailed account of the latter (eradication) surviving for us is, of course, Josephus' account of Vespasian's and Titus' suppression of the Jewish revolt, in his *Jewish War*; but other such campaigns are noted by other authors, justifying Tacitus' words for Calgacus, "they create desolation and call it peace."⁸⁸

1.2.5. *The View from Below*⁸⁹

Unrest nonetheless recurred, both within the fluid borders, on them and from beyond, as recounted by Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius, Dio Cassius, and others; despite the devastation of Judaea, 67–73 CE there was a further Jewish uprising in Egypt, Cyrenaica and Cyprus, 116–117 CE, and then Empire-wide, 132–135 CE.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Pliny, *Letters*, 10.96–97; see further, ch. 11, below; and Christopher J. Fuhrmann, *Policing the Roman Empire*, 161–162, 193–194. See also Bekker-Nielsen, Tønnes (ed.). *Rome and the Black Sea Region. Domination, Romanisation, Resistance* (Black Sea Studies 5; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2005).

⁸⁶ Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.851–853.

⁸⁷ *Res gestae divi augusti* 3.2, in Alison E. Cooley, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti. Text, Translation and Commentary* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 61. For the insistence on humiliation, see S.P. Mattern, *Rome*, 171–180; and on Augustus, 191.

⁸⁸ Tacitus, *Agricola*, 30. For the policy of punitive deterrence, 'terrorising', see again S.P. Mattern, *Rome*, ch. 3, "Strategy", 81–122, and ch. 5, "Values", 162–210; but also, for instance, Herod's tactics in his early career, winning him Roman approval (e.g., Josephus, *B. J.* 1.206–360).

⁸⁹ Compare M. Goodman, *The Roman World*, ch. 16, "Reactions to Imperial Rule": 159–164; 211–212; 221; 227–228; 255–258; Mary T. Boatwright, *Peoples of the Roman World*. For a fuller sketch here of the apparent range of views from below apparent within the Empire, see ch. 7, "All Things to All People".

⁹⁰ H. Fuchs, *Der geistiger Widerstand gegen Rom in der antiken Welt* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1964); R. MacMullen, *Enemies*; ANRW II.3, 138–175; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle* chs. 6 & 7, 327–452; D.J. Mattingly (ed.), *Dialogues in Roman Imperialism. Power, Discourse, and Discrepant Experience in the Roman Empire* (JRA Sup 23; Portsmouth, RI: JRA, 1997);

Even an aristocrat such as Dio, released by Nerva from exile under Domitian, could be frankly critical of the imperial administration, especially in his advice to rival town councils, Nicomedia and Nicea. He begins his address to the former with praise for concord (ὁμόνοια), 'being of one mind together', as (in his Stoic view) not only the Gods are, but the very elements, and without which a ship could not sail nor a household survive. But his quite practical point runs as follows:

What need is there to discuss the present situation of your (imperial) governors ... Or is it possible that you are not aware of the tyrannical power your own strife offers those who govern you? For at once whoever wishes to mistreat your people comes armed with the knowledge of what he must do to escape the likely penalty ... He appears to favour one when he in fact favours neither, while protected by those who believes he favours them.⁹¹

If ethical, religious or philosophical reasons do not sway, at least self interest should. Much better than insisting on justice is forgiveness and reconciliation, as noted above: "believing that to endure such treatment and not to court a quarrel is, as is in fact the case, a great achievement and one befitting people who are altogether superior."⁹² And not only does Dio have inter-city rivalries in his sights, but the internal rowdiness of a city like Alexandria receives a warning that "cautery and the knife" threaten if its citizens persist in their unruly behaviour in theatre, hippodrome and gymnasium.⁹³ Tarsus, on the other hand (as also noted previously), is chided for its exclusiveness, its refusal of citizenship to its 'metek' linen weavers. Dio was himself a target of civic unrest, over charges of profiteering during a food shortage, and defended himself, but also threatened a hostile crowd with the governor.⁹⁴ Yet he can also counsel his fellow citizens to present a united front to a new Governor, even if that means covering over a range of disagreements and accusations of broken promises: expedient concealment of the

for 116–117 CE, John M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, ch. 8, 232–258; Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ* (ET; London: SCM Press, 1987); R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 290–314.

⁹¹ Dio, *Discourse* 38.36; cf. Epictetus, 3.7.13; it is also worth comparing this with Pliny's patronising "don't with Greeks rub in their subordinate status", *Letters* 8.24.

⁹² Dio, *Discourse* 34.43, again. One may compare on the individual level, Musonius, *Discourse* 10; Plutarch, *De capienda ex inimicis*, 9 (90EF).

⁹³ Dio, *Discourse* 32.17–18; compare R. MacMullen, "Urban Unrest", in *Enemies* 163–191; J. Toner, *Popular Culture*, ch. 3, "The World Turned Bottom Up", 92–122, and ch. 5, "Popular Resistance", 162–184.

⁹⁴ Dio, *Discourses* 32, citing here 32.18; 34.21–23; and 46, citing 46.14. One may compare Luke's Town Clerk of Ephesus, Acts 19.40.

truth.⁹⁵ (Although this sort of response may at times itself be concealed in a “hidden transcript”, see just below, yet here, as in Plutarch it is frank and overt.)⁹⁶

More generally, as also referred to earlier, Dio is firmly in favour of job creation, ensuring that all can gain an honest livelihood, as a topic integral to a philosophical discussion of politics.⁹⁷ On political theory he is adaptable to his audience; he can favour a genuinely participative democracy in a public address, love patriarchalism in a speech before the Emperor, and a (‘hidden’) critique of Roman imperialism at Olympia, the latter appealing to Zeus, “our God, peaceful and altogether gentle (εἰρηνικὸς καὶ πανταχοῦ πρᾶος), as befits the guardian of a faction-free and concordant (ὁμονοούσης) Hellas”.⁹⁸

In Rome itself Epictetus reflects in passing, “A soldier in civvies sits down beside you and starts to speak ill of Caesar, and then you do, too ... and you tell him everything you think. Next moment, you’re being taken off to gaol in chains.”⁹⁹ In exile at least, Dio felt called to mount a Socratic (or even Cynic) attack on the character of the respectable civic society of which he later was again an integral part.¹⁰⁰ Plutarch can admire Alexander in one piece, and excoriate “most kings and rulers”, who are like rubble-cored statues, only outwardly impressive, not even in command of themselves. When power gives wickedness free reign, “it makes anger into murder, sexual desire into adultery, covetousness into confiscation.”¹⁰¹

Jerry Toner debates the extent to which ‘carnavalesque’ festivals, Kronia/Saturnalia in particular may have provided a release mechanism for

⁹⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 48.

⁹⁶ J.C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1990); *idem*, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1986). For a critique, F. Gerald Downing, “In Quest of First Century Galilee”, 79.

⁹⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 7, *Euboicus*, 103–145, again, noting 128–129; cf. 3.124–126; on which see also John Ma, “Public Speech and Community in the *Euboicus*”, in S. Swain (ed.) *Dio Chrysostom*, 108–125.

⁹⁸ Dio, *Discourses* 32.27; 3.45–47; 12.16–20 and 73–85 (on the latter, as argued by Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1996], 187–241); and discussion in F.G. Downing, “God with Everything: Dio Chrysostom”, in *idem*, *God with Everything. The Divine in the Discourse of the First Christian Century* (SBWA 2.2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008): 20–42, citing 29; and Dio, *Discourse* 12.74.

⁹⁹ Epictetus 4.13.5, LCL, adapted.

¹⁰⁰ Compare Dio *Discourse* 13.10–20 with *Discourses* 45–50.

¹⁰¹ Plutarch, *De Alex.*, *Moralia* 326D–345B, with *Ad princ.* 1, *Moralia* 780 AB and 6. *Moralia* 782C (the latter, LCL adapted).

social tensions, and whether they “actually reinforced hierarchy because they underlined the norms of order that were expected for the rest of the year.”¹⁰² He himself argues that it kept an image of a different kind of order in mind, while himself ignoring the popular Cynic insistence that the simple Golden Age of Kronos could be lived here and now, any day.¹⁰³

But it may also be worth noting that propertied Egyptians could make use of Roman officialdom in its own terms whilst also raising the threat of opting out (*anachoresis*), or, in two known instances, storing in the family archive quite subversive literature.¹⁰⁴

And the practice of magic, spells, incantations can be seen as affording ways of dealing with an unjust or malign order, especially for the poor; as was recognised by rulers, seen to be a threat to (their) ‘good’ social order (particularly in sooth-saying forecasts of societal disruption).¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, imperial propaganda could present the emperors as themselves as gifted with such powers.¹⁰⁶

Cynics, as already noted, opposed the artificiality of all civic life, its quest for possessions, ostentation, prestige, power over others, all the factors that encouraged strife rather than quiet co-existence, as instanced in Crates “Begging bag city”.¹⁰⁷ Dio, as a very moderate Cynic, took a more nuanced but still unStoic view, as already discussed. It should be possible for industrious adults to gain a necessary healthy, not minimal sufficiency, eschewing luxury, for themselves and any dependants.

¹⁰² J. Toner, *Popular Culture*, 95.

¹⁰³ Lucian, *Runaways* 17, and *Saturnalia*; *ps.Anacharsis* 9; *ps.Diogenes* 32.3; Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 90. 5–14; Maximus of Tyre 36.4. (Toner is mistaken, *Popular Culture* 93, in suggesting that the age of Saturn was necessarily conceived as one of disorder: it could readily be imagined as an age of egalitarian universal harmony.)

¹⁰⁴ See B. Kelly, *Petitions*, 87, 204–206; 159–160.

¹⁰⁵ F. Gerald Downing, “Magic and Scepticism in and Around the First Christian Century”, in Todd Klutz (ed.), *Magic in the Biblical World. From the Rod of Aaron to the Ring of Solomon* (JSNTS 245; London: T & T Clark, 2003), 86–99; Ian H. Henderson, “Apuleius of Medauros” (2006), in Amy-Jill Levin et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus*, 193–205; Jerry Toner, *Popular Culture in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge and Malden MA: Polity, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Wendy Cotter, C.S.J., “Miracle Stories: The God Asclepius, The Pythagorean Philosophers, and the Roman Rulers”, in Amy-Jill Levine et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus*, 166–178.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. John Moles, “The Cynics”, ch. 21 in C. Rowe and M. Schofield et al. (eds), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 415–434, citing (427) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.85, together with a continuation in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* II. 20.121, 1–2. On Cynics and their importance for this period, see Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, “Le cynisme à l’époque impériale”, *ANRW* II 36.4 2720–2823; F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 26–84; *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 26–54.

1.2.6. *Humankind, the Universe and Deity*

For many, though not all, the practice of good order has divine support, and reflections on good order are articulated in metaphysics. The former has been already noted, and more could readily have been added.¹⁰⁸ On the latter, especially influential has been the idea, developed by Stoics, of the orderly universe, the cosmos, as a single city, *cosmopolis*, and the divine as ultimately a unity ‘behind’ and underlying perceived diversity.¹⁰⁹ Dio can assume the following as a commonplace:

Do you not see in the heavens as a whole and in the divine and blessed beings that dwell therein [the planets] an order and concord (τάξιν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν) and self-control which is eternal, and than which it is impossible to conceive anything either more beautiful or more august? Furthermore, do you not see also the stable, righteous, everlasting harmony (ἁρμονίαν) of the elements, as they are called—air and earth and water and fire ... For even if this talk of the heavens seems to you a bit high-flown and alien, you should realise that these things, by nature indestructible and divine and regulated by the purpose and power of the primary and greatest God ... are not so indestructible as to escape being thrown into dissolution ... from being into non-being ... Yet such ruin will never engulf the universe as a whole because complete peace and justice are existent in it and all things everywhere serve and attend the law of reason (εὐγνώμονι νόμῳ).¹¹⁰

In the threatened dissolution, the *ekpyrosis*, everything returns into its divine rational origin, which Dio imagines in detail in his *Discourse* 36: “Zeus, having made all his essence fluid, one seed for the whole world, he himself moving about in it like a spirit does in [animal] generation ... he with ease moulds and fashions all.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ E.g. prayer for political harmony in Dio: *Discourses* 38.8, 18–19, 51; 39.2, 8; 40.36.

¹⁰⁹ On the *Cosmopolis*, see Eric Brown, “Natural Law”, 356–360; on deity as really one, Dio, *Discourse* 31.1.

¹¹⁰ Dio: *Discourse* 40.35–36, LCL, adapted; cf. 38.11; and O.M. Bakke, “Peace and Concord”: 160–167. Human worth, human dignity, are also divinely given (*Discourse* 7.138).

¹¹¹ Dio: *Discourse* 36.42–62, citing 59–61, LCL, adapted, cf. Michael Trapp, “Plato in Dio” (2000), in S. Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom*, 213–239, citing 214–219 and Maximilian Forschner, “Philosophie und Politik: Dions philosophische Botshaft im *Borysthenikos*”, in Heinz-Günther Nesselrath et al. (eds), *Dion von Prusa. Menschlichen Gemeinschaft und Göttlichen Ordnung. Die Borysthenes-Rede* (SAPER VI; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003). 128–156; one may compare Seneca, *Naturales questiones* 13.1; *Hercules Oetaus*, 1102–1117; Epictetus, *Dissertation* 3.13.4–5; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.136; on the *ekpyrosis* see F.G. Downing, “Common Strands in Pagan, Jewish and Christian Eschatologies in the First Christian Century”, *TZ* 51.3 (1995), 196–211; repr. in *idem, Making Sense in and of the First Christian Century* (JSNTS 197; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000): 169–187, with extensive bibliography.

Humans, sharing in the divine reason—and, if willing to, exercising it—are or should be able to discern the pervasive ‘law’ which the natural world’s regularities seem to obey, but also discern the divine rational will for humans, ‘the law of nature’.¹¹² All humans should thus all be able to live as law-abiding citizens of the orderly cosmos. In practice such citizenship was held to be exercised only by the few who accepted in practice the ‘wisdom’ of the Stoic or Cynic sage; and one’s common citizenship could actually be experienced only in one’s inner circle.¹¹³

Still more influential with such as Philo, to whom among others we move shortly, though less, it seems, among the earliest Christians, is the heritage of Plato. Here two illustrations from Plutarch should suffice:

God is (if that needs to be said), and exists for no fixed time, but for everlasting unmoving ages, timeless, and undeviating, in which there is no earlier nor later, no future nor past, no older nor younger; but God, being One has with only one ‘now’ completely fulfilled ‘forever’, and only when ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν) is after his pattern is it in reality ‘being’—not having been nor about to be ... In fact the Deity is not many ... Being must have unity, even as unity must have being.¹¹⁴

Nonetheless, what we experience is pluriform, evanescent, imperfect, other than true “being”:

Reason ‘harmonizes’ (ὁ λόγος διαρμολύμενος) the universe and creates concord out of discordance, not destroying but only weakening the power of its destructive forces ... What is by nature better and more nearly divine in the universe consists of three parts: conceptuality, matter, and that which is formed of these, which the Greeks call the cosmos (τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ ἐκ τούτων ... κόσμον).¹¹⁵

Duality is inherent in all of us humans, who must use our reason to channel the power of the irrational in us: “in accordance with nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and rule the irrational ... so reason makes use of the passions when they are subdued and tamed ...” and so

¹¹² Dio, *Discourse* 36.35–37; 80.5–6; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.85–86; Epictetus, *Dissertation* 1.29.19.

¹¹³ H.C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind*, 167–203; Cicero, *De officiis* 1.50; *De natura deorum* 2.164–165; *De finibus* 5.65; Hierocles, again, in Stobaeus, *Anthology*, 4.84.23.

¹¹⁴ Plutarch, *De E apud Delphos* 20 (393AB), LCL, adapted.

¹¹⁵ Plutarch, *De iside et osiride* 55–56 (373 D–F); cf. *Plat. quaest.* 2.2, *Moralia* 1001BC and 4, 1002F–1003B, on binding and bounding and shaping originally formless matter; 1014B, we find τάζειν again.

produce harmony.¹¹⁶ (The theme of individuals' self-mastery, inner control, unity, occupies us in chs. 3 and 4.)

Among Platonists the musical-mathematical model, for articulating a sense of cosmic harmony in the Pythagorean tradition is, of course explicit, and for Quintilian, it is a commonplace "that the universe is constructed on the same principles as those which were after imitated in the construction of the lyre, and not content merely with emphasising that concord of discordant elements which they style harmony, attributed sound to the motions of the celestial bodies."¹¹⁷

Divine unity, seen in Stoic or Platonic form, can be taken to find expression in and to validate imperial unity, focussed in the emperor himself, "the bond by which the commonwealth [*res publica*] is united, the breath of life which these many thousands draw", according to Seneca, early in Nero's reign.¹¹⁸ Later, Plutarch could propose,

Even as Plato asserts that the entire universe arose from fire and earth ... so, in my opinion did Time lay the foundation of the Roman state, and, with the help of God, so combine and join together Fortune and Virtue that he might construct for all humankind a household in truth both holy and beneficent, a steadfast cable, a principle abiding for ever [στοιχείον αἰδίου], "an anchorage from the swell and drift" as Democritus says.¹¹⁹

This reference to Democritus returns us, of course, to our starting point, in the search for orderly unity in the thought of the earliest Greek philosophers.

We now turn to examples of Jewish attitudes to order and orderliness.

¹¹⁶ Plutarch, *De virtute morali* 11–12 (450E–451F).

¹¹⁷ E.A. Lippman, *Musical Thought*, 6–9; Plato, *Rep.* 530D7–9, *Timaeus* 40C; Quintilian, *Inst.* 1.10.12; Dio, *Discourse* 36.22; Lucian, *Dance*, 7; cf. Plutarch, *De is. et os.*, 5, *Moralia* 373 CD; *On Music*, 44, *Moralia* 1146F.

¹¹⁸ Seneca, *De clementia* 1.4.1, LCL; cited by Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana*, 9; see all of ch. II; and, in much more detail, Allen Brent, *The Imperial Cult and the Development of Church Order. Concepts and Images of Authority in Paganism and Early Christianity before the Age of Cyprian* (VCSupp XLV; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1999), ch. 2, "The Foundation of the Imperial Cult. The Religious Character of the Augustan Revolution", 17–72; M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, ch. 4, "Didactic Aspects of the Praises of Human Rulers", 100–146, again; and ch. 2, n. 93, below; J.R. Harrison, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities*, 118–132.

¹¹⁹ Plutarch, *De fortuna romanorum* 2, *Moralia* 316F–317A, LCL; also discussed in detail by E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, 290–306. But it is worth comparing Philo on joy to the world in the early days of Caligula, *De leg.* 8–13, and 78–113, with Augustus, 143–158.

2. IN LATE SECOND TEMPLE JUDAISM

2.1. *Classical Sources*

"How good and how pleasant it is to live together as brothers in unity" (Ps 133.1; cf. Ps 122). Unity and harmony are pervasively implicit as ideals for 'Israel' in what was in the first century CE the emergent canon of Jewish Scriptures, and they are explicit, in the Psalter, and elsewhere in exilic and post-exilic canonical writings.¹²⁰ So, for instance God expressly promises Jeremiah, "I will give them one heart and one way of life."¹²¹ God can be implacable, he can also be forgiving and willing to restore.¹²² Isaiah's God can proclaim "peace, peace, for all, both far and near."¹²³ Patriarchal households comprise the basic units, as in the Decalogue, and to hold these together there should be a wider tiered ('hierarchical') structure to ensure justice and harmony.¹²⁴ The focus of unity is Israel's sole deity, and allegiance to him; in what in our period is one of the most popular writings, Isaiah, this God emerges not just as Israel's sole God, but as the only real God, the creator and controller of all, offering law for his people to live by.¹²⁵ He rules his chosen people through one leader.¹²⁶

2.2. *Sources from around the First Century CE*2.2.1. *Unity, Reconciliation and Inclusion*

Three sources are chosen here to illustrate Jewish responses from the first century CE: Philo of Alexandria, from the Diaspora, Josephus as a Judaeen in origin, and some of the Qumran documents. All emphasise unity, concord, harmony, order, but none appear to support or illustrate these aims themselves with the Scriptural passages just cited, or others in the same vein, save only the Decalogue, and that in Philo alone.¹²⁷ Authoritative support is on occasion sought for details of procedure, but not for the over-all ends.

¹²⁰ E.g., Ps. 14.7; 44; 122; 50.5; 72; 105; 114; 115; 147.1–14.

¹²¹ Jer 32.19–24, but cf. 31.33 with Ezek 11.19–20; 37.16–24 and then Exod 19.8, Josh 24.24, Ezra 3.1, Neh 8.1.

¹²² Ex 20.5, Deut 5.9; forgiving etc., Psalter, *passim*, but e.g., Ps. 85.

¹²³ Isa 57.19.

¹²⁴ Deut 5.9–12, 21, 5.23–27; Ex 18.19–22; 20.5–12.

¹²⁵ One God, Deut 6.4–5, 32.8–9, 15–18, with Isa 44.6, etc; controller, lawgiver, e.g. Ps. 19, 146, 147.

¹²⁶ One ruler: Davidic, e.g., Ps 72, 110; Ezek 37.24–25; priestly, e.g. Ezra 7, Zech 6.12–13.

¹²⁷ Philo, *De decal.*, etc.; relying for Philo on the index in F.H. Colson and F.W. Earp, *Philo X* (LCL; Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1962), 189–268;

Philo and Josephus, clearly datable to our period, readily pick up the wider Greek articulation of the themes of unity, concord, harmony that we have noted above. Answering Apion's standard criticisms of Judaism as perceived both in its theory and its practice, Josephus announces,

I would therefore boldly maintain that we have introduced to the rest of the world a very great deal of what is fine and beautiful (καλλίστων). What is finer than inviolable piety? What higher justice is there than obedience to the laws? What is more beneficial than to be of one mind (ὁμονοεῖν) with one another, to be prey neither to disunity in adversity nor to arrogance nor to disruptive faction-forming (στασιάζειν) in prosperity? In peace to devote oneself to crafts and agriculture? And to be convinced that everything in the universe is under the eye and direction of God?¹²⁸

Earlier Josephus has already insisted, "At our sacrifices, prayers for our common welfare must take precedence over each one's own, for we are born for community (κοινωνία), and those who set its interests above their own are especially pleasing to God."¹²⁹

Without any rhetorical or any Scriptural appeal to elicit acceptance in detail, the Damascus Document, regulating the Covenanters who were to live a disciplined, self-supporting family life "in Camps", in (carefully regulated) contact with outsiders, simply insists that when they assemble, "All of them shall be enlisted by their names: the priests first, the levites second, the children of Israel third and the proselyte fourth ... And thus shall they sit and thus shall they be questioned about everything."¹³⁰ Among the celibate elite, the יִחִד, the *Yahad*, the rule is even more strict: "The priests shall enter in order foremost, one behind the other, according to their spirits ... No one shall move down from his rank, nor move up from the place of his lot. For all shall be in a Community of truth, of proper meekness, of compassionate love and upright purpose."¹³¹

for Josephus on my own reading and the LCL marginal notes and footnotes; and for the Dead Sea Scrolls, relying on the index in James VanderKam and Peter Flint, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Their Significance for Understanding the Bible, Judaism, Jesus and Christianity* (London: T & T Clark, 2002), 407–423.

¹²⁸ Josephus, *Apion* 2.293–294, LCL, adapted.

¹²⁹ Josephus, *Apion* 2.193, 196; LCL, adapted.

¹³⁰ CD XIV 4; this and other quotations from the Scrolls, trans. in Florentino García Martínez, *The Dead Sea Scrolls in English. Study Edition* (2 vols; Leiden and Grand Rapids MI: Brill and Eerdmans, 1997–1998). For this interpretation of the two strands of community life, see Yonder Moynihan Gillihan, *Civic Ideology, Organisation, and Law in the Rule Scrolls. A Comprehensive Study of the Covenanters' Sect and Contemporary Voluntary Associations in Political Context* (STDJ 97; Leiden and New York: Brill, 2012).

¹³¹ 1QS II, 19–24.

Whether any or many later Second Temple Jews deliberately engaged in proselytizing remains debatable, but the balance of evidence suggests few if any did.¹³² Josephus, however, vigorously repudiates any suggestion that Jews are xenophobic, for part of their Temple precincts is open to all, and, he insists,

our legislator took the best of all measures both to secure our own customs from corruption, and to throw them open ungrudgingly to any who choose to share them. To those all who desire to come and live under the same laws with us he gives a gracious welcome.¹³³

On converts Philo says much the same, ranking them well above unfaithful born Jews.¹³⁴

He warmly commends instances of forgiveness by Joseph and by Moses, and finds with God, supremely, just such grace and mercy towards those who repudiate past wrong and look forward to a better life, especially in the Day of Atonement ritual.¹³⁵ Similarly, Josephus has the patriarch Judah explain to the unrecognised Joseph, “to refrain from wrath in the case of crimes which expose the culprit’s life to his victim’s vengeance is an attribute of the nature of God.” In his earlier Jewish War he claims to have made a similar point to the besieged rebel in Jerusalem, in words that echo those of his model, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, “... a way to safe well-being is still open to you, if you will take it, and the Deity is readily reconciled (εὐδιάλλετον) to those who confess and repent.”¹³⁶

The Rule for the *Yahad* has members acknowledge their own and their forebears’ wickedness, with themselves as men graciously forgiven; forgiveness for subsequent minor offences entails the acceptance of penalties; but some incur total and unnegotiable exclusion.¹³⁷ The theme of divine forgiveness is further elaborated and celebrated frequently in the *Hodayot*, 1QH, resonating with many of the canonical psalms, but without, it seems, obvious direct dependence. There are rules for the admission of new members, in both grades, but no discussion of admission procedures for non-Jews,

¹³² See the brief discussion in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul*, 4–7.

¹³³ Josephus, *Ant.* 8.117; *Apion* 2.209–210.

¹³⁴ Philo, *De praemiis* 152.

¹³⁵ Philo, *De vita mosi* 1.97; *De iosepho* 166; *De prov.* 2.4–6; *De praemiis* 116; *De spec. leg.* 2.196.

¹³⁶ Josephus, *Ant.* 2.146; *BJ* 5.415, with Dionysius *RA* 8.50.4.

¹³⁷ 1QS I, and VI–VII.

even though such as Pliny the Elder and Dio of Prusa could express apparent admiration for those “Essenes” that had come to each author’s attention.¹³⁸

(In second century or later Rabbinic sources there is the reminder that Abraham himself was a proselyte; and there is an insistence on the [qualified] efficacy of the Day of Atonement.)¹³⁹

2.2.2. Households as Basis

The family is as clearly basic for Philo and for Josephus as for the ‘pagan’ Greek and Latin authors quoted earlier, as appears, for instance, in the former’s sequence of concerns, “the honouring of parents, the ordering of their children aright, the safety of their country, the maintenance of its laws, the conduct of affairs private and public, the sanctity of temples, and piety towards God ...” So, too, when Josephus outlines the details of conduct enjoined among Jews, first comes “... our marriage laws. The law recognises no sexual connections, except the natural union of man and wife, and that only for the procreation of children ... The woman, says the Law, is in all things inferior to the man; let her, accordingly, be submissive, not for her humiliation, but that she may be directed—for authority has been given by God to the man.” (Like Dionysius, quoted above, Josephus insists that rituals were not to be the occasion for drunken revelry.)¹⁴⁰

Philo can celebrate the fondness parents have for their children, “cherishing them with extreme tenderness, providing them with good gifts from every quarter, and shunning no toil or danger because they are fast bound to them by the magnet-force of affection”—in one instance in a manner that, as many commentators have noticed, resonates with the parable of the spendthrift, ascribed by Luke to Jesus, where Philo writes, “often they lavish their kindness on the wastrels more than on the well behaved.” Joseph is less expansive on this issue, though he can note it in passing.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ 1QS VI; Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 5.17.4 [73]; Dio, as reported by Synesius (H. Lamar Crosby, Dio Chrysostom V, LCL, “Testimony”, 378). Following *Torah*, the family groups could at least in theory include gentile slaves and resident aliens, גרים, *gerim*, CD XIV 3, as already mentioned above, but with no admission procedure offered; Y.M. Gillihan, *Civic Ideology*, 256–257, argues that integration allowing for intermarriage would have been unlikely.

¹³⁹ *Genesis Midrash* 45.2–3, Abraham; *m.Yom.* 8.8–9—one has to appease any offended fellow human; but not God.

¹⁴⁰ Philo, *Quod deus immut.* 17; cf., in more detail, *De decal.* 165–167, *De spec. leg.* 2.224–227 (on which see further n. 106, below); Josephus, *Apion* 2.199–201; sobriety, 195 and 204. On the Law as a basis for true friendship, Josephus, *Apion* 2.206–210.

¹⁴¹ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 2.239–240; *De prov.* 2.4–6; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.147 (Isaac for Joseph); 5.264 (Jephthah for his daughter).

The strict and hierarchical celibate life of the *Yahad* has already been recalled. Josephus' Essenes have rules for common meals in particular, but also for sleeping, dressing, washing, defecating, worshipping, learning and conversing, some of which are matched for the *Yahad* in 1QS. There are multiple fragmentary copies of what seems to be a "pre-Essene" household code, in 4QInstructions, based in this particular instance on reflections on a number of Scriptural passages, covering detailed hierarchical relations of husbands and wives, parents and children, and these documents may have been used in the "Camps". However, no such rules for family life are included in the *Damascus Document* itself, nor any suggestion that the hierarchical family affords either basis or model for this, let alone for wider society.¹⁴² It is only in passing that in one of the *Hodayot* ('scriptural') similes from fathering and mothering are deployed of God's care for all his creatures.¹⁴³

The "Camp" communities can use "brother" (אח) more widely than on the basis of a shared biological father, as evidenced in the *Damascus Document*, but it is made clear that this still denotes a 'blood' kinship, that is to say, it is not an open, purely 'fictive' one. 'Brother' is not used in 1QS and related texts, of relationships in the *Yahad*.¹⁴⁴ Philo, however, takes the Essenes' sense of 'brotherhood' as embracing all humanity, not fiction, but real. The nearest Josephus comes to that is in his version of *Aristeas*, where he includes the insistence that all humans are God's handiwork.¹⁴⁵

Only in the *Yahad*, as the name suggests, is there a full sharing of possessions.¹⁴⁶ Acceptance of an initiate's possessions, hitherto held in trust, into the common fund of the *Yahad*, is an effective sign of his acceptance, when it has been ascertained that he shares the common mind, ethos, and teachings of the élite community. Then, by contrast with the "Camps" and their family ties, the *Yahad* could in contemporary Hellenistic terms be seen as

¹⁴² Josephus, *BJ* 2.119–159; 160–161; CD VI and IX–XII; on 4QInstructions, see Benjamin G. Wold, "Family Ethics in 54QInstructions and the New Testament", *Nov.T.* 50 (2008), 286–300, arguing common ground with Philo. Sidnie White Crawford, in her "Mothers, Sisters and Elder: Titles for Women in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Communities", in James R. Davila (ed.), *The Dead Sea Scrolls as Background to Postbiblical Judaism and Early Christianity. Papers from an International Conference at St. Andrews in 2001* (STDJ 46; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 177–191, notes just one fragment referring to "mothers" who have some but very subordinate authority. It is not a common motif.

¹⁴³ 1QH^a IX; cf. e.g., Ps. 27.10; Isa 66.13.

¹⁴⁴ CD VI 20, VII 1, 2, with VIII 6, XIX 18, XX 18, relying here on Martin G. Abbeig Jr., et al. (eds), *The Dead Sea Scrolls Concordance. I. The Nonbiblical Texts* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). I record thanks to George J. Brooke for pointing me in this direction.

¹⁴⁵ Philo, *Quod omn. prob.* 79; Josephus, *Ant.* 12.22–23; cf *Ap.* 2.281.

¹⁴⁶ 1QS II.

exhibiting true friendship, while still hierarchical. Certainly this is how both Philo and Josephus present the Essenes (and Philo, the Therapeutai), detailing their common beliefs, attitudes, practices, their shared meals and common possessions, again specifically contrasting their all-male community (κοινωνία) with the distracting and disorderly ties of family and wider society.¹⁴⁷

2.2.3. Ancestral Tradition as Cement

That the social importance of ancestral piety is widely acknowledged appears in Philo's indignant protest,

One of our rulers with Egypt in his charge, under his authority purposed to disrupt our ancestral customs, and especially to do away with the law of the seventh day which we regard with utmost reverence and awe. He tried to compel people to do service to him on it, and perform other actions which contravene our established custom, thinking that if he could destroy the ancestral rule of the Sabbath, it would lead the way to irregularity in all other matters, and a general backsliding.¹⁴⁸

Philo further insists that the laws must be observed in overt practice; reflection on their allegorical interpretation is not enough.¹⁴⁹

Josephus, of course, concurs, and extends the sentiment: "A wise man's duty is to be scrupulously faithful to the laws of his country, as well as to refrain from the abuse of those of others." His people's customs are ancient, whatever ignorant outsiders say, no one has dared to add, remove or alter a syllable, and they are focussed on the welfare of all.¹⁵⁰

The Qumran Community clearly saw itself as inviting other Israelites to join it in a return (as it was seen) to the God-given Covenant, and copied and recopied its most valued ancient shared texts (especially Psalms, Deuteronomy, Genesis, Isaiah, Exodus and Leviticus)—while feeling free to insist on its own interpretation of them, even including extensive "re-written Bible".¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Josephus, mainly *Bf* 2.119–161; cf. *Ant* 18.19–22; on contrast with family and society, *Bf* 2.120–121, 160–161; open to one another (conventional friendship *topos*), *Bf* 2.141. Philo, *Quod omni. prob.* 75–98, and *Hypothetica* 2.1–18, Therapeutai in *De vit. cont.*; contrast with family, *Quod omni. prob.* 79, *Hyp.* 2.2, *De vit. cont.* 18; wider society, *Quod omni. prob.* 92, *Hyp.* 14–17, *De vit. cont.* 68, 72. Be it noted, neither 1 QS nor CD seems to use any word that demands translation by 'of one mind' or 'heart', and where García Martínez and Tigchelaar, 1 QS VI–VII, might render רַעַ with 'friend' they give 'fellow'.

¹⁴⁸ Philo, *De somniis* 2.123, LCL, adapted.

¹⁴⁹ Phil, *De mig.* 89–93.

¹⁵⁰ Josephus, *Apion* 2.144, with *Ant.* 16.44, *Apion* 1.42; and *Apion* 2.193–198.

¹⁵¹ E.g., 1QS V; and see J. VanderKamm and P. Flint, *Meaning*, 180, 210–215.

2.2.4. *Other Ways and Means to Unity and Concord*

It is worth quoting a passage from Philo, one that also figures in my “Legislation as Social Engineering” (ch. 8, below). Philo concludes that Moses thought it best that his people should

first provide themselves with rules for life and *gain practice* in all that would surely enable their communities to steer their course in safety and then settle down to follow from the first the principles of justice lying ready for use, in harmony and fellowship and rendering everyone their fair share.¹⁵²

Similarly, Josephus explains,

Starting from the very beginning with the food of which we partake from infancy and the conduct of life in the home, he left nothing to the discretion and caprice of individuals: what food one should abstain from and what enjoy, with what persons one should associate ... To this cause above all we owe our admirable harmony.¹⁵³

Though the *Damascus Document*, CD, itself, makes no reference to common meals for the Camps, some of the related scrolls prescribe exclusion from the pure food for various offences committed by members.¹⁵⁴ The importance of shared food is explicitly stressed in the *Community Rule* for the élite of the *Yahad*, with its year’s preparation for sharing food, two years for drinking together, with everyone set in the rank accorded them, and Charlotte Hempel argues that the evidence indicates increased care in the preparation, untouched by the impure, as a part of members’ attaining and retaining greater purity.¹⁵⁵ One may usefully compare what is described—or imagined—by Philo, but at much greater length, for his *Therapeutae*.¹⁵⁶

Both Philo and Josephus in fact also emphasise, as did Dionysius, their law’s injunction (Deut 21.18–21) that parents discipline their offspring.¹⁵⁷

The value of shared vocal music is celebrated in the Qumran *Hodayot*:

You created breath on the tongue,
you know its words,
you instituted the fruit of lips
before they came to be;

¹⁵² Philo, *De decal* 14, LCL, my emphasis.

¹⁵³ Josephus, *Apion* 2.173–175, 179.

¹⁵⁴ 1QS VI–VII, 4QD^b and 4QD^c.

¹⁵⁵ Charlotte Hempel, ‘Who is Making Dinner at Qumran?’, *JTS* NS 63.1 (2012), 49–65.

¹⁵⁶ Philo, *De vita contemplativa* 64–90.

¹⁵⁷ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 2.232, but carefully qualified: both parents must agree before a rebellious son is executed; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.260–261; see also CD VII.

you placed rhythm for words,
 and a cadence to the puff of breath from the lips,
 to make the rhythms emerge by their mysteries,
 and the puffs of breath by their measure ...
 to praise your name through the mouth of all.

So, too, Philo has his Therapeutae listen to their leader singing, and others in turn, with the whole company joining in refrains, and then men and women in (it seems) antiphonal choirs, apparently in choral dance.¹⁵⁸ Music can be expected to reduce discord to harmony in individuals and communities, though (as in Plato) it can be dangerously disruptive. Josephus can assume that his hearers will take music for granted, it does not need to be described in detail.¹⁵⁹

Some forms of diversity are allowed for by being themselves codified (and thus implicitly accepted as inevitable); the most obvious being male and female, and then free and slave, adult and child; but also by family of origin (and thus, in a loose sense, by “race”), in an orderly hierarchy.¹⁶⁰ But among those who saw themselves as loyal Jews there could be considerable divergence in the strictness of local interpretation (despite Josephus’ insistence to the contrary, but noting his awareness of Jewish ‘sects’).¹⁶¹

The code in question (especially in Leviticus) emphasises distinctiveness as such, in its insistence on clear boundaries between kinds, and not only between clean and unclean, but also among clean kinds, categories that are not to be confused.¹⁶² Appraising the Qumran community, Carol Newsom writes,

¹⁵⁸ 1QH^a IX 28–31, cf. 23; and 4Q400–407; Philo, *De vita. Cont.* 29, 80, 83–90, *De agr.* 80, where Philo seems to have adapted the account to match his Therapeutae; and *De cong.* 16, 76. There is no suggestion that the sectarians in the Camps or in the *Yahad* engaged in communal dance, with words for dance absent in their writings (for which assurance I again thank George J. Brooke).

¹⁵⁹ *De cong.* 16, *De ag.* 35, *De ebr.* 95–98; cf. Everett Ferguson, “The Art of Music. Philo and Philodemus on Music” (2003), in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds), *Early Christianity*, 391–426. Josephus, *Ant* 7.305–306, 8.176.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Josephus, *Apion* 2.199–206.

¹⁶¹ Josephus, *Apion* 2.179, again; ‘sects’, *Antiquities* 18.11–24; cf. Albert I. Baumgarten, “Josephus on Ancient Jewish Groups from a Social Scientific Perspective”, in Shaye J.D. et al. (eds), *Studies in Josephus and in the Varieties of Ancient Judaism. Louis H. Feldman Jubilee Volume* (AJEC/AGAJU 67; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 1–13.

¹⁶² Cf., again Albert I. Baumgarten, “Josephus on Ancient Jewish Groups”; Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger. An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

Persons develop a sense of who they are in many ways. Social norms for bodily practices are one significant means, because of the close identification of a person with his or her body. How one positions and moves the body helps to form a sense of the self ... How one clothes the body and what foods one eats or does not eat—and with whom—join any number of other symbolic practices that are of great significance in the construction of identities.

In the wider east Mediterranean world (as further argued in this volume in “Legislation as Social Engineering”, ch. 8), the self-formation of the individual is primary, as also appears in some of the examples cited in this chapter; but, as Newsom observes, at Qumran, “rather the community and its work are primary.”¹⁶³ (This ‘behaviourist’ or ‘communitarian’ understanding of social practice, individual or corporate, it will be argued in the next chapter, was in fact urged most vigorously by Cynic philosophers.)

The teacher or others among the Essenes may well have reflected on methods of community formation, but have not left any such reflections for us, in contrast with the other authors noted; though, of course, it is implicit in Jer 32.19 (cf. 31.33); Ezek 11.19–20. That the community applied strict sanctions was remarked above; they were very precisely graded for severity and duration, including reduced diet, exclusion from the common meal for six or twelve months “for his soul’s sake”, or, as said, total banishment.

Sanctions in Jewish communities in Judaea and Galilee against individuals’ breaches of law as interpreted were much as in the wider world: fines and beatings. Although individual Herodian rulers had authority to execute, the balance of probability is that lesser Jewish leaders had not: not even the High Priest. Luke in Acts suggests that Paul could be given authority to arrest dissident Jews in Damascus, which seems to many commentators implausible; rather would Diaspora communities be restricted to flogging those who presented themselves in prayer-houses (synagogues), as Paul seems to have done, and suffered the consequence; or perhaps vigilantes could on occasion get away with mob violence.¹⁶⁴ Qumran could suspend from membership or expel altogether for what might seem to others to be only minor infringements, if that; while Philo, himself was ready to sanction the execution of a renegade, and insisted that homicide in defence of divine law

¹⁶³ Carol Newsom, “How to make a Sectarian”, in eadem, *The Self as Symbolic Space. Constructing Community and Identity at Qumran* (STDJ 52; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 91–190, citing 92–93 (also quoted in part below in ch. X, “Legislation as Social Engineering”), and 189.

¹⁶⁴ Acts 8.3; 9.1; 2 Cor 11.24; mob violence, Acts 7, in Jerusalem; 18.17, in Corinth.

is justified.¹⁶⁵ Yet he could write of fellow Jews whose only share in corporate practice was on the Day of Atonement, without suggesting that they warranted exclusion.¹⁶⁶ Obviously, the kind of genocidal collective deterrent punishment meted out by Roman commanders had not been an option for Jewish leaders since Herod the Great.

Further, simply maintaining similar patterns of community structure— assemblies and officers—both expresses and helps to attain a shared aim.¹⁶⁷

2.2.4. *Voices from Below*

Richard Horsley has sought in various publications to discern “a view from below” for Galilee in particular, by positing on the one hand a ‘little tradition’ of tales in particular of the northerners, Elijah and Elisha, as evidenced in the synoptic gospel tradition, and in the concentration in that same source of interest in the countryside, indebtedness, and poverty mitigated by sharing. Some evidential support may be drawn from Josephus’ awareness of the plight of the rural priests, and his account of the destruction of the Jerusalem record office early in the revolt.¹⁶⁸ Josephus himself highlights two episodes of mass protest (peaceful, he insists), in defence of a traditional concern for the integrity of the Temple; yet the ability or willingness of Galilaean villagers regularly to leave home, crops and livestock for frequent (three a year?) pilgrimages to Jerusalem seems very unlikely.¹⁶⁹

Philo is bitterly aware of the sufferings of fellow Jews in Egypt, and especially in Alexandria, but still, it would seem, convinced that peaceful protest (as in Syria under Petronius), and patient diplomacy at the highest level (as undertaken by him and his peers), and reliance on divine reward for national virtue, were better than confrontation with Rome (even while noting that “the great ones of the earth ... think that it is right to give great justice to the great and little justice to the little”).¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 3.128.

¹⁶⁶ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 1.186.

¹⁶⁷ See, again, Y.M. Gillihan, *Civic Ideology, passim*, but esp. 408, again.

¹⁶⁸ Richard Horsley, e.g., *Galilee. History, Politics, People* (Valley Forge PA: Trinity Press International, 1995); and on all this, F.G. Downing, “In Quest of First-Century Galilee”, *CBQ* 66 (2004), 78–97; revised in idem, *God with Everything*, 150–173; Josephus *BJ* 2.176; *Ant* 20.181. For recent critical surveys, Alexander J. Wedderburn, *Jesus and the Historians* (WUNT 269; Tübingen: 2010 Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 166; Maurice Casey, *Jesus of Nazareth. An Independent Historian's Account of His Life and Teaching* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 101–141; Helen K. Bond, *The Historical Jesus* (Guide for the Perplexed; London & New York: T & T Clark, 2012).

¹⁶⁹ Josephus, *BJ* 2.169–174; *Ant* 18.261–288.

¹⁷⁰ See *De legatione*, and esp. 207–261 and *In flaccum*; and cf. Thomas H. Tobin, S.J., “Philo

At Qumran concern for the Temple's sanctity meant the purest, the members of the *Yahad*, staying away from it as currently administered. In Galilee archaeology has revealed a significant absence of pig bones, and the prevalence of stone water jars, of the kind later held to resist contamination; among the urban wealthy *mikva'oth*, stepped ritual baths, are also to be found.¹⁷¹ It is unlikely that each small village community could afford or safely house a large set of the formative canon of sacred writings, but single copies of a "book of the Law" (Deuteronomy?) were stored and could be worth risking death for.¹⁷²

Clearly some Jewish males were willing to accept the strict discipline offered at Qumran, "to seek God with a whole heart and soul and do what is good and right before him as he commanded by the hand of Moses and and the prophets"; and stand bitterly opposed to "all the men of the lot of Satan". Josephus claims that there were around 4,000 "Essenes".¹⁷³ He also refers, of course, to many more mass actions leading up to and during the revolt, but also the factional infighting which helps him to discredit the rebels. He ascribes to Judas the Galilean "a passion for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are convinced that God alone is their leader and master," a view with which Josephus ultimately concurred, save that he allowed that currently God was exercising his rule through Rome, itself unawares.¹⁷⁴

The view from below in Diaspora communities is even harder to discern. What we can tell from Josephus is that enough Jews paid the annual half shekel levy for the Temple to make it very wealthy, though wealthy Philo seems himself to have visited only once. Enough expatriate Jews cared sufficiently for their traditional faithful practice to fund publicly obvious 'prayer houses', where they could meet together, taking advantage of privileges granted by Julius Caesar and his successors, however locally unpopular that

and the Sibyl: Interpreting Philo's Eschatology", *StudPhilAn* 9 (1997), 84–103; but on reward, see the careful qualifications in Alan Mendelson, "Philo's Dialectic of Reward and Punishment", *StudPhilAn* 9 (1997), 104–125; on justice, *De mutatione* 104, accepting the editors' interpretation, *LCL* ad loc.

¹⁷¹ See F.G. Downing, "In Quest of First Century Galilee", 153.

¹⁷² Josephus, *BJ* 2.229–231, *Ant* 20.114–117; *Apion* 1.190–191.

¹⁷³ 1QS I; Josephus, *Ant* 18.20; cf. J. VanderKam and P. Flint, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, 50–52.

¹⁷⁴ Josephus, *Ant* 18.23; cf. *Ant* 1.20, *BJ* 5.396; cf. R. MacMullen, *Enemies*, 192–241, and 255–268; Steve Mason, *Josephus, Judea, and Christian Origins. Methods and Categories* (Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 2009), 77–92.

made them.¹⁷⁵ But then again, the level of devotion varied considerably we may gather from Philo remarking (as noted above) that there were those who met only once a year, just for the Day of Atonement but also that some (others?) interpreted the cultic rules symbolically, neglecting the literal practice.¹⁷⁶ There is in fact archaeological evidence for considerable variation in practice among those claiming to be Jewish in the Mediterranean world.¹⁷⁷

2.2.5. *The Universe and the One God*

The Community Rule from Qumran enunciates a clear and encompassing conviction:

From the God of knowledge stems all that is and shall be. Before they existed he made all their plans, and they will execute all their works in compliance with his instructions, according to his glorious design, without altering anything. In his hands are the laws of all things, and he supports them in all their needs.¹⁷⁸

The distinction between prior ‘plan’ or ‘design’ on the one hand, and subsequent ‘existence’ is intriguing, if put alongside Philo’s much more elaborate contrast between God’s creative ‘ideas’ and their execution.¹⁷⁹ But the emphasis on purposive order is clear; it is also implicit in the explicit concern for calendrical accuracy and propriety.¹⁸⁰

Similarly, the ideal for Josephus is “unity and identity of religious belief, perfect uniformity in habits and customs, producing a beautiful concord in human character.” He also then insists (implausibly, as we have seen), “among us alone will be heard no contradictory statements about God, such as are common among other nations ... with us all act alike, all profess the same doctrine about God.”¹⁸¹ The heart of this unity and concord (however

¹⁷⁵ Tessa Rajak, “Document and Rhetoric in Josephus: Revisiting the ‘Charter’ for the Jews”, in Shaye J.D. Cohen and Joshua J. Schwartz (eds), *Studies in Josephus*, 187–189. On such contributions as a unifying factor, J.M.G. Barclay, “Money and Meetings. Group Formation among Jews and Early Christians” (2006, repr. 2011), in *idem*, *Pauline Churches*, 107–122.

¹⁷⁶ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 1.186; *De mig.* 89–93.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. John M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*.

¹⁷⁸ 1QS III 15–17; cf. J. VanderKam and P. Flint, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, 255–256.

¹⁷⁹ Philo, *De opificio* 15–25.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. 1QS IX.26–X.8, and Y.M. Gillihan, *Civic Ideology*, 438–446.

¹⁸¹ Josephus, *Apion* 2.179–181, LCL, adapted. On Josephus’ theology, see, e.g. Harold W. Attridge, *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates of Flavius Josephus* (HDR 7; Missoula MO: Scholars Press, 1976), 71–108; F. Gerald Downing, “Ethical Pagan Theism and the Speeches in Acts”, *NTS* 27.4 (1981), 544–563; and “Common Ground with Paganism in Luke and in Josephus”, *NTS* 28.4 (1982), 546–559; Per Bilde, *Flavius Josephus between Jerusalem and*

admittedly fractured in practice) is to have “just the one temple for the one God, as likes attract: common to all as God is common to all ...”¹⁸² Moses’ “polity”

may be termed a “theocracy”, ascribing all sovereignty and authority to God. To him he persuaded all to look as the author of all blessings, both those that are common to all humankind, and those won by prayer in the crises of history ... Moses represented him as one, uncreated and immutable to all eternity (καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ πρὸς τὸν αἰδίδιον χρόνον ἀναλλοίωτον), in beauty surpassing all mortal thought, made known to us by his power, although the nature of his real being surpasses knowledge.¹⁸³

Although some Greek philosophers do, Josephus allows, contradict such theology, the great ones, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato and the Stoics, he claims (following Aristobulus), agree with Moses, having learned from him.¹⁸⁴ Whether or not we feel that Josephus’ creed does justice to the dynamics of the theology(-ies) in the Jewish canon of writings, it clearly articulates a distaste for any extensive variety of practice or belief among contemporaries and/or predecessors, even variations of the sort that he himself has illustrated in his accounts of the Jewish “sects”, and elsewhere.

Philo explores still more deeply into Platonizing metaphysics of unity, ‘oneness’. The best vision of God that Jacob-Israel, the seer, the visionary, could receive “only showed that God is, not what he is. For that which is better than the good, senior to the idea of unity, purer than unity itself, cannot be discerned by anyone else; to God alone is it permitted to apprehend God.”¹⁸⁵ God is pure being, the only one who truly ‘is’, where ‘being’ as such is orderliness: when God creates he brings into being what was not, “order out of disorder, distinctiveness out of indifference, similarity out of confusion, identity out of heterogeneity, shared harmony out of disjunction, equality out of inequality, light from darkness.”¹⁸⁶ Impressively, Philo can nonetheless insist that humans can be ‘friends’ of this God, in a truer sense than his advisors can be ‘friends’ of the Emperor.¹⁸⁷

Rome. *His Life, his Works, and their Importance* (JSPSup 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988), 185–187; Louis H. Feldmann, “Josephus”, *ABD* 3 (1992), 981–998.

¹⁸² Josephus, *Apion* 2.193, LCL, adapted.

¹⁸³ Josephus, *Apion* 2.165–167, LCL, adapted.

¹⁸⁴ Josephus, *Apion* 2.180, 168, LCL, adapted.

¹⁸⁵ Philo, *De praemiis* 39–40, LCL, adapted.

¹⁸⁶ Philo, *De vita mosis* 2.100; cf. 2.267; and *De spec leg* 4.187; cf. *De somn.* 2.45; LCL, adapted; cf. the discussion in F.G. Downing, “Ontological Asymmetry in Philo, and Christological Realism in Paul, Hebrews, and John”, *JTS* NS 41.1 (1990), 423–440; repr. in idem, *Making Sense*, 188–207.

¹⁸⁷ Philo, *Quod omn. prob.* 41–45; cf. *Quis haer.* 21; *Somn.* 1.232; *De vit. Mos.* 1.156–157.

Philo, also includes a now traditional reference to music, “For the seven-stringed lyre, corresponding to the choir of the planets, produces notable melodies.”¹⁸⁸ It is on this basis that Philo can insist elsewhere, “it appears that states would have done right if they had first prevailed upon their citizens one by one to put an end to the disorder within each which abounds in each ... for, to be honest, this internal strife is the origin of external warfare”; but order also demands “a ruler and guide, lest mob-rule, the very worst of bad constitutions, the counterfeit of democracy, which is the best of them, infect us, so we spend our days in ceaseless experience of disorders, tumults and intestine broils” or awaiting “the advent of some aspirant to sovereign power, a tyrant forcibly setting law at naught.”¹⁸⁹

Philo imagines Cain as a symbol of multiple distraction, to contrast with Moses, the epitome of unified, centred and undifferentiated experience and awareness, and so uniquely fitted to “enter into the thick darkness where God is, that is, into conceptions regarding the one who is, conceptions that belong to the unapproachable region where there are no material forms” (though the cause of all is not there either, but beyond place and time). For, “when without speech and within the soul alone we contemplate the one who is, there is perfect stability, based on the indivisible unity.”¹⁹⁰

CONCLUSION

It is thus clear that there was considerable pressure in civil society in the East Mediterranean to achieve and maintain unity, harmony, concord; and widespread agreement on many ways in which this was to be done. This is a significant aspect of ‘cultural convergence’, where a theme is accepted as important, and elaborated in similar ways, but apparently without requiring the backing of received authoritative tradition. It is ‘in the air’, simply obvious.¹⁹¹

In the next chapter we consider how early Christians, whose thoughts have reached us in the New Testament collection and in a trio of other early writings, responded to this widespread agreement.

¹⁸⁸ *De opif.* 126; *De cong. erud.* 51; cf. E. Ferguson, “The Art of Praise”, 411–417.

¹⁸⁹ Philo, *De post.* 184–185; *De agric.* 45. One can readily find much more in the same vein.

¹⁹⁰ Philo, reading *Quod det.* 167 on into *De post.* 14, with *De gig.* 52.

¹⁹¹ For instance, by John Barclay in his discussion of cultural convergence in general in his *Jews in the Mediterranean World*, chs. 6, 125–180; ch. 12, 336–380; and see n. 1, above.

CHAPTER TWO

“LET EVERYTHING BE DONE DECENTLY AND IN ORDER
(ΕΥΣΧΗΜΟΝΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΞΙΝ)” (1 COR 14.40).
UNITY, ORDER AND PROBLEMS OF DIVERSITY

B. The New Testament Authors

Issues of order, unity, harmony, and their importance in the wider Graeco-Roman world around the first century CE, and in elements of its Jewish sub-culture, have been surveyed and illustrated from a range of ancient sources. It remains now to show whether, and if so, how such themes, motifs, were taken up by those early Christians whose thoughts are preserved in the New Testament collection and some other sources judged roughly contemporary with some of the latter. These early Christian writings will be bunched, fairly conventionally, as follows: (i) the letters ascribed to Paul and most widely recognised as his in contemporary critical scholarship; (ii) the Synoptic Gospels, Acts, James and *The Didache*; (iii) the “Deutero-Pauline” letters (Colossians, Ephesians, Pastorals) together with 1 Peter and 1 Clement; (iv) the Johannine writings together with Hebrews and Ignatius’ *Letters*, plus a side glance at some “gnostic” documents. The subheadings employed in the previous chapter will reappear in each of these sub-sections.

1. THE LETTERS OF PAUL¹

1.1. *Classical Sources*

Clearly there are a great many unascribed allusions to his Scriptures in Paul’s writings, together with quite a fair number of formulaic quotations; yet even when in 1 Corinthians and Romans he is arguing forcefully for unanimity, for concord among Christians, no canonical passage promoting unity is cited in support; not even when he insists that the one God is God of Jews and

¹ Rom, 1 & 2 Cor, Gal, Phil, 1 & 2 Thess (the latter of course often also disputed), Phm, late 40 to early 60 CE.

Gentiles together (Rom 3.30, cf. 10.12; 1 Cor 8.4).² When Paul explicitly quotes Ps 24.1, “The earth is the Lord’s and everything in it” (1 Cor 10.26), it is indeed to counter divisions based on diet; but there is no commendation of unity or harmony in the psalm itself.

1.2. *Inclusion, Reconciliation*

As just indicated, the issues of unity, peace, harmony are nonetheless major concerns of Paul in these letters. With respect to wider society, Paul addressing Christians in Rome clearly inculcates civil obedience (Rom 13.1–7; but see further below, and ch. 7), confidently urges his hearers to take good active account of what all people at large consider honourable, and further forbids taking the law into one’s own hands (Rom 12.17–21; on “all”, cf. 2 Cor 8.21, and 1 Cor 10.32–33).³

As Margaret M. Mitchell demonstrated some years ago now, Paul also argues for harmony and concord in his own communities in ways that echo contemporary Greek and Latin discussions of civic life in the Roman Empire, not only in his use of the ‘body’ and ‘building’ metaphors (widely recognised among commentators), but at many other points. Already at 1 Cor 1.10–13 Paul can gather six key words or phrases for whose use in this kind of context Mitchell can find numerous parallels in Dio and others: speaking with one voice, with no schisms, one in mind, one in thought, avoiding discord and division.⁴ Mitchell traces these and similar themes throughout 1 Corinthians, but they all also re-appear, with other similar ones, in the remaining letters, with concentrations in 1 Thess 4.9–12, 5.12–28; 2 Cor 12.20; Gal 5.22–6.5; Rom 9–11, 12–14; Phil 1.12–2.18. Most prominent in Paul’s ministry, of course, is the inclusion of uncircumcised Gentiles among God’s sanctified people (Gal, Rom, Phil), the inclusion of women (if with some conventional restrictions), and of slaves, and of children of

² Cf. Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture* (SNTSMS 7; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley (eds), *As It Is Written: Studying Paul’s use of Scripture* (SBL Symposium Series 50; Atlanta GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008).

³ And compare Phil 4.8–11 with Dio 69.2: many of the same words, and the same demand for action, not admiration. Benjamin Edsall has argued recently that displaying social disharmony in court is socially shaming; in “When Cicero and Paul Agree: Intro-group Litigation among the *Luperci* and the Corinthian Believers”, *JTS* NS 64.1 (2013), 25–36.

⁴ Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 65–183, noting 68–87, and the summary, 180; cf. George H. van Kooten, “Ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ: The ‘Church of God’ and the Civic Assemblies (ἐκκλησίαι) of the Greek Cities in the Roman Empire: A Response to Paul Trebilco and Richard A. Horsley”, *NTS* 58.4 (2012), 522–548, esp. 539–547. See further, p. 197, n. 115, end.

one Christian parent (Gal 3.28; 1 Cor 7 and 11.2–15; Phlm). Reconciliation (καταλλαγή) as such is for Paul, with God (one exception, 1 Cor 7.11), but conciliatory behaviour “to God’s glory” to all people in all things is strongly urged (1 Cor 10.31–32, again). On the other hand, while Paul does not talk of forgiveness from God, he does occasionally urge inter-human forgiveness (1 Cor 6.7 [?]; 2 Cor 2.5–11; Gal 6.1; Rom 12.19–21 [?]; Phil 4.2–3). Rather than backward-looking divine forgiveness, Paul prefers to talk of being justified by, being right with the one God now and onwards; this relational status is the basis for the unity he urges his hearers to enjoy.

1.3. *Household*

Paul is clearly aware of households (1 Cor 11.22, 16.15, etc.), but has nothing to say about their structure, convinced as he is that there is little time for rebuilding society at large. (1 Cor 7.29–31).⁵ He touches on the question of marriage and marital relationships issue just once in the surviving writings here surveyed, though even there he does insist, “God’s call is a call to live in peace” (1 Cor 7.15). Rather are Christians to see themselves as siblings (ἀδελφοί), adopted (women and men alike) as sons and heirs by God as father, fellow heirs with Christ (Gal 3.26–4.7; Rom 8.14–17), and should live the common brotherly-sisterly ideal (1 Cor 6.6–8; 8.12–13; Rom 14; Phm 16), as the household of faith (Gal 6.10). The household is still, and clearly, ‘hierarchical’, God is ‘father’, and Paul is sort of step-father (1 Cor 4.15), and converts are children.⁶ And there was no call for Scriptural support for the relational ideals.

For Paul friendship does not replace family, at least in theory; but in fact he assumes and urges important elements of the ethos of friendship. Pressing the case for the collection for “the saints” he urges that resources be “held in common” (κοινωνία, as ideally, it was agreed, should be the case among friends), so as to even out differences, albeit not as far as Acts’ actual pooling of possessions (Rom 15.26; 2 Cor 8.4, 9.13).⁷ Even so, as L.L. Welborn has recently argued, and cogently, Paul’s insistence on general, not “socially proportional” equality “would have appeared as a dangerous attempt to reverse the established social relations of power [between patron and client] within Graeco-Roman friendship”, but also in civic (i.e., ‘political’) decision

⁵ See the discussion in the previous chapter, and the bibliography, p. 13 and n. 28.

⁶ Cf. Trevor Burke, “Paul’s New Family in Thessalonika”, *Nov. T.* 54.3 (2012), 258–268.

⁷ As argued recently by J.M. Ogereau, “The Jerusalem Collection”. Ogereau’s case on Paul here stands, I judge, despite the criticism levelled above, ch. 1, p. 19, n. 41, on the wider setting of the terminology deployed.

making.⁸ Although they are not expected to cut themselves off from all outside contacts (1 Cor 5.10; but. cp. 2 Cor 6.14–7.1), in practice the Corinthian servants of Christ are to eschew everything in civic life that is explicitly cultic (1 Cor 10.20–22), and instead to have prime significance for one another, to be of ‘one soul’, ‘one in spirit’, being minded in the same way, in this way also exhibiting community (κοινωνία) (e.g., Rom 12.9–10, 16; 1 Cor 2.16; Phil 1.27, 2.2, 4, 5, 4.2).⁹

Paul ties himself in knots over women’s hair styles (1 Cor 11.1–16), as many commentators allow: just as he is reluctant to risk having outsiders misinterpret glossolalia (1 Cor 14.23), so he does seem reluctant to permit even the impression of women disruptively flouting accepted norms of public appearance, including the supposed “order of creation”, and insisting on female silence in the Christian assembly, in 1 Cor 14.33b–35, if this ‘digression’ is accepted as authentic.¹⁰ But these seem to constitute his only overt support for civic convention at this level (though for more general conformity with “what seems honourable in the eyes of all”, as already noted, see Rom 12.17, 1 Thess 5.15).

1.4. *Ancestral Tradition*

All appeal to the Jewish Scriptures entails an implicit affirmation of ancestral tradition; but Paul is also able to make this explicit, most powerfully

⁸ L.L. Welborn, “‘That There May Be Equality’: The Contexts and Consequences of a Pauline ideal”, *NTS* 59, 73–90, here citing 80, and referring to 76–81, noting a contrast with Philo’s conventional (Aristotelian) interpretation of the same ‘proof text’, Ex 16.18, at 2 Cor 8.15. In 81–85, more theoretically, Welborn argues that Paul is further innovating in also implying a distinct field of ‘economics’. Robert Knapp allows that the poor themselves shared the Aristotelian idea of equality, “each according to his [her] due”; *Invisible Romans*, 120.

⁹ Cf. John T. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in the context of some ancient discussions of friendship” (2008), in *idem* (ed.), *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech*, 141–160, and essays in the same collection by John Reumann, Ken L. Berry and Abraham J. Malherbe; also Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Radical Altruism in Phil 2.4” (2003), and Michael White, “Rhetoric and Reality in Galatians: Framing the Social Demands of Friendship” (2003), in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds), *Early Christianity*, 197–214 and 307–359, resp. In her *Paul and the Dynamics of Power. Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement* (London & New York: T & T Clark, 2007), Kathy Ehrensperger argues forcefully for Paul as one interacting with fellow Christians, not dominating or manipulating them; but weakens her case with a repeated monochrome contrast between Paul on the one hand and the entire non-Jewish ancient Mediterranean world on the other, ignoring counterbalancing matter assembled by such as A.J. Malherbe.

¹⁰ Accepted by many, including G.H. van Kooten, “Ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ”, 546–547; but see the strong, also common, objections outlined in F.G. Downing, “Women and Men, Mary, and Woman-Talk”, in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 190.

in his credo in Rom 9.4–5. “To my kin belong the adoption, the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the temple service, the promises, the ancestors; and from them by human descent came the Messiah.”¹¹ And with this one may take the arguments in Gal 3.6–18, Rom 4–5, as well as such passages as Gal 1.14, 2 Cor 11.22, Phil 3.4–6. It is also noteworthy that Paul can already appeal to young Christian tradition (Rom 6.17; 1 Cor 7.10, 11.2, 23; 15.3; 1 Thess 4.15 [?]; 2 Thess 2.15; 3.6). There is no call for Paul to argue the case that the hallowed past is expected to have a powerful—and unifying—claim on his hearers. Even when he deploys a common urban Greek vocabulary, he can be shown to use such terms and images in a characteristic way, with this “sociolect” articulating and reinforcing group distinctiveness and unity.¹²

So it is important to acknowledge the extent to which Paul and those he addresses are *in practice* nonetheless breaking, and radically breaking, with ancestral tradition, either Jewish, or civic (including imperial). Even those contemporaries who saw Judaism with its exclusivity as itself disruptively uncivic, might at least accept it had some valid claim to antiquity; yet even this authentication Paul’s Christ-faith entirely lacked. Such a threatening breach in civic harmony and concord was a very serious matter; as Lucian announced later, “they have transgressed totally by denying the Greek Gods and by worshipping the crucified sophist and living under his laws.”¹³ Although Paul and perhaps associates could offer occasional conformity to Jewish law (1 Cor 9.20), that would not satisfy the zealous, such as Paul himself had been, as the five synagogal beatings he had been subject to indicate (2 Cor 11.24). And Paul’s refusal to countenance any compromise over civic, including imperial cults was absolute (1 Thess 1.10; 1 Cor 8.4,

¹¹ Cf., James D.G. Dunn, *Romans 9–16* (WBC 38B; Dallas TX: Word Books, 1988); Ben Witherington III with Darlene Hyatt, *Paul’s Letter to the Romans. A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids MI and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004); Robert Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2007), ad loc.

¹² On ‘ideolect’, or ‘social dialect’, cf., again, Wayne Meeks, *The First Urban Christians*, 93–96; and John M.G. Barclay, “Πνευματικός in the Social Dialect of Pauline Christianity” (2004, repr 2011), in *idem, Pauline Churches*, 205–216.

¹³ Lucian, *Peregrinus* 1.13; cf. Tacitus, *Histories* 5.4.1, 5.5.1; Juvenal, *Satires* 3, 6, 14; and passages in Molly Whittaker, *Jews and Christians: Graeco-Roman Views* (CCWJCW; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), John M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 286–287; cf. David A. deSilva, “Participation showed one’s support for the social body, one’s desire for doing what was necessary for the welfare of the city,” in his “‘Worthy of the Kingdom’: Honor Discourse and Social Engineering in 1 Thessalonians”, *JNT* 64 (1996), 49–79, 61. On the practical impact of Gal 3.28 evidenced within Paul’s Christian communities, see Loveday C.A. Alexander, “Women as Leaders in the New Testament”, *Modern Believing* 54.1 (2013), 14–22, though the wider social impact is not here touched on.

10.21; Gal 4.8–11; Rom 1 18–25). However conventional Paul and Paul's Christians might try to appear in general (Rom 12.17; 1 Thess 5.15, again), on this they were openly counter-cultural. (On Benjamin Kelly's careful argument, eschewing the civic courts (1 Cor 6.1–11) was itself a significant refusal of the ethos the legal system articulated and affirmed.)¹⁴

1.5. *Other Ways and Means*

What drew people positively to baptism and then continuing membership of Paul's house-churches? There were spiritual gifts in response to the vivid presentation of the crucified Christ (Gal 3.1–5; 1 Cor 1.23–24), and the promise of new life with him, escaping the wrath to come (1 Thess 1.10; 1 Cor 1.7–9). It is also arguable that in a fiercely "agonistic" society, psychophysically intensely stressful, membership of a relatively egalitarian group with a relatively simple shared life-style would itself constitute a strong inducement to the maintaining of active membership, reinforced perhaps by the pooling of funds for "the saints in Jerusalem".¹⁵

A central focus for this maintenance will have been the common meal, 'the Supper of the Lord', though its celebration in the Corinthian church seems to have been leaving social divisions relatively untouched. Hans Joachim Stein has argued recently, and cogently, that 1 Cor 11–14 takes us through Paul's interpretation, from the meal to the solidarity and love it should enact and then to shared talk and singing.¹⁶ Although Paul does not make music's unitive potential explicit, it is implicit in the martial metaphor chosen, and should help to "build up" the congregation (1 Cor 14. 7–8, 26), "for God is not a God of disorder (ἀκαταστασίας), but of peace" (1 Cor 14.33). The sequence ends, of course, with the phrase which heads this and the previous chapter, "Let everything be done decently and in order (εὐσχημῶνως καὶ

¹⁴ B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, esp. 117, and ch. 5, "Political Ideologies in the Legal Realm", 168–209; cf. Benjamin Edsall, "When Cicero and Paul Agree: Intro-group Litigation among the *Luperci* and the Corinthian Believers", *JTS* NS 64.1 (2013), 25–36.

¹⁵ Cf. F.G. Downing, "Fairly Simple: The Impact of Life-style", in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 64–90; but also, more recently, J. Toner, *Popular Culture*, ch. 2, "Mental Health", 54–91, citing 58–74 in particular, agreeing that the early church, despite its own weaknesses, "established a more stable social base on which people could carry on their lives", 91. On contributions as a unifying factor, J.M.G. Barclay, "Money and Meetings".

¹⁶ H.J. Stein, *Früchrlstlicher Mahlfeiern*, e.g., 38–39, on the social symbolism involved; and M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 269–287, on Phil 2.6–11, as drawing its audience together. On recent debates see Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell (eds), *After The First Urban Christians. The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five years Later* (London: T & T Clark, 2009); referring to Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983).

κατὰ τὰξιν) (1 Cor 14.40), with its echo in Hierocles, but also in a religious inscription cited by Hans Conzelmann.¹⁷ And when Paul prays that Roman Christians may praise God, united in voice and feeling (Rom 15.6), it is, much more likely than not, praise in song for which he hopes.¹⁸

(Neither choral nor individual dance is mentioned; the former, of course, demanded public space.)

Although Paul can talk of disciplining the Corinthian church with a rod (1 Cor 4.21), we may safely take this as metaphorical: he does not deploy the sanctions local synagogues were able to direct against him. He has to rely on his personal authority as his hearers' father or mother in Christ (1 Cor 4.14, Gal 4.19), and on his rhetorical skills, however poor his own delivery (2 Cor 10, esp. 3–11), divinely authenticated by the fact of his hearers' own conversion and subsequent experience, pre-eminently in their enjoying the gifts of the Spirit (Gal 3.2–5, 1 Cor 12–14, Rom 15.15–19), together with, as suggested, a diminished level of socially induced stress.¹⁹ He clearly tries to emphasise a shared and united leadership (witness the number of 'συν-' words he deploys; e.g. Phil 4.2–3).²⁰ The one final sanction is exclusion from the community, with perhaps a corporate malediction, a joint "consigning to Satan", though that may, rather, be simply leaving the one excluded at risk in Satan's sphere (1 Cor 5, noting v. 5, and comparing 11.30). Paul does not claim himself to have a powerful curse at his disposal (unless Gal 1.8–9 implies that); and while he claims "signs and wonders" (Gal 3.5; Rom 15.19; 1 Cor 9.1, 2 Cor 12.12), he never *details* these in support of his authority. Further,

¹⁷ Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (ET, Hermeneia; Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1976), 247. It is disappointing to find Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians. A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids and Carlisle: Eerdmans and Paternoster, 2000), 1167–1168, has nothing to say about the cultural resonances of the phrase.

¹⁸ As argued by Robert Jewett, *Romans*, 884–885; cf. Calvin R. Stapert, *A New Song for an Old World. Musical Thought in the Early Church* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007), 25; G.H. van Kooten, "Ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ", 541.

¹⁹ F.G. Downing, "Fairly Simple: The Impact of Life-style", in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 64–90; on discipline, see now Robert E. Moses, "Physical and/or Spiritual Exclusion. Ecclesial Discipline in 1 Corinthians 5", *NTS* 59.2 (2013), 172–191.

²⁰ Compare also Paul's use of overt or implicit community/communitarian models, on which see Hans-Josef Klauck, "Gemeinde und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum—ein Leibbild für die Zukunft?", in his *Religion und Gesellschaft in frühen Christentum. Neutestamentliche Studien* (WUNT 152; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 212–232, here 219–227, though with no particular attention given to the issue of 'order' as such; and the discussion above, 2 (c), and nn. 7 and 8. Also now see Anna C. Miller, "Not with Eloquent Wisdom: Ekklesia Discourse in 1 Corinthians 1–4", *JNTS* 35.4 (2013), 323–354, arguing that Paul "subtly" "undercuts" the democratic wisdom of the popular ekklesia, assembly; yet he is using much the same rhetoric as Dio, whom she cites, deployed (see ch. 7, below), and other Corinthian members would be doing.

as noted above, the one excluded, once penitent and repentant, should be met with loving forgiveness (2 Cor 2.5–8).

1.6. *Voices from Below*

There are strong but often unclear echoes of dissident voices from Paul's congregations, including voices raised against Paul himself. There are the 'Judaizers': if not Jewish outsiders still influential, then Christian Jews like James, converts to Judaism turned Christian, and Christ followers straight from general civic religion or by way of synagogue attendance, variously urging not just the acceptance as authoritative of the Jewish Scriptures, but urging some more traditional interpretation of them, and customary and distinctive Jewish practices. Any compliant congregation could well, incidentally, have found itself at least marginally less unacceptable socially. Paul insists that the cost of social hostility is well worth meeting (1 Thess 2.2, 14; Gal 3.4; Rom 8.35–39; Phil 1.27–30). (Paul's disturbing radicalism in arguing that the wealthier have a duty to seek general equality with the poor, not maintain "proportional", differential equality, is touched on above, 2 (c).)

In the middle of the previous century it was vigorously argued that in Corinth at least Paul had to face a 'gnostic' opposition from people sure they had a 'knowledge' (γνῶσις, 1 Cor 8.1–6), an inner awareness of divine reality that might also set them free from the inhibitions and restrictions that beset lesser folk. More recently very reasonable doubts have arisen over 'gnosticisms' as such, and in particular over their relevance for 1 Corinthians.²¹ Much more cogent is the suggestion that the understanding of baptismal initiation that Paul had apparently inherited (Gal 3.28) had been welcomed with disturbing enthusiasm by women in the Corinthian congregation, exercising their prophetic gifts (1 Cor 11.5 with ch. 14).²² Further, a more 'respectable' alternative voice has been discerned in the divisions over the Lord's supper, with the few wealthy members seen as behaving in character, eating their own more lavish food separately; and this proposal can be linked with

²¹ See Volker Gäckle, *Die Starken und die Schwachen in Korinth und in Rom* (WUNT 2.200; Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 4–35; Philip F. Esler, *Galatians* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), and *idem*, *Conflict and Identity in Romans. The Social Setting of Paul's Letter* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2003). Todd E. Klutz, "Re-Reading 1 Corinthians after *Rethinking Gnosticism*", *JSNT* 26.2 (2003), 193–216, argues that there are still significant similarities on the level of tensions with surrounding society between Paul and some of the Nag Hammadi tractates.

²² See Antoinette C. Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction Through Paul's Rhetoric* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1990); Margaret Y. MacDonald, *Early Christian Women and Pagan Opinion. The Power of the Hysterical Woman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jorunn Økland, *Women in Their Place. Paul and the Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space* (JSNT 269; London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004).

the further suggestion that Paul faced in Apollos someone with superior rhetorical gifts, so highly prized by the élite (or would-be élite).²³ Here, by contrast with his response to the enthusiastic women, Paul would be seen as again himself a “voice from below”, resisting pressures to conform; perhaps also in attempting to dissuade the presumably wealthy with ready access to the law courts from taking action against one another or, perhaps, against the poor indebted to them.

I have myself argued that at least in the earlier days of his mission Paul was indeed ready to appear as himself a ‘voice from below’. Paul and his immediate associates were not simply absent from civic sanctuaries and festivals, beaten up and thrown out of synagogues; even day to day in shop front and market place they behaved provocatively, and preached provocatively, as Paul insists on a number of occasions (1 Cor 4.9–13; 2 Cor 4.8–9; 6.4–5, 11.23–29, 12.10; Phil 4.12; Rom 8.35). Poor, hungry, half-naked, displaying the scars of floggings slavishly received, urging people to be followers of a crucified leader, Paul could but be seen as, and content to be seen as some sort of Cynic philosopher.²⁴ I have further argued that in Corinth Paul had to confront those who had taken too far his own message of Christian-Cynic freedom, they were “already kings”, laws unto themselves (1 Cor 4.8 with 6.12, etc.).²⁵ Earlier, in Thessalonica, there were some who had given up work, perhaps relying on friends having all in common, or on still more of the Cynic ethos that Paul seemed to be replicating (1 Thess 4.11; 2 Thess 3.11).²⁶

I have yet further argued that already in the Corinthian correspondence Paul was himself moving towards a more ‘respectable’ Stoic-seeming ethos, one still more obvious in Romans and Philippians, and particularly striking in Rom 13.1–7, despite the arguments of some that this passage should be read as irony, and Phil 2.6–11 as clearly subversive.²⁷ It may well be

²³ See Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (John H. Schütz, ed. & tr.; Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1982); Bruce W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists* (SNTSMS96; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁴ F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches. Cynics and Christian Origins II* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 1–25. Cf., recently, John Grainger Cook, “Cruxifixion as a Public Spectacle in Roman Compania”, *Nov.T.* 54.1 (2012), 68–100, emphasising “the scandalous nature of Paul’s gospel of the crucified Christ”.

²⁵ F.G. Downing, *op. cit.* 85–127.

²⁶ F.G. Downing, *op. cit.* 239, 292.

²⁷ R. Jewett, *Romans*, 790; per contra, F.G. Downing, *op. cit.* 280–281, and H.-J. Klauck, “Gemeinde und Gesellschaft”, 227–230; cf. the discussion of Stoic attitudes, above, pp. 14–15 & nn. 18 and 22; and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul’s Stoicising Politics in Romans 12–13: The Role of 13.1–10 in the Argument” *JSNT* 29.2 (2006), 163–172; but also cf. the discussion in Ian J. Elmer, “When in Rome. Church and State in Romans and Mark”, in David Luckensmeyer and

the case that fundamentally Paul's talk of one God, one Lord, and of this God's justice, undercuts the claims of Caesar: but that involves no immediate challenge, no pseudo-Sybilline prophecy of immediate demise or defeat (no soothsaying of the sort that Roman law proscribed).²⁸ (How variously Paul might then have been heard by different folk in Rome and elsewhere in Italy is aptly discussed by Peter Oakes, in his *Reading Romans in Pompeii*.)²⁹

1.7. *The Universe and the One God*

Paul insists adamantly "there is no God but one" (1Cor 8.5), and "of him and through him and unto him are all things" (Rom 11.36; cf. 1Cor 8.6), and that this has decisive practical implications, for the unity of Jew and Gentile (Rom 3.30), for the subordinate status of the divisive Mosaic law, "given by angels" (Gal 3.20), and the merely demonic status of other supposed deities (1Cor 8.4–6, again), whatever they and their festivals' significance for civic unity and harmony. To this one Lord "belongs the earth and all that is in it" (1Cor 10.26, citing Ps 24.1 etc.), which means that all conventional food is in principle acceptable. Among those who in loyal trust in Christ affirm allegiance to this one God there can in logic be no barriers to unity and concord.

However, just how the one God relates his lordship to that of his Son, Jesus Christ (Rom 1.1–4; 2Cor 1.19), Paul notoriously fails to clarify, though it is clear that lordship is God's gift to award to Jesus (Phil 2.9–11), and even though Father and Son seem taken to share distinguishable aspects of creation and its sustaining, denoted in prepositional terms as source and agency, respectively, but not otherwise specified (1Cor 8.4–6, yet

Pauline Allen (eds), *Studies in Religion and Politics in the Early Christian Centuries* (ECS 13; Strathfield NSW: St. Paul's Publications, 2010), 45–58; on Phil 2.6–11, M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 280–287, esp. 285; J.M.G. Barclay, "Paul, Roman Religion and the Emperor", and "Why the Roman Empire was Insignificant"; J.R. Harrison, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities*; and, most recently, Rahnu Callia, "Between Ambition and Quietism? The Socio-Political Background of 1 Thessalonians 4.9–12", *Bib.* 91 (2010), 393–417, allowing for much more general involvement in the imperial cult than I am able to credit; cf. Jeffrey A.D. Weima, "'Peace and Security' (1 Thess 5.3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?" *NTS* 58.3 (2012), 331–359. See further, ch. 7 (iii), for a more detailed discussion.

²⁸ Pliny the Elder, *Hist.nat.* 24.4.18, and MacMullen, *Enemies*, 129–130.

²⁹ Peter Oakes, "Re-mapping the Universe", and *Reading Romans in Pompeii. Paul's Letter at Ground Level* (Minneapolis MN and London: Fortress and SPCK, 2009), 98–126; see also Peter Frick, "Monotheism and Philosophy: Notes on the Concept of God in Philo and Paul (Romans 1:18–21)", in Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts (eds), *Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism ... Early Christianity in Its Hellenistic Context 2* (TENT'S 10; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 237–258.

again).³⁰ In one passage this delegation seems for Paul to have been taken to be temporary: at 1 Cor 15.24–28, he explains that when the end comes, Christ will surrender his rule and be subjected to God the Father, so that “God may be all in all (ἵνα ᾗ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πασίν)”. Taken on its own this latter phrase might well have been heard as somewhat like Dio’s myth in his *Borysthenic Discourse*, where the universe is absorbed back into Zeus.³¹ However, Dieter Zeller, in a succinct but wide ranging survey of similar phrases, argues that ἐν πασίν may very well be taken as personal (cf. 1 Cor 9.22), and thus Paul would be expressing the trust that with this final act, God will be in every respect [God] for everyone.³² And, to be sure, Paul’s assurance to the Thessalonians, “then shall we for ever (πάντοτε) be with the Lord” (1 Thess 4.17) seems in context to affirm a trust in a continuing or renewed relational, personal existence, not absorbed, for individuals and, a fortiori, for the Lord Jesus; so too, at Rom 8.19–23, where the “subjection” of the whole creation seems to emerge into liberty for all people and all things, rather than further subjection.³³ However, as in the Greek and the other Jewish authors surveyed in the previous chapter, it is clear that talk in the field of actual or potential human unity, harmony, concord, involves talk of the unity of the divine and of accepted or hoped for divine ordering, albeit left imprecise. So, too, the latter then demands metaphysical articulation, if very briefly and sketchily in Paul.

³⁰ On “prepositional metaphysics”, here and elsewhere in the New Testament writings, see the very careful analysis of varied usage among Graeco-Roman contemporaries, in Gregory E. Sterling, “Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christian Liturgical Texts”, *Stud.PhilAn* 9 (1997), 219–238, suggesting that “εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα” of 1 Cor 8.6 is probably, but only probably, “instrumental”; also, H.-J. Klauck, “‘Pantheisten, Polytheisten, Monotheisten’—eine Reflexion zur griechisch-römischen und biblischen Theologie,” (2003), in idem, *Religion und Gesellschaft*, 3–56, here 43–46; see also Peter Frick, “Monotheism and Philosophy: Notes on the Concept of God in Philo and Paul (Romans 1:18–21)”, in Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts (eds), *Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism ... Early Christianity in Its Hellenistic Context 2* (TENTS 10; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 237–258.

³¹ Dio, *Borysthenicos*, 36.39–61. For Stoic and other resonances, cf. George van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School. Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology; with a new Synopsis of the Greek Texts* (WUNT 2.171; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 104–109; resonances discounted by Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1239; and ignored, it seems, by Wolfgang Schrage, *Der Erste Brief an die Korinther VI/4* (EKK; Düsseldorf and Neukirchener: Benziger and Neukirchener Verlag, 2001), 220–231; see also *TriTrac* 132.21–29, cited p. 81, below.

³² Dieter Zeller, “Die Formel εἶναι τὰ πάντα ἐν πασίν (1 Kor 15.28)”, *ZNW* 101 (2010), 148–152.

³³ Cf. surveys in John Ziesler, *Pauline Christianity* (rev. edn; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 24–48, noting here 39–40; Larry W. Hurtado, “Paul’s Christology”, in James D.G. Dunn (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to St. Paul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 185–198.

2. THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS, ACTS, JAMES AND *DIDACHE*³⁴2.1. *Classical Sources*

A selection of the authoritative Jewish Scriptures constitute the only important classical sources for these writings: chiefly among them for the gospels, Genesis, Deuteronomy, Psalms and Isaiah; while James, and possibly *Didache* include Wisdom writings. They can be cited in reference to God as one (implicit, only, in *Didache*, 1.1, 5.2), and as placing a demand on hearers to love God and love neighbour, and so, implicitly, inculcating unity; but even in Luke's "Good Samaritan" the implication, though clearer, is not made fully explicit.³⁵

The fulfilment of prophecies recorded in the ancient and authoritative writings, especially as emphasised in Matthew, implies a divinely pre-planned and purposeful ordering of events, but without any claim that a clear and comprehensive pattern or sequence is in them to be discerned.³⁶ Thus Luke's James quotes the LXX version of Amos 9.11–12:

... that the rest of humankind may seek the Lord,
and all the Gentiles upon whom my name is called.
Thus says the Lord who is doing now
what was made known long ago. (Acts 15.16–18)

Earlier Luke extends Mark's quotation from Isaiah 40 to include "and all flesh shall see God's salvation", Lk 3.4–6. These quotations serve to articulate convictions already reached, rather than prompting or shaping them.³⁷

³⁴ Dating Mk to 75 CE, Mt 85, Lk-Acts 90, Jas early second century, *Didache* also, though both of the latter using earlier tradition, and *Didache*'s "Two Ways", 1–5, as most likely pre-Christian Jewish.

³⁵ E.g., Deut 6.4–5 in Mk 12.29–30, Mt 22.37, Lk 10.27; Lev 19.18, in Mk 12 30, Mt 22.39, Lk 10.27; and Mk 14.27, Mt 26.31 (Zech 13.7); Mk 15.24, Mt 27.35, Lk 23.34 (Ps 22.13); and Mt 1.22, Isa 7.14, etc; cf. Jas 2.9, 14–20.

³⁶ For sheer quantity of citation, see *1 Clement* (discussed below), and *Epistle of Barnabas* (not discussed here). On Matthew, see the discussion in Ulrich Luz, *Matthew 1–7* (ET; Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1989), 156–164. Thomas Brodie argues that in fact the Elijah-Elisha cycle in 1 and 2 Kings orders the structure of Luke-Acts. This is discussed and rejected below, in ch. 6; so, too, but much more briefly, the suggestion by Dennis. R. MacDonald, that Homer has been 'emulated' by Mark and by Luke. T.L. Brodie, *The Birthing of the New Testament. The Intertextual Development of the New Testament Writings* (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2004), p. 7; cf. D.R. MacDonald, *Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), and *Does the New Testament Imitate Homer? Four Cases from the Acts of the Apostles* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003).

³⁷ Christopher F. Evans, *Saint Luke* (TPI NTC; London and Philadelphia PA: SCM and Trinity Press International, 1990); Wilfried Eckey, *Das Lukas Evangelium unter Berücksichtigung seiner Parallelen* (2 vols; Neukirchener-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2004), ad loc.

Luke later cites without naming him the Stoic poet Aratus, at Acts 17.28, and this passage does affirm human unity within an immanent divine unity (yet not some new stage in the divine ordering of things), but it also serves to indicate that any concerns for unity, harmony, concord to be found in these writings do not depend for their origin or urgency on these authors' Jewish scriptural heritage.

2.2. *Inclusion, Reconciliation*

The synoptic gospels talk of friendship with tax-collectors, and presuppose a largely peaceful and law-abiding countryside, where, even if wandering preachers are not offered hospitality neither are they likely to be offered serious violence, though they may be vilified. At Mt 5.41 hearers are encouraged to respond generously to a soldier sequestering their labour. Luke has John the Baptist outline a recipe for civic order (Lk 3.10–14) that takes tax collectors and soldiers for granted. James insists that “the whole law” is to be kept, citing the Mosaic Decalogue, and rejects jealousy and faction in favour of peace and gentleness (Jas 2.10, 3.14–18, 4.1–2).

Further, and without any panegyric on harmony and concord, it is clear that for all three evangelists *σωτηρία*, well-being, involves inclusion and reconciliation, and these are dominant concerns, in terms of the offer of assured forgiveness and of the opportunity and encouragement to change (repent) together so as to live the teaching outlined: e.g. Mk 1.4, 15, 2.14–17 (physician to tax collectors and sinners), and parallels in Mt and Lk; Acts 2.38, Jas 1.19–21. Healing is restoring people's well-being, physically, psychologically and socially: e.g. Mk 1.25; 2.1–12; ch. 5, and parallels; and Jas 5.5. Mutual forgiveness, peace-making, and avoidance of schism, occupy the first four chapters of *Didache*. The conventional ideal of friendship is realised in the sketch of the early community in Acts, where members have all in common (Acts 2.43–47; 4.32–35; cf. also *Did* 4.8).³⁸ Important in the healing and securing of relationships in all three gospels is mutual forgiveness as the condition for receiving divine forgiveness, as at Mk 11.25 and Lk 11.8, most emphatically in Matthew (Mt 6.12, 14–15 and 18.21–35), but also, implicitly, in *Did* 14; perhaps cf. Jas 5.9, 16.

³⁸ Cf. A.C. Mitchell, “The Social Function of Friendship in Acts 2.44–47 and 4.32–37”, *JBL* 111 (1992), 97–122; cf. Todd Penner, *In Praise of Christian Origins. Stephen and the Hellenists in Lucan Apologetic Historiography* (ESEC 10; London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 262–287. I agree with Kurt Widerwimmer, *The Didache. A Commentary* (ET of 1989; Hermeneia; Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1998), 109, that *Did* 16.4–5 is *ad hoc*, and does not indicate a common purse.

Nonetheless, there is an awareness that the message and its enactment in practice had been and seemed likely to go on being unsettling in wider society and divisive internally (Mk 3.6, 11.18, 13.9–13 and parallels); “not peace, but a sword” (Mt 10.34, Lk 12.51; cf. 22.35–38); compare Acts 6.1, 14.19, 15.1–2, 17.6, 18.13, 19.23–41, 28.25–28 and *Did* 16.4–5.³⁹ James vigorously criticises the wealthy and any subservience to them (Jas 2.1–7, 4.4, 5.1–6; cf. *Did* 5, and see further, below.)⁴⁰ With Jas 2.6 and *Did* 5.2 one may compare Mt 5.25–26, and Lk 12.57–59. Any literal eschewing of the court system (as in 1 Cor 6.1–11, noted earlier) may well betoken a rejection of the social ethos it enshrines.⁴¹

2.3. Household

Again, as is well known, it is easy to find passages that affirm the conventional evaluation of the patriarchal family, emphasising the marriage bond and care for parents and for children (Mk 5.22, 7.9–13, 25, 9.22, 10.1–12, and parallels; cf. also Lk 11.11–13, Mt 7.9–10), noting that Matthew adds women and children to those present at the feedings, Mt 14.21, 15.38, but also Mt 27.56, “the [otherwise nameless] mother of Zebedees sons”. James ignores households. In Acts the household is soon taken for granted as the base for Christian community (Acts 10.2, 12.2, 16.15—albeit, with a woman householder—and 16.34).⁴² In *Did* 4 the hearer is urged to ensure daily contact with fellow “saints”, in an effective extended family, for benefit from others as well as to them, while still being part of an individual household, likely including children and slaves.

And yet, once more, there are strong contrary indications, not only that families do break up (Mk 3.21, 31, with 13.12, again, and parallels; *Did* 16.3) but such fracture may well be demanded, and the ‘natural’ family replaced by another (Mk 3.32–33, 10.29–30, and parallels; Jas 2.15—though not *Didache*,

³⁹ On the latter passage, see Loveday C.A. Alexander, “Reading Luke-Acts from Back to Front”, in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context. A Classicist Looks at the Acts of the Apostles* (LNTS 298; London and New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 207–230, noting 215.

⁴⁰ For this interpretation of James, see Robert L. Webb and John S. Kloppenborg (eds), *Reading James with New Eyes. Methodological Reassessments of the Letter of James* (LNTS/JSNS 342; London and New York: T & T Clark, 2007).

⁴¹ B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, esp. 117, and ch. 5, “Political Ideologies in the Legal Realm”, 168–209, again; and n. 6, above.

⁴² On recent discussion see David L. Balch and Jason T. Lamoureaux, *Finding a Woman's Place. Essays in Honor of Carolyn Osiek* (PTMS; Eugene OR: Pickwick, 2011), part 2, “Synoptic Gospels and Acts”, 81–188. One may also note *Didache* 4 and *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.

see above). Lk 14.26, unlike Mt and Mk, includes “wife” among those to be abandoned. In its sketch of the early Jerusalem community Acts has itself already tacitly challenged its later idealisation of the property based household.

Despite their abandonment of family and property and despite their shared meals, in this synoptic tradition Jesus’ disciples do not (contrast John) have a common purse, and are as yet at least, clearly not of one mind with Jesus or with one another (e.g. Mk 9.33–37, 10.35–45; Mt 19. 13–15, 20–27; Lk 9.46–48, 51–55). For Luke such unity of mind and sharing of possessions waits till after Jesus’ death and resurrection, and the coming of the Spirit (Acts 2.44–47, 4.32–37, “united in heart and soul”), although even then it is limited to the early Jerusalem community, and dissension still arises there among followers of Jesus the Christ (e.g., Acts 15.2, 37–39).⁴³

2.4. *Ancestral Tradition*

In Matthew and Luke, but in differing ways, Jewish ancestral tradition is at times affirmed, with Mt 5.17–19 being, at least on the surface, the most forceful: “Whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments, and shall teach people so, shall be counted least in the kingdom of heaven” (v. 19); and it is noted that neither Matthew nor Luke include Mark’s “making all food clean” (Mk 7.19; cf. Mt. 15.10–11; Luke omits the whole sequence). Luke affirms Jewish tradition (in his own interpretation of it) by making both Jesus’ family and the early Jerusalem community and Paul himself observant (Lk 1–2; Acts 3.1, 4.2, 21.20–24). *Didache* insists on twice-weekly fasting, mirroring but contrary to Jewish practice (*Did* 8), while taking over its version of the “two ways” from Jewish wisdom reflections, including an emphasis on almsgiving (15.4), marginally if significantly supplemented from Christian tradition.⁴⁴

Once again there are clear divergent strands. James, as noted, insists on the whole “royal law” being kept (Jas 2.8–10), but his emphasis is on interpersonal issues, not, it seems, Sabbath or dietary rules, despite the reference to a “synagogue” (or is that just “a meeting”? Jas 2.1). Mark himself insists, as recalled, that Jesus did declare all foods clean (7.19), and also has had Jesus

⁴³ See, again, A.C. Mitchell, “The Social function of Friendship in Acts 2.44–47 and 4.32–37”, *JBL* 111 (1992), 255–272.

⁴⁴ Cf. John S. Kloppenborg, “The Transformation of Moral Exhortation in *Didache* 1–5”, in Calyton N. Jefford (ed.), *The Didache in Context. Essays on its Text, History and Transmission*, (NovT Supp LXXVII; Leiden and New York: Brill, 1995), 88–109.

apparently ignore blood and death impurity (Mk 5), where both Matthew and Luke do follow (Mt 8.28–34, 9.18–31; Lk 8.26–56). But the situation is still more complex, for it may well be that Matthew will have intended to insist on maintaining—and having read—the letter of the law, while free to reinterpret it, as he has Jesus do for the Sabbath (Mt 12.1–8, adapting Mk 2.23–28, cf. Lk 6.1–5, but also Mt 13.52).⁴⁵ Further, it may well be that Luke, for his part, would see the early Christians retaining the life-affirming aspects of their inherited Jewish tradition while discarding what many contemporaries saw as the life-diminishing aspects, as superstition (δεισιδαιμονία).⁴⁶ And then it needs to be recognised that the most significant affirmation of their inherited tradition lies in the respect accorded in practice to its authoritative writings, however “forced” the interpretation may at times seem to us.

2.5. *Other Ways and Means*

James insists that there should be no class division nor favouritism, but does not say how any such should in practice be ended (Jas 2.1–9, again), though Peter-Ben Smit has recently argued that important elements of the letter appeal to the accepted ideal ethos of the symposium, with singing praise encouraged (Jas 5.13). Calvin Stapert argues from James that “praise” mentioned elsewhere would also normally be sung; indeed, in the light of the prevalence of music in Judaism and in the ambient culture, an eschewal of song would have needed to be made explicit.⁴⁷ So, when Paul and Silas sing together in prison, Luke is more likely indicating habit rather than exception; he certainly has Jesus’ birth greeted by an angelic chorus (Acts 17.24; Lk 2.13–14). Though in Luke there is encouragement to followers to “exult and dance for joy” and reference in Jesus’ teaching to children and to households dancing (Lk 6.23; Q/Lk 7.32; Lk 15.25), nowhere in the Synoptics or in Acts do we find accounts of followers taking this lead, and *Didache* is silent on the issue.

Mark offers no explicit discussion of ways and means to create and maintain harmonious community; implicitly we may assume the common importance of shared meals, and the likelihood that the memory of Jesus’ last meal (and a psalm sung together) would have been seen as formative,

⁴⁵ Discussed further, ch. 9, below.

⁴⁶ See F.G. Downing, “Law and Custom: Luke-Acts and Late Hellenism”, in B. Lindars (ed.), *Law and Religion* (Cambridge: J. Clark, 1988), 148–158.

⁴⁷ Peter-Ben Smit, “A Symposiastic Background to James?”, *NTS* 58.1 (2012), 105–122; R. Stapert, *A New Song*, 15.

together with stories of friendship, healing, open (on occasion, miraculous) table-fellowship, and teaching, especially on generosity to the poor. In his account of the feeding of the five thousand (συμπόσια συμπόσια) he stresses the orderliness of the proceedings (Mk 6.30–44, noting 39–40). Although neither Matthew nor Luke take this orderliness up, all the rest of these motifs reappear, with additional encouragement to generosity and sharing, while Luke, as recalled just above, adds the Jerusalem community having all things in common. *The Didache* expects a weekly gathering “to break bread and give thanks” (13). But whether the prayers of *Did* 9–10 also refer to this, as seems often assumed, or to any *ad hoc* but exclusive meal with “saints” met on any day (*Did* 4.2, 9.5), is not to my mind clear.⁴⁸ (Above it was suggested that such common life and mutual support also might well have appreciably reduced socially induced painful stress levels.)

Common to the three gospels are promises of final well-being, and the sanction of its potential loss (e.g., Mk 8.35–38, cf. *Did* 16). Mark includes no note of any immediate disciplinary measures, indeed seems to argue for a generous inclusivity (Mk 9.33–48).⁴⁹ Matthew seems to envisage only positive ‘pastoral’ procedures (Mt. 18), where even the harsh sound of treating anyone recalcitrant “as a Gentile or a tax-collector” is probably to be heard as echoing the ongoing welcome for such people elsewhere in the Gospel (Mt 18.17 with 9.10, 11.19, 21.31–32).⁵⁰ *Didache* includes the shaming sanction of public confession of misdoings (4.14); false prophets are to be ignored, but no further measures are specified. Only in Acts are wrong-doing members or would-be members struck dead, or threatened (Acts 1.18, 5.1–11, 8.20–24).

2.6. *Voices from Below*

Dissidence in the wider Christian movement is discerned by some in Mark’s treatment of Jesus’ family (Mk 3.21, 31–35), and in his negative portrayal of Peter and the rest of the twelve as failing to understand, and cowardly,

⁴⁸ The absence of “body and blood” words still leaves it open as to whether either, both, or neither may have been taken to involve a “sharing in the body and blood of Christ”; cf. the discussion in Paul F. Bradshaw, *Eucharistic Origins* (London: SPCK, 2003); *idem* and Maxwell E. Johnson, *The Eucharistic Liturgies. Their Evolution and Interpretation* (Collegeville MS and London: Liturgical Press and SPCK, 2012), 14–19, 36–40.

⁴⁹ Cf. Larry W. Hurtado, *Mark* (NIBC rev. edn; Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 1989); Morna D. Hooker, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (BNTC; London: A & C Black, 1991), ad loc.

⁵⁰ Cf. Isaac K. Mbabazi, *The Significance of Interpersonal Forgiveness in Matthew’s Gospel*. PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 2011.

features softened by the other two evangelists.⁵¹ (A more usual interpretation is to see their weakness as encouraging us weak hearers—the twelve's preaching will nonetheless reach the whole world, Mk 13.10). Other dissension seems evidenced in Matthew (5.19, again, sometimes thought to be directed against Paul or Paulinism), but also a sense of loss at the breach with organized Judaism (Mt 23, esp. v. 3). Luke allows for the reality of disagreement (Acts 6.16, 15.1–5, 39), again, but tones it down when compared with Paul's vituperation (Gal 1.6–9, 2.1–14). James, as noted, is highly critical of the rich as oppressors (Jas 2.6–7) and as corrupt employers (Jas 5.1–6).

Troubles with the wider community, and with organised Judaism, and with the Herodian kings, and with Roman hegemony are obvious (e.g., Mk 13.9–11 and parallels, implicit mostly, in *Didache*). Mt 11.12/Lk 16.16–18 may be seen as a covert but very obvious denunciation of Herod Agrippa's violence.⁵² Yet there seems evidence on the one hand of an increasing move to diminish the overt responsibility of Pilate (and so, of Rome) for Jesus' death, shifting the blame to the Jewish authorities (e.g., Mt 27.24; Lk 23.4, 14, 22), while on the other hand, there is an implicit challenge to Rome in the Christians' allegiance to a quite different "Son" of the only true God, perhaps especially in the Matthaean and Lukan birth narratives, and in their Temptation stories; and cf. *Did* 16.4.⁵³ "Though the Gentiles rage and the peoples hatch their futile plots" (Acts 4.25), God has his way, with Jesus and with Paul. Pretensions to divine status, whether overt in the case of Herod Agrippa I, or implicit in the case of Domitian, are confidently shown false.⁵⁴

Here one particular crux is the sense Mark may have intended and his hearers may have made of "give back to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and

⁵¹ Cf. Theodore J. Weeden, *Traditions in Conflict* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1971).

⁵² Matthew W. Bates, "Cryptic Codes and a Violent King: A New Proposal for Matthew 11:12 and Luke 16:16–18", *CBQ* 75.1 (2013), 74–93.

⁵³ On the former, see, e.g., H.-J. Klauck, "Das göttliche Kind" (2003), in *idem*, *Religion und Gesellschaft*, 290–313, and also Stefan Schreiber, *Weihnachtspolitik. Lukas 1–2 und das Goldene Zeitalter* (NTOA 82; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); on the latter, Gerd Theißen, "Die Logienquelle—palästinazentrierte Perspektiven in der Mitte des 1. Jahrhunderts" (1989), in *idem*, *Lokalkolorit und Zeitgeschichte in den Evangelien* (NOTA 8; Freiburg and Göttingen: Universitäts Verlag Freiburg and Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 212–245, here 312–332; M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 305–322. On Mark, F.G. Downing, "A Rival to Romulus", in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words*, 133–151, with references there to wider debates; for a more complaisant Mark, Ian J. Elmer, "When in Rome".

⁵⁴ H.-J. Klauck, "Des Kaiser's schöne Stimme. Herrscherkritik in Apg 12,20–23" (2003), in *idem*, *Religion und Gesellschaft*, 251–267; cf. Loveday C.A. Alexander, "New Testament Narrative and Ancient Epic" (2005), in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context*, 165–182, citing 176, "a power greater than Caesar's".

to God what belongs to God”, that is, the Jewish God, clearly not the divine Caesar inscribed on the coin (Mk. 12.17; Mt 22.21; cf. Lk 23.2). The Mark for whom God has all in his power (Mk 10.27) may well have heard Jesus’ saying in the light of Ps. 24.1, “The earth is the Lord’s, and everything in it”, leaving any claim from Rome totally undermined.⁵⁵

2.7. *The Universe and the One God*

That for all three evangelists and for James quite firmly (*Didache*, implicitly), God is one has been already registered. These authors offer little, however, by way of metaphysical articulation or underpinning, save that James insists that God is Father of the celestial lights, while himself “without variation or shadow of turning” (Jas 1.17). Later this could be interpreted as ἀπαθής, but here it is clearly a matter of benevolently consistent providence. Jesus’ birth in Luke, as noted earlier, is greeted by an angelic chorus proclaiming universal peace (Lk 2.13–14, again). The relationship of Jesus as Son to this God as Father is dynamic, but is, obviously, not spelled out. Jesus exercises divine power over demons and/or ‘natural’ forces (e.g., Mk 4.35–5.20 and parallels), but is subject to his Father’s will, and unaware of his Father’s future plans (Mk 14.36 and parallels; Mk 13.32, Mt 25.13; cf. Acts 1.7).

The sequence, “... ‘I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob.’ He is not the God of the dead but of the living” (Mk 12.27 and parallels) arguably assumes a metaphysics of orderly being as opposed to the dissolution of death: God (as in Philo) cannot be held to be “relative to” (“be of”) what is dead.⁵⁶ Explicitly this God has everything in his power (Mk 10.27, again), and can and will draw all the chaos and disorder of tumults and wars and oppression into a coherent life in some future ‘angelic-like’ community. Luke later deploys a similar metaphysics of orderly being (but this time, clearly Stoic), a little more explicitly, at Acts 17.22–31 (cf. 14.15–17); God is, by definition, one who has no needs, no dependency, is only agent, not recipient, the sole and thus unifying source and sustainer in good order of us and everything: “in him we live and move and ‘are’ (‘have our being’, Acts 17.28)”.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ J.L. Reed, “Archaeological Contributions”, 42. Justin Martyr took it as acknowledging the Emperor’s rights (*Apology* 1.17); Paul, as noted earlier, notes Ps. 24.1 etc. as authoritative, but still encourages submission, as noted above.

⁵⁶ See F.G. Downing, “The Resurrection of the Dead: Jesus and Philo”, *JSNT* 15 (1982), 42–50, though that discussion could well be expanded in terms of ‘being’ as ‘orderliness’.

⁵⁷ On Lukan theology, see L.C.A. Alexander, *Acts*; and F. Gerald Downing, “Ethical Pagan Theism” and “Common Ground with Paganism”.

3. THE PSEUDO-PAULINE LETTERS, 1 PETER AND 1 CLEMENT⁵⁸

In this study, Ephesians, Colossians, “The Pastoral Epistles” (1 and 2 Timothy and Titus), are taken as being, respectively, by three different authors who saw themselves followers—and were in all likelihood indirect followers—of Paul. 1 Peter is also pseudonymous; 1 *Clement* is anonymous, but is ascribed to “Clement” by later writers, who take him to have been the first bishop of Rome, though ‘monepiscopacy’ is not mentioned in the letter (cf. 1 *Clem* 41–44). Although most date these within the first century CE, there are those who date one or more later; the present author would place 1 Peter around 112 CE.

3.1. *Classical Sources*

All these writings acknowledge the incipiently canonical Jewish Scriptures as authoritative (1 *Clement* particularly lavishly), but, with the possible exception of 1 Pet 2.9 citing Ex 19.6, “a chosen race ... a people claimed by God as his own” (to be built up together into a single living temple), show little reliance on them in urging unity, order, harmony, until 1 *Clement*, who cites the “order” of “high priest, priests and Levites” in support of restoring due order in the church in Corinth (1 *Clem* 40.5–41.1).⁵⁹ In Ephesians we are told that God had long ago determined “to sum up, head up together (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι) all things” in Christ Jesus, and this is assured by Ps 110.1 (Eph 1.10, 22). That Christ is head over all things is reaffirmed in Colossians, but without explicit scriptural support (Col 2.10), and there is no recourse to Scripture on our themes of order, peace, concord, in the Pastorals.⁶⁰

3.2. *Inclusion and Reconciliation*

On attitudes to order in the wider community these writings differ. 1 *Clement* trustingly urges submission to those in authority (1 *Clem* 60.4–61.3), as does 1 Peter (2.13–15), for, despite “outrage and torture” (1 *Clem* 6; 61.2–3), despite the recent “fiery trial” (1 Pet 4.12), all is under the control of “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 *Clem* 61.2–3; cf. 1 Peter 1.5; it is

⁵⁸ Taking the Pastorals and 1 *Clem* around 95, 1 Pet 112 (see ch. 11, below).

⁵⁹ Cf. O.M. Bakke, ‘Concord and Peace’, 184–188.

⁶⁰ Compare the comment on the author’s omission of any “authoritative source”, Abraham J. Malherbe, “Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth”, *Nov.T.* 52 (2010), 376–405, citing 392.

argued in chapter eleven that this “fiery trial” is most likely the attempt of Pliny the Younger to ensure order in his province of Bithynia). It is to be accepted as God’s testing – 1Pet 4.17. No escape or resistance is envisaged. The ‘pastor’ urges intercessions for all, including emperors and all in high office, who are expected to enable a quiet and tranquil well-being (σωθῆναι) for all, his addressees included, under just laws (1Tim 2.1–4, with 1.8–10 and 4.10), even though governors govern under both the Christians’ fatherly God and saviour (Tit 1.3) and “our great God and saviour, Jesus Christ” (Tit 2.13). The Pilate before whom Jesus “made his good confession” is noted without critical comment (1Tim 6.13; cf. 2Tim 1.16. 2.9, 4.6).

Both Ephesians and Colossians, as noted above, believe that Christ Jesus has been set in authority over all; but in Ephesians this seems to be *de jure*, not *de facto*, and ‘we’ are still resisting “the world-rulers of this darkness” (Eph 6.12), resisting them, rather than relying on their earthly representatives. It may be that Ephesians is attempting to correct Colossians’ triumphalism (Col 2.15); but neither acceptance of nor opposition to Roman hegemony is made explicit.⁶¹

Within their communities, however, peace, harmony, reconciliation are strongly affirmed. “Everything should be done in order” (τάξει, 1Clem 40.1). We are adopted, redeemed, forgiven, one body brought under the same head, Christ (Eph 1.5–10; cf. Col 1.12–14, 19–21, 2.5; 1Clem 37.4–38.1), with mutual forgiveness (Col 3.13; Eph 4.2, 32). Peace has been offered and in Christian communities, realised, between Gentiles and Jews, creating a single new reconciled humanity (Eph 2.13–18).⁶² In Colossians, “all things” have already been reconciled, with no division between Jew and Greek, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, bond or free (but noting, male and female unmentioned; Col 1.20, 3.11). We have been brought to sincere family bonds, to grow in love for one another (1Pet 1.22; cf. 2.1, 4.8–10). There is a less ebulliently, more narrowly focused vision in Tit 3.3–7 (cf. 1Tim 1.15),

⁶¹ On Ephesians as correcting Colossians, cf. George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and in the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology* (WUNT 2.171; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); more recent, but ignoring van Kooten, Charles H. Talbert, *Ephesians and Colossians* (PCNT; Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2007); cf also, Te-Ti Lau, *The Politics of Peace. Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books*. On Col 1.15–20, see M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 288–303: “the power of the emperor is in no way denied or diminished ... Rather the emperor is indirectly (or by extension) placed under the authority of Christ” (295) without either as ‘appointee’ or ‘usurper’ being specified.

⁶² Noting the very full discussion in E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, but also the discussion of ‘body’ in O.G. Bakke, “Peace and Concord”, 179–184.

with an end to mutual animosity, though Ilaria Ramelli argues that 1Tim 5.1–2 significantly echoes a Stoic concern to appropriate apparent outsiders as close family members.⁶³ In fact the Pastor and 1Clement allot much more space to discouraging dissension than to celebrating concord, though warnings similar to theirs appear in the other writings.

3.3. Households

As is widely noted, all these writings place a heavy emphasis on the household, the commonly accepted basis for civic order in the Roman Empire.⁶⁴ Ephesians and Colossians both explicitly set the household in a Christian context, urging subjection “in the Lord”, reminding masters that they themselves have a master in heaven (Eph 5.21–6.9; Col 3.18–4.1; compare 1Pet 5.5; 1Clem 38.1).⁶⁵ It is arguable that “Be subject to one another” (Eph 5.21; 1Pet 5.5) in principle could subvert hierarchy, but this receives no further explanation or emphasis in either.⁶⁶ In Ephesians, husbandly obligation warrants most space; but other than that the emphasis there, and in Colossians and 1Peter, is solely on subordinates (cf. 1Clem 1.3; 21), and on slaves in particular.⁶⁷ Interestingly, in the Pastorals by way of contrast, the focus is on kinds of leadership, the Pastor making it clear that a Christian congregation’s social standing is at stake in its leader’s rule of his own household (1Tim 3.1–7); but the same applies to other households, and especially those where young widows are accused of running loose (1Tim 5.14; Tit 2.5). At this level social conservatism is shared by all these authors, with the Pastor possibly addressing Christian groups more integrated with their wider society (or, at least, more hopeful of being so).⁶⁸

⁶³ Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, “The Pastoral Epistles and Hellenistic Philosophy: 1Timothy 5:1–2, Hierocles, and the ‘Contraction of Circles’”, *CBQ* 73.3 (2011), 562–581.

⁶⁴ For an overview, Margaret Y. MacDonald and Halvor Moxness (eds), *Domestic Space and Families in Early Christianity*, *JSNT* 27.1 (2004). Benjamin G. Wold, “Family Ethics”, argues that 4QInstruction and Philo indicate more ‘Scriptural’ input than most commentators allow for.

⁶⁵ The similarity with the ethos of imperial and especially Flavian Rome here and in 1Clem 21 is argued in detail by E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, 431–441. However, see Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Slavery, Sexuality and House Churches: A Reassessment of Col 3.18–4.1 in the Light of New Research on the Roman Family”, *NTS* 53.1 (2007), 94–113.

⁶⁶ J.A. Glancy, *Slavery*, 145, 149, overlooks the motif of mutual submission in Eph and 1Pet.

⁶⁷ Cf. O.M. Bakke, “Concord and Peace”, 119–126.

⁶⁸ Cf. Margaret Y. MacDonald, *The Pauline Churches: A Socio-Historical Study of Institutionalisation in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Churches* (SNTMS 60; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); but also Reggie M. Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral*

Friendship motifs, sharedness, commonality, as constituent elements of the unity commended are not obvious in this set of writings, though perhaps implicit (e.g., Eph 4.23–25; Col 2.2, 3.12–14; 1 Pet 1.22, 4.8–9; 1 Clem 49); the emphasis on ‘submission’, even if mutual, is much stronger.

3.4. *Ancestral Tradition*

In these writings an affirmation of ancestral tradition lies primarily in showing respect to the inherited Jewish Scriptures—even though, apart from their frequent appearance in 1 Clement, they are not widely quoted. For Colossians, baptism replaces circumcision, and sabbaths and new moons are a snare (Col 2.11–12, 16). Ephesians is the only one obviously eager to claim for the non-Jews addressed, the actual Jewish past, “the community of Israel ... the covenantal promises” (Eph 2.12), as now re-interpreted in this context, but with no suggestion of Jewish practice even as a temptation.⁶⁹ 1 Peter seems to take it for granted that the followers of Christ have taken over the heritage of Israel (1 Pet 2.4–10, again). 1 Clement, as already acknowledged, Christian public ministrations (λειτουργίας) mirror in their orderliness, but replace, those of Judaism (1 Clem 40.2., 41.1). For the Pastor, the Jewish Scriptures are good for ethical instruction, which is how he in fact employs them (but not often; 2 Tim 3.14–17; 1 Tim 1.8, 5.18). By the time of writing ‘tradition’ in his community is primarily its own (2 Tim 1.5, 12); Jewish converts and their “myths” pose a problem (Tit 1.10–14).

3.5. *Other Ways and Means*

That there is strong verbal encouragement to orderly behaviour in conventional households has been noted just above. It was suggested that a measure of common life and mutual support might well have appreciably reduced socially induced painful stress levels.

While there is no overt reference to the Supper of the Lord, the motifs of 1 Cor 11–14 reappear in brief at Col 3.12–17; compare Eph 5.14–20, here with a warning against drunkenness; in both with encouragement to hearers to sing together.⁷⁰

Epistles (SBLDS 122; Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1990); Matthias Becker, “Ehe als Sanatorium. Plutarchs *Coniuglia Praecepta* und die Pastoralbriefe”, *Nov.T.* 52.2 (2010), 241–266.

⁶⁹ Cf. Margaret Y. MacDonald, “The Politics of Identity in Ephesians”, *JSNT* 26.4 (2004), 419–444.

⁷⁰ See again Hans Joachim Stein, *Früchristliche Mahlfeiern*, 172–182; and M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 288–302, though, as noted earlier, with scant attention to music as such.

There is a promise of blessedness to come, a prospect not to be lost or put at risk (Col 1.5, 12; 2.2, 8, 16–19; Eph 1.11, 14; 4.1, 17, 30; 5.6; 1Tim 1.19–20; 4.1; 6.20; 2Tim 1.18; 4.8, 14; Tit 2.13; 1Pet 1.3–5; 1Clem 28.1; 35; 41.4; 59). The communities whose leaders are addressed by the Pastor seem to be paying them, and also to be maintaining widows (whether or not expecting some further ministerial service from the latter in return, 1Tim 5.8–10, 17; cf. 1Pet 5.2). Subscription, and paid leaders (or servants, *διάκονοι*), as with other *collegia*, indicates a bounded membership that can afford to discipline its members. A specific sanction seems to be expulsion for non-compliance (Tit 3.10), which may or may not be the same as “delivery to Satan”, 1Tim 1.20; as with Paul earlier, the latter may betoken expulsion or curse (or both).

3.6. *Voices from Below*

It is always possible that an author may anticipate disagreement or dissent (even at the risk of prompting it); but dissent in Colossians, in particular, seems so specific that it needed only to be labelled (and so enigmatically that its interpretation continues to be disputed).⁷¹ Some present or erstwhile members seem to practice and encourage a divisively strict self-discipline, one with Jewish roots of some sort (Col 2.16–23), and one which the author interprets as denying what he took God to have achieved in the death and enthronement of his Son. Ephesians, as noted just above, may be urging a greater realism: Christ is in charge of operations, creating an all-encompassing “new humanity” to rival that offered by Rome, and especially, it may seem by the Flavians; but the powers and Rome, God/Christ’s vicegerent, have not yet submitted; nor, for that matter, has the wider society in which the missive’s audience lives (Eph 4.17–19).⁷² On the other hand, Colossians is also aware that suffering remains, and there’s a lot of work still to be done (Col 1.24–29; and see further, above).

⁷¹ Cf. Loren T. Stuckenbruk, “Colossians and Ephesians”, in J.D.G. Dunn (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, 116–132, citing 119–122.

⁷² G.H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology*, again; M.Y. MacDonald in “The Politics of Identity”, 437–442, “Imperial Ideology and Ephesians”; E. Faust concludes, “E 2, 16 kann die neue ekklesiologische Gemeinsamkeit von Juden und Nichtjuden durch die Kurzformel ‘die beiden in einem Leib’ ansprechen, wobei Christus, ‘in dem’ beide zum Typ des ‘neuen Menschen’ umgeschaffen wurden, als Haupt des Leibes vorausgesetzt wird (cf. 1,22 f.; 4, 15 f.25; 5,22.28.30). Auch hier ist schließlich der Kaiser also Haupt des corpus imperii nur zu deutlich vergleichbar ...”, *Pax Christi* 401. (Faust goes on to reaffirm his detection of an implicit Logos theology in both ideologies, which I find less persuasive.)

The Pastoral Epistles offer evidence of more diverse forms of dissent. Alongside 1 Tim 2.1–4 we find the religio-political term ἐπιφάνεια transferred from “saving appearances” of the Greek Gods and then of the Roman Emperors, to the past and future salvific appearing of “our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ” (Tit 2.13).⁷³ Often noted are the indications that some women are daring to think for themselves and speak up in public, including young widows staying clear of patriarchal households, and some men are encouraging them, though can only be after their bodies (1 Tim 2.12, 5.13; 2 Tim 3.6). But there are also world-denying ascetics, who refuse marriage and animal flesh (whether for individual or for social reasons, or both, is not said, 1 Tim 4.3; and cf. 1 Tim 5.23, on wine); nor is it clear whether these are also the ones who say the general resurrection has already happened (2 Tim 2.18). In contrast, there are those who are too worldly (and a paid leadership may tempt such people; 1 Tim 6.6–10, 3.8; Tit 1.7). Some indulge in misleading speculations about origins and law (*torah*? 1 Tim 1.4–7; Tit 1.14, 3.9), they and/or perhaps others are finding Christian belief intellectually stimulating and assuming they are free to discuss it (1 Tim 6.4; 2 Tim 2.23, 4.4). The Pastor’s response to all this is, of course, the very conventional foundation of social order, the patriarchal household. In Clement’s time, so O.M. Bakke argues, trouble has arisen in the form of resistance to patronal control of the congregation by those held socially inferior, the ἄτιμοι, ἄδοξοι, ἄφρονοι, over resources and respect, 1 Clem 3.3 with 38.2 and 54.3. Clement’s response as Bakke amply shows, is presented in terms of very conventional Graeco-Roman arguments for the shared benefits of a hierarchical society.⁷⁴

There are no indications in 1 Peter of ideological or other dissent in the communities addressed. Tensions there are, but arise from the wider civic communities where the congregations addressed are situated (and where they may literally be resident aliens).⁷⁵ Slaves may well suffer unjust and arbitrary punishment, Christian wives of pagan husbands may need to exercise an exemplary docility, and valid accusations of criminal behaviour are not unimaginable (1 Pet 2.18–3.6; 4.15).

⁷³ Cf. Raymond F. Collins, “From ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ to ΕΠΙΦΑΝΕΙΑ: The Transformation of a Pauline Motif”, in Christopher W. Skinner and Kelly R. Iverson (eds), *Unity and Diversity in the Gospels and Paul. Essays in Honor of Frank J. Matera* (ECL 7; Atlanta GA: SBL, 2012), 273–299, citing 295–298.

⁷⁴ O.M. Bakke, “Peace and Concord”, ch. 4, 281–327.

⁷⁵ Cf. John H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless. A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter. Its Situation and Strategy* (London: SCM, 1981).

3.7. *The Universe and the One God*

On the surface there might seem to be no metaphysical underpinning for the “blessed rage for order” in these writings, other than *1 Clement*, where

Day and night accomplish the course ordered (τεταγμένον) for them, without hindrance to one another. Sun and moon and the dancing stars according to his appointment circle in concord ... all these things the great creator and master of the universe ordered to be in peace and concord ... but far beyond the rest, us.

(our first instance of the cosmic dance in an early Christian source; *1 Clem* 20, 3–4, 11).⁷⁶

Echoes of the Hebrew Psalter and Stoic cosmology are readily discernible, but, as O.M. Bakke shows, the socio-political message of such a cosmic picture was a commonplace.⁷⁷ Yet, as George van Kooten has persuasively argued, ‘body’ and ‘powers’ talk in Colossians, and then in Ephesians, manifestly echoes Middle Platonic and Stoic discussions of the powers of the universe as a cosmic body, articulated from the outset in terms of the ‘prepositional metaphysics’ deployed at Col 1.17–20, with Christ as agent, filling the whole, as the πλήρωμα, the fullness of the divine nature (Col 2.9), the basis of universal peace and harmony among all the cosmic powers.⁷⁸ The author of Ephesians is happy enough with the thought forms, but not with Colossians’ conviction that the universe is already Christ’s body (a disagreement already alluded to above).⁷⁹

The closest the Pastor comes to metaphysics is in the rhetorical ascription of honour and glory “to the King of the ages/eternal, incorruptible, invisible, the only God” (1 Tim 1.17; cf. Tit 1.2; cf. 1 Pet 1.4), without making it clear whether αἰώνιος is ‘everlasting’ or ‘timeless’. But then, neither is the relationship explained between this Father and saviour (1 Tim 1.1–2) and king on one side, and “our great God and saviour Jesus Christ”, on the other (Tit 2.13). Also of note is the confident assertion, “everything created by God is good ... if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by God’s word and prayer”

⁷⁶ Cf. Cilliers Breytenbach, “Civic Concord and Cosmic Harmony: Sources of Metaphoric Mapping in *1 Clement* 20.30” (2003), in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds), *Early Christianity*, 259–273. Y. Zafiri, “Chorus and dance”, 227, finds “no parallel” to the cosmic dance “in the Judaeo-Christian tradition”, perhaps meaning in the respective canonical scriptures, but anyway ignoring Philo and Clement of Rome (and Ignatius, *Eph.* 19, see below).

⁷⁷ Cf. O.M. Bakke, “*Peace and Concord*”, 160–174.

⁷⁸ Cf. E. Faust, *Pax Christi*, 448–470. On ‘prepositional metaphysics’, see again Gregory E. Sterling, “Prepositional Metaphysics”.

⁷⁹ G.H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology*, again.

(1Tim 4.4–5). Integral to the hope of quiet and tranquil well-being for all is a trust in the one God and the one mediator between God and humans, the human Jesus (1Tim 2.1–5, noted already above). And what the Pastor thus expresses matches, of course, what we have been observing in the other authors surveyed. Human unity, concord, harmony is articulated in terms of divine unity and ordering, in hope, expectation, or projection.

4. THE JOHANNINE WRITINGS, WITH HEBREWS AND IGNATIUS⁸⁰

4.1. *Classical Sources*

Again, all of the documents listed explicitly quote from, and also clearly allude to passages from among the authoritative Jewish writings (if least in Ignatius).⁸¹ Yet, while unity, peace and concord again matter for these authors, no overt scriptural support on such issues appears. At most ἀπαύγασμα, δόξα, δυνάμεις at Heb 1.3 might lead one to suspect Wis 7.22–27 in the background, with its articulation of a sense of orderly divine unity behind and sustaining the diversity of phenomena.⁸² Rev 1.8 also implicitly celebrates divine encompassing unity, here with a likely allusion to Ex 3.14, LXX, together with Amos 3.13, LXX; taken up again when the threads are joined together, Rev 21–22 (cf. 21.6), yet with no explicit causal link indicated. Particularly significant in this respect is the *Apocryphon of John*, with its emphatic affirmation of hierarchical harmony, alongside a vehement repudiation of the story of the Jewish nation as narrated in the Scriptures: Ialdabaoth, the creator God of the Jews, simply presides over division and chaos.⁸³ It is middle Platonism that provides the articulation of the harmony sought; all that Jewish tradition provides are the ‘doxological’ terms that can evoke that Platonic unitive divine reality. Not all ‘gnostic’ writings are as wholesale in their dismissal of the physical creation; the *Tripartite Tractate*, for instance, allows that, though imperfect, physical creation remains within the benevolent thought of the incomprehensible Father.⁸⁴ But there is no sign of any

⁸⁰ Placing Heb in the 90’s CE, alongside 1Clem; Jn and the Johannine letters around 100, Ignatius 110.

⁸¹ Cf. William R. Schoedel, *Ignatius of Antioch* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1985), 9.

⁸² See Harold W. Attridge, *Hebrews* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1989), 41–45.

⁸³ *ApocJoh* 10–14 (NHC 58–60); cf. Karen L. King, *The Secret Revelation of John* (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 95, 157–160, 199.

⁸⁴ On the intellectual context, K.L. King, *op.cit.*; Zlatko Pleše, *Poetics of the Gnostic Universe. Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John* (NHMS 52; Leiden and Boston:

tradition of reading the Scriptures or any individual texts as themselves articulating the compelling vision of harmonious reconciliation. “Orthodox” Christians (the spiritual ancestors of later orthodoxy) shared the “blessed rage for order” of many of their contemporaries, and found no such disparity as *ApocJoh* articulates between that driving concern and the Jewish Scriptures they brought with them or themselves inherited—yet neither do they claim to find support for that ideal spelled out in those authoritative writings.⁸⁵

4.2. *Inclusion and Reconciliation*

John accepts that Roman power comes to it “from above” (Jn 19.11), but offers Rome (identified as, or itself subject to “the prince of this world”, Jn 12.31, 14.30, 16.11) and wider society no allegiance (even if effective compliance).⁸⁶ For John Jesus’ followers are in this world but not of it (Jn 17.15–16); so, too, for the letter-writer (1Jn 4.5–6). Those addressed in Hebrews have endured prison and confiscation (10.34), and are urged to accept again that, like Jesus (and the faithful of ch. 12) they do not belong in the contemporary social scene, its ruler not even named (13.13–14), while their suffering is to be interpreted as divine parental disciplining. They are, nonetheless, to pursue peace with all (unspecified; Heb 12.14), in established households (13.1–5; see further, below). Ignatius goes to his death in the arena in Rome, critical of his escort though not explicitly of the Empire. His Roman guard in fact allows him safe contact with churches on the way, but also his eagerly desired self-offering to God (*Rom* 5–7). The sense in which “the old kingdom perished” with the birth of Jesus is not explained (Ign. *Eph* 19.3). Revelation is, at least on the surface, most thoroughly “dualist” among the “canonical” writings in

Brill, 2006), Gerard P. Luttikhuisen, *Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions* (NHMS 58; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). For ‘doxological’ in this sense, Einer Thomasen, “The Structure of the Transcendent World in the Tripartite ‘Tractate’ (NHC I, 5)”, *VigChr* 4.4 (1980), 358–375, 368–369. I am grateful to Kimberley Slack for pointing me to these and other “gnostic” writings and their commentators. Translations in James M. Robinson (ed.), *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), and in K.L. King, as above; and notes on TriTrac in Harold W. Attridge and Elaine Pagels, “NHC I,5: The Tripartite Tractate”, in Harold W. Attridge (ed.) *Nag Hammadi Codex I (The Jung Codex). Notes* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 217–497.

⁸⁵ Again, the phrase is from a poem by Wallace Stevens, taken as his title by David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order*.

⁸⁶ Craig S. Keener, *The Gospel of John. A Commentary*, 2 vols (Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 2.879–880, etc; Andrew T. Lincoln, *The Gospel According to St. John* (BNTC; Peabody and London: Hendrickson and Continuum, 2005), 252–253, etc.

this group; yet even here, the (Roman) enemy beast “is allowed” (by God, presumably) to rampage (13.5, 7) and to control the entire socio-economic system (13.16–17), which is, however, to be overthrown (ch. 18).⁸⁷ On the other hand, the incoherent repeatedly violent imagery is clearly metaphorical, and no authoritative interpretation is offered, allowing the reader, if she will, to suppose that an acceptance by the author’s enemies of a drastic purgation is possible, even assured, and “the kings of earth” and their culture may come, cleansed, into the heavenly community (21.22–27).⁸⁸

Within the Christian communities addressed, divine forgiveness or removal of offences is widely affirmed (Jn 1.29, 20.23; 1Jn 1.9; Heb 1.3, 9.22, 10.18; Rev 1.5; fruitful repentance, at Ign. *Eph.* 10.1–3), and unity—for some, at least—together with God is celebrated (Jn 17.21; 1Jn 1.3, 2Jn 9; Rev 21.3; Heb 2.1–13, 3.1; Ign. *Eph.* 4; *Mag* 1.1). Mutual forgiveness is not mentioned (unless it is implied at Jn 13.10–13; 1Jn 1.7, 3.11–12; Heb 12.14). Tolerance and forbearance whatever the cost, are urged by Ignatius (only, *Eph.* 10); it may redound to the group’s public credit (*Trall.* 8.2). Love for one another among members, like God’s generous love for them, is a key motif in the Gospel and letters. It is also enjoined, more inclusively if with less emphasis, in Hebrews (10.24; cf. 13.1–2). With faith(-fulness), it is a constant theme in Ignatius (*Eph.* 14.1–2; *Mag.* 6.1–2, etc.).⁸⁹ The only love to find commendation in Revelation seems to be directed Godwards (2.4, 19).

4.3. Household

Ordinary households receive no focussed attention in this set of writings. Jesus attends a wedding, but we meet only its steward, slaves and guests; he heals a male child in a prominent household; and he has a meal in a household of adult sibling friends (Jn 2.1–12; 4.46–53; 12.1–3). Relations between Jesus and his birth-brothers is strained; so, too, it may seem, with his mother (Jn 7.1–10; 2.3–5). Jesus on the cross places her, not in the care of any among her other natural sons, but of another male, Jesus’ best friend, as now his friend’s ‘fictive’ mother (Jn 19.26–27).⁹⁰ Sjef van Tilborg has argued persuasively that friendship motifs (not just in Jn 15.14–15) dominate in the

⁸⁷ Richard Bauckham, *The Theology of the Book of Revelation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 35–47, noting 47 for “allowed”.

⁸⁸ On contemporary acceptance of the ‘openness’ of metaphor in particular, and of words and sequences of words in general, see ch. 6, below.

⁸⁹ W.R. Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 24–26.

⁹⁰ A.T. Lincoln, *John*, ad loc.

gospel, and, it would seem, to the occlusion of the natural household or family.⁹¹ Even fictive family terms are rare in the gospel; only at Jn 20.17 does Jesus talk of his “brothers”; contrast the Johannine *Letters*. Similarly there is no interest in the family or household in Revelation. Here Hebrews differs, as already indicated, with family and household providing a leading image in the first three chapters (Heb 1.5–6; 2.11–14, 17; 3.1–6; cf. Ignatius, *Eph* 6, 16), then to be taken up in the conclusion of the main argument (10.21; cf. 12.5–9). The everyday household also figures in practical injunctions (Heb 13.1–5, 16; cf. Ign *Sm* 13; *Pol* 4–5). In Hebrews friendship motifs may be discernible as complement to the family model (13.1, 16). 1 and 3 John here also differ from the gospel, using “brother” frequently, and treating the community as ‘children’ in a fictive family (1 Jn 2.9, 12; 2 Jn 1), but combined with such terms as community, fellowship (κοινωνία, 1 Jn 1.3, 2.21, 3.17—sharing possessions; 3.24). Ignatius occasionally deploys a ‘common mind’ topos (e.g., *Eph* 3.2–4.1; *Trall* 1.1).

4.4. Ancestral Tradition

As explained, the main claim to own and affirm an ancestral tradition is here, too, represented by our authors’ appeals to the Jewish Scriptures brought with them (in memory and in written texts) by their Jewish Christian predecessors. This involves, of course, the implicit, and now often explicit claim that Jews who have not “turned to Christ” have failed to understand their own authoritative writings—with the explicit claim most vigorously advanced in Hebrews; while Ignatius insists that living by Torah is incompatible with Christian commitment (*Mag* 8–10; *Phil* 6); (on both of these themes compare *Epistle of Barnabas*). In Hebrews it is insisted that the whole story recorded in the ancient scriptures looks forward to Jesus who has realised their promise of open access to God (ch. 11, with its climax, 11.39–40 and 12.18–24), thus rendering the old anticipatory and provisional practices irrelevant, as those writings had themselves forecast (10.8–9, 19–22; cf. Ignatius, *Phil* 9). Whereas the Temple-set worship prescribed in those Scriptures foreshadowed divine reality, present access to that reality is now assured for followers of Jesus (Heb 12.22–29 with 10.1–23). With this Rev 4–5 would seem to concur (cf. Ignatius, *Phil* 4); but so, too, the Fourth Gospel: “The time is coming when you will worship the Father neither on

⁹¹ Sjef van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love in John* (BIS 2; Leiden and New York: Brill, 1993); see also, Ronald F. Hock, “Jesus, the Beloved Disciple, and Greco-Roman Friendship”, in Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts (eds). *Christian Origins and Greco-Roman Culture ... Early Christianity in Its Hellenistic Context 1* (TENTS 9; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 195–212.

this mountain [Gerizim] nor in Jerusalem ... the true worshippers will worship the Father in Spirit and in truth" (Jn 4.21–23; cf. 2.20–21; 7.37–39; [and 12.20–21?]).⁹²

4.5. *Other Ways and Means*

Love for one another can be enjoined in the Gospel, and is backed up in 1John and in Hebrews by sharing resources, by exercising hospitality, by mutual encouragement, following Christ's example (1Jn 3.16–17; Heb 10.23–24; 13.1–2, 16; cf. Ignatius, *Eph* 13, 20; *Sm* 6). The Fourth Gospel narrates meal fellowship and hospitality, and its main block of teaching from Jesus is given a symposium setting (13–17); while explicitly it enjoins only foot-washing (Jn 13.14–15). Ignatius regularly emphasises the centrality of the shared Eucharist, but also on one occasion takes shared song as an effective means and expression of unity: "Your esteemed presbyters, worthy of God, act in harmony with your bishop, like the strings of a lyre, and so, in your concord and harmonious love, Jesus is praised in song" (*Eph* 4.1–2; cf. all of 4–5).⁹³ On mutual support Revelation also indicates unity in liturgy, and especially in choral singing, together with eating (Rev 4–5, with 2.7, 3.20, 19.9, 22.14); but it it condemns a socio-economic system that deprives the audience of sustenance, if without sharing among Christians being specifically enjoined. (There is no overt reference to dance, but whether the heavenly community was imagined standing stock-still apart from occasional prostrations is at least questionable.)

As among other Christians, the most powerful sanction is the threat of ultimate rejection by God or Christ as judge (Heb 10.26–27; Rev 2.5, 3.5; Jn 5.28–29; 1Jn 3.15, 5.12; Ignatius, *Eph* 11.1). For now people leave of their own accord, perhaps having failed to persuade others to share their divergent convictions (Jn 6.26; 1Jn 2.18–19; Rev 3.1–5; Heb 10.25–31; *Trall* 11). Perhaps dissidents could be frozen out. One alternative is to refuse hospitality (3Jn 5–10), perhaps involving physical barriers or bodily removal. And then, as in Acts and in Paul, Revelation may suggest curses inducing psychosomatic punishment (Rev 2.16, 22–23).

⁹² C.S. Keener, *John*, 1, 615–619; on 'in the air' priestly motifs in these and other writings, see very recently, Harold W. Attridge, "How Priestly Is the 'High Priestly Prayer' of John 17?", *CBQ* 75.1 (2013), 1–14, noting 7–8.

⁹³ Harry O. Maier, "The Politics of the Silent Bishop: Silence and Persuasion in Ignatius of Antioch", *JTS* NS 55 (2004), 503–515, argues with copious illustration that reserved and controlled speech in Ignatius is to be seen as a means towards creating and preserving harmony and concord, in accord with the divine communication in silence, *Eph* 19.1–3.

4.6. *Voices from Below*

Ideological dissent from the *pax Romana* is overt and encompassing in Revelation, as already acknowledged, with John's Gospel and the Letters betokening a quietist withdrawal. Hebrews' audience, it was suggested, lies somewhere between, subject to prison and confiscation, but more engaged in surrounding society. Accepted, critical redescriptions by these (as by "gnostic") writers of their contemporary world as governed by false Gods and false values is an act of inner resistance. Yet unless that is accompanied by a practical local individual and communal *askesis*, it is as tolerant in practice as Stoicism could be; to echo Karl Marx, it prefers description of the world to changing it even locally.⁹⁴ The 'gnostic' writings noted here show little if any overt sign of encouraging even the alternative local social enactment that is inculcated by the less metaphysical Christians. And, while these gnostic writings oppose "usurping" hierarchical powers, that is in favour of the true hierarchy, unreservedly affirmed.

Dissidence within the Christian groups addressed is also apparent, from neglecting meetings, and lukewarmness (Heb 10.25; Rev 3.15), to leadership disputes (3 Jn 5–10, again; Heb 13.7) to rejecting "the Christ come in the flesh" (1 Jn 4.2; Jn 6.53–58; cf. Ignatius, *Trall* 9; *Sm* 2) or to a "persisting in sin" which amounts to "trampling under foot the Son of God" (but this is otherwise unspecified; Heb 10.26–29).

4.7. *The Universe and the One God*

Once more there is no attempt at metaphysical elaboration, either descriptive or prescriptive (contrast much "gnostic" writing); but there are metaphysical asides and allusions, mostly in the Gospel and in Hebrews, worth comparing with, though probably not derived from the much more detailed reflections of Philo in particular. Thus there is "the Word", fully divine but distinct enough to be the divine agent in creation and source of its life and intelligence, and, as Son to Father, identified with the human Jesus. The extent to which John's hearers' would have picked up Stoic resonances in some of this is debated; they are clearly there in Philo's reflections.⁹⁵ It is

⁹⁴ Responding here to K.L. King, *Secret Revelation*, 157–173. If Nag Hammadi documents were used by 4th–5th century desert ascetics, of course, they then articulated an enacted critique: cf. F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 239–270.

⁹⁵ Compare the discussion in C.S. Keener, *John*, 1, 333–363; contrast A.T. Lincoln, *John*, 92–99; on Stoics, Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.51, 2.19, 45–46, 57–58, and ch. 1, above, pp. 32–33; on Philo, *Leg.all.* 2.86; *Deus immut.* 77; *Abr.* 119–123, and ch. 1, above, pp. 47–48.

worth considering that Jesus' later insistence that "my Father continues to work and I must work, too" (Jn 5.17; also resonating with Philo) would have confirmed the Stoic echo, in light of Stoic insistence on the ceaseless activity of the Logos. The contrast is then all the more striking, for in John the cosmos, though loved, is opposed to and refuses, rather than being pervaded by, and held in peaceful harmonious unity by the divine intelligence (Jn 1.10–11).

Hebrews, too, identifies Jesus as creative divine Son, in terms perhaps, as suggested earlier, drawn from Wisdom of Solomon (and so, also, but indirectly, with Stoic links; Heb 1.1–4).⁹⁶ Yet here, again, there is no suggestion in these writings of an underlying and now renewed harmony for all things of the kind explored in Colossians and Ephesians. In Hebrews, for instance, the household of God consists in God's faithful people, not the cosmos (Heb 3.1–6, 18). Ignatius, too, includes metaphysical terms in passing, including the kind of paradox that would later be much expanded (e.g., *Eph.* 7.2), but not of divine creative and sustaining unity; his metaphysics of new unity and concord, like that of the others, but richer, is in "mythic" narrative, involving the cosmic dance, rather than in formal abstraction:

A star shone forth in the heavens above all the stars, and its light was inexpressible, its strangeness amazing; and all the rest of the constellations, sun and moon included, formed themselves into a chorus around this star, though it outshone them all, leaving them perplexed, unable to tell from whence this unprecedented and incomparable phenomenon had sprung. From that instant on every sorcery, every spell was broken, every ignorant source of wickedness was dispersed, their ancient rule destroyed, when God appeared humanly (ἀνθρωπίνως) to restore eternal life, and what he had long prepared began to take effect, shaking the universe, with the end of death in hand.

(χορὸς, as in 1 *Clement* 20.3, suggests the musical model for concord, *Eph* 19.2–3).⁹⁷

There is nothing here to match Paul's enigmatic "and thus God will be all in all"; nor, for that matter, akin to the sort of final return of all to the original inexpressible unity proclaimed in *ApocJoh* 25–27, *TriTrac* 115–118, 121–end, noting 132.21–29, where "Christ is all in all", as at 1 *Cor* 15.24–28.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion can be quite briefly stated. Concerns both for unity, peace, concord, as expressed in the wider Graeco-Roman world and among Jews

⁹⁶ Compare the discussion in H.W. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 35–48.

⁹⁷ See W.R. Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 87–94; M.E. Gordley, *Teaching through Song*, 349–358.

around the early years of the Christian movement, as well as varying intimations of unease, on occasion, with the manner of their imposition and the quality of the result, are echoed in our early Christian documents in similarly varying ways, and drawn, it would seem, from common conviction, with little if any reference to specifically Judaeo-Christian sources. Such ideas were “in the air”. Although scholars may at times suggest very clear divisions between affirmation of the Roman peace and social conformity on the one hand among Christians, and radical dissent on the other, the evidence is rather of a much more nuanced and varied *range* of qualified affirmations and oppositions. This is significant for any reconstruction of Christian origins, but also for any attempt to ‘use’ these texts as a basis for social and ethical commentary.⁹⁸

Further, order was widely held to need to begin with each individual, and might perhaps only be truly found there. Certainly, social order itself was taken to depend on the orderly self-control of the leader, as was noted from Plutarch, earlier: “The ruler must first gain command of himself, must regulate his own soul and establish his own character, and then make his subordinates conform.” Music and dance could have their social benefit through their effect on individuals. “Control over one’s moral purpose”, Epictetus had earlier assured his hearers, is what produces “love in the household, concord in the state, peace among nations, and thankfulness towards God”, in this following Musonius before him. Behaving properly towards one’s country, Hierocles insisted, demands ridding oneself of “every passion and illness of one’s soul”. The one who rules himself is fit to rule world, avers Dio.⁹⁹ For some at least, such freedom from ‘passion(s)’ (however understood) was also thought to characterise God or the Gods, thus setting a model and ideal for humans.¹⁰⁰ Such ideas and ideals of self-control are pursued in the next two chapters.

⁹⁸ On making oneself aware of the diversity, rather than demanding a utilitarian coherent unity in the Scriptures, see Ellen Bradshaw Aitkin, “Relentless Intimacy: The Peculiar Labor of an Anglican Biblical Scholar”, *ATR* 93.4 (Fall 2011), 563–580.

⁹⁹ Plutarch, *Ad princ. inerud.* 2, *Moralia* 780B, LCL (adapted); cf. 777C, 779B; Epictetus *Diss.* 4.5.34–35; Musonius 8; Hierocles in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.39.36, Ramelli, *Hierocles* p. 71; Dio, *Discourse* 49.8–12, noting 11.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Seneca, *De clementia*, 1.1.2, 5.7, 7.1, 19.9; 2.2.1, as noted by George H. vanKooten, “Paul the Roman”: Reading “Paul’s Letter to the Romans” in the Light of Roman Historiography, Law and Politics’, as yet unpublished Manson Memorial Lecture, 2012, University of Manchester.

CHAPTER THREE

ORDER WITHIN: PASSIONS, DIVINE AND HUMAN

A. In the Wider Graeco-Roman World

INTRODUCTION

As summarised in the conclusion of the previous chapter, order was widely held to begin, of necessity, with each individual, and might perhaps only be truly found there. Certainly, social order itself was taken to depend on the orderly self-control of the leader, as was noted from Plutarch, Epictetus, Musonius and Hierocles.¹ For some at least, such freedom from disruption by “passion(s)” (however understood) was also thought to characterise God or the Gods, or (for Stoics at least), the divine cosmos, setting a model and ideal for humans to appropriate; and these are our concerns in what follows.

However, although among western (Christian and Jewish) theologians the debate over “passions” has mostly focused on the latter, on divine passions (or their lack or their impossibility), the ancient discussion has its home in discussions of human psychology. Fundamentally, it is about the possibilities of human self-control, integrity, autonomy: the issue amounts to, *Is there in some effective sense a self, an 'I', that is at least potentially other than its feelings, and capable of being in control of them rather than controlled by them (or by any other externality)?*² And further, if so,

¹ Plutarch, *Ad princ. inerud.* 2, *Moralia* 780B, LCL (adapted); cf. 777C, 779B; Epictetus *Diss* 4.5.34–35; Musonius 8; Hierocles in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.39.36, I. Ramelli, *Hierocles* p. 71.

² On the issue of ‘the self’, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), and the critical response in F.G. Downing, “Persons in Relation”, in *idem*, *Making Sense*, 43–61, referring to 57–61. There is a helpful debate among contributors in Shardi Bartsch and David Wray (eds), *Seneca and the Self* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) on the issue of whether the Senecan, Stoic, ‘self’ is ‘ontologically’ distinct: see the summary in Catherine Edwards, “Free yourself! Slavery, freedom and the self in Seneca’s *Letters*”, *op. cit.*, 139–159, here 144. In practical, ethical terms, there can be a reflective soul-self sufficiently distinct to address, question, criticise and give effective orders to itself. This ‘self’, thus distinct, can be enacted without necessitating any obvious attention to Stoic physical ontology.

is there perhaps also held to be a gender difference here, with self-control seen as a male prerogative?

The wider context still, is a *devaluation of and becoming indifferent to everything not at one's disposal*: property, civic status, health—and so, possibly even ‘one’s own’ feelings, emotions.³ In the next chapter the question is discussed as to whether any such talk, of humans as well as of God, is (as sometimes alleged) quite foreign to late Second Temple Jews and to the first Christians among them, an alien intrusion; or whether some such talk about ‘inner order’ is at home at least in some of these ancient Jewish circles. The present chapter attempts in brief to clarify and distinguish some of what Greek and Roman thinkers had been discussing, noting in further illustration how varying Christians in the second and later centuries responded to them.

However, it is worth noting how different some modern usage of the term “passion(s)” can be from the ancient debate discussed here, but for which the term is largely used. In a recent collection of essays, *Passion and Passivity*, it is held, in common with ancient views, that ‘passions’ happen to us, we ‘suffer’ them; but there is no suggestion that they may enslave us, overwhelm us, threaten our integrity as persons. Seneca and Stoicism, important in what follows, are noted together, without any nuance, and just once in passing; and “passion and passivity”, it is firmly concluded, “do not restrict or limit the human or divine potential by making it dependent on something else. Rather they are the creative source of everything new, the gateway beyond the conceptual limits on which we (must) insist ...”, a much more generous and encompassing assessment than Plato’s (also only acknowledged in passing).⁴

1. AMONG GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS

1.1. *Plato and Aristotle*

Attempts to understand feelings, and a willingness to define some at least of them as needing therapy, can be found among the Presocratics, as well

³ Thomas Krüger, *Qoheleth. A Commentary* (tr. O.C. Dean Jr.; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 22, my emphasis, citing M. Hossenfelder, *Die Philosophie der Antike*, 3: *Stoa, Epicureismus und Skepsis* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1985), 33–34; see further, below.

⁴ Ingolf U. Dalferth, “Introduction. Passion, Passivity, and the Passive Voice”, in *idem* and Michael Rodgers (eds), *Passion and Passivity. Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Conference 2009* (RTP 61; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 1–10, citing 3, 5, 9–10.

as in Plato and Aristotle, most intensively in the Stoics, but also among such as the Epicureans.⁵ (Evidence for Neopythagoreans is hard to come by.)⁶

For Plato the divine rational realm is changeless.⁷ Embodied souls, by contrast, are beset by four kinds of disturbing emotion: pleasure (ἡδονή) and grief, distress (λύπη), desire (ἐπιθυμία; sometimes, ‘appetite’) and fear (φόβος) (a quartet taken up, and on occasion expanded by later thinkers).⁸ Elsewhere Plato pictures just two emotions, appetite and anger, as powerful horses which reason as charioteer needs to control, though not eliminate: the passions are too inextricably intertwined with what is good in life to allow for neat excision; and that qualification is significant for the ongoing debates.⁹ Further, a distinction between self-willed self-ordering on the one hand, and pure imperviousness to change on the other may also turn out to seem significant for any attempt to interpret the evidence.

It is also important to allow that other authors, poets, romancers, playwrights and historians (and presumably, the populace at large) were readier to accept that emotions are “natural” and their display appropriate.¹⁰ Aiming for some form or degree of ἀπάθεια should not be seen as a universal Hellenistic trait, let alone, as among biblical scholars, one distinguishing Greeks

⁵ Michel Spanneut, “*Apatheia* ancienne, *apatheia* Chrétienne”, ANRW II 36.7, 4642–4717; Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Gifford Lectures; Oxford and New York, etc.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19; David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto & London: University of Toronto Press, 2006); John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁶ Glenn F. Chesnut, “The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic and Late Stoic Political Philosophy,” ANRW II.16.2, 1320–1332, referring to 1313–1315.

⁷ E.g., Plato, *Timaeus* 27a–30d, 42e. Plato does not make it clear how “the idea of the good” and the active demiurge, craftsman, are related; cf. Albert Rivaud (ed. and tr.), *Platon. Oeuvres complètes. X. Timée—Criteas* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1963), 36–38.

⁸ R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 136, citing Plato, *Laches* 191D; *Symposium* 207E; *Phaedo* 83B; *Republic* 429C and 430A; and *Theatetus* 156B.

⁹ R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 136 and 183, citing Plato, *Phaedrus* 5.5.34 and *Philebus* 47E–50B, respectively; cf. Plutarch, *Platonic Questions* 9 (*Moralia* 1008C, 1009A).

¹⁰ On this see further, below, and, especially, Bernard Pouderon and Cécile Bost-Pouderon (eds), *Passions, vertus et vices dans l’ancien roman. Actes du colloque de Tours, 19–21 octobre 2006* (Collection de la Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée 42, Série Littéraire et Philosophique 14; Lyons: Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2009); Loveday C.A. Alexander, “The Passions in Galen and the Novels of Chariton and Xenophon” (2008), in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 175–197; and B. Diane Lipsett, *Desiring Conversion. Hermas, Thecla, Asenath* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5, 14, 92–94. Geoffrey David Miller finds Herod overwhelmed by conflicting passions (albeit without the conventional terms), in “An Intercalation Revisited: Christology, Discipleship and Dramatic Irony in Mark 6.6b–30”, *JSNT* 35.2 (2012), 176–195, citing 183.

from Jews. Nonetheless, plausibly, it did represent an important implication of a more general foundational axiom for all strands of Hellenistic philosophy. *In a time when even free male Greek citizens were politically powerless, a basic shared principle was an acknowledgment of those needs and only those needs whose satisfaction lay in one's own power, and unruly emotions could be seen as threatening that autonomy.*¹¹ This psycho-social generalisation is supported by the previous chapter, but will be further illustrated in the passages to be cited in the discussion that follows.

(If this generalisation is at least provisionally accepted, then a significant commonality may be discerned with the situation of Jewish intellectuals in the early period of the formation of the canon, living and reflecting as they did in minor subordinate communities in the Persian, Hellenistic and, later, Roman empires. That topic is the subject of the following chapter.)

Already in this discussion we need, then, to be aware of the wide semantic range of πάθος (and πάσχω and παθήματα). The words cover all kinds of happenings to a more or less 'passive' subject, affecting, changing, constraining; often judged undesirable, with some, but by no means all, painful. Potentially character-changing things happen to you, but you—the 'real you' or the 'inner you' or your ideal self—may, some insisted, remain steadfast, in control.

Already in Aristotle's day there were some who argued for the eradication of all παθή, while he himself still urged only their moderation.¹² Nonetheless, to succeed in this control, ἐγκράτεια, effective prudence, σωφροσύνη, one would have to be an adult Greek male.¹³ Aristotle's deity, on the other hand, is the entirely unmoved, unaffected (ἀπαθής), unchanging actuality that activates the changing but perduring world, while itself engaged in contemplative pure thought.¹⁴

¹¹ So M. Hossenfelder, "Das praktische Grundprinzip ist also, nur solche Bedürfnisse anzuerkennen, deren Befriedigung ganz in der eigenen Macht steht", *Philosophie* (2nd ed., 1995), 24. On socio-political powerlessness and self-governance see, e.g., Dio, *Discourse* 44.12; Plutarch, *Præcepta ger. reipub.* 10 and 17, *Moralia* 805AB, 813 EF; Epictetus 4.1, and e.g. 4.1.62–63; Quintilian, *Institutes* 3.5.8.

¹² R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 195, citing Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1104^b25; *Eudemian Ethics* 1222^a3.

¹³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.2.1–15 (1254a,b); 1.5.8–9 (12260a); cf. *Generation of Animals* 4.6 (775a).

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1071b–1073a.

1.2. *Stoics*

Total human eradication of distress, pleasure, fear and desire was then urged by the early Stoic Cleanthes, arguing that all that aroused them was to be held indifferent.¹⁵ Following Chrysippus, later Stoics allowed instead a distinction between discerning what the emotion aroused is, and deciding on accepting or acting on it. The ultimate aim was still for your inner self to be in control, even if on the way to such perfection you might judge some emotions less inappropriate than others.¹⁶ Further, the true sage (who might never be instantiated) would be able to enjoy εὐπαθείας, well judged, rational and serene emotions, of joy (χαρά), caution (εὐλαβεία), and willing the good (βούλησιν), (including kindness and love).¹⁷ Numerous subdivisions of good and bad emotion are variously listed by different authors, and these, it seems to me, importantly modify and “humanize” the picture—especially when one recalls that the perfection of control sought was for all intents and purposes an impossible possibility, the achievement of the true sage, one who might never occur. So when Martha Nussbaum, approving the Stoic acceptance that emotions are ‘intentional’ (they involve discernible aims and evaluations), has nonetheless characterised even this latter, modified quest for individual perfection as “pathological narcissism”, I dare to disagree.¹⁸

I risk differing, at least in the instance of Epictetus. As we shall see, he seems able to welcome something like εὐπαθείας in ordinary people, and without reserve. If ἀπάθεια is understood not as changelessness, but as self-control, allowing in any way for εὐπαθείας, then it will be much easier to find anticipations of such talk in the Jewish canon.

It is worth illustrating the issues from other first century CE writers. Musonius, as a Cynic-leaning Stoic, and influential, insists—but needs to

¹⁵ R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 47–51; compare, e.g., Cicero, *De finibus* 3.10.35, “of these the sage will always be free”, in the light of the following discussion, especially 3.20.68.

¹⁶ R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 33.

¹⁷ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.110–117; Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6.11–7.15; cf. Margaret R. Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions. Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), esp. 134–145; and *eadem*, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), esp. 46–60; and Edgar M. Krentz, “Πάθη and Ἀπάθεια in Early Roman Stoics”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 122–135, though he ignores the εὐπαθείας, ‘good emotions’, to which Graver draws important attention.

¹⁸ Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 524.

argue—that control of the passions is as open to women, albeit bound to domesticity, as to men in the public sphere. Women are just as capable by nature of resisting slavery to pleasure and other desires, and controlling grief and all the other emotions (παθή).¹⁹ (Musonius influenced Clement of Alexandria, and through him, much early Christian reflection). It may nonetheless be held significant that Musonius will much more often stress self-control, self discipline (σωφρονσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, κρατεῖν μὲν ὀργῆς, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δ' ὑπὸ λύπης), rather than ἀπάθεια as such; so, too, for his student, Epictetus, it is a matter of concentrating on what is, rather than what is not under our control (ἐφ' ἡμῖν).

Seneca explains, “The mind of the wise man is like the ultra-lunar firmament: eternal calm pervades that region.”²⁰ A longer quotation seems worth considering, from Seneca’s *De ira*, illustrating Nussbaum’s insistence on the precise evaluations and judgments that emotions may be seen to involve:

That you may know, further, how the passions begin, grow, and run riot, realise that the first prompting is involuntary, a preparation for passion, as it were, and a sort of menace. The next move is combined with an act of volition, though not yet an unruly one: it judges that it is right for me to avenge myself because I have been injured, or that it is right for the other person to be punished because he has committed a crime. The third prompting is now beyond control, in that it wishes to take vengeance, not because it is right, but whether it is or not. And this has utterly vanquished reason.²¹

Seneca’s would-be sage is very clearly not simply impervious. In fact the accomplished sage may even welcome the storms of life that threaten to arouse passions as affording an occasion to exercise the control claimed.²²

¹⁹ Musonius Rufus, in Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus* (New Haven NJ: Yale, 1947), *Discourses* 3, “That women, too, should study philosophy”, 40, ll. 17–25, and 8, “That kings should also study philosophy”, 62, ll. 10–26; cf. Michel Spanneut, “*Apatheia* ancienne”, 4687–4688. On Cynics, cf. ps.Crates, *Epistles* 28, 29; cf. also Antisthenes, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.12; Dio Chrysostom, *Discourse* 74.19, though the latter can lapse into conventional demeaning of women, as at *Discourse* 30.36, where intemperance is symbolised by a woman, reason by a male; Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.24.53.

²⁰ Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 59.16 (LCL). Seneca, *ibid.*, also allows that the sage could experience some very refined and controlled emotion: “the effect of wisdom is a joy that is continuous and unbroken”.

²¹ Seneca, *De ira* 2.4.1, LCL slightly adapted. Richard Sorabji, *Emotion* 66–75, argues that here, in allowing for an initial “neutral” stage Seneca is making a distinctive advance in Stoic thought, though Margaret Graver, *Stoicism and Emotions*, 88, finds it also in Philo, and argues that it must be earlier; but I still think the passage a useful illustration of the underlying ethos. Michel Spanneut, writing earlier, concludes that Seneca “n’a jamais formulé une théorie des passions”, ‘*Apatheia* ancienne’ 4679.

²² Seneca, *Letter* 85; the storm metaphor, 33–34; cf. Shardi Bartsch, “Senecan metaphor

Then one may note from Epictetus, discussing how one may be orderly in what one assents to (τὰς συγκαταθέσεις):

The most important and especially pressing topic has to do with the stronger passions ... This is the field of study that introduces us to confusions, tumults, misfortunes and calamities, sorrows, lamentations, envies—passions which make it impossible even to listen to reason.²³

Just as our integrity and freedom depend on our treating as inessential things “not under our control—the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers and sisters, children, country”, so too are my passions to be judged external to my self.²⁴ There is a self that can be free from control by any of these; and such concern may well suggest a solipsistic narcissism. Selecting such passages, and many more alike, Michel Spanneut argues that Epictetus is a rigourist in the earliest tradition of Stoicism.²⁵

However, as noted above, the emphasis is on self-control, σωφρονισμὸν, as such, rather than on being impervious; and on my reading, neither Musonius nor Epictetus deploy ἀπαθής, ἀπάθεια, at all frequently. And in fact in the passage quoted above Epictetus continues, “the second topic deals with duty; for I ought not to be unfeeling (*sic*, ἀπαθή) like a statue, but should maintain my relations, both natural and acquired, as a pious man, a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.”²⁶ In further explanation Epictetus is then ready to use terms like ‘φιλόστοργος’ (affectionate), and ‘ἡμερος’ (gentle).²⁷ Epictetus does not term these εὐπαθείαι, but I suggest we should understand them so.

To flesh this out further, it is worth noting an anecdote that Arrian on Epictetus’ behalf shared with us (one to which we shall later return). He asked an elite official,

“What is your experience of marriage?” “Wretched, he said ... I feel so wretched about my little children, that recently, when my little daughter was sick and thought to be in danger, I could not bear even to stay by her sick bed, but I up and ran away, until someone brought me word that she was well again ...” “I suppose you will not deny that going away and leaving one’s child when

and Senecan self-instruction” (2009), in S. Bartsch and D. Wray (eds), *Seneca and the Self*, 188–217, here 194; also D. Wray, on Seneca’s dramatic presentation of characters coping with conflicting demands, in “Seneca and tragedy’s reason” (2009), *op. cit.*, 237–254.

²³ Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.2.3, LCL, adapted; compare 3.13.10–12.

²⁴ Epictetus, e.g., *Dissertations* 1.22.10; cf. 4.1.100–101.

²⁵ Michel Spanneut, “*Apatheia* ancienne”, 4688.

²⁶ Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.2.4, LCL, adapted.

²⁷ E.g., Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.18.5; cf. 3.3.9–10; 3.24.58–64.

she is sick is at least not reasonable ... But we have to consider whether it is affectionate ... Has her mother no affection for her child? (ἡ μήτηρ δ'οὐ φιλοστοργεῖ;)” “On the contrary, yes, for sure, she has affection for her”. “Ought she then to have left the child?”²⁸

The mother had sufficient control of her emotions to stay and care for and comfort her child. It is not the case that the wise person should not display affection; it is that she or he should maintain rational control over it, and not be controlled by it; even allowing that the advent of emotions that *could* overwhelm is not under our control. One might compare Callirhoe’s control of the anger she initially felt at a disgraceful suggestion she encounters in the Great King’s court, in Chariton’s novel.²⁹

Primarily, Epictetus would insist on taking action that is needed, not waiting for mood to prompt it. But if mood does prompt, one may well decide to respond. Celibate Epictetus can confidently ask, “Who is not tempted by attractive lively children to join their play and crawl on all fours and talk baby-talk?” with no disparagement (and no, “of course, one would refuse”).³⁰ What matters is your assessment of feelings aroused and your active response. So, too, sexual attraction happens; but whether you indulge it in your imagination and action should be yours to determine.³¹ The Stoic ideal in these writers and elsewhere is not someone inert and insensitive—in fact Stoics expected your senses to be alert, but your judgment even more so, ready to appraise and respond appropriately and effectively.³² You should wisely experience εὐπαθείας: delight, apprehension, and volition.³³

Dio is particularly interesting in this regard. Although regularly and insistently labelled Stoic by many writers cited in this book, or possibly ‘Stoic-Cynic’, and though he is certainly critical of greed- and pleasure- and

²⁸ Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.11.2–4, 20–22, LCL, adapted.

²⁹ Chariton’s *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 6.5,8, as cited by L.C.A. Alexander, “The Passions in Galen”, 184; and the comparison between Callirhoe and Chaereas analysed by Koen de Temmerman, “Quelques réflexions sur l’expression incontrôlée des émotions chez Chairéas” (2009), in B. Pouderon and C. Bost-Pouderon (eds), *Passions, vertus et vices*, 239–255; Julia Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), argues that the characters in the novels are not really affected; but I think ignores the commonplace Stoic distinction deployed, that between the real ‘bite’ of sensation, and a controlled response.

³⁰ Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.24.15–18; 4.9.17.

³¹ Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.76; 2.18.15–17.

³² Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.3, and esp. 20–22; cf. 1.1.7; 1.28.

³³ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.116, again.

reputation-seeking, he never (on my reading) argues for *apatheia*; when he admires the independence and integrity of his imagined Euboian hunter, and the latter's naive amazement at local townspeople's lack of emotional self-control, he also commends the rural family's pleasure in eating, and the warmth of the sympathetic response from husbands and wives to the romantic attachments of their children.³⁴

So far as I am aware, Stoics did not discuss the possibility of divine passions.³⁵ However, the God who has given each of us, according to Epictetus, the possibility of an inner control over our moral purpose unassailable from without, is unlikely to have been thought any less invulnerable.³⁶ One might perhaps note Epictetus rebutting suggestions that at the final "conflagration" Zeus would feel sad and lonely, with "one ought to prepare oneself for this, also, that is, to be self-sufficient, to be able to commune with oneself, even as Zeus communes with himself ..." ³⁷ Though critics mocked the provident Stoic deity as restlessly hyperactive, the divine is seen by the latter as supremely rational, while in a pantheist metaphysics, the question of being affected "from outside" could hardly arise.³⁸

1.3. Epicureans and Cynics

Epicurus' aim was peace of mind, to be achieved by discriminating between sensations, moderating desire so as to avoid fear and pain, and thus attain a refined and secure pleasure, while open to controlled and advantageous

³⁴ Critiques in Dio, *Discourse* 4.83–139; sympathy in 7.66–80; cf. Dorit Engster, "Fiktion oder Realität?", 149 and n. 31. There is no suggestion here that "inner freedom" is all that one needs (contra Elisabeth Herrmann-Otto, in her otherwise very useful "Armut, Arbeit, Sklaverei und Prostitution in der römischen Kaiserzeit im (Spannungs-) Verhältnis zur dionysischen Menschenwürde" (2012), in Gustav A. Lehmann, *Armut—Arbeit—Menschenwürde*, 213–233, citing 227.)

³⁵ As noted by Paul. L. Gavrilyuk, *The Suffering of the Impassible God* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29; also noting something of the variety in ancient talk of divine impassibility, 35–36, but paying scant attention to the issue of self-ordering.

³⁶ Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.5.34; cf. Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 124.23. One might compare Chrysippus in Plutarch, *De stoic. repugn.* 13, *Moralia* 1038CD, "As it befits Zeus to glory in himself and in his way of life ... since he lives in a way worth boasting about, so does this befit all good men, since they are in no way surpassed by Zeus" (LCL); cf. also Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Address to Origen*, 9.124, "the wise person is equal in wisdom to the supreme deity", taken to be a Stoic conclusion.

³⁷ Epictetus, *Dissertation* 3.13.4–7.

³⁸ M. Spanneut, "*Apatheia*" 4646, found no explicit Stoic discussion of the issue, but argues that the divine *apatheia* is implied by the insistence that the divine is active agent, never passive subject; citing Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.134.

“natural” emotions (such as fear of injury).³⁹ Epicurean Gods were taken to enjoy just such a completely untroubled existence, tranquil, entirely inactive, contemplating their own blessedness.⁴⁰

A few Cynic sources deploy ἀπαθής, ἀπάθεια on scattered occasions, but of being undetermined by external circumstances, ‘indifference to hardship’, rather than of internal self-control.⁴¹ Physical self-discipline is seen as the short cut to well-being, rather than relying on a Stoic intellectual appraisal of sense-impressions.⁴² I venture a further theoretical point. All the Greek and Roman authors cited here accept that at least some basic feelings, emotions, sensations are natural among humans. The Cynics, however (anticipating, among others, Wittgenstein), take it that what is actually experienced is socially constructed and acquired “passionate behaviour”, most effectively countered directly, by *askesis*. What is needed, and most likely to be achieve results, is engagement in a different and austere pattern of activity rather than, for instance, indulging in a long course of Stoic re-imagination or Epicurean self-analysis: the ‘short cut’ of overt activity rather than interminable inwardness. Implicit for the Cynics, explicitly for Wittgenstein, social forms of pain- (and so, of fear-, desire- and pleasure-) behaviour do not simply provide recognisable *expressions* of emotions, but actually evoke and constitute having the emotions themselves; alternative activities exclude or reduce the expressions and thus the arousal or encouragement of the unwelcome feelings.⁴³ At any rate, the priority of *praxis* seems to have been accepted by such as Musonius, although

³⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 10.144–148; Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1 (17) 45, (19) 51; cf. Michel Spanneut, “*Apatheia* ancienne”, 4666–4670; David Armstrong, “‘Be Angry and Sin Not’: Philodemus versus the Stoics on natural bites and natural emotions”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 79–121. I here taking issue with Julia Annas, “Epicurean Emotions”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 30.2 (1989), 145–164, who interprets them as much closer to the Stoics. (I am grateful to Michael Flowers for the latter reference.)

⁴⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 10.139.

⁴¹ Compare ps.Crates 34.4, ps.Diogenes 11, 12, 21, 47, although translators will sometimes introduce “passions”, despite the context. On this see F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992), 26–56, and especially 34–42 and 45–50. David E. Aune, “The problem of the passions in Cynicism”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 48–66, relies more on Teles, whose examples (frg. 7), mostly from bereavement, are closer to those later deployed by Epictetus, with a similar stress on interiority, itself missing in the Cynic Epistles.

⁴² Cf. F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992), 34–39, and references there.

⁴³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (2nd ed.; tr. G.E.M. Anscombe; Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 199–408, or more.

himself still convinced of the validity of a Stoic theoretical analysis, yet placing his trust in severe Cynic askesis:

There are two kinds of training, one of which is appropriate to the soul alone, and the other which is common to both. This we use when we discipline ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, meagre rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and patience under suffering. For by these things and others like them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring hardship, sturdy and ready for any task; the soul, too, is strengthened, since it is trained for courage under hardship and for self-control by abstinence from pleasures.⁴⁴

On this Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé comments, “Ce passage pourrait constituer une excellente définition de l’entraînement propre au Cynique.”⁴⁵ Similarly she notes that Seneca can from time to time urge just such austere practice as a way to habituate the soul-self to the ways of virtue, as does Epictetus. I would add Dio of Prusa, at least during his exile having recourse to Cynic self-discipline, not relying on Stoic meditation.

(The Cynic approach affirms human bodiliness, as opposed to the belittlement of his body—the body he ‘possesses’—by a more thoroughly Stoic author such as Epictetus.⁴⁶ In more general terms, the importance of practice, of compliance with law as creating a *habitus*, is widely acknowledged, as was noted earlier, “Ways and Means”, and is discussed further in ch. 8, below, “Law as Social Engineering”).

It is here, but not only here, that I think Robert Knapp, for whose *Invisible Romans* I am very grateful, has failed to appreciate the force of some of his own conclusions. When his ordinary people show they value their self-reliance and their own skills and efforts, they are clearly at one with their social superiors; but in their response they are at one with Cynics who attain valued independence in action, not in thinking about it. And it is here that I again rely on Dio, who (as himself one with sophisticated Cynic leanings) appreciates the power but not the manner of popular Cynics:

⁴⁴ Musonius Rufus, *Discourse 6, On Training*, in Cora Lutz (ed. & tr.) *Musonius Rufus*, 55, ll. 11–18, slightly adapted. Musonius continues, “Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing that demonstrations concerning the merely apparent goodness of supposed goods are always ready to hand ...” (also adapted).

⁴⁵ Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, *L’ascèse cynique* (HDAC 10; Paris: Vrin, 1986), 187–188; on Cynics, see also *eadem*, “Le cynisme à l’époque impériale”, *ANRW* II 36.4, 2720–2823.

⁴⁶ Epictetus, e.g., *Diss.* 3.10.16. On being one’s bodily self among other human bodily selves—rather than ‘possessing’ your body—see Rowan Williams, “Do Human Rights Exist?”, in his *Faith in the Public Square* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 149–159.

As for the Cynics, as they are called, it is true that the city [Alexandria] contains no small number of that school, and that, like any other, this too has had its crop—persons whose tenets, to be sure, comprise practically nothing spurious or ignoble, yet whose bellies need filling—still these Cynics, posting themselves at street-corners, in alleyways, and at temple gates, pass round the hat and con youngsters and sailors and crowds made up of that sort, stringing together rough jokes and much tittle-tattle and that low badinage that smacks of the market-place.

He then contrasts such with the few like himself who have the same frankness (*παρρησίαν*), but in more seemly style, yet still able to address people at large, including angry mobs.⁴⁷

It is of course in this Cynic style, with its emphasis on bodily activity (and some key Cynic articulation) that early Egyptian monasticism developed its disciplined insistence on physical *ἀσκησις*.⁴⁸

1.4. *Platonists: Plutarch*

By way of contrast, a Platonist such as Plutarch insists that emotions are constituent elements of the human self; though emotions can overcome rational control, under control they are beneficial and necessary:

Much more useful than the beasts are the whole brood of passions, when they are in the service of reason and help to intensify the virtues—anger, if it be moderate, will assist courage, and hatred of evil will aid justice ... Who, even if he so wished, could separate or sever from friendship a natural propensity toward affection, from humanity, pity, and from true benevolence the mutual participation in joy and grief?⁴⁹

Yet, of course, for Plutarch, this is where “there is no passion disobedient to reason, no strife of impulse with impulse ... not rough tumult and pleasure on the borderline, as it were, between desire and repentance.”⁵⁰

It is also clear to Plutarch that women can and do exhibit the same virtues, excellencies, as men: intelligent control of fear, desire, grief, and pleasure.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 32.9, LCL, lightly adapted, and 11. On plebeian Cynics cf. also Lucian, later in the second century CE, *Fugitivi*, 12–17, stressing the popular appeal as he saw it, and the quick route of action, rather than lengthy reflection.

⁴⁸ Cf. F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 257–270.

⁴⁹ Plutarch, *De virtute* 12 (*Moralia* 450E–451F); cf. *Quomodo ... virtute profectus* 12–16 (*Moralia* 82F–85B); see Richard A. Wright, “Plutarch on moral progress”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 136–151.

⁵⁰ Plutarch, *Maxime cum principibus* 2, (*Moralia* 777C); and *Platonic Questions* 9 (*Moralia* 1008C, 1009A), again.

⁵¹ Plutarch, *Mulierum virtutes* (*Moralia* 242E–263C), noting 242F for the general assertion.

Nonetheless, Deity is beyond even the controlled deployment of passion, as pure unitary “being” without any change or becoming.⁵²

1.5. *Romances*

The “romancers” can be seen to display an awareness of the philosophical discussion, as well as of the medical debate concerning the bodily expression of emotions.⁵³ In general terms they side with Plato and the platonists. Particularly noteworthy, in the light of both the foregoing and the following discussions, are Cécile Daude’s findings for Achille Tatius’ *Leucippe and Cleitophon*, where all the four “classic” passions are noted (among others), though not, it seems, clustered, and with a considerable emphasis on fear, pleasure and grief, if much less on desire.⁵⁴ There is no suggestion of their extirpation: without the rational struggle for control there would be little of interest to tell, little triumph for virtue.⁵⁵

Early in the collection Jean-Philippe Guez draws attention to a very carefully worked out distinction in Chariton’s *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, between control as tyranny and royal rule of self that refuses to tyrannise over others, with Callirhoe implicitly exhibiting the latter throughout, Chaereas, the macho male only attaining to it in the end; as in effect also noted by Koen de Temmerman in a separate essay, touched on just above.⁵⁶

2. SOME LATER EARLY CHRISTIAN EXAMPLES

To recapitulate, in the *Introduction* to this chapter, it was proposed that the issue could be phrased as follows: we are considering the possibilities of human self-control, integrity, autonomy: Is there a self, an ‘I’, that is at least

⁵² Plutarch, *De E apud delphos* 18–20, *Moralia* 392E–393D.

⁵³ So, L.C.A. Alexander, “The Passions in Galen and the Novels of Chariton and Xenophon” (2008), in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 175–197, and many of the contributors to B. Pouderon and C. Bost-Pouderon (eds), *Passions, vertus et vices*; on Galen and the medical discussion, Cécile Daude, “Aspects physiques et psychiques des passions chez Achille Tatius” (2009), op. cit., 184–208.

⁵⁴ Cécile Daude, “Aspects physiques”, 198.

⁵⁵ One might compare Seneca on the testing storm, or as dramatist, n. 20, above.

⁵⁶ Jean-Philippe Guez, “Homme tyrannique, homme royal, dans le roman de Chariton” (2009), in B. Pouderon and C. Bost-Pouderon (eds), *Passions, vertus et vices*, 23–38 (drawing an explicit contrast with Michel Foucault’s typology); on Chariton see also Romain Brethes, “Rien de trop. La recherche d’un juste milieu chez Aristote, Ménandre et Chariton” (2009), op. cit., 71–83. On Koen de Temmerman on Chariton, see again, n. 29, above.

potentially other than its feelings, and both willing and able to be in control of them rather than controlled by them, in the context of a devaluation of and becoming indifferent to *everything* not at one's disposal? The variety of reflections in this field may be usefully further illustrated from among early Greek Christians.

2.1. *Second Century*

There is a quite fascinating survey of varying reflections on emotions in ancient Jewish and Christian imaginative narrative in Diane Lipsett's *Desiring Conversion. Hermas, Thecla, Asenath*. On the first she concludes, "For *The Shepherd of Hermas* the experience of *metanoia* and the cultivation of manliness involve not so much the suppression of desire as the choice of its proper object, and even abandonment to the right kind of desire." On Thecla, she argues, "an easy characterization of Thecla's own transformation as a move from feminine desire to masculine control belies the complexity of how desire and restraint function in the narrative ... desire is destabilizing in ways that propel conversion—social re-identification, ritual act, changes in language, changes in the self".⁵⁷ In all that follows it is important to recall and to bear in mind the range of attitudes to the control of the passions already argued to be found, in the wider Graeco-Roman world, as well as among Christians (and, as we may accept, among earlier and contemporary Jews).

As noted earlier, Clement in the late first and early second centuries CE, follows Musonius (and the Cynics) in insisting that women and men, bond and free, share the same human nature, capable of exhibiting the same virtue, righteousness, self-restraint, superior to pleasures and all desires, ruling, not ruled by them; noting that he, too, can qualify this: "Women are therefore to philosophize equally with men, though the males are better at all of it".⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that a quite critical outsider, the cultured physician Galen, supports Clement's contention. Of Christians Galen says,

For their contempt of death ... is patent to us every day, as is their restraint in sexual matters. They include not only men but also women who refrain from

⁵⁷ B. Diane Lipsett, *Desiring Conversion*, 52 and 85; cf. Carolyn Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas. A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis MN 1999), 148, suggests a correspondence between 'desire' in *Hermas* and the good and bad 'influence', יצר, in rabbinic Judaism. Philip Alexander, in conversation, explained that a parallel with Plato's two horses was only discussed by much later rabbis.

⁵⁸ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 4.8.

sexual intercourse all through their lives; and they also number individuals who in self-discipline and self-control in matters of food and drink and in their keen pursuit of what is right have attained a level no way inferior to that of genuine philosophers.⁵⁹

2.2. Late Second Century and Onwards

Many of the “gnostic” writings found at Nag Hammadi celebrate an abstract philosophical ideal of a divine undifferentiated unity of self-awareness, impervious to any disturbance: disturbance from outside, of course, but as emphatically, from within. Yet, for there to be anything outside that unimaginably perfect self-awareness, it is taken to have generated further reflections with their own if lesser reality, lesser self-coherence, and thus ultimately the chaos of disorder we experience. Salvation involves rescuing us humans (or some of us) from the resulting, demonic, disorderly passions, as, for instance, in *ApocJoh* 18/66 (reflecting a standard Greek analysis; cf. *TriTrac* 95), and 25–27/73–74 (cf. *TriTrac* 115–116–120). For those authors who still take their clue from the Jewish canon, that involves a more or less thorough “deconstructive” reading of it and its celebration of the physical world and human life (very negative in *ApocJoh*, rather less so in *TriTrac*, which allows that the “impassible Logos came into being in flesh”, 13.35–15.30). Whatever the religio-cultural origins of such thinkers (Jewish, Jewish Christian, other), the dominant force lies, as older and modern critics accept, in particular combinations of strands of Platonic, Pythagorean, Aristotelian, Stoic, and even Epicurean ideals of self-controlled coherent equanimity.⁶⁰

A more nuanced, Platonizing, discussion of self-control, control of the passions, emerges particularly in some further Alexandrian Christian writing, from the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries. Origen’s received writings puzzle the commentators. In his *Homilies on Ezekiel* 6.6 he asserts that the Son suffered prior to his incarnation, and even that “the Father himself is not impassible”, for “if he is besought he is pitiful and compassionate. He suffers

⁵⁹ Galen, from the translation of the Arabic in R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* (Clarendon: Oxford, 1949), p. 15; on Galen and the passions, again see also L.C.A. Alexander, “The Passions in Galen” (drawing attention to a similar shaming of unbridled emotion in Galen and in Chariton’s and Xenophon’s novels), and, again, Cécile Daude, “Aspects physiques”. For a more detailed discussion of Galen and Clement, and the latter’s adoption of the more radical and severe Stoic stance, see L. Michael White, “Moral pathology: passions, progress and protreptic in Clement of Alexandria”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 284–321.

⁶⁰ For bibliography, see ch. 2, p. 75, nn. 83, 84. See also, Ismo Dunderberg, “Moral Progress in Early Christian Stories of the Soul”, *NTS* 59.2 (2013), 247–267.

something of love ... and because of us he endures human sufferings”.⁶¹ Yet, despite this, in his *Contra Celsum* 4.72, for instance, he rebuts any suggestion that scriptural talk of divine wrath asserts any passion on God’s part. However, to support his point he then instances passages where humans are taken as capable of controlling any impulse to anger: the *a fortiori* implication is that God himself unquestionably has such control.

Certainly just this focus on self-control rather than immovability appears in Origen’s pupil, Gregory Thaumaturgus. He accepts the common Stoic account of the passions—pleasure, desire, grief and fear—that our reason should master, and, it would seem, a Stoic insistence that such effective reason mirrors divine wisdom.⁶² In another piece he first agrees readily with an acquaintance, Theopompus, that, of course, God is impassible. Theopompus next asks whether that means that God is to be thought unfree to do what he wills, “bound” by his impassibility. Gregory then insists that God’s will to do good to humans is not constrained, and that means that his ‘impassibility’ consists in being unaffected by anything that might thwart or diminish his unchanging and inviolable benevolence. In clear opposition to the detached, narcissistic self-contemplative deities of the Epicureans and Aristotle (and, perhaps, of Plato), Gregory argues:

Rather, the incorruptible and blessed one is he who kills the passions, who makes people wise, implants divine knowledge, and manifests virtue. But we say that in God it would be a great passion [constraint] not to care for human beings, to be unwilling to see good done, and to neglect the welfare of the human race.⁶³

Such “care” as ἐνπαθεία we may see as evincing a willingness to have this as integral to his own divine wellbeing, εὐδαιμονία.⁶⁴ So Gregory insists:

he worked whatever he wanted and by his powerful will accomplished what he set out to do, maintaining his divine power, remaining what he was, and

⁶¹ *Homilies on Ezekiel* 6.6, cited by Daniel Castelo, *The Apathetic God. Exploring the Contemporary Relevance of Divine Passibility* (Milton Keynes and Colorado Springs CO: Paternoster, 2009), 56, from J.K. Mozley, *The Impassibility of God. A Survey of Christian Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 61.

⁶² Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Oration to Origen*, 9.119–120, and 124.

⁶³ Gregory Thaumaturgus, *On the Impassibility and Passibility of God*, 13, in M. Slusser (tr.) *The Fathers of the Church. A New Translation*. 98. *St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Life and Works* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 1998). On volition, see e.g. *ibid.*, 4, 8, 10, 12; on refusing constraint, 9; on refusal of a purely contemplative deity, 10, 14, 15.

⁶⁴ Compare M. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 318–319, 324–325; “a willingness to be susceptible”, 537.

suffering nothing in his sufferings, because in his sufferings his impassible nature continued as it is.⁶⁵

The incarnate God encountered real sufferings (“not in imagination, no pretence”), but without suffering any change in his essential character: so these constitute εὐπαθείαι.⁶⁶

In the Latin west and a little later Lactantius as a scholarly (and ‘scriptural’) Christian could advance a detailed and documented discussion, finding some good sense in the Platonists, a little in the Aristotelians, but only nonsense among the Stoics.⁶⁷ Agreeing with the philosophers that what matters is for oneself to have control of one’s passions, not be controlled by them, he argued that such control is other than extirpation, specifically precluding inertia; it has in practice to involve careful discernment and active and effective choice among real continuing emotions.⁶⁸ In the light of this analysis Lactantius is able further to insist that the good creator must obviously himself retain those emotions that are included among the good gifts he shares with us humans: “wrath against the wicked, love for the good, compassion for the afflicted” (*ira in malos, caritas in bonos, miseratio in adflictos*).⁶⁹ (In fact, the Latin ‘*patientia*’, with verb ‘*pator*’, etymologically the obvious equivalent to the Greek πάσχω, ἔπαθον, denotes positive endurance, rather than being subjected to some other control, and to ‘patience’ Lactantius then turns.)

Gregory of Nyssa, in his *Catechetical Discourse* 15–16, offers a stipulative definition of πάθος: for him it concerns self-determination, and denotes a voluntary change of character from virtue to wickedness. By contrast, all natural developments, such as birth, growth, a person’s continuity through digestion and evacuation, the retention of elements in bodily formation, and their final dissolution should all be termed ἐργον, activity, not πάθος: they are things you do (you grow, as we say), not things that happen to you. And even more, reasoning, understanding, coming to know things, and all

⁶⁵ Gregory, *Theopompus*, 9.

⁶⁶ Gregory, *Theopompus*, 12.

⁶⁷ On Lactantius see Jean-Yves Guillaumin and Stéphane Ratti (eds) *Autour de Lactances. Hommages à Pierre Monat* (Paris: Press Universitaire de France-Comté/Belles Lettres, 2003).

⁶⁸ Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 6.14–18, here 6.14.7–10 and 6.15.6–8, 6.17.21–22; in Christiane Ingremau (ed. and tr.), *Lactance, Institutes Divines VI* (SC 509; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2007), with her footnotes and “Notes complémentaires”.

⁶⁹ Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* 6.15.9; and *De ira dei*, e.g., 4–6 and 16, citing 16.6; in Christiane Ingremau (ed. and tr.), *Lactance. La Colère de Dieu* (SC 289; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982), with her *Commentaire*.

such aspects of human life count as virtuous activity, not corrupting πάθος. And since we are made in the divine image, and none of these count as παθή in any pejorative sense, the incarnation of the Word involved no πάθος, no induced change for the worse. Only a change from virtue to vice could ‘properly’ be termed a πάθος; any change in the incarnate Word that was part of his being human was an act of will (προαίρεσις), and should more accurately be termed ‘action’. Because, like creation itself, the incarnation with all its vulnerability was a matter of divine will (here, θέλημα), it was an expression of superabundant power, not of subjection (24.9–16).⁷⁰

Similarly, Moses allows himself to experience the πάθος of fear on the holy mountain, out of compassion for his people. It is really experienced, in his soul, as well as physically expressed, and is not simulated; but, as distinct from the terror of the mass of the people, his fear is freely induced by Moses, not forced on him.⁷¹

By way of contrast, Hilary of Poitiers, in his *De Trinitate* 10.23, insists that, while things could happen physically to Jesus, he was *unable* to feel them as pain: “habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est, sed naturam non habens ad dolendum”. (One may compare Boethius, *Contra Euctychen* 6).⁷² Thus, against Gregory of Nyssa, but also against Gregory Thaumaturgus, Hilary cannot envisage the divine Word himself having the freedom to decide whether to accept such sensation. As the editors note,

⁷⁰ Text in Grégoire de Nysse, *Discours Catéchique* (ed. & tr. R. Winling; SC 453; Paris: du Cerf, 2000), 15–16; 24.9–16.

⁷¹ Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses* I 43–45, 316BD–317A, in Jean Daniélou, S.J., (ed. & tr.), Grégoire de Nysse, *La vie de Moïse ou Traité de la perfection en matière de vertu* (2nd edn., SC1bis; Paris: du Cerf, 1955); compare II 3, 328B; II 30, 336A, distinguishing “being subjected to change”, and changing oneself. It is clear that Gregory (like Lactantius, in fact, *Divine Institutes* 6.15.10–17) accepted a conventional view of the relationship—quite loose—between words and what they point to (a topic dealt with at some length in ch. 6, below). It always needs to be borne in mind that a phrase such as “he suffered without suffering” from Cyril of Alexandria, *De recta fide ad Pulcherium et Eudocium*, 31 (cited in Robert L. Wilken, *Judaism and the Early Christian Mind. A Study of Cyril of Alexandria's Exegesis and Theology* [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971]), 184, could have evoked something like, “he willed the controlled and unforced experience of pain”. However, Cyril’s general insistence on divine changelessness should probably suggest otherwise: unless there too it is only passive change that is being refused. On Cyril and the impassible suffering of the incarnate Word, see P.L. Gavriluk, *The Suffering*, 159–163; and *idem*, “God’s Impassible Suffering in the Flesh: The Promise of Paradoxical Christology”, in James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (eds), *Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 127–149.

⁷² M. Figura and J. Doignon (eds), G.M. de Durand et al. (trs), *Hilaire de Poitiers* (3 vols; Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1999).

this seems to be reproducing a Stoic ideal, but in fact the austere position of Cleanthes, rather than that of Seneca, as they propose.⁷³

Augustine insists that even “the holy angels feel no anger in punishing, no pity or compassion in helping.”⁷⁴ Aquinas then insists, emphatically, “Those creatures that come nearest to God, the first and completely perfect being, have little of potentiality and passivity in them.”⁷⁵ For Aquinas, a human body can suffer passions as happenings experienced as feelings, to which the soul responds with acceptance or reversion, which in turn affect the body; but “a passion strictly so called ... cannot be experienced by the soul, except in the sense that the whole person, the body-soul compound, undergoes it.”⁷⁶ God, being incorporeal and pure act, without potential, cannot (is not free to) engage even in this sense with experience, despite evincing love, joy and pleasure as attitudes, in effect the Stoic *eupatheiai*.⁷⁷

INTERIM CONCLUSION

There is, then, considerable variety in explicit talk of ‘apathy’, both in general Greek and Latin writers, and in early and ongoing Christian usage, and there is no justification in assuming that all intended to evoke the sense that an Augustine or later Thomas Aquinas might affirm. In the next chapter we shall consider the question whether *any* of these foregoing kinds of ‘apatheia’ talk may in any way be matched among early Second Temple Jewish and among the earliest Jewish-Christian writings. To anticipate, if we define ‘apathy’ as changeless perfection, human or divine, we are likely to find little if anything akin in these latter sources. On the other hand, if we focus on will, integrity, and at least relative autonomy, for *a self, an ‘I’, that is at least potentially other than its feelings, and capable of being in control of them rather than controlled by them (or by any other externality)*, then it may well be agreed that quite similar things could be said, even if the individual key words are not conventionally held to be inter-translatable.

⁷³ M. Figura and J. Doignon, *Hilaire de Poitiers*, ‘Introduction’, 1.107, n. 4.

⁷⁴ Augustine, *City of God* 9.5; cf. 15.5. [CHECK]

⁷⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae 22.2.r. 1.

⁷⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* 1a1ae 22.1.c; quoted in M. Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, 108.

⁷⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate* 26.4 c, cited by M. Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, 115.

CHAPTER FOUR

ORDER WITHIN: PASSIONS, DIVINE AND HUMAN

B. Among Late Second Temple Jews and the First Christians

INTRODUCTION—JEWISH CHRISTIAN WRITINGS: THE NEW TESTAMENT

That God was to be thought of as ‘passionless’, ἀπαθής, that is, without the sorts of ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’ that can and may well effectively overwhelm, change and control one, was being taken for granted very soon by some at least in the early days of the Christian church.¹ The ground for a widespread acceptance of the conviction had been prepared at least by the Jewish theologian, Philo of Alexandria, and it became and has remained standard in Eastern Orthodoxy, in western Catholicism and in Reformed Protestantism, if only in the background.² However, it was in some measure challenged by Luther, more explicitly by nineteenth century Lutheran theologians, and has been opposed more widely still in the last fifty years or so.³ For many of these opponents it seems to conflict with the even more central Christian conviction of divine incarnation in the Jesus who, according to the

¹ E.g., Ignatius of Antioch, early 2nd century, *To Polycarp* 3.2.

² It appears, for instance, in the Anglican *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion*, and in *The Westminster Confession*.

³ See Daniel Castelo, *The Apathetic God*, citing, among others, Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God* (ET. R.A. Wilson & J. Bowden; London: SCM Press, 1974); Terence E. Fretheim, *The Suffering of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984); Walter Brueggemann, *Theology of the Old Testament* (Minneapolis: Augsburg/Fortress, 1997); John Goldingay, *Old Testament Theology*, 2 vols (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003); I would add, Marcel Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality* (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992); Clark H. Pinock, *Most Moved Mover. A Theology of God's Openness* (Carlisle and Grand Rapids: Paternoster and Baker, 2001), arguing that, for the Old Testament, “God acts and interacts, engages and suffers”, and “The God of the Gospel is not the god of philosophy, at least, not of Hellenic philosophy. The God and Father of Jesus Christ is compassionate, suffering, and victorious love. The god of philosophy is immutable, timeless and apathetic” (26–27); and more recent comment, Paul. L. Gavriluk, *The Suffering of the Impassible God*, who allows for variety among the ancient writers, but allots only three pages, 26–28, for the human basis for such talk; D. Stephen Long, *Speaking of God. Theology, Language and Truth* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 18–85.

Synoptic Gospels “had to suffer”, but also it seems at odds with the clearly passionate figure of God in the Jewish Scriptures brought with them by Jewish Christians: and this claimed conflict with Jewish Scriptures is the chief concern in what follows. The main question in what follows is, Are some or all ideas of ‘passionlessness’ compatible with the discernible ethos, or significant strands in the variegated discernible ethos of the Jewish canon, and in the surviving writings of the first Christians?⁴ Can we find in any of these indications of *a self, an I, that is at least potentially other than its feelings, and capable of being in control of them rather than controlled by them (or by any other externality)?*⁵

One may admit to being both sympathetic with the challenge and yet at the same time out of sympathy with an over-ready disjunction often drawn here between ‘Greek’ (or ‘philosophical’) and ‘Jewish’ ways of thinking, a disjunction that is or may be taken to exemplify a supposed general resistance of cultures to translation into each others’ languages. Further, in a previous study of ancient Graeco-Roman advice on living a tranquil life, for which no close parallel in contemporary Jewish writing was forthcoming, the present writer nonetheless hazarded the guess that “presumably ancient Israelites had further ways to articulate their responses to harassing concerns.”⁶ That constitutes a further interest in the question, Is ἀπάθεια, human and/or divine, and in any or all uses, fundamentally out of tune with most or all sectors of the Jewish canon? For sure, Philo, as a reflective and faithful Jew of the first century could deploy the vocabulary of πάθη, and so, too, could the author of IV Maccabees (written in Greek); but ἀπαθής, ἀπάθεια, are used neither by the third century BCE LXX translators, nor by Ben Sirah’s grandson, later second century, nor in Wisdom of Solomon; and, while the word πάθος is found twice in the older LXX translations, it does not appear there in the plural, nor of ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ that can threaten to overwhelm and control someone.⁷ And, while πάθος, in contexts where the translation “passions” would fit, occurs on three occasions in the New

⁴ There is a sensitive analysis of recent interpretations in Matthew R. Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Hermeneutics in Biblical Theology” *CBQ* 69.4 (2007), 637–694, but without reference to differences in ancient usage.

⁵ I note Stephen C. Barton recently addressing “The Emotions: A Missing Element in the Study of Early Christianity”, in his “Eschatology and the Emotions in Early Christianity”, *JBL* 130.3 (2011), 571–591, citing 571; but discussing only grief (and joy).

⁶ F. Gerald Downing, “On Avoiding Bothersome Busyness”, in *idem, God with Everything*, 91–114, citing 104.

⁷ Job 30.31, of sadness or weeping; Prov 25.20, sadness or trouble.

Testament writings, nowhere do ἀπαθής, ἀπάθεια appear there.⁸ Nor do we find the quartet of pleasure, grief, desire and fear clustered together. In fact, λύπη, grief, is accepted as appropriate, especially where it is concentrated in 2. Cor 1.1–2.13, 7.5–16; but compare also Jesus at Mt 26.37–38.⁹ Fear, φόβος, is also often apposite, at least in Acts (2.43; 5.5, 11; 9.31; 19.17) and 1 Peter (1.17; 2.18; 3.2, 15—but cf. 3.14). Desire, ἐπιθυμία, is quite frequently mentioned, and usually, but still not always disapprovingly. Both Jesus as narrated and Paul in his letters can express desire. Disapproval has to be expressed with an addition such “of the flesh”, or by linking it with παθός, πάθημα, or with ἡδονή, or ἡ ἀπάτη τοῦ πλοῦτου (1 Thess 4.5; Gal 5.24; Tit 3.3; Mk 4.19). Such wrong desire, craving is on just a few occasions thought capable of overpowering the self (e.g., Rom 6.2; 7.7–8; Jas 1.14; Tit 3.3, again).¹⁰ That is clearly a possible but not a frequent theme among these early Christians.¹¹

And, as indicated, powerful desiring may be good (even in Paul: Phil 1.23, 1 Thess 2.17; cf. Matt 13.17; 1 Tim 3.1; Heb 6.11; 1 Pet 1.12). In particular is this emphasised at Luke 22.15, where Jesus “ardently desired” (ἐπιθυμία

⁸ Rom 1.26; Col 3.5; 1 Thess 4.5. Cf. Stanley K. Stowers, “Paul and Self-mastery” (2003), in J.P. Sampley (ed.), *Paul in the Greco-Roman World* (Harrisburg & London: Trinity Press International, 2003), 524–550, emphasising rather the Augustan emphasis on self-control as fitting men for subordinate leadership roles.

⁹ In a recent article, “Paul and Pain: Paul’s emotional Therapy in 2 Corinthians 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 in the Context of Ancient Psychagogic Literature”, *NTS* 57.4 (Oct 2011), 547–570, L.L. Welborn argues forcefully but I think wrongly that in Stoic reflection grief was the worst passion, having no “eupathic” counter in the passages from Cicero and Diogenes Laertius cited above; while Paul reflects very positively on grief, and also deploys all three of the given ‘eupathic terms’. Welborn cites Margaret Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, in support, but neither she nor her sources draw Welborn’s conclusion as to the particular reprehensibility of grief; and I note that Epictetus, for instance, can allow ‘joy’ as the effective eupathic counter to grief (*Diss.* 3.24.11 in a context of grieving, using various terms, including λύπη, 3.24.23). Graver notes that Cicero’s own emphasis on grief in the *Tusculan Disputations* stems from his own sense of having wallowed self-indulgently in grief on the death of his beloved daughter, Tullia.

¹⁰ Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The logic of action in Paul: how does he differ from the moral philosophers on spiritual and moral progression and regression” in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 238–266, also argues cogently that “throughout Paul presupposes the kind of self-determining self who makes up his or her mind”, 260. David Charles Aune, “Passions in the Pauline epistles: the current state of research”, in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), op. cit., 221–237, concentrates on Paul’s emotional appeal to hearers, rather than on any overt appraisal of emotions.

¹¹ Robert C. Roberts, “Emotions in the Epistemology of Paul the Apostle” (2011), in Ingolf U. Dalferth and Michael Rodgers (eds), *Passion and Passivity*, 11–29, besides coalescing the Paul of Acts, the Paul of the most widely recognised letters, and the Paul of Ephesians, interprets the ‘love’ that can be commanded, and ‘gifts’, in Paul, as passions suffered; whereas Paul is sure that gifts are under the recipient’s control (e.g., 1 Cor 14.32). Even response to “the love of Christ” that “constrains us” has to be exhorted.

ἐπιθύμησα) to eat the Passover meal. In connection with this, in a recent study Claire Chivaz has persuasively argued for the originality in Luke's text of Lk 22.43–44, with its Alexandrian omission attributable to later unease with this passionate and anguished Jesus in need of help—even though he wins through.¹²

Despite the scant interest displayed among most of these NT authors in this motif of human inner struggle against feelings, passions, desires, it should nonetheless still be seen as significant that something of the sort can be included, if only incidentally, but with no apparent sense of strain.

1. LATE SECOND TEMPLE JEWISH WRITINGS

Before moving on to look at ancient Jewish writings, outwith and within the canon, it is worth noting Abraham J. Heschel's *The Prophets*, with its very positive interpretation of the divine *pathos*, which, he claims, “basically defines the prophetic consciousness of God.” This “pathos was understood, not as unreasoned emotion, but as an act formed with intention, depending on free will, the result of decision and determination ... no inner bondage, no enslavement to impulse.”¹³ And this seems to me much the same position as that argued by Gregory, at least in its insistence on freedom in [self-]control. But my question remains, Does this properly represent what we find among first century CE and earlier Jewish authors in their analyses of human interactions and then in their deployment of this imaginary for their talk of God?¹⁴ (Heschel himself is fully aware of the “anthropological” base of the Graeco-Roman discussion of the passions, but only touches in passing on their place in human inter-relationships.)¹⁵

2. JEWISH AUTHORS IN GREEK

Among Jewish authors composing in Greek, Josephus can use the full semantic range of πάθος for almost any kind of untoward event that ‘hap-

¹² Claire Chivaz, *L'ange et la sueur de sang* (Lc 3,22,43–44), ou comment on pourrait bien encore écrire l'histoire (Leuven and Paris: Peeters, 2010).

¹³ Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York and Evanston: Harper Row, 1962), 221–306, here citing pp. 224, 258.

¹⁴ I would accept Heschel's proper caution when using anthropology for theology, allowing at least the possibility that the ancient authors were not accommodating the higher to the lower, but the lower to the higher: A.J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, 271.

¹⁵ A.J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, 252–255; 281–282.

pens to' humans, among which are 'feelings', as in his account of Pentephres' wife's lust for Joseph, which he urges her to constrain by reason (though, nonetheless, he does not need to apologise for Joseph's tears).¹⁶ Unlike other nations who even divinize passions, the Jewish people as a whole, Josephus claims, are not moved by passing feelings either in their discourse of the divine or their lived enactment of it. Keeping the laws God sent by Moses will exclude submission to lust or any other passion.¹⁷ (This emphasis on activity, rather than introspection, brings Josephus and other Jewish authors of the period closer to the Cynic stress on *askesis*, discussed in the previous chapter). Though Josephus can use ἀπαθής for various instances of being 'unaffected', he does not use it of God. The nearest he comes to that is to insist that God in Jewish theology is "one, uncreated, immutable to all eternity (πρὸς τὸν αἰδίων χρόνον ἀναλλοίτον)", while at the same time being the author of all blessings, universal or individual, responsive to prayers.¹⁸ It is also worth noting that in his re-written Bible as a whole Josephus can include notes of emotion in his accounts of important characters, much as one of his models, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, does, and as, of course, the Hellenistic romances do.¹⁹ As suggested above, ἀπάθεια in any degree was presumably a minority aim, even among the educated.

Philo confidently and frequently reproduces much of the common discussion of the passions, as powers that seem to invade us from outside, for us to resist rationally by voluntary effort.²⁰ His emphasis, however, is often on desire, ἐπιθυμία, in particular, stemming from its occurrence in the tenth commandment (LXX): "All the passions of the soul which stir and shake it out of its proper nature and do not let it continue in sound health are hard to deal with, but desire is hardest of them all." Elsewhere, pleasure "is accounted worse than the other passions ... because it is a kind of starting point and foundation. Desire (ἐπιθυμία) comes into play through love of pleasure, grief (λύπη) arises as pleasure is withdrawn; fear (φόβος), again, is engendered owing to a dread of being without pleasure (ἡδονή)."

¹⁶ Josephus, of events, e.g., *Ant.* 1.80, 96, 230; 2.158; of lust, 2.41–53; tears, 2.109, 123; cf. 16.265.

¹⁷ Josephus, *Apion* 2.180–181; *Ant.* 7.384; cf. *Ant.* 2.41–53, where Joseph appeals to Potiphar's wife to control her ἐπιθυμία and πάθος, and tries to turn these womanly impulses and passion into the way of reason.

¹⁸ Josephus, *Apion* 2.166–167.

¹⁹ E.g., Dionysius, *RA* 4.66–70; cf. F. Gerald Downing, "Redaction Criticism, Josephus' *Antiquities* and the Synoptic Gospels. I. Josephus", *JSNT* 8 (1980), 46–65, citing 54–56.

²⁰ Philo, *De decal.* 177; *De sac.* 51; *De congressu* 1–2; cf. David Winston, "Philo of Alexandria on the rational and irrational emotions", in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress*, 201–220.

This amounts to “the cruel and bitter tyranny of the passions”, though one may escape such capture, or, if caught, escape from captivity.²¹ Here again, women come off worst, as in the Garden of Eden, where “pleasure does not venture to bring her wiles to bear on the man, but on the woman ... for in us mind corresponds to man, the senses to woman.”²² Nonetheless, the Mosaic law is divinely given to enable a rational conquest of the passions, with the commandments encapsulating divine truth by specifying its practical enactment, and εὐπάθειαν becomes a real possibility.²³

In a different context Philo the Platonist can allow that we naturally begin life experiencing all the passions, there is no other starting point from which the ideal can emerge; and in this setting he can envisage positive desire, desire for disciplined self-control.²⁴ The ideal, nonetheless, is still to be ἀπαθής κακῶν, “suffering no evils”, “exempt from external movement and from passions”, as God is, “not susceptible to any passion at all”.²⁵ Among humans, only Moses and Isaac are said to have achieved such complete ἀπάθειαν; Abraham is allowed μετριοπάθειαν, moderated passion.²⁶ Jacob, the next best, significantly wins through as ἀσκητής, by πόνος. The Cynic resonances are clear.²⁷

Talk of divine anger or repentance is a matter of concessionary metaphor, denoting not divine emotions but human culpability and warranted punishment, even though such strictures still allow for Philo to talk of the man Moses displaying “good feeling and profound affection”, and himself approving of “the kindly and humane emotion [*sic*, παθός] of pity”.²⁸ Furthermore, the passionless God still remains actively in charge, responsive to events, including reacting justly and paternally, and as though in pity, even if not said to “feel” pity.²⁹

²¹ Philo, *De decal.* 142–153; *Leg. all.* 3.113, LCL; *Quis Haer.* 186. At *De decal.* 143–146, the fourfold analysis, pleasure, pain, fear and desire are again spelled out, but in more detail; and *De mig.* 219.

²² Philo, *De opif.* 165; cf. 167.

²³ E.g., *De mig.* 88–93, 119; *De sac.* 103; and *De mut.* 1, *De Ab.* 201, on “joy”, the best of εὐπαθείαι; and on the law as *askesis*, see, again, F. Gerald Downing, “Legislation as Social Engineering”, ch. 8, below, p. 205.

²⁴ Philo, *De congressu* 81–88.

²⁵ Philo, *Immut.* 52; *Quis haer.* 314; *De opif.* 101. Be it noted, ἀπαθής and ἀπάθεια are not ascribed to God.

²⁶ Philo, *Mos.* 1.26–27, *Leg. All.* 3.129; *Quod det.* 46; *Ab.* 257; John Dillon, “The Pleasures and Perils of Soul-Gardening”, *StudPhilAn* 9 (1997), 190–197; R. Sorabji, *Emotion*, 385–386.

²⁷ E.g., *Mut.* 81–82, *Som.* 1.174, 255, *Leg. all.* 3.93; cf. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, *L’ascèse cynique*.

²⁸ Philo, *Mos.* 1.33 (εὐνοία καὶ τῷ φιλεῖν ἐχθύμῳ).

²⁹ *De prov., passim*; *Quis haer.* 300–301; *De fuga*, 95; *De spec. leg.* 3.121; *De praem.* 39. *Immut.* 74–75; *Jos.* 83 (χρηστὴ πάθει καὶ φιλανθρωπῶπι); *De somn.* 1 234–235.

A near contemporary of both the foregoing, the author of IV Maccabees, announces the question “whether devout reason, rationality (ὁ εὐσεβῆς λογισμός) is self-sovereign (αὐτοδέσποτος) over the passions (emotions—feelings) ... that conflict with a sound mind” as the leading theme of his work. These passions are variously listed, chiefly as constituted by the familiar quartet of pleasure and desire, fear and sorrow, but including among others, gluttony, anger, distress (πόνος—or ‘pain’), and sexual lust.³⁰ The fact that Jews can resist the attractions of forbidden food displays the rationality of a sound mind (σωφροσύνη) in action.³¹ Why this self-control (αὐτοδέσποτος) should itself be thought ‘rational’ is not further explained, but one might guess something akin to Philo’s explanations of the implied logic of the dietary code is presupposed.³² The author in fact agrees with Philo in emphasising the control of desire (ἐπιθυμία), ordered in the tenth commandment, as a leading instance. If one practices obedience to the Mosaic law in the kinds of detail then given, one finds (or will find) oneself enacting what (Greek) philosophy tells us constitutes reason’s control of impulse.³³ And in this instance, a woman, martyred mother of seven martyred sons, “though of the weaker sex ... yet with a man’s courage ... more noble than a male in steadfastness, more manly than a man in endurance” could be “vindicator of the law and serve as the nation’s champion.”³⁴ The model for emulation is the idealized male, but its (costly) realization is, for this Jewish author, open to women.

He does not discuss God’s own self control, but we may take it that God is held to enjoy the most admired gift he gives to humans (2.22–23), no more amenable to action out of character than was Eleazar, while remaining one who hears and responds with mercy to prayers.³⁵

After finding so wide a deployment of the popular philosophical language of ‘the passions’ and their control particularly in the last two of this trio of Jewish works in Greek, it is perhaps surprising to find none such explicitly

³⁰ IV Macc, all of ch. 1, and in particular, 1.1–2, 20–23. I accept the majority view that the work dates from the first century CE; see., e.g., David A. deSilva, *4 Maccabees* (Guides to the Apocrypha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).

³¹ IV Macc 2.30b–35.

³² Philo, *De decal.* 142, again.

³³ 4 Macc 2.2–6 and the whole chapter, with 5.26–27, 7.18; cf. D.A. de Silva, *4 Maccabees*, 51–52.

³⁴ 4 Macc 15. 23, 29–30.

³⁵ 4 Macc 2.22–23, on God’s gift; Eleazar, 6.24; yet hearing and responding, 6.27–29; 9.24; 10.19–21; 12.16.

in *Joseph and Aseneth*, plausibly a near-contemporary Jewish work in Greek. Here, by contrast, while Aseneth's virginal contempt for men, and her pride, are explicitly repudiated by her herself in due course, emotions of fear and grief, in particular (and similar to those in the popular romances), are clearly held to be appropriate.³⁶ Aseneth exhibits an admirable passionate desire for Joseph with his life-style and his God, and as such becomes a symbol of *μετάνοια*, of movement rather than of arrival.³⁷ *Σωφροσύνη* is valued, but only occurs as a gift from God (237). As Edith M. Humphrey, commenting on rival reconstructions of the narrative, concludes, "neither [reconstructed] text applauds autonomy": God is in control (without articulated reflections on God's self).³⁸ (In fact, Carol Newsom has recently argued that desire, when it is informed desire for the good, is widely approved in the Hebrew Scriptures.)³⁹

If only on the issue of over-ridden autonomy, there is some overlap between Aseneth and the ethos of the Qumran community, especially as evinced in the *Hymns*, as noted by Carol Newsom in emphasising "The extent to which personal autonomy is minimized, even undermined, in the *Hodayot*."⁴⁰ And this affords a contrast, not only with "the kind of self-culture one might find in a Greco-Roman context", but also with Jewish Wisdom literature, with the concern at Qumran being with the community's cohesion, not with an individual's moral improvement for that individual's own sake.⁴¹ Yet, even so, Newsom stresses the interiority of the one offering reproof; "it is to be conducted 'in tr[ruth] and humility and kindly love towards a man. Let him not speak to him in anger or in complaint or in stub[borness] or in mean-spirited [jealousy], and let him not hate [...] in his heart.'"⁴²

In fact, as already suggested, there is also little overt attention to the passions in Wisdom of Solomon, although conventionally taken as written

³⁶ E.g., *Joseph and Aseneth* 6. On the date and provenance, B. Diane Lipsett, *Desiring Conversion*, 86–95; Edith M. Humphrey, *Joseph and Aseneth* (GAP; Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield, 2000), 28–37; translation in C. Burchard, "Joseph and Aseneth", in James H. Charlesworth (ed.) *The Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*, 2 vols. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), 2. *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 177–248; for the Greek, I have been able to consult only Marc Philonenko, *Joseph et Aseneth. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* (Brill: Leiden, 1968).

³⁷ B.D. Lipsett, *Desiring Conversion*, 120–122.

³⁸ E.M. Humphrey, *Joseph and Aseneth*, 77 (also 66).

³⁹ Carol A. Newsom, "Models of the Moral Self: Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism", *JBL* 131.1 (2012), 5–25, citing 12.

⁴⁰ Carol A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space*, 274; and see, further, "Models of the Moral Self", 16–24, on the perceived need for external help in dealing with wrong desire.

⁴¹ C.A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space*, 189 and 141.

⁴² C.A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space*, 142, citing 1QS 5:25–26.

in Greek in Alexandria, dated in the late second or early first century BCE, and usually credited with other clear input from popular Greek (including Stoic) philosophy.⁴³ Here the love of wisdom consists in the keeping of her laws (6.18), without any further “interior” benefit said to accrue. Only incidentally can “desire” (ἐπιθυμία) and fear (φόβος) be seen as harmful, irrational powers, with grief (λύπη) amenable to reason:

The fascination of wickedness obscures what is good
and roving desire perverts the innocent mind, (4.12)

while fear (φόβος) is nothing but the surrender of the helps that come from reason (17.11/12), and wisdom grants “good counsel and encouragement in cares and grief (λύπη, 8.9)”. The quartet of pleasure and desire, fear and sorrow are not brought together, and, although the hedonism of the righteous man’s persecutors is fiercely rebuked as “treachery to their upbringing” (2.12), it is not called irrational ἡδονή; indeed “pleasure-seeking” from God is actually rewarded (16.2, 19.11), and that despite Num. 11.33. Yet, little though there is of the discourse of the passions, it still remains significant, it seems to me, that a Greek-style critique of them can be deployed thus incidentally in a composition so richly redolent of older Jewish tradition.

Despite the eulogy of Sophia imagined as female, there is no attention to women’s rationality, equal or not. The God of this writer, however, is rationally intelligible, consistent, and so trustworthy; and this includes being consistently and mercifully responsive to prayer and to human conduct.⁴⁴

Probably our earliest extensively surviving Jewish writing composed in Greek is the *Letter of Aristeas*, dateable to 170 BCE.⁴⁵ It firmly, but again, only in passing and among much else, commends disciplined self mastery over inordinate desire (τὸ καλῶς ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ ... ἄσχημόν τι ἐπιθυμῆσαι) or impulse (ὁρμή) seeking pleasures, while righteousness frees from sorrow.⁴⁶

⁴³ David Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1979), citing, e.g., 194 on Wisd. 8.7; W. Horbury, “The Wisdom of Solomon”, in John Barton and John Muddiman (eds.) *The Oxford Bible Commentary* (Oxford and New York NY: Clarendon, 2001), 650–667, citing 650–651; Martin Neher, *Wesen und Wirken der Weisheit in der Sapientia Salomonis* (BZAW 333; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2004), though concentrating on the Neoplatonic and Stoic metaphysics.

⁴⁴ Wis. 1.8, 2.23, 3.5, 4.15, 5.18, 9.3, 12.1–2, 15–16, 18.21.

⁴⁵ R.J.H. Shutt, “Letter of Aristeas”, in J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 7–34, citing p. 9; Greek text used, André Pelletier, S.J. (ed. and tr.), *Lettre d’Aristée à Philocrate* (SC 89; Éd. du Cerf: Paris, 1968).

⁴⁶ *Aristeas* 211; cf. 221–222; 256 (impulses or desires); pleasures, 108, 278; sorrow, 232; fear is noted only in passing.

(Fear does not seem to figure as a passion.) Here self-control would seem to be God's gift, for he controls men's minds (if not women's, apparently).⁴⁷ God himself is one who consistently directs good intentions aiming at what is fitting and is right. Righteousness itself is taught by the food rules of the God-given law as interpreted by "right reason", much as later in Philo and IV Macc.⁴⁸

My interim conclusion is, as proposed in the *Introduction* to this chapter, that a number, though not all of these quite diverse Jewish writers in the early Hellenistic period have found little difficulty in matching or assimilating, and that quite incidentally, *something* of this Greek concern with self-control, involving an explicit or implicit sense of a self that may be encouraged and enabled to master its feelings rather than be mastered by them, as a good in itself, not just as conducive to other benefits. And such self-mastery may well appear as God-given, rather than constituting a godless self-assertion. Though this sort of talk is not further used of God's 'self' explicitly among preserved sources prior to Philo, there is no indication that God might exempt himself from the ideals he is held to favour.

3. JEWISH AUTHORS IN HEBREW

Seemingly from round the same date as that suggested for *Aristeas* we have Ben Sira's Hebrew reflections, with his grandson's translation produced later in the second century BCE. Commentators suggest that Stoic influence may be discerned here, too.⁴⁹ By contrast with Wisdom and *Aristeas*, ben Sira's ethic is largely eudaimonist (and very unStoic).⁵⁰ Pleasure escapes criticism. Some desire may well be commendable; it should be controlled, but only for fear of divine or social punishment.⁵¹ "Fear" as "fear of the Lord" is repeatedly

⁴⁷ *Aristeas* 195, 197, 227, 236; on women's apparently inescapable weakness and fickleness, 250.

⁴⁸ *Aristeas* 18.144–166.

⁴⁹ John J. Collins, "Ecclesiasticus, or The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach", in John Barton and John Muddiman (eds), *The Oxford Bible Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 667–698, citing 667–668; cf. Alexander A. di Lella, "Sirach", in Raymond E. Brown, S.S., et al. (eds), *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), 496–509; Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, OFM, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira. A New Translation with Notes; Introduction and Commentary* (AB 39; New York and London: Doubleday, 1987).

⁵⁰ Sir 14.14; 30.22–23.

⁵¹ Sir 3.29, 6.37; 5.2, 18.30–31, 23.1–6.

enjoined. Grief at another's misfortune is commendable; on bereavement it can be appropriate, if not over-indulged, but otherwise "gladness of heart is the life of man."⁵²

But this is where I begin to enter fresh caveats. Ben Sira does not talk of control for its own sake, for an absence of disturbance, because he simply does not believe in it; it is not because he lacks the words. Quite clearly, he can consider self-control or its lack, as such, and affirm the former and lament the latter. A—perhaps uncharacteristically—"Jobian" passage runs:

... a heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam ...
 their perplexities and fear of heart—
 their anxious thought is of the day of death ...
 there is anger and envy and trouble and unrest
 and fear of death and fury and strife
 and when one rests upon his bed
 his sleep at night confuses his mind.⁵³

The cure lies with respect for God ("the fear of the Lord") and an obedience to his law which he may agree to enable and, reassuringly, reward:

Whoever keeps the law controls his thoughts
 and wisdom is the fulfilment of the fear of the Lord ...
 O that a guard were set over my mouth,
 and a seal of prudence over my lips
 that it may keep me from falling
 so that my tongue may not destroy me.
 Lord, Father and Ruler of my life,
 do not abandon me to their control.
 O that whips were set over my thoughts
 and the discipline of wisdom (παιδείαν σοφίας) over my mind!
 ... then I will not fall before my adversaries ...
 do not give me haughty eyes,
 and remove from me evil desire.
 Let neither gluttony nor sexual lust overcome me,
 and do not surrender me to a shameless soul.⁵⁴

Self-control can be envisaged, albeit not for its own reward of inner undisturbed peace.

That a woman might achieve such self-control is not considered; about the grudging best allowed by this patriarchal misogynist is, "If kindness and

⁵² Sir 26.28; 30.21–23; 38.16–23.

⁵³ Sir 40.1–6 (RSV); cf. Job 5.7, 15.21, 18.11.

⁵⁴ Sir 21.11; 22.27–23.6 (RSV, adapted).

humility mark his wife's speech, her husband is not like other men. He who acquires [such] a wife gets his best possession, a helper fit for him, and a pillar of support."⁵⁵

God is trusted to be consistent. "All things are the works of the Lord, for they are very good, and whatever he commands will be done in his time ... to the holy his ways are straight, just as they are obstacles to the wicked. From the beginning good things were created for the good, just as evils for sinners."⁵⁶ There is no suggestion that the God who can be asked to aid self-control may hold himself free to dispense with it.

Also significant for my argument is the extent of allusion to previous Jewish writings discerned in ben Sira by the commentators, displaying a marked "fidelity to tradition", even though he claims a willingness to learn, critically, on his wide travels.⁵⁷ Without overt direct external influence, he could still reflect in his own ways on inner tensions and pressures, and the desirability of an inner control centre (if still, not for its own sake). Such reflections on being human and by extension on divine being were entirely possible, without needing to await another culture's articulation of them.

Still more significant for my thesis is Qoheleth, Ecclesiastes, widely dated earlier in the Hellenistic period. Here too there have in the past been suggestions of specific Greek influence (Epicurean, Cynic, Stoic), but suggestions rightly (to my mind) rejected by many recent commentators.⁵⁸ What does seem also to be widely accepted as shared here with important Greek thinking of the period is a focus on the well-being of individuals within society, rather than on corporate well-being as such. Further, "the basic approach, common to various directions within Hellenistic philosophy, of determining the happiness available to human beings through a *devaluation*

⁵⁵ Sir 36.23–24. On such gender differentiation, see Ellen van Wolde, "Sentiments as Culturally Constructed Emotions", *Bib.Int.* 16.1 (2008), 1–24, but dealing with love and anger, not the Greek quartet.

⁵⁶ Sir 39.16, 22–24; cf. 6.16–17, 15.11, 16.26–30.

⁵⁷ Sir 39.4; cf. P.W. Skehan, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 22; 48–49; Pancratius C. Beentjes, "Canon and Scripture in the Book of Ben Sira (Jesus Sirach / Ecclesiasticus)" (repr. of 2000), in *idem "Happy the One who Meditates on Wisdom" (SIR 14.20). Collected Essays on the Book of Ben Sira* (CEBT 43; Leuven and Paris: Peeters, 2006), ch. 13, 169–186, together with chs. 14–16, following.

⁵⁸ The most recent commentator available to me who argues for direct and particular influence is Norbert Lohfink, in his revision of his original 1980 *Kohelet* (NEB 1; Würzburg: Echter), now in *Qoheleth. A Continental Commentary* (tr. Sean McEvenue; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003); in response, e.g., Roland E. Murphy O. Carm., *Ecclesiastes* (Word Biblical Commentary 23A; Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1992), xliii–xlv; T. Krüger, *Qoheleth*, 21–22; 73–74.

of and becoming indifferent to everything not at one's disposal is taken up in the book and reflected on critically.⁵⁹

"Then I considered all that my hands had done and the toil I had spent in doing it, and, behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and there was nothing to be gained under the sun," complains Qoheleth (2.11). The supposed "good things" listed just happen, they "befall" wise and fool alike (2.15).⁶⁰ You cannot ensure their obtaining or their retention, or even the fleeting enjoyment of them; yet only what one can get and keep is real 'gain' (יתרון, *yitrôn*), Qoheleth in effect insists.

The recipe for "gain" is not worked out in terms even roughly equivalent to those considered earlier. Pleasure here is an acceptable aim, and neither sexual desire (2.8) nor grief (1.18) is criticised; they and the other passions are not picked out as important influences "external" to the self (not even anger is, 7.9). Significantly, the LXX translator finds nothing that invites let alone demands the Greek words we have considered. What Qoheleth does inculcate is the consistent self-critical management of one's attitudes, including one's attitudes to what one likes and dislikes. One can only enjoy what comes or what one works for if one does not expect it to last and does not allow enjoyment's uncontrollability and evanescence (הבל, *hebel*) to spoil it when and if it does occur. And then at this deeper level there is an implicit sense of a self that can be in control of itself, a conviction we have seen worked out rather more explicitly, if still only in passing, by ben Sira. This, I suggest, expresses an ethos that is structurally close to that of the Greek and Latin thinkers sketched earlier, yet independent of them.

The nearest Hellenistic parallel to Qoheleth would probably be afforded by Aristippus and his Cyrenaic followers: for instance, it is said of the former, "he derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present"; yet this is still without any sign of direct influence; rather is Qoheleth's dominant and general intellectual context afforded by the incipient Jewish "canon".⁶¹

⁵⁹ T. Krüger, *Qoheleth*, 22; again, present author's emphasis. Admittedly, this interpretation of "gain" in Qoheleth is not universal; for instance Tomas Frydrych, *Living under the Sun. An Examination of Proverbs and Qoheleth* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 190, notes that things being out of an individual's control is at issue, but not that Qoheleth allows that one's attitude to them may be. Rather closer, Naoto Kamano, *Cosmology and Character. Qoheleth's Pedagogy from a Rhetorical-Critical Perspective* (BZAW 312; Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 2002), allowing for human lack of control, 105, 108; an ethos of striving to enjoy without attempting to control, 118, 149–150, 201.

⁶⁰ They are genuinely good, despite the oppression of "life under the sun", as J. Gerald Janzen argues, in "Qohelet on 'Life under the Sun'", *CBQ* 70.3 (2008), 465–483.

⁶¹ On Aristippus, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 2.65–104, citing 2.66

As a further example from the Aristippean tradition, one might take his “I have Laïs (a courtesan), not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but not needing them.” Women in fact figure only in passing in Qoheleth, as slaves or as a good wife who may “happen” (9.9); on women in general there seems to be nothing positive (7.29); the companion you rely on (4.9–12), is male, and woman is a snare you can’t be sure of being able to escape.

God in Qoheleth is a consistently inscrutable creator (3.11–14; 8.17), and apparently arbitrary in his giving and taking away (2.26; 5.18–6.1), and the same end awaits good and bad alike, no one has deserved better (9.2).⁶² God shows no sign of being likely to be persuaded to or adapt to suit humans (5.1–2; in general, compare Job 38–42.6); nor are any possibly conflicting feelings attributed to this deity, though, since he may display appropriate hostility in response to a vow reneged on (5.6): you’d better not risk it.

If one then reads Job as dialogical and even more as polyphonic, then at least the prose tale seems also to be talking of “the wisdom of ‘nonattachment’”, the sense that possessions are, like clothes, “not part of the ‘naked self’”.⁶³ Certainly his “nonattachment” not only to goods and family but also to his own physical well-being seems to match very closely that of Epictetus, in the latter’s “not under our control are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers and sisters, children, country.” Otherwise, when Zeus takes any of these away, we risk saying, “What have I to do with him, if he wills that I be in such a state as I am now?” The next step is that I begin to hate him.”⁶⁴ Quite how close we judge them depends rather on how we interpret Job’s (תַּמָּה, *tumah*), his “innocence”, “perfection”, or “integrity” (on which I as interpreter so far can find no decisive help). If it is the latter, “integrity” (2.3, 9; cf. 27.5, 31.6) then it may come close to Epictetus’ *προαίρεσις*, self-determination. If, on the other hand, it is the “perfection” of his submissive “fear of the Lord”, that is then just a single but also greater external attachment (for rejecting which his wife suffers his rebuke). Yet even so,

and further on, 2.75.; and On native intertextuality, see for instance Qoh. 1.12, 16; 3.11 with Gen. 1. 31 and Isa. 44.24, but also with Isa. 46.10; 3.14b with Prov, frequent; 5.15 with Job 1.21, etc.; and commentaries ad loc.

⁶² However, T. Frydrych, *Living under the Sun*, 43 talking of divine ‘whim’ here, is, I think mistaken. God is too inscrutable to for humans to know whether it is by whim or design; better, just it is “unpredictable”, as Frydrych then explains.

⁶³ Carol A. Newsom, *The Book of Job. A Contest of Moral Imaginations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 1, “The Book of Job as Polyphonic Text”, 3–31, and 58.

⁶⁴ Epictetus, e.g., *Dissertations* 1.22.10, 15 (part cited earlier); cf. 4.1.100–101.

Job would still in the prose work be portrayed with a significant “nonattachment” to *most* externalities. Further, without it being articulated, he evinces no distress, fear, desire or hedonism.

In contrast, the Job of the poetic dialogues, while disowning any lecherous male gaze (31.1, 9), displays much grief (e.g., 3.3, 20; 6.20), fear (e.g., 3.25; 7.7, 14; 30.15), desire (e.g., 10.20; 29.1–11), pleasure-seeking (e.g., 6.6–7; 21.23–24; 29.1–11, again, and vv. 18–19). His friends and Elihu share all these same concerns, including their evaluation of their contribution to a desired social recognition, disagreeing with Job only on the justice of their general allocation.⁶⁵

The God of the prose boasts of his servant’s respectful submissiveness, while admitting no reciprocal covenantal care for his servant’s well-being; rather is this deity easily persuaded to risk all of that to score a point against one of his courtiers. Then the God of Job’s speeches is “obsessed” with Job.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the God of 38–41 seems entirely other, admitting no obsession with Job, no desire (nor fear, pleasure-seeking, or grief), and is impervious to any challenge external to his self-determined creative but inscrutable purposes (cf. 42.1–2).

Thus certainly, issues of resisting control by anything seen as physically but also emotionally external to a ‘self-determining self’—a self as both pre-supposed and enacted—can be articulated in these Wisdom writings, even if an explicit externalising of and resistance to specific ‘passions’ remains unstated, while the gain from resistance is in many instances itself still external. (So far I have not found much help in my quest from older studies of ‘man’ [*sic*] in the Old Testament.)⁶⁷

⁶⁵ C.A. Newsom, *Job*, 105–115, argues that the friends encourage religious practice as therapeutic, which might suggest a refocus on the relationship for its own sake; but still allows that the aim of prayer is a reversal of physical fortune and a social restoration (112). David J.A. Clines, *Job* (Word Commentary 18, 3 vols; Nashville TN: Nelson, 2006), 18b, 1015, on this passage, writes of “a worrying disjunction between the person and his body.”

⁶⁶ C.A. Newsom, *Job*, 149.

⁶⁷ E.g., Walther Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 2 vols (ET, J.A. Baker; London: SCM Press, 1964), II, chs XVI, 118–150, on feelings, but not their control; and XXII, 316–379, on the goods and motives of moral behaviour, where Qoheleth and Job seem not to contribute; Hans W. Wolff, *Anthropology of the Old Testament* (tr. M. Kohl; London: SCM Press, 1974), on feelings, 36–37 and 44–45, where just Prov 23.17 is noted in passing, as inculcating one’s own obedience rather than being upset by sinners; Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, 2 vols (tr. D.M.G. Stalker; Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), 1. “Israel’s wisdom deriving from experience”, 418–441: the teaching of “self-mastery” is noted, 430–432, but not the issue of ‘feelings’ as such (despite a passing reference to Greek *σωφροσύνη* and *φρόνησις*, 432); Walter Brueggemann, *Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy* (Minneapolis MN:

Wisdom motifs have long been discerned in the David saga.⁶⁸ The unwisdom of David's allowing himself to be ensnared by his lust for Bathsheba, followed by his son, Amnon's lust for his step-sister, Tamar, are as clear in this narrative as in Epictetus' sketch, "Today when I saw a handsome lad or a handsome woman ... I do not even picture to myself the next scene—the woman herself in my presence, disrobing and lying down by my side."⁶⁹ So, too, David's inability to control his grief at the death of his rebel son, Absalom, when the peace and integrity of the realm is at stake, is narrated as critically as does Epictetus his account of the high official unable to cope with his daughter's illness.⁷⁰ The folly of allowing desire or grief to overpower one is as clear in both.

The possibility of self-control, and the disadvantages of its lack, are from time to time noted in Proverbs and elsewhere. In the text of Genesis as it stands, Jacob curses the fierce anger of his sons Simon and Levi (Gen 49.7; cf. Amos 1.11). We are warned, "The pressure of anger produces strife" (Prov 30.33; cf. 29.22; Qoh 7.9). "Better be slow to anger than a fighter; better control one's temper than capture a city" 16.32 (cf. 15.18; 19.11). "Though wealth increases," says the psalmist, "do not set your heart on it" (Ps 62.10). For the most part, however, while disturbance, anxiety, fear, are deprecated, the answer does not seem to lie with the individual's self-control, but with trusted divine providence expected to render external social and wider circumstances more favourable (e.g. Ps 55). But I think it is clear that ideas of inner control over passions, desires, emotions, are by no means foreign to the Jewish canon even if not often the subject of reflection.

Fortress, 1997), ch. 15, "The Human Person as Yahweh's Partner", 450–491, where the covenantal emphasis precludes attention to self-control, Qoheleth having earlier been side-lined as "the far edge of negativity", 393.

⁶⁸ Cf. Carole R. Fontaine, "The Bearing of Wisdom on the Shape of 2 Samuel 11–12 and 1 Kings 3" (originally *JOT* 34 [1986], 61–77), in Athalya Brenner (ed.) *A Feminist Companion to Samuel and Kings* (The Feminist Companion to the Bible 5; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 143–160, citing 143.

⁶⁹ 2 Sam 11–13 and the following chapters; Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.18.15–18; and cf. Job 31.1, 9, noted above. On the force of a display of the ill-effects of losing self-control, see again, L.C.A. Alexander, "The Passions in Galen".

⁷⁰ 2 Sam 18.31–19.6; Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.11.2–4, 20–22. quoted above; cf. Paul Borgman, *David, Saul and God. Rediscovering an Ancient Story* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 210, "obsession", "out of control with grief". In both narratives no counter is entered to the critical stance articulated. Intriguingly, David A. Bosworth, "Faith and Resilience: King David's Reaction to the death of Bathsheba's Firstborn", *CBQ* 73.4 (Oct. 2011), 691–707, has just recently argued that David's failure to mourn the death of his and Bathsheba's first child is to be read as "resilience" rather than callous indifference; even if it is so in the earlier story, it is only with difficulty that Joab in the later narrative recalls David to it.

Although, as announced, the theology of divine ἀπάθεια is not the main concern of this chapter, that issue does provide a further test. Is God regularly in the canon, or at least often, portrayed as in control of his own desire, fear, pleasure, compassion—and, especially, of his anger? Or does he seem to be controlled by them?⁷¹

Certainly there are occasions when anger seems to happen to God, it is “kindled” (in the older translations) rather than, possibly, “exercised” (e.g., Num 11.10, 33; the LXX uses a passive). Especially striking is Num 22.22, where God seems to be aroused to anger by Balaam doing precisely what he himself has just ordered him to do (Num 22.20–22). Yet there are many other passages where God seems to act of set and self-determined purpose (in later writings, covenantally assured), steadfastly aiming to secure a loyally righteous people, appropriately rewarded with peace, increase and prosperity, and punished, even very severely only when his vision for them is thwarted by them (although some of us may still find the concomitant self-blame for disaster experienced hard to accept). Walter Brueggemann, for instance, notes a contradiction between this “core testimony” of Israel to divine constancy and faithfulness, and a “countertestimony”.⁷² In illustration of the former, with Heschel I quote:

Behold the storm of the Lord!
Wrath has gone forth.
a whirling tempest;
it will burst upon the head of the wicked.
The anger of the Lord will not turn back
until he has executed and accomplished
the intents of his mind.
In the end of days you will understand it clearly.⁷³

(Jer 23.19–20; cf. 30.23–24)

Of course, it is not only anger that constitutes divine *eupatheia*:

The Lord is good to all,
And has compassion over all he has made. (Ps 145.9)

⁷¹ For possible indications of God as ‘impassible’, M. Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, 13, helpfully lists what he discerns as the most often quoted passages: Num 23.19; 1 Sam 15.29; Ps 102.25–28; Isa 40.18, 25; 41.4; 43.10; Ezek 5.11; Hos 13.14; Mal 3.6 (and Acts 14.15; 1 Tim 6.15–16; Heb 1.10–11; 6.17; Jas 1.17). These all indicate firmness of purpose, as argued below, and not inflexibility in response.

⁷² W. Brueggemann, *Theology*, 268, 366–367.

⁷³ Quoted by A.J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, 288.

Or

The Lord is merciful and gracious,
slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love. (Ps 103.8)

The LXX (Ps 102.8) renders this with

οἰκτίρμων καὶ ἐλεήμων ὁ κύριος,
μακρόθυμος καὶ πολυέλεος.

This God can also (if rarely) himself be held to rejoice, announcing

I will rejoice in Jerusalem
And be glad in my people (Isa 65.19)

but also can (so, some) allow himself to be grieved (or, at least, provoked), as at Ps 78.40, Isa 63.10. If we judge these emotions attributed to one who is all along steadfast and self-determined, then we are not far from discerning ἀπάθεια in an important, evidenced sense earlier explained. This God's character is settled and immovable in his emotional and providential response to what happens in the human and wider world. In that sense, and in some accounts, he is ἀπαθής, but only in that sense: steadfast, but not stuck fast—just as, ideally, it is widely accepted, humans can and should be.

Having one's feelings under control is part and parcel with having one's thoughts in order, and being able to express them in an orderly way. It is to reflections on order in thought and its communication that the reader is now invited to turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

ORDER IN COMPOSITION: “ΚΑΘΕΞΗΣ ΣΟΙ ΓΡΑΨΑΙ” (LUKE 1.3)

INTRODUCTION

In his prologue Luke assures “Theophilus” that he had decided to write an ordered narrative, “καθεξῆς σοι γράψαι”, where καθεξῆς, like the more usual ἐφεξῆς, assumes a common understanding of what might count as ordering or orderly, like putting things in a row. It is not further defined. In his *Jewish Antiquities* Josephus similarly assures his hearers that he will be putting everything in its appropriate order (κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν), again without specifying what that means (though it clearly includes rearranging the “canonical” order on many occasions).¹ So, too, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (a model for Josephus) promises to “relate in order” (ἐφεξῆς) the events that he means to recount.² In the next century Lucian advised the would-be historian to collect his material, make a series of notes, then, having put them into order (ἐπιθείς τὴν τάξιν), rephrase them elegantly. Again the order is unspecified, save that for an account of a battle the author should switch from time to time from one side to the other.³ And, as Loveday Alexander says of Luke, “There is nothing in the preface to lead us to believe that the order Luke offers is conceived as better than or even different from the order the material had in any other version, much less that the order in Luke’s narrative is closer to a presumed *historical* order of events.”⁴

¹ Josephus, *Ant.* 1.17. On what follows, see F.G. Downing, “Redaction Criticism: Josephus’ *Antiquities* and the Synoptic Gospels” II, *JSNT* 9 (1980), 29–48. On prologues, cf. Loveday Alexander, *The Preface to Luke’s Gospel. Literary convention and social context in Luke 1.1–4 and Acts 1.1* (SNTSMS 78; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), noting concern for order, 95; 131–132; and, “The Preface to Acts and the Historians” (2005), in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context*, 21–42. In discussion with Alexander, Armin D. Baum, “Lk 1,1–4 zwischen antiker Historiografie und Fachprosa. Zum literaturgeschichtlichen Kontext des lukanischen Prologs”, *ZNW* 101.1 (2010), 33–54, but without discussing “order” as such.

² Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 11.1.6.

³ Lucian, *How to Write History*, 48–49; on Lucian, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Thucydides on “order”, see L.C.A. Alexander, “Fact, Fiction and the Genre of Acts” (2005), in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context*, 133–164, citing 144–145.

⁴ L.C.A. Alexander, *The Preface*, 135–136; original italics.

1. IDEOLOGICAL ORDERING

Kinds of detailed ordering will be the main concern of this chapter. But the fact remains, order in information (of “thought” or supposed “knowledge”), however specified or unspecified, is never—or very rarely—neutral. Any collecting, let alone any “tidying”, is likely to impose order of sorts on what otherwise might be discerned as random, but now is to be experienced differently. When Josephus re-orders Scriptural narratives, it is not at random; nor are his or Philo’s re-ordering of legal matter.⁵ Michel Foucault’s insights on the ordering of information (“knowledge”) are applied—critically—to writings from late antiquity in a fairly recent collection of essays, *Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire*. In an age when rhetoricians were expected to be able to display wide ranging knowledge, a collection such as Pliny the Elder’s *Natural History*, and other such ‘encyclopediae’, may be seen as celebrating the Roman Empire in text in much the same way as physical objects were collected and displayed to decorate the palaces of Emperors and governors.⁶ By way of contrast, Plutarch’s wide-ranging celebration of the playful inventiveness, creativity and extent of Greek culture, locally rooted yet readily universalized, in his *symposia* discourses significantly *ignores* the Latin classics entirely, and the presence of Roman rule itself (even though its threat impinged in other contexts, see ch. 1, above; and contrast the *Parallel Lives*).⁷ Dio, however, in his *Olympicos*, openly acknowledges the enslaving might of the Empire, but also challenges fellow Greeks (if only implicitly) nonetheless to live the ancient heritage he has in effect selectively rehearsed and ordered. Yet in his *Borysthenicos*, with its cosmic scope, high culture is Greek, and Rome only appears in a slighting reference to its alien hairstyle.⁸

⁵ See F.G. Downing, “Redaction Criticism Josephus’ *Antiquities* and the Synoptic Gospels” I, “Josephus”; and Peter Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria: Reviewing and Rewriting Biblical Material”, *StudPhilAn* 9 (1997), 37–53 (with Josephus, 47–50).

⁶ Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh, “Ordering Knowledge”, in *idem* (eds), *Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3–39, citing 36–37, with a very telling quotation from Edward Said, but also referring to Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (ET, London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (ET, London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).

⁷ Jason König, “Fragmentation and coherence in Plutarch’s *Sympotic Questions*”, in J. König and T. Whitmarsh (eds), *Ordering Knowledge*, 43–68.

⁸ *Olympicos*, Discourse 12, 20–21, and 85, and *Borysthenicos*, Discourse 36, 17; cf., again, S. Swain, “Dio of Prusa”, in his *Hellenism and Empire*, 200–202, cited in ch. 1; and John H. Moles, “Dio Chrysostom, Greece and Rome”, in Doreen Innes et al. (eds) *Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday* (Oxford: Clarendon

As Loveday Alexander points out, while the romantic novelists, Chariton and Xenophon, depict a Rome-free Mediterranean, Luke and Paul on the other hand see world geography in the Empire's terms.⁹

A comparison between Dio's *Olympicos* and Paul's Romans is able to show something of the extent to which they share a wide range of similar topics (a widely overlapping “*inventio*” of many very similar elements, at a similar length), displaying a similar trust that such a range so ordered constitutes an assimilable package, plausibly an effective presentation in each case of a providential and thus ultimately orderly world-view. Orderliness tacitly appreciated becomes an unspoken strand of the message. Dio's scope is from human beginnings up to the near future; Paul's vision runs from creation (Rom 1.20) through current strife to final recreation (8.19–21), and both in a very different cosmic scheme from that proposed by imperial propaganda, in an order that verbally disorders, seems to disrupt that of Rome.¹⁰ Admittedly, in his letter Paul acknowledges present Roman order with much less qualification than does Dio in *Discourse* 12: but nonetheless Paul places Roma subservient to his God, as an incidental and very temporary instrument at his service (Rom 13.1–7, 11) rather than indefinitely mistress of all. Rome's officials are to be given what they are owed—that is, what his hearers judge is due, only that, and especially when it is a matter of respect.¹¹ Yet is also worth noting that Dio allowed that not all his hearers would catch all the allusions and nuances of his speech, even though he did expect them to engage actively, attentively, with the tracks and digressions he was likely to introduce.¹² Further than this, Peter Oakes has recently suggested that we may profitably imagine some of the likely varieties of interpretations

Press, 1995), 177–192; and also again, discussion in F.G. Downing, “God with Everything: Dio Chrysostom”, in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 28–29. On Dio's artistry in enlisting sense of place to encourage critical self-awareness among listeners, see Michael Trapp, “Sense of Place in the Orations of Dio Chrysostom”, in Doreen Innes et al. (eds) *Ethics and Rhetoric*, 163–176; cf. also, Hans Rupprecht Goette, “Die Topographie der Karystia in der Euboischen Rede des Dion von Prusa—Autopsie oder Fiktion?” (2012), in Gustav Adolf Lehman et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschwürde*, 167–189.

⁹ L.C.A. Alexander, “Narrative Maps. Reflections on the Toponymy of Acts” (2005), in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Environment*, 97–132.

¹⁰ F.G. Downing, “God with Everything: Paul”, in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 43–63. On Paul apart from this comparison, see Robert Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2007), on Rom 13.1–7, 785–803; Richard A. Horsley, *Paul and Empire. Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society* (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International, 1997); *idem* (ed.), *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*.

¹¹ Judged by hearers: so R. Jewett, *Romans*, 802–803.

¹² Dio, *Discourse* 12, *Olympicos*, 16, 25–26, 38; also 11.6.

in detail of Paul's Romans, forthcoming among a range of likely hearers.¹³ The author's sense of over-all order is not necessarily that discerned by each hearer.

Yet another such comprehensive vision is offered by Revelation, very different in detail from Paul's (and not just in the roles accorded Rome—compare Rev 13 and Rom 13.1–7!). As well as being distinctive in his Christian ethos, 'John', specifically and incisively, even more overtly 'deconstructs' Rome's self-image (e.g. Rev 18). Yet a third 'encyclopaedic' vision is offered by Luke, a story from Adam to the end (Lk 3.38, 21.9), creation to judgment (Acts 17.24–31), with Rome accorded a rather more significant and at times even quite positive role, but still as just one minor actor late on stage in a script not of its own writing. Still more positive, of course, in its interpretation of Rome's role is Josephus' massive ordering of his story: as he says he explained to the besieged in Jerusalem, "Fortune, indeed, had from all quarters passed over to them [the Romans], and God who went the round of the nations, bringing to each in turn the rod of empire, had now sided with Italy (ὁὖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰταλίας εἶναι)." Yet Josephus carefully avoids saying that God's circling had stopped, just as he had earlier avoided explaining the "white stone", the everlasting kingdom of Dan 2.44 as Rome or not.¹⁴ What is omitted forms a part of the open-ended ordering of the narrative and of the world order the hearer is invited or inveigled to accept.

Mark begins his ordering of things by announcing a Son of God who is not the Roman Emperor and with the formal proclamation (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) of a divine empire (βασιλεία) that is not Rome's, one quite different in kind. This newly proclaimed empire's distinctive ethos had its inception at creation, had recently registered a triumph that parodied the rituals of Rome, and looks to an end that excludes her. Without deigning to mention Rome herself, her ways clearly constitute precisely the "counter-culture" that followers of Jesus have engaged to resist, accepting the likely cost.¹⁵

¹³ Dio *Discourse* 12.38, again, and 43; Peter Oakes, *Reading Romans in Pompeii*, 127–179.

¹⁴ Josephus, *BJ*. 5. 367; *Ant*. 10.210.

¹⁵ Mk 1.1, 15; 10.42–45; 13.9, 13; 10.6; 13.29; P.B. Duff, "The March of the Divine Warrior and the Advent of the Greco-Roman King: Mark's Account of Jesus's Entry into Jerusalem", *JBL* 111.1 (1992), 55–71; and F.G. Downing, "A Rival to Romulus", in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words*, 133–151. On Mark's ethos, see also Ched Myers, *Binding the Strong Man. A Political Reading of Mark's Story of Jesus* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988). On the openness of various New Testament writings to this sort of "anarchist" reading, see Alexandre J.M.E. Christoyannopoulos, *Christian Anarchism. A Political Commentary on the Gospel* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010). (Christoyannopoulos restricts himself to much later readings rather than possible contemporary ones.)

In much smaller space, Colossians, Ephesians and Hebrews, as shown in ch. 2, offer further grand schemes of cosmic ordering, where *de jure* if not *de facto* God's Son is in authority over all things—not just Rome—even if all do not yet acknowledge him.¹⁶ However, in Colossians and Ephesians (if less obviously in Hebrews), also as we have seen, cosmic order presupposes and requires domestic sub-ordination, the commonly approved foundation for conventional civic order. The ideological challenge is to that extent softened.¹⁷

Still less ideologically subversive and much less grandiose scenarios, affirming the Roman order despite some apparent aberrations, appear in 1 Peter, the Pastoral Epistles (also emphasising domestic order) and 1 Clement (emphasising church order). Here the current Roman emperor is, without question of merit being raised, to be accorded honour, or prayed for, or both. Though again Christ is Lord and Saviour—even God—he seems to be so “not of this world”, rather as in the Fourth Gospel.¹⁸

The foregoing sketch must suffice for the kinds of cosmic, social and/or domestic order affirmed or refused, implicitly as well as on occasion openly, in the ordering of their hortatory and kindred matter by early Christian and other contemporary authors.

2. KINDS OF DISCOURSE

Conventional guidelines for structuring a discourse, whether in court, in decision-making assemblies, or for more general occasions of praise or blame, were available and were discussed by teachers of rhetoric in late Mediterranean antiquity, and have been employed in commentary, and increasingly, by New Testament scholars over the last thirty years. Common structural headings include such terms as ‘*exordium*’, ‘*narratio*’, ‘*propositio*’, ‘*probatio*’ and ‘*peroratio*’.¹⁹ It seems likely, however, that at most ancient

¹⁶ All: all angels in Hebrews, all principalities and powers in Colossians and Ephesians; on the cosmic schemes in the latter two see, e.g., again, George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School*; on Hebrews, ch. 5 of Edward Adams, *The Stars will Fall from Heaven. Cosmic Catastrophe in the New Testament and its World* (LNTS [JSNTS] 347; London: T & T Clark, 2007), 183–199.

¹⁷ Eph 5.21–6.12; Col 3.18–4.1; Heb 3.1–6; 12.7–11.

¹⁸ 1 Peter 2.17; 1 Tim 2.1–3 and Tit 3.1; 1 Clement 60.4–61.3; Jn 17.6; 18.36. For awareness of ‘aberrations’ on the part of the Roman state, despite the affirmations, 1 Pet 3.14–17; 4.12–19; 1 Tim 6.13; 2 Tim 4.6, 16–17; 1 Clem 5.

¹⁹ E.g., by R. Jewett, *Romans*, vii–ix, and often in the main commentary; H.J. Klauck, *Dion von Prusa*, uses ‘*prolalia*’, ‘*exordium*’, ‘*narratio*’, ‘*propositio*’, ‘*argumentatio*’ and ‘*peroratio*’

rhetoricians took this sort of menu of proposals ‘à la carte’ rather than as ‘table d’hôte’, or so Quintilian, one of our main sources, argues forcibly they should.²⁰ There are, then, possibilities of structural ordering, but there is no ordained structural order.

A little more of authors’ implicit sense for correct order may be discerned when they are clearly using sources preserved for us. Unfortunately, we do not have many such: little for narrative and still less for more discursive composition.²¹ The most extensive is Josephus, in his *Jewish Antiquities*, where we have not only narrative but also codified law. He can be observed apparently avoiding what might appear as discrepancies or undue duplication or, in narrative, interruption (yet even on the latter, we have the counter example of Mark, and of the authors of the ancient Romances, seeming deliberately to choose narrative “intercalations”).²² Josephus also appears to take care over ethical and theological propriety (that is to say, avoiding what he shows elsewhere might be seen as apologetically awkward). The over-all aim, most clearly in narrative, is harmony and continuity, clarity and plausibility, with some addition of ‘pathos’, positive appeal to the emotions. This is all rather obvious; but it does show that Josephus, as our example, is not bound by the order of his sources, not even when they are accorded great authority and respect as part of the (emergent) ‘canon’ of sacred writings.

in discussing that discourse; yet G.A. Kennedy, a prime mover in this field, in his *The Art of Rhetoric in the Ancient World* (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1972), 575–578, on this discourse, quite forgoes such divisions; cf. also *idem*, *The Genres of Rhetoric* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1979).

²⁰ Quintilian, *Institutes*, e.g., 2.1.9–13; 3.9; and cf. J.-N. Aletti, querying such analyses, in “La présence d’un modèle rhétorique en Romains: son rôle et son importance”, *Bib* 71 (1990), 1–24; and his “La rhétorique paulinienne: construction et communication d’une pensée”, in A. Dettwiller et al. (eds), *Paul, une théologie en construction* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2004), 47–66; cf. F.G. Downing, “God with Everything: Dio Chrysostom”, 23–24.

²¹ See F. Gerald Downing, “Writers’ Use of Abuse of Written Sources”, in P. Foster et al. (eds.) *New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett* ((BETL CCXXXIX; Leuven and Paris: Peeters, 2011), 523–548), and, in the same volume, Alex Damm, “Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem”, 459–482; and Robert A. Derrenbacker Jr., “The ‘External and Psychological Conditions under Which the Synoptic Gospels were Written’: Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem”, 435–458; and *idem*, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem* (BETL 186; Leuven and Paris: Peeters, 2005).

²² F.G. Downing, “Redaction Criticism”, 50, on Josephus; and *idem*, “Markan Intercalations in Cultural Context”, in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words*, 118–132.

3. EMULATION—FOLLOWING ADMIRABLE EXAMPLES

Nonetheless, to compose effective and admirable poetry or prose in ancient Graeco-Roman culture, you were expected to take careful note of and in some ways follow accredited examples and to attempt to improve on them. You might, of course, on occasion, quote explicitly (and aptly) from Homer or Hesiod, Euripides or Vergil.²³ But such quotation apart, following chosen examples, *mimesis*, *imitatio*, had to be other than word-for word copying. Un-attributed precise copying was theft, κλοπή (our ‘plagiarism’), though a very obvious quotation might not need to be ascribed.²⁴

The foregoing is not, I think, contentious. For instance, we find such as Josephus clearly following this rule in the paraphrastic re-writing of the Jewish scriptures in Greek which we have just been considering.²⁵ And we find much similar largely paraphrastic responses to their native traditions among other Jewish writers.²⁶ However, further reflections on the matter seem worth illustrating. Aristotle had asserted, approvingly, “From childhood humans have an instinct for mimetic representation (μιμεῖσθαι), and in this humankind differs from other animals in being far more imitative (μιμητικώτατον), learning our first lessons by copying.”²⁷ Aristotle leads on from this generalisation to discuss poetic representation, *mimesis* in that sense, of copying human life, noble or base. But, implicitly, so Aristotle avers, you learn how to do this “copying from life” by following the example of other poets doing that, and notably Homer.²⁸ Moving swiftly to the first century CE, Quintilian insists,

²³ Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Style*; but also, Alex Damm, “Ancient Rhetoric”.

²⁴ “Longinus”, *On the Sublime*, 13.4, in D.A. Russell (ed.), “Longinus” *On the Sublime*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Russell refers, besides, to Cicero, *Brutus*, 67, and Seneca, *Suas.* 3.7; cf. also Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.9.2. Cf. Stephen Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext. Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), citing the elder Seneca on Ovid quoting Vergil, p. 22; and L. Edmunds, *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press), 2001.

²⁵ Josephus changing whatever he could, if only by inversion, as concluded by A. Pelletier, in his *Flavius Josephus*, pp. 29 and 222.

²⁶ Cf., e.g., D. Marguerat and A. Curtis (eds), *Intertextualités. La Bible en échos* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2000).

²⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics* 4.2.1448b; Isocrates, *Sophists* 18.

²⁸ On induced echoes of Homer, see, for instance, G. Schmelling, “Callirhoe: God-like Beauty and the Making of a Celebrity”, in S. Harrison et al. (eds), *Metaphor and the Ancient Novel* (Gröningen: Barkhuis and Gröningen University Library, 2005), pp. 36–49: Chariton integrates allusions to Homer, Sappho, Herodotus, Thucydides, tragedy/comedy, rhetorical texts, and others, into his novel.

It is from authors worthy of our study that we must draw our stock of words, the variety of our figures of speech, and our methods of composition, while we must form our minds on the model of every excellence. For there can be no doubt that in the craft [of composition] no small portion of our task lies in imitation ... it is a universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we approve in others.

However, he immediately adds, “we must realise that imitation alone is not sufficient.”²⁹ We have to attempt, at least, to improve on our predecessors: “Even those who do not aim at supreme excellence ought to press towards that mark, rather than be content to follow in the tracks of others.” Producing your own variant, ringing the changes on your model, “improving on” your exemplar (see further, ch. 6, below) is what distinguishes your efforts from vulgar theft.³⁰ The question here is whether the *order* of a classic narrative was also to be “emulated”.

4. “EMULATING” ORDER?

This theme of ‘mimesis’ has been energetically pursued of late, if in rather different ways, by Thomas Brodie and by Dennis MacDonald. Both, however, join in insisting that ‘emulation’ entails the expectation and intention that your use of, and even more, your improvement on your models will at least be noted by, and, you hope, admired by your peers. They will approve, they will engage more with what you offer them, and enjoy it more; but they will also congratulate themselves on their sensitivity both to the quality of your style and to the intertextual echoes.³¹ Emulation only ‘works’, MacDonald avers, if recognised. To be honest, I have not found this latter said in any of

²⁹ Quintilian, *Institutes* 10.2.1, 4; cf. much earlier, Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 8; and a little earlier, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Mimesis*; Cicero, *De oratore* 2.22.90–92; Horace, *Ars Poetica* 131–134; and the *Progymnasmata*, on which see J.S. Kloppenborg, “The Emulation of the Jesus Tradition in the Letter of James”, in R.L. Webb and J.S. Kloppenborg (eds), *Reading James with New Eyes. Methodological Reassessments of the Letter of James* (LNTS 342; London: T & T Clark, 2007), pp. 121–150; cf. A. Barchiesi, *Speaking Volumes. Narrative and Intertext in Ovid and other Latin Poets* (M. Fox and S. Marchesi (eds and trans), London: Duckworth, 2001).

³⁰ Quintilian, *Institutes*, 10.2.9; T.L. Brodie, *The Birthing of the New Testament. The Intertextual Development of the New Testament Writings* (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2004), p. 7; cf. D.R. MacDonald, *Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), and *Does the New Testament Imitate Homer? Four Cases from the Acts of the Apostles* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003); ‘Imitations of Greek Epic in the Gospels’ (2006), in Amy-Jill Levine et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus*, 372–384.

³¹ Brodie (*Birthing*, 261, 361), and MacDonald (*Homeric Epics*, 6) talk of ‘emulation’, *aemulatio*, or, in Greek (from Dionysius of Halicarnassus), *mimesis* fr. 2, ζῆλος.

the ancient authors I have read, nor argued among other recent and contemporary scholars. Karl Olav Sandness, in response to MacDonald, points out, forcefully, that the ‘competition’ spoken of is competition with your model, to say much the same, but better. The aim is to say it more effectively, not to look for your improvement on your chosen model to be recognised as such. In itself it nonetheless seems entirely plausible that there may be implicit competition for literary reputation: if it is to ‘emulation’ that your peers have been educated, they will be likely to notice it in others, and very likely be looking for it. Epictetus makes the contrast between looking for praise and looking to be an effective orator; and one might note Lucian of Samosata, *The Mistaken Critic, or On a Slip of the Tongue*.³²

But, insists Sandness, you are taught to “rival and vie with the original in the expression of *the same thoughts*” (“circa eosdem sensus certamen atque aemulationem”), to produce what you yourself judge to be improvement—but on the expression, not the idea. Just so Pliny the younger hoped he could out-do Cicero, his model.³³ And this distinction is important, if not decisive. MacDonald (so Sandness) and Brodie (so the present author) discover “the same thought” only at a very high level of abstraction.

Brodie joins with many others in finding imitation of matter from Jewish Scripture in Luke. MacDonald finds imitation of Homer in Mark and in Acts. L. Feldman has over many years pointed to such imitation of many classical models in Josephus.³⁴ Roger Tomes has effectively analysed such

³² Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.16.5–10.

³³ Quintilian, *Institutes* 10.5.5; Pliny, *Letters*, 4.7.4–5; cf. 7.9.1–6, cited by Karl Olav Sandness, “Imitatio Homeri? An Appraisal of Dennis. R. MacDonald’s ‘Mimesis Criticism’”, *JBL* 124.4 (2005), pp. 715–732, here citing pp. 723–725; see further K.O. Sandness, *The Gospel ‘According to Homer and Virgil’*. *Canon and Cento* (NovTSup 138, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2011). Sandness here argues that only in the fourth century CE, and only in the ‘Cento’ form, poetic pastiche, do Christians plunder Homer, and still only to retell prior Christian narrative or liturgical sequences; and see also L.C.A. Alexander, “New Testament Narrative and Ancient Epic” (2005), in *eadem*, *Acts in its Ancient Literary Environment*, 165–182.

³⁴ L.H. Feldman, *Josephus’ Interpretation of the Bible*, (HCS 27; Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1998), and *Studies in Josephus’ Re-written Bible* (JSJ Sup. 59; Leiden: Brill, 1998). For instance, Josephus echoes Hesiod in his account of early humans in the “Golden Age” “free from evils and toil, [where] old age did not soon overtake” (*Interpretation*, p. 172; cf. *Studies*, pp. 1–16). He tells his hearers that Isaac was born “on the threshold of Abraham’s old age”, echoing Priam addressing his son Hector, also leaving to face death (*Iliad* 22.60; *Interpretation*, pp. 172, 268); but there is also a trace of Iphegenia in Isaac’s eagerness to offer himself. The contrast between Rebecca’s welcome to Eliezer and the rebuff from her companions recalls *Odyssey* 6.137–141, 198–210, *ibid.*, p. 186). Feldman finds echoes of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus in the lamenting companions accorded Moses in his final walk (*ibid.*, p. 174). So, too, Solomon characterized as quick-witted mirrors Oedipus (*ibid.*, p. 175). Josephus’ Moses as ideal leader reflects Thucydides’ Pericles (*ibid.*, p. 177).

imitation in 1 and 2 Maccabees. I quote the latter's conclusion: "Thus in many different ways the Jewish historians show affinity with Hellenistic historians and Greek ideas at least as clearly as their affinity with Hebrew historians and biblical ideas".³⁵

5. IMITATING PLOT?

Brodie goes further that this, in a study that he has been engaged with over many years. He argues that Luke has in effect abstracted the gist, the plot of the sequence of events in the Elijah-Elisha cycle, and imitates it in much of Luke-Acts. Decades earlier Christopher F. Evans argued that Luke's "travel narrative" (Lk 9.51 to somewhere in chs 18.14 or thereabouts) was based on the sequence of *pericopai* in Deuteronomy.³⁶ MacDonald does not go quite as far as suggesting a structural influence on that scale, but does suppose that Homer has provided Luke and Mark with the ideas for a number of episodes, and for over-all structurally important themes (suffering, foolish companions, murderous usurpers, sleeping sailors, anointing women): not just as incidental colour, but as the sole basis for some narrative's inclusion. I shall not here pursue MacDonald's Homeric case further. There is an effective detailed critique by Sandness.³⁷ Brodie notes Evan's argument, but only in passing. Evans himself later mentions it in the "Introduction" to his *Saint Luke*, and offers a selection of possible resonances; but in his detailed comments pays his own earlier findings very little attention.³⁸ Evans' suggestion is not discussed further here, but Brodie's is now to be considered, with objections raised, in more detail.

³⁵ R. Tomes, "Heroism in 1 and 2 Maccabees", *Bib.Int* 15 (2007), pp. 171–199. Loveday C.A. Alexander gave the 2008 BNTC a lively paper on "The Myth of the Imprisoned God: Classical Intertextualities in the Acts of the Apostles", and we may hope this will appear in print in due course.

³⁶ Christopher F. Evans, "The Central Section of Luke's Gospel", in D.E. Nineham (ed.), *Studies in the Gospels. Essays in Memory of R.H. Lightfoot* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), 37–54; *idem*, "Introduction", in *Saint Luke* (TPI Commentaries; London and Philadelphia: SCM and Trinity Press International, 1990), 1–111, noting 34–36; and K.R. Snodgrass, *Stories with Intent. A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), e.g., 125, 345, 424 (confused in the "Index" with Craig F. Evans).

³⁷ Karl Olav Sandness, "Imitatio Homeri". Sandness also cites, appositely, Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 4.7.4–5; 7.9.1–6; cf. *idem*, *The Gospel "According to Homer and Virgil"*, and n. 30, above.

³⁸ Brodie, *Birthing*, pp. 270–272. The argument that follows was first aired at a conference in Limerick, and has benefitted from discussion and from papers given there, especially those by Joseph Verheyden and Alex van Damm. These are to be published in the near future, ed. John Kloppenborg and Joseph Verheyden, by Bloomsbury.

6. THOMAS BRODIE ON ELIJAH, ELISHA, AND LUKE-ACTS

First, it is quite clear to many readers that there are in Luke numerous resonances with the Elijah-Elisha cycle of narratives. What can well be disputed is the further suggestion that Luke is imitating, in effect, the ‘plot’, the ‘story line’ of that sequence, in structuring much of his two-part work.

As a first step we may note that as well as echoes of Elijah and Elisha, there are a great many other possible echoes of other Scriptural narratives: there is no sign that Luke has focussed exclusively on Elijah and Elisha, even where they do appear particularly frequently, in Luke 7–9. For instance, while “he gave him to his mother” (Luke 7:15) seems clearly to echo 1 Kgs 17:23 (cf. 2 Kgs 4:36), the emphatic “sole” son (Luke 7:12), implicit in 1 Kgs 17, 2 Kgs 4, is explicit only at Judg 11:34, Tob 3:15; 8:17. Meeting at the gate occurs in many narratives. If a bier echoes anything, it is 2 Sam 3:31 (David and Abner). “A great prophet” echoes Deut 18:15. If “he that cometh” echoes any, it could be Gen 49:10, Deut. 18:15, 18 (again); Ps 118:26; Dan 7:13. Listing miracles might *just* possibly echo 2 Kgs 8:4, a request for an account of Elisha’s deeds. “The blind”, however, may recall Isa 29:18; 35:5, 6; the poor, Isa 61:1; no stumbling, Isa 8:14–15. “I send my messenger ...” (the only explicit quotation), we might well compare Mal 3:1; but also Exod 23:20. Mal 4:5 could indicate Elijah as the one being sent, as is often suggested; but, just as often it is noted that Luke seems reluctant to make an explicit identification of John with Elijah: John comes in the spirit and power of Elijah (Luke 1:17, and cf. 1:76), but not in the clothes of Elijah (contra Mark 1:6), neither is he so identified by Jesus (contra Mark 9:13), nor even thought by the crowd to be invoked by the dying Jesus (contra Mark 15:35). There is no reference to “wisdom” in 1–2 Kings to anticipate Luke 7:35, nor to foot-washing (perhaps Gen 18:4), though Elisha washed Elijah’s hands (2 Kgs 3:11). In the cycle in Kgs there is no greeting kiss (cf. 2 Sam 15:5; 19:39; 20:9), to prefigure Luke 7:44–45. A delegate from Elisha anoints the head of Jehu (2 Kgs 9:6); the woman’s act in Luke 7:36–38 is quite different without any explicit contrast being offered (cf. Luke 9:54, where a contrast *is* made explicit). “Go in peace” could echo 1 Sam 1:17. Elijah is mentioned by name, as already observed, at Luke 9:30, 33; but the talk of Jesus’ departure, ἔξοδος, echoes Wis 3:7; 7:6, rather than Elijah’s departure, even if we might link Elijah’s ascent with that of Jesus (despite the latter lacking chariots and whirlwind). Luke 9:51, “steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem” might recall 2 Kgs 12:17, even if there it is Hazael, with a very different purpose in mind (of which he relents). But we might also note Isa 50:7, Jer 42:15, Ezek 6:2. “Fire”, Luke 9:54, clearly reminds most readers of 2 Kgs 1:10–12; but here, as already noted, where a contrast is

recalled, it is made explicit. The LXX Greek and Luke use different terms, though that could be deliberate paraphrase (which Luke does deploy in his use of Mark). And “first suffer me”, Luke 9:61, might suggest 2 Kgs 19:20 to many, even though Jesus is here less easy-going with the volunteer than Elijah with the conscript. (On this, however, compare Josephus, below.)

All we may say is that such scriptural echoes as we may discern resonate proportionately more with the Elijah-Elisha cycle than with any other single antecedent; but they can hardly be said to dominate this section of Luke even so.

So, then, to Brodie on borrowing structure, ‘plot’. It is clear that in his *Poetics* Aristotle provided the ancient world with an analysis of plot, of story line (one that continues to be quoted to this day). Such stories, he says, can either be traditional or made up.³⁹ Many of our most admired examples of story-telling comprise fresh accounts of the thoughts, speeches and interactions of characters in sequences of events drawn from earlier writings, and especially from Homer: ‘re-written Homer’, in effect. Aristotle himself instances re-imagining Iphigeneia, Odysseus, Ajax, Niobe; compare Lucian’s parody, *A True Story* I and II. But there is nothing here to suggest at all obviously that an author then might readily abstract one of these storylines and use it to structure the interactions of a fresh set of characters in a fresh setting in the known past, occasionally dressed in reminiscent verbal clothes. Nor does any such suggestion appear in any of the other writers discussing *mimesis*. And although the Greek romances include many allusions, and, of course, common topics such as journeys and conflicts and trials and disguise, in the commentaries no one seems to suggest or argue that overall structure, storyline, has been ‘borrowed’. Again, at no point in his *How to Write History* does Lucian criticise others for failing to analyse and abstract older thematic patterns, plots, storylines to structure narratives of more recent times; nor, for that matter, does he discern and appraise any attempts at such imitation.⁴⁰

7. BORROWED ‘PLOT’ IN JOSEPHUS?

It seems nonetheless worth asking whether such structurally formative and substantially generous *structural* influence of older models may be dis-

³⁹ Aristotle, *Poetics* 17.5, 1455ab.

⁴⁰ There is no reference to any such procedure in B. Croke and A.M. Emmett (eds), *History and Historians in Late Antiquity* (Sydney and Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983).

cerned in Josephus’ storylines, either in his retelling of scriptural narratives (Feldman’s concern in the works cited), or in his accounts of happenings subsequent to the scriptural record. Josephus warrants our careful attention simply because he affords us the most extensive potential evidence for discerning one ancient writer’s procedures in using a classical source—indeed, some of the same classical source as Brodie argues for Luke—while concerned with following known compositional conventions.

On the retelling, we note Feldman’s analyses of Josephus not only choosing a telling phrase from such sources, but also inventing minor details (such as Isaac’s eagerness to accept death). But it is also quite clear that Josephus invents no Jewish siege occasioned by an errant wife (not even a wooden bull filled with soldiers); nor a Davidic king who kills his father and weds his mother. Josephus’ only major structural addition to his authoritative scriptures is Moses’ Egyptian campaign (*Ant.* 2.238–253), but for this he had a source in Artapanus.⁴¹

On the other hand, it is also clear to many readers that Josephus did have recent events in mind when retelling the old accounts. So, for instance, Feldman concludes,

the analogy between Joseph [the patriarch] and Josephus is remarkable: both are depicted as child prodigies (*Ant.* 2.9; *Life* 8), both can show extraordinary insight in interpreting dreams (*Ant.* 2.63–90), both are cast out by jealous brothers (fellow Jews in the case of Josephus) to a foreign land (Egypt and Rome respectively), and both are deeply involved in politics.⁴²

Yet even here, the differences are made clear. And, as just one further example, at *Ant.* 2.79 Josephus resists, even if tempted, to assimilate his own and Joseph’s restored fortunes. Whereas he tells of his chains being struck off as a sign of reasserted honour (*War* 4.627–629), he simply has Joseph made ready to enter Pharaoh’s presence, ignoring the biblical shaving and change of clothes (Gen 41:14).

Feldman’s discussions of Elijah and Elisha are clearly relevant. He notes the importance of the former in particular in ongoing Jewish tradition outside the Christian New Testament, already figuring in ps. Philo, *Bib. Ant.* 48.1–2, where the zealot Phineas seems to acquire elements of the Elijah

⁴¹ Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* 9.27, 432d; cf. H. St. J. Thackerary (ed. and trans.), *Josephus IV Jewish Antiquities I–IV*, in *idem et al.* (eds and trans.), *Josephus I–IX* (LCL, 9 vols; Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1930), p. 269.

⁴² L.H. Feldman, 1998a, *Josephus’ Interpretation of the Bible*, p. 335; cf. David Daube, “Typology in Josephus”, *JJS* 1980.2, pp. 18–36.

narrative. Yet, while Josephus gives extra space to Phineas, by Feldman's count he gives less in proportion to Elijah than to other included figures, less proportionately to Elijah than does the LXX, and only a little more than does the Hebrew (96 and 152 words respectively). For anyone aware of popular Judaism, as Feldman judges the matter, Elijah would be a disturbingly nationalistic figure: so it may be significant that Josephus omits each of Elijah's self-ascriptions of the term "zealous".⁴³

For Josephus, the prophets are Judaism's historians, and guarantors of historical accuracy. So he stresses Elijah's steadfast integrity, yet makes no attempt to ascribe written records to him. Feldman also reminds us how Josephus tones down the biblical accounts of Elijah's and Elisha's miracles.⁴⁴ Josephus does, nonetheless, include them: and that should bring to mind the large number of tales in the older cycles for which there is, nonetheless, no Lukan counterpart. Not every vivid detail is re-used by the evangelist, however important to the original storyline.

Although Josephus allots even less space, proportionately, to Elisha, Feldman notes that, unlike Elijah, Elisha receives an encomium. Particularly significant is the remark ascribed to Jehoash: "Because of him [Elisha] ... they [the Judaeans] had never had to use arms against the foe, but through his prophecies they had overcome the enemy without a battle" (*Ant.* 9.179). And this clearly does anticipate Josephus' speech before the walls of Jerusalem (*War* 5.390; 5.376–419, *passim*). In this speech God is the Jews' "ally" (σύμμαχος) when they rely on him (cf. *Ant.* 9.55). Perhaps in line with this Josephus omits narratives where Elisha himself loses his cool.⁴⁵

There is only one explicit reference to these two prophets in the *War*, and that is at 4.460–467, noting the spring that, according to tradition, was the one that Elisha purified, "an unfailing supply of water conducive to fruitfulness, so long as they remained a righteous people" (*War* 4.463), again part of Josephus' theodicy in relation to the rebellion.⁴⁶ So far as I can discern, Josephus makes no structural attempt to re-read the Elijah-Elisha cycles as a whole as positively illuminating recent events; rather does he seem determined to preclude any such reading, as inevitably zealot, even with Elisha's "pacifism" as counter-weight to Elijah.

⁴³ L.H. Feldman, *Josephus' Interpretation of the Bible*, pp. 291–295; 302–303.

⁴⁴ L.H. Feldman, *Josephus' Interpretation of the Bible*, pp. 298–302.

⁴⁵ L.H. Feldman, *Josephus' Interpretation of the Bible*, pp. 339–340.

⁴⁶ D. Daube *Typology in Josephus*, pp. 22–23, notes a triple resonance: Moses and water, Elisha and water, Jesus and water. But the latter is in John's Gospel; Luke includes none such.

8. JOSEPHUS AND JEREMIAH

Puzzlingly, while he includes a study of Josephus' Isaiah, Feldman has not included a survey of Jeremiah himself in the two extensive collections quarried here, nor, so far as I can find, elsewhere.⁴⁷ To Jeremiah I shall return in a moment, as clearly very significant for Josephus in his interpretation of recent events. However, Feldman does include essays on Zedekiah and on Gedaliah.⁴⁸ In what follows, the parallels between figures from the book Jeremiah and episodes in *Ant.* and *War* include my own suggestions.

In relation to Zedekiah, Josephus rehabilitates Nebuchadnezzar, as a sort of forerunner to Titus. The Danielic Nebuchadnezzar has the young men taught not only the conqueror's but also their own lore; just as the Flavians encouraged both (*Ant.* 10.187). Josephus also softens some of the irrationality and cruelty of the Danielic portrait of Nebuchadnezzar and makes him more pious (*Ant.* 10.217), just as he emphasises Titus' piety (e.g., *War* 5.519). Against his own better nature, shown in protecting Jeremiah, Zedekiah is led astray by some in his court, and by the entire lawless multitude (*Ant.* 10.103, 105), anticipating the people's part in the disaster in Josephus' own time. Jeremiah (*Ant.* 10.128), like Josephus later (*War* 5.416), gives his assurance that no harm will come to those who surrender. Zedekiah has some excuse in his failure to respond to prophecy, as Ezekiel's and Jeremiah's seem to conflict (*Ant.* 10.106; the conflict is only resolved at 10.141). Josephus has told of encouragement from ambiguous oracles during the 67–70 CE siege (*War* 3.351). There are also false prophets on both occasions (*Ant.* 10.111; *War* 6.288). However, while Nebuchadnezzar breaks his oath before Zedekiah breaks his (*Ant.* 10.99–100; 10.138–139), Titus is completely absolved of responsibility for the destruction of the Temple (*War* 6.260–266). On the other hand, the courage of the defenders and the effort needed to overcome them is added, emphatically (*Ant.* 10.116, 132–134), just as we find it regularly emphasised in the *War*.

Feldman is sure that Josephus saw Gedaliah as a predecessor. Both had prophetic powers, both advocated subservience to the dominant foreign power, and an end to any desire for an independent state (at least in the foreseeable future). Gedaliah is not given much space, but he is accorded a cluster of flattering adjectives (*Ant.* 10.155), and on this occasion Feldman himself notes that many of these are applied to Titus and other admired

⁴⁷ D. Daube on Jeremiah, *Typology in Josephus*, pp. 26–27, is very brief.

⁴⁸ L.H. Feldman, *Studies in Josephus' Re-written Bible*, pp. 459–462; 463–472.

Romans. (Josephus avoids self-flattery at this point; but he has exercised what is implicitly the same kind of concern for his fellow countrymen, at risk to his own safety.) Feldman also notes that Ishmael seems to stand in for Josephus' own opponent, John of Gischala. That seems persuasive. But it is also clear that Josephus refrains from inventing episodes to suit: for instance, there is no escape from ambush by Gedaliah (contrast *Life* 85–86), and no meeting with treacherous Ishmael at a banquet (contrast *Ant.* 10.168), no speech from Gedaliah to the besieged, no address from outside the walls, no hiding the fact that Gedaliah gained, however briefly, a governorship, while Josephus himself received no such authority. Josephus can adjust his narration of incidents in both accounts to enhance already apparent similarities (and significant contrasts), but invents no major new incidents for the old, and allows much in the old to remain unparalleled in the very recent.⁴⁹

However, it may seem worth pursuing this comparison a little further still, surveying for this study aspects of Josephus' re-writing of the tale of Jeremiah, *Ant.* 10.78–158. Josephus takes Lamentations as a prophecy both of the fall to the Babylonians, and of the recent one to the Romans (*Ant.* 10.79).⁵⁰ They both happen on the tenth day of the tenth month (*Ant.* 10.116; *War* 6.251; LXX Jer 52:4, ninth month). According to Josephus, Jeremiah foretold the former fall “every day” (*Ant.* 10.89), which contrasts with both MT Jer. 26:8 and LXX Jer 33:8. It does, however, seem to anticipate Jesus son of Ananias, *War* 6.300–309, prophesying woe to Jerusalem “daily” (*War* 10.306, cf. 302). Perhaps a minor point, the biblical text has Jeremiah warn against prophecies that diverge from his own (Jer 27–28); Josephus explains that Zedekiah found them persuasive, as did the people of Jerusalem their “charlatans” in Josephus' day (*War* 6.288).

Josephus' Jeremiah urges the people to open the gates and admit the Babylonian king (*Ant.* 10.117; cf. 10.15), for which I think there is no direct parallel in the MT or the LXX, where Jeremiah urges them to go out and surrender (Jer 21:9; 27:12; 38:2). “Opening the gates” is, of course, a conventional

⁴⁹ One might qualify this a little. There are some issues around the birth and death of important people (men) and events where convention would encourage the invention of or ready acceptance of rumours of prodigies, in Josephus as in the NT gospels. Yet it remains significant that, for instance, from psalms that are quarried for the passion narratives, much that might seem worth including is nonetheless *not* dragged in to provide further colour. Impressions of actual events seem to govern selection.

⁵⁰ Cf. R. Marcus, *Jewish Antiquities Books IX–XI*, in H. St.J. Thackeray et al., *Josephus*, VI, pp. 200–201, n. c.

term for surrender (cf. *Ant.* 12:182, 246); yet even so, we may find it worth noting that “opening the gates” is in question early in the siege of Jerusalem (*War* 4.273–275; cf. 4.112).

Josephus (unlike his scriptures) has Jeremiah single out saving the Temple; as Josephus tells us he himself did (cf. *Jer* 38:17–18 with *Ant.* 10.126–128). Josephus’ Jeremiah being freed asks for another to be freed with him, as Josephus himself did, later (*Ant.* 10.156–158, *Life* 419; contrast *Jer* 50:1).⁵¹ And finally, Josephus’ description of Nebuchadnezzar’s siege works, with “towers on great earthworks, with earthworks surrounding the whole city” (*Ant.* 10.131–134), seems to anticipate both attack and defence in *War* 5.466–510.⁵²

It has thus been evident to careful readers over the years that on occasion at least Josephus re-wrote his scriptures with specific later events in mind. It also seems likely that such resonances with his scriptures had occurred to him already when reflecting on events in which he shared, or which had been related to him by contemporaries.⁵³

And this would tally well with the use Greek and Roman authors made of their classics in their compositions of histories and biographies, sources we saw earlier that Josephus himself could also deploy. We may take it that Josephus supposed that he (with helpers) was using well, perhaps even improving on, his models’ treatment of such themes in their accounts of analogous events and characters.

However, we have still to survey a few further echoes of the book Jeremiah in the account written earlier of the rebellion, but missing from the account of Jeremiah in *Ant.* The crucial importance of Sabbath observance is emphasised in *Jer* 17, and reflected at *War* 2.391–394, and again at 3.456, 517; and at 4.97–120. Failure in this would lead to the gates of Jerusalem being burned and its palaces destroyed (*Jer* 17:27; *War* 5.411–412). This is, of course, what happened, but would in or after any successful siege. At *Jer.* 21:4–5 God promises to turn the defenders’ weapons back against themselves, and Josephus tells us that something like this did happen, but at Gamala (*War* 4.76); later, Ananus repeats the prediction (*War* 4.190), but no event of the kind is repeated. There is not even a distant ‘parallel’ for Josephus with such events as Jeremiah’s encounter with Hananiah, with his symbolic breaking of a pot, his attempt to secure an inheritance, or his imprisonment in and rescue from a cistern, or his being dragged off to Egypt. One might discern some

⁵¹ D. Daube, *Typology in Josephus*, pp. 26–27.

⁵² R. Marcus, *Josephus* VI, p. 230, n. ^b, citing Weill.

⁵³ Cf. Alan Kirk, “Memory, Scribal Media, and the Synoptic Problem”, in P. Foster et al., *New Studies*, 459–482.

incidental resonance between Jer 11:19, a lamb to the killing, and *War* 4.171, the factional killing of “prize victims” led to slaughter. So, too, Jer 7:11, “is this house ... become a den of robbers?” may be in mind when Josephus tells of spoils being stored in the temple, *War* 4.181, 242, 261. But, as David Daube concluded, “Obviously, some differences are glaring”.⁵⁴

There is an explicit comparison with Jeremiah at *War* 5.391 (cf. Jer 27:12): the rebels are more wicked than the latter’s contemporaries, just as their attitude to Josephus’ claim to speak for God is more murderous than was their forebears’ response to Jeremiah. The conviction that “God has fled from the holy places”, here and again at *War* 6.300, resonates with Ezek 8–9 rather than with Jeremiah, though perhaps the thought that God has taken sides with the Romans may echo Jer 21:5, noted earlier.

No canonical source can be discerned for the ancient prophetic oracles cited as threatening the fall of the city as a punishment for fratricidal conflict (*War* 6.109–110); but the purging of the city with fire might just possibly also reflect Jer 17:27 (or Jer 11:16–17 or 15:14, etc.). There is another reference to canonical Jeremiah at *War* 6.251–252, the coincidence of dates, already noted; and there is also Jesus son of Ananias, again noted earlier, *War* 6.300–309, whose “daily” prophecies of doom may echo Jer 7:34 as interpreted by Josephus.

Others may have found or be able to find more, even many more resonances than these. But those that I have suggested seem to be haphazard, and in no way structural for Josephus’ narrative. There is still no indication that he analysed and abstracted thematic patterns in past records of events to provide matrices or major content (including contrasts) for his accounts of more recent happenings, let alone to provide the sole or major basis for detailed narratives.

That so much fails to find an echo also would seem to point to their secondary function. The event in each instance is primary, even though it may be very significantly depicted in colours taken from and pointing to some antecedent. Yet even here, if Josephus wants occasionally to ensure the connection is not missed, he makes it explicit. Otherwise it is incidental, a bonus should a hearer acknowledge it, but not essential to the narration and the effect of its message.

A comparison with Lucian of Samosata, in his *How to Write History*, is relevant. He notes imitations of style, vocabulary and theme, of course. “They are all Thucydideses, Herodotuses and Xenophons to us” (*History* 2).

⁵⁴ D. Daube, “Typology in Josephus”, 26.

But events emphatically matter (*History*, 7, 10, 12, 16, 20, 24), even though on the other hand, minor detail *ought* to be adjusted, and Lucian pours scorn on a writer who allowed a character, Severianus, to commit suicide with a jagged shard of glass, “as if there were no dagger, no javelin to be found to bring him to a manly and heroic death” (*History* 25). For sure, the distinction between major events that must not be invented and minor details of events that may or even should be improved is likely to have been subjective, but the distinction is made. At no point, then, does Lucian either criticise others for failing to analyse and abstract thematic patterns in past records of events to provide matrices and major substance for narratives of more recent times; nor, for that matter, for attempting that and doing it badly.

One might conclude, nonetheless, that some whom Lucian criticised expected to get away with substantial showy imitative storyline construction, and expected some in their circle to provide an appreciative audience. But that model does not seem to fit Luke’s or the other gospels, either. Luke’s gospel in particular, as the present writer has argued elsewhere, would seem much more like the work of the military surgeon instanced by Lucian: by Lucian’s criteria, very pedestrian in style, but affording the factual groundwork that might be written up by someone more accomplished.⁵⁵ And however free the evangelists were in their re-writing of one another’s work, the fact they, one or more, often kept so closely to predecessors indicates forcefully that they did not feel warranted to invent ad lib. This itself affords a significant contrast with the insistence of Longinus, in his *On the Sublime*, that borrowings should either be by subtle paraphrase, or else be precise and acknowledged, as noted at the outset.⁵⁶

One might challenge the relevance here of Josephus as a model for the gospel writers’ use of scripture as imaginative prompter. He was writing to be heard, importantly, by other participants in the climactic events recorded in the recent War, events much more recent than many would suppose of those happenings, perhaps two generations ago, that were the concern of the evangelists. In response to this I think that in general Richard Bauckham

⁵⁵ F.G. Downing, “Theophilus’ First Reading of Luke-Acts”, in C.M. Tuckett (ed.), *Luke’s Literary Achievement* (JSNTSup 116; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 91–109; rep. as “Theophilus’ First Hearing of Luke Acts”, in F.G. Downing, *Doing Things with Words*.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of the uncommon closeness of the synoptic gospels to one another, see again F.G. Downing, “Writers’ Use or Abuse of Written Sources”. Philip Alexander, in conversation, pointed to unattributed close reproduction in some later rabbinic texts, and not only in midrashic commentary; but this would come from a later period, when Graeco-Roman models were deliberately eschewed.

has valid arguments in his *Jesus and the Eyewitness*.⁵⁷ In particular does he effectively rehabilitate Papias as reproducing a conventional but also intellectually respectable interest in interrogating eyewitnesses. Further, we have every reason to accept, and none to doubt, that people who knew Jesus survived into the period of the writing of the gospels, as will have even more who had benefited from their seniors' reminiscences. This seems to me cogent, while allowing fully that people can and do re-frame reminiscences (and, indeed, were trained to in the educational system of the day). It was obvious to most that you could evoke a given idea or memory with the help of various sets of words. It is not the variations among the synoptic evangelists that are striking, nor the occasional item that "fulfils" scripture. Rather is it the meagreness of their inventiveness, as is also the case with Josephus, who does, therefore, afford us a useful comparison with the evangelists as authors responding to their sacred scriptures.

9. TRAGEDIANS' AND COMEDIANS' AND ROMANCERS' PLOTS

There is one more line of historical investigation to pursue, before concluding with some more general considerations (in the field of psycholinguistics). It is obvious that the Greek tragedians could take a legend and imagine afresh the rhetorical interplay of the agents in the story; and another, such as Seneca in Latin might offer his own variant reconstruction. In this sense, people *were* able to discern 'plot', as context for expressed thoughts of participants. An historian such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, also, could then cite Aeschylus or Sophocles, but only as sources for colouring accounts of particular events. There seems no sign of a reinterpretation of a sequence in Roman or Greek history along the lines of a plot deployed by a tragedian.

The ancient comedies (Menander, followed by Plautus and Terence) also have discernible 'plots', in the sense that they deploy what seem to be stereotypical characters and encounters and concealments and misunderstandings: the cunning lazy slave, the reluctant bride, the pompous father, the enamoured young man. But these seem to be stock items, to be arranged in various sequences to taste. There are no set sequences, save in the most general sense that sympathetic characters will achieve their ends, and others get some form of comeuppance. To a considerable extent, one finds a simi-

⁵⁷ R. Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses. The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).

lar range of stock characters and situations in the legal cases summarised by such as Quintilian. I think the same must be said of the episodic romances. There are, as noted earlier, kinds of episodes such as imprisonments, trials, threats of punishment, journeys, debates, riots, erotic encounters (all of which appear in Luke-Acts), but there is no obvious sign of any set *patterns* for their occurrence determined by some classic precedents.⁵⁸

There is, then, still no sign apparent that Luke or Josephus or any contemporary may have interpreted the *imitatio* he most likely thought expected of him, in terms of structure, of plot. There is no indication that they, or anyone else, analysed and abstracted thematic patterns in past records of events to provide matrices or contrasts for the storyline of his narratives of more recent happenings, let alone to prompt the only or major basis for them.

10. POSTSCRIPT: PSYCHOLINGUISTICS

So, how may we suppose that imitation works in general, and in particular in a culture that encouraged it? Noteworthy are the following reflections from David Daube:

There is virtually no experience without some transfer from the past. Whatever you feel about a certain doctor, soldier, horse, wood, book, dinner or concert is bound to reflect previous encounters with such or suchlike persons, things or occasions ... What must not be overlooked is the impact of a transfer on the original phase ... When we label Munich as the Athens on the Isar, Stalin as the modern Ivan the Terrible, Delphi as the ancient Vatican, we are not only casting Munich in the role of Athens, Stalin in that of Ivan the Terrible, Delphi in that of the Vatican, but also Athens in that of Munich, and so on. This retro-effect strengthens the link. With Athens assimilated to Munich—the Symposium serves beer—Munich is a more plausible replica of Athens.⁵⁹

I think the foregoing amply illustrates the effect.

But worth brief consideration are the psycholinguistic mechanisms by which this effect is achieved. Whatever our views of ‘mind’ and ‘brain’, we may take it that we may assume that our brains, still far from well understood, have not undergone major structural changes over the past two or three thousand or so years. More controversially, it is argued that talk of

⁵⁸ Peter Oakes, in conversation, pointed out that there are extensive echoes of Homer in Vergil’s *Aeneid*; but this is still less than a repetition of extended sets of analogous events.

⁵⁹ D. Daube, “Typology in Josephus”, 21–22; cf. also A. Kirk, “Memory”.

'mind' works for us, not as ontological, but as affording a way of articulating and so in some measure shaping our experience of the physical processes that go on in our brains: 'mind' is not a 'stuff', it affords a way of articulating second-order reflections on thoughtful communication. Persuasive, at least for the present author, are those who suppose our brains are 'hard-wired' in modular form, so that some functions continue of which we are unaware. That this is so seems strongly suggested, if not established, by the observed effects of partial brain damage. Some functions continue little affected, others cease; for example, someone may be able to use a knife and fork, but be unable to talk about them; or vice-versa.

In a standard work, *Words in the Mind*, here in its third edition, Jean Aitchison explains, "Humans behave like jugglers when they use the mental lexicon, in that they have to deal with semantic, syntactic and phonological information at the same time".⁶⁰ Looking at the way both people in normal mental health and brain-damaged people can muddle words and mis-combine parts, Aitchison concludes,

There seems to be a good deal of evidence, then, that in speech production it is normal for the mind to activate many more words than are likely to be used in the course of a conversation. When we describe how people find the words they want, we must show how people cope with this teeming mass of extra items.⁶¹

It is a matter both of feeling you have 'something' to say and at the same time sorting the words (and their sequence) which will articulate for you as well as for others what 'it' is. "I don't know what I think until I hear myself saying it." In effect (so, Aitchison again), you may get the field, say, a colour, but you get the wrong one, or the sound similar ('audience' for 'ordnance'), or both part right ('badger' for 'beaver'). But your word module may well be offering a much larger list of small mammals for your meaning module to select and your phonetics to process. Or your meaning module may ('as it were') tell your word-store, no, none of those is good enough. And then you do hesitate—and perhaps an interlocutor who has been activating similar

⁶⁰ Jean Aitchison, *Words in the Mind. An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon* (3rd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 215; and cf. Peter Carruthers, and Jill Boucher (eds), *Language and Thought. Interdisciplinary Themes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robyn Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Deirdrie Wilson and Robyn Carston, "Metaphor, Relevance, and the 'emergent Property' Issue", *Mind & Language* 21.3 (2006), pp. 404–433; and other contributions to that issue of the journal.

⁶¹ J. Aitchison, *Words in the Mind*, p. 219.

processes while she listens interpretatively, prompts you. And all of this interactivity (to-ing and fro-ing) is going on while you talk (or write; but here we are discussing a predominantly oral culture).⁶²

In a culture with a classical prose and/or poetry, however close to or far from ordinary speech, the classics by definition provide a part of the vocabulary and ‘imaginary’ of anyone acculturated. For some purposes, at least, this would afford important elements of the available word store and word-fields that would be accessed to articulate desired communication. So, perhaps, a desire to tell of a wordless fight or a tacitly burgeoning friendship might access just such a store of words and combinations of words, more or less richly, appropriately, with more or less of ‘parroted’ clichés. A Luke, a Josephus, a Lucian, composing a narrative would choose among words and phrases and sequences proposed by his word module, some unreflectively, but with others allowed to trigger further connections, and then afford yet further incidental resonances; even (but unlikely) checking with an available written text.

As already mentioned, in first century CE east Mediterranean culture, such use of classics was positively encouraged (as it was in western Europe up to at least my own schooling). Children learn to paraphrase, at first very mechanically, later, much more freely, learning both to condense and to expand given narratives, to acquire an approved vocabulary, to discern approved syntax and prose and verse rhythms. The best pupils will have had accessible in mind some precise quotations for appropriate occasions. But mostly the various modules in their brains will have been effectively programmed to offer and to assess words and sequences from appropriate ranges of general vocabulary and ‘imaginary’ (and, of course, pronunciation and emphasis and gesture), that and no more.⁶³

There is, in this education, *no suggestion at all* that abstracts of complex sequences, plots, storylines, should be formulated and then reused. There is no evidence that I have met with to indicate that people then or now have a brain module that tacitly performs, stores and then offers for re-use, any such *elaborate* structural abstracts.⁶⁴

⁶² J. Aitchison, *Words in the Mind*, pp. 223–226.

⁶³ Compare in particular, Quintilian, *Institutes*; Plutarch, *How the Young Man Should Learn to Study Poetry*; and ps.Plutarch, *The Education of Children*; Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (ET; London: Sheed and Ward, 1956); Martin Lowther Clark, *Higher Education in the Ancient World* (London: Routledge, 1971); Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome* (London: Methuen, 1977).

⁶⁴ Russian formalism, Vladimir Propp, A.J. Greimas et al., might suggest counter examples;

On this basis one would have to argue that Luke in his composition would mostly simply write; and many of the allusions to scripture, including some of those we ourselves would trace to the Elijah-Elisha sequence, would simply 'come to him' without his looking for them or being aware of their specific scriptural sources. Some may plausibly have come from a deliberate decision to echo the Elijah-Elisha sequence, but without checking with a written text; and that would probably include the one explicit quotation from 'scripture' (Malachi). For this sort of dependence on a classic we have plentiful ancient accounts and examples. For any depth analysis of structure, let alone of detailed plot then to be reproduced, we have no independent evidence at all.

11. MORE ON ORDERLY THOUGHT

It is easy for us with our massive dictionaries to suppose that order in thought demands and is ensured by words that are clearly definable and clearly defined; only so may disorderly ambiguity be avoided. In the next chapter, originally published on its own, and focusing on 'faith', 'trust', 'believing', it is argued that in the ancient Graeco-Roman world it was widely accepted that orderly thought could be achieved in the mind and be shared with other minds, but that words were to be taken as multi-purpose labels whose very adaptability allowed them to evoke the clear and orderly thought 'in speaker's mind' and expected or hoped to be evoked 'in the minds' of hearers. Ambiguity in words spoken (or written to be spoken) served orderly thought; clarity was to be found only in minds, not in sounds or in marks on papyrus.

but that would then be at a very much higher level of abstraction than is under consideration here, where, as in Thomas Brodie's proposal, a very complex and specific story line is abstracted from the Elijah-Elisha sequence: not that the latter is discerned as exhibiting a pattern widely instanced elsewhere.

CHAPTER SIX

ORDER IN THOUGHT: AMBIGUITY, ANCIENT SEMANTICS, AND FAITH*

1. AMBIGUITY

It is hard to find a contemporary scholar actually approving sustained ambiguity in the interpretation of ancient texts, especially in the πίστις Χριστοῦ debate. However, just one, and that quite recently, comes to mind: Robert Jewett, discussing ‘faith of’ or ‘faith in’ Christ at Rom 3.22, argues:

Both the subjective or [sic] objective theories as currently presented have loopholes ... It may be that a simple association between ‘faith’ and ‘Jesus’ ... may have been intended ... and neither of the strict construals matches what the original audience would have understood. I wonder whether the ambiguity may have been intentional on Paul’s part, so as to encompass the variety of tenement and house churches in Rome that may well have been using the formula of πίστις Χριστοῦ with a variety of connotations.¹

However, Jewett cites no one in support of hearing two or even more senses together, and on the whole, the guild of biblical scholars would appear to dislike ambiguity, should it appear, or seem to, in the ancient texts, and especially in the πίστις Χριστοῦ debate. It is “unfortunate” (Morna Hooker), “dangerous” (Paul Achtemaier), and needs to be “disambiguated” (Barry Matlock): in each instance the genitive is claimed to be either objective or subjective.²

To be sure, in narrative (e.g., in the Fourth Gospel) ambiguity may be allowed as intentional and admissible; yet, once two clear senses of a lexeme

* This essay first appeared in *NTS* 56.1 (2009) 139–162, and is printed here with permission; it was dedicated to Christopher F. Evans on the occasion of his one hundredth birthday anniversary, albeit appearing after the event.

¹ R. Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 2007) 277–278. In what follows “ambiguity” is used, as Jewett does here, for any imprecision, not just uncertainty between two meanings (each possibly precise).

² M.D. Hooker, “ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ”, *NTS* 35.3 (1989) 341–342, citing 321; P.J. Achtemeier, “Faith in or of Jesus Christ”, in E.E. Johnson and D.M. May (eds), *Pauline Theology IV. Looking Back, Looking Forward* (Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1997) 82–92, citing 92; B. Matlock, “The Rhetoric of πίστις in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9”, *JSNT* 30.2 (2007) 173–203, citing 173, 174, 200.

are recognised, confusion for discerning readers is happily dispelled.³ In 1995 Lauri Thurén discerned a persuasive ambiguity in 1 Peter's combination of exhortation and encouragement ("become what you are").⁴ Mark D. Given has argued (and cogently) for a deliberate employment of ambiguity by the Lukan Paul of Acts 17, and by the authorial Paul of the Corinthian and Roman letters. (In passing, Given glanced at what is the main theme of this paper, *pervasive* polysemy, rather than deliberate and even precise 'two senses' ambiguity, but did not pursue it.)⁵

Todd Still might seem recently to have come fairly close to Jewett's position, in illustrating something of the semantic richness in Hebrews of πί-στις, πιστεύω, and πείθω. Jesus is portrayed as one who "trusts" God and acknowledges his "belief" and "confidence" in God, as well as being himself "trustworthy", "firm", "reliable". The terms are "polyvalent", they display "lexical flexibility", although most often the specific "valence" "trustworthy" is stronger. Thus the overall drift of the argument remains in favour of one or other sense at a time.⁶ Earlier, Richard Hays urged that both distinct "objective" and "subjective" senses of πίστις χριστοῦ be taken as intended at Gal 3.14. Just here Hays came close to proposing the flexibility of language that, it is here to be argued, obtained in general in the world of the New Testament: uses of 'faithfulness' throughout Paul, he insisted, are themselves "analogically related", "not [all] identical". Paul Achtemeier, for one, has remained highly sceptical.⁷

Obviously scholars have long been aware of polyvalence, or polysemy: our dictionaries number on occasion half-a-dozen or more distinct senses for lexemes. Oddly, 'polysemous' itself seems to be taken as unquestionably 'monosemous': users of such terms assume they can only designate distinct

³ A.T. Lincoln, *The Gospel According to St. John* (BNTC; London: T & T Clark, 2005) 19–50. C.M. Conway, "Speaking through Ambiguity: Minor Characters in the Fourth Gospel", *Bib. Int.* 10.3 (2002) 324–341, argues cogently for deliberate and sustained ambiguity in elements of John's narrative.

⁴ Lauri Thurén, *Argument and Theology in 1 Peter. The Origins of Christian Paraenesis* (JSNTSup 114; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995).

⁵ Mark D. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Cunning and Deception in Greece and Rome* (ESEC 7; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001) and 68 n. 123. I am grateful to a reviewer for a note of this book.

⁶ Todd D. Still, "Christos as Pistos: The Faith(fulness) of Jesus in the Epistle to the Hebrews", *CBQ* 69.4 (2007) 746–755.

⁷ R.B. Hays, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ and Pauline Theology", in E.E. Johnson and D.M. May, *Pauline Theology IV*, 35–60, citing 59, strongly supported, more recently, by David J. Southall, *Rediscovering Righteousness in Romans. Personified dikaiosunē within Metaphoric and Narratorial Settings* (WUNT 2.240; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Achtemeier, "Faith in or of Jesus Christ", 92.

“senses” (“semes” or, better, “uses”) as discriminated, as enumerable, in the lexicons.⁸ That usages may merge, unbounded, may flow into one another, implicate one another, seems mostly not to be considered; or if considered, is rejected (evinced “polysemiophobia”).⁹ One further recent partial exception has been K.F. Ulrichs’ cogent syntactical argument that in Paul’s use of πιστις Χριστοῦ both objective and subjective valences evoke one another, complementing each other, as occurs in analogous constructions.¹⁰ However, he dismisses previous discussions of the wide semantic field of πίστ- words as problematic, and that still without reference to ancient semantics as such.¹¹ It seems it can simply be assumed that Paul would have made distinct senses clear: “ein *genitivus subjectivus* eingeführt, erklärt oder jedenfalls gekennzeichnet hätte werden müssen”.¹²

More widely still, a preference for distinct senses seems generally prevalent in literate circles today, readily found in a standard modern textbook on language. Any ‘crude’ enumeration of senses will certainly be rejected, and more nuanced terms such “facets” and “micro-senses” will be introduced. But there still seems to remain the ‘modernist’ expectation that the context will make these specific facets clear and distinct.¹³

A problem that then confronts this present discussion is the reader’s likely tacit assumption that phrases such as ‘the idea of ...’ or ‘a meaning of ...’ necessarily imply that some precise and definable sense is in question; yet these are the only terms available with which to counter that very assumption. The reader is asked to be patient with ‘scare quotes’ when such terms as ‘meaning’ and ‘idea’ are used. Our use of ‘ambiguous’ is itself also imprecise (as remarked above, n. 1). Its etymology may suggest an

⁸ “Polyvalence” (better, ‘multivalence’) may even more strongly suggest distinct ‘valences’, if the metaphor from atomic physics is pressed.

⁹ D. Geeraerts, “Polysemization and Humboldt’s Principle”, in R. Jongen (ed.) *La Polysémie: Lexicographie et Cognition* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Cabay, 1985) 29–50; R.B. Matlock, “Detheologizing the ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ Debate: Cautionary Remarks from a Lexical Semantic Perspective”, *NovT* 42.1 (2000) 1–23, argues against an “amoebic sort of sense that could ooze”, p. 5.

¹⁰ K.F. Ulrichs, *Christusglaube. Studien zum Syntagma pistis Christou und zum paulinischen Verständnis von Glaube und Rechtfertigung* (WUNT 2.227; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007) 19–23. I am grateful to a reviewer for this reference.

¹¹ K.F. Ulrichs, *Christusglaube* 23–25, 45–52.

¹² K.F. Ulrichs, *Christusglaube* 104; cf. 107, “hätte Paulus diesen nicht deutlich(er) markieren müssen?”; 168, “die (den Paulus nicht kennenden und dem Paulus unbekannten) Adressaten diese kaum hätte erschließen können.”

¹³ E.g., A. Cruse, *Meaning in Language. An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics* (2nd. edn.; Oxford: Oxford University, 2004) 104–121, referring to 112, 117–118.

expression with two distinct senses, or an expression that is simply unclear, in practice polysemous: the latter, however, is more likely, according to my dictionaries.

The topic mainly to be discussed here is whether our widespread contemporary expectation of and insistence on clarity in the use of words is justified—is at all justified—in our interpretation of texts from the ancient Graeco-Roman world, if we trouble to take account of available contrary indications in ancient commonplaces on words and ideas, on translation, metaphor and allegory. It is certainly striking that in none of the discussion among New Testament scholars noted so far does there seem to be any suggestion that a consideration of ancient understanding(s) of semantics might be relevant or can and has been shown not to be. Nor does any such possibility appear to have been considered over the years in a number of monographs on Biblical semantics: not in those by James Barr, Anders Nygren, nor Arthur Gibson; nor, indeed, more recently by Anthony Thiselton, nor by others.¹⁴ Two very recent titles that might seem to suggest concern with these issues also fail to engage with ancient theory.¹⁵

Scholars today are accustomed to consulting elaborate dictionaries, monolingual and bilingual, where different spellings and senses (or uses) of lexemes are carefully discriminated, even enumerated for us.¹⁶ Such lexicons only began to appear in Europe in the eighteenth century.¹⁷ In the ancient Graeco-Roman world individuals compiled word-lists, be it of difficult words in Homer, with suggested current equivalents, or of synonyms and homophones in contemporary use, and speculated on etymologies. But

¹⁴ J. Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1961); A. Nygren, *Meaning and Method. Prolegomena to a Scientific Philosophy of Religion and a Scientific Theology* (London: Epworth, 1972); A.C. Thiselton, "Semantics and New Testament Interpretation", in I.H. Marshall (ed.) *New Testament Interpretation* (Exeter: Paternoster, 1979) 75–104; A. Gibson, *Biblical Semantic Logic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); J.P. Louw, *Semantics of New Testament Greek* (Philadelphia PA/Chico, CA: Fortress/Scholars, 1982); K. Vanhoozer, *Is there a meaning in this text? The Bible, the reader and the morality of literary knowledge* (Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 1998); I. Boxall, *New Testament Interpretation* (London: SCM, 2007).

¹⁵ C. Helmer (ed.), *The Multivalence of Biblical Texts and their Theological Meanings* (SBLSymS 37; Atlanta GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006); P. Spitaler, "Διακρίνεισθαι in Mt. 21:21, Mk 11:23, Acts 10:20, Rom. 4:20, 14:23, Jas 1:6 and Jude 22—the 'Semantic Shift' That Went Unnoticed by Patristic Authors", *Nov.T.* 49 (2007) 1–39.

¹⁶ Cf. R.B. Matlock, "Detheologizing", 5–13; and K.F. Ulrichs, *Christusglaube*, 23–25.

¹⁷ R.L. Collison, *A History of Foreign Language Dictionaries* (London: Deutsch, 1982) ch. 9, 'Emulation and Achievement', 100–110, citing Jean Baptiste de La Curne de Sainte-Palaye, who "allowed for a far greater amount of information about each word than any dictionary had so far supplied", p. 101; cf. also, J. Green, *Chasing the Sun. Dictionary-makers and the Dictionaries They Made* (London: Cape, 1996) ch. 1, 39–54 and ch. 9, 210–234, esp. 217 and 224.

none of even such simple tools as these were in wide circulation.¹⁸ This already constitutes a very significant difference between authors and hearers/readers then and those of us engaged in literary and kindred scholarship today.

There were occasional attempts to distinguish between the denotations of a general term such as “ζῶον”, so a human might be defined as a “rational animal” (ζῶον λογικόν, Aristotle, Chrysippus) or a “featherless biped animal” (ζῶον δίπουν ἄπτερον, ascribed to Plato).¹⁹ Cicero or Quintilian may explain (with examples) what terms such as “paraphrase” amount to (see further below). They may discuss the limitations to the overlapping usages of Greek and Latin words.²⁰ The same word is taken to “name” various things or activities, as will be discussed shortly. But there seems to have been no general attempt to distinguish and define (let alone then exclude) possible or apparent connotations of individual words—possible senses of “human”, for instance.²¹

It is important to recognise that in the ancient Graeco-Roman world only Aristotle earlier seems to have been seriously concerned in general with possible ambiguities that may occur in individual words spoken, heard, written, read. At *Topica* 1.15.1–30 (106a) Aristotle distinguishes uses of δικάως and also of ὑγιεινῶς, with the latter anticipating (or prompting?) my dictionary: “denoting health, conducive to health, preserving health” (compare *Poetics* 25.22–23, 1461a). But nowhere in his *Rhetoric* does this sort of analysis recur; nor does it seem to be taken up in later rhetoricians who cite him. In *Topica* 1.15, Aristotle then notes that δξύ can be used as “sharp” (as in modern English), in quite different senses in respective contexts of knives and of music. In each context there is now, no suggestion of ambiguity. In fact, he himself at *Poetics* 25 discusses similar instances in terms of metaphor, the transfer of names (to which, as said, we turn in a moment).²²

For Aristotle and for later writers ἀμφιβολία, *ambiguitas*, is to be mainly discerned in a lexeme such as OY enunciated with rough or smooth breathing, or a faulty construction, or uncertain breaks between words that leave

¹⁸ R.L. Collinson, *History*, ch. 1, “The Pre-Christian Era”, 25–44.

¹⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 6.40.

²⁰ E.g., Quintilian, *Institutes* 5.10, in discussion with Cicero and Caecilius; see further below.

²¹ Nor is any hard denotation/connotation disjunction here implied.

²² On Aristotle, J. Pinborg, “Classical Antiquity: Greece”, in T.A. Sebeok (ed.), *Current trends in Linguistics 13: Historiography of Linguistics* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975) 69–126, here referring to 76 and 98; C. Atherton, *The Stoics on Ambiguity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993) 99–103. Note Quintilian on “definition”, *Inst.* 7.III (7.2.57–3.35), dismissing attempts at verbal precision as fruitlessly risky.

the performer and/or the hearers unsure: but ambiguity is not at all said to be found in individual words in contexts seen as normal. In context, different applications are usually clear enough for purpose.²³

Otherwise, it seems that none but the Stoics as a school took deliberate pains to coin or to define their terms so as to obviate particular ambiguities, and they did that for their own distinct philosophical purposes. Roughly speaking, to live rightly you had to have and articulate comprehensively correct impressions of things.²⁴ Critics, including the present author, have discerned Stoic influence among early Christian writers; but there is no sign of their adopting an extensive Stoic technical vocabulary, essential to any comprehensive assimilation. Otherwise, only Galen, in the second century CE, as an individual philosophically minded physician sought precise clinical terminology.²⁵

Philo does suggest that contemporary sophists “wear out the ears of any audience they happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings (τὰς διπλᾶς καὶ ἀμφιβόλους λέξεις ἀναπτύσσων).”²⁶ It is to this kind of practice that Mark Given draws attention, explaining how the divergent readings of modern commentators may well represent kinds of double sense that Luke and Paul could have deliberately deployed, with a Socratic transformative irony.²⁷ However, this is still to discern distinct senses in words such as δεισιδαιμονεστέρους, ἀγνοοῦντες, ὑπεριδῶν, and τέλος, and that may seem not to go far enough.

For there is no indication that such sophistry (or sophistic anti-sophistry) involved a pervasive attention to individual word usage, nor that such as Philo or Quintilian were drawn in response to pre-empt seriously what they took sophists to be doing for display. Rather did authors (including writers) rely on ordinary words in discursive context to evoke the sort of response

²³ Aristotle, *Topica* 1.15.20–21; *Poetics* 25.18–21 (1461a), *Rhetoric* 2.24.3; Demetrius, *On Style*, 4.196; *Ad Herennium* 2.16; Quintilian, *Institutes* 7.9.1–18; Theon, *Progymnasmata* 81–82, 100.15 (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.118, 6.3).

²⁴ E.g. Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.7.1 and Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.62; and cf. C. Atherton, *The Stoics on Ambiguity, passim*, but esp. 59–64, 92–94, 175–191; and the classifications in Galen, *On Linguistic Sophisms*, [Gabler, 12.10–14.5] and Theon, *Progymnasmata* 81.25–82.30, in M. Patillon and G. Bolognesi (ed. and trans.), *Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata* (CUF; Paris: Belles Lettres, 1997).

²⁵ Cf. R.J. Hankinson, “Usage and abuse: Galen on language”, in S. Everson, *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought 3; Oxford: Oxford University, 1994) 166–187.

²⁶ Philo, *De agr.* 136, LCL; cf. Dio, *Discourse* 4.36–38.

²⁷ M.D. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*. Given's ancient references are mainly to Plato and Aristotle, but he also engages with recent discussions of discernible Socratic motifs in Acts and in Paul, and I have adduced the first century passages in the previous note, in support.

sought, as did Stoics themselves for much of the time.²⁸ Only in passing does Quintilian tell us “in the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which does not signal many things” (*nullum videtur esse verbum quod non plura significet*).²⁹ Chrysippus, according to Aulus Gellius, took it that “every word is by nature ambiguous, since from the same [word] two or even more things can be understood” (*duo vel plura accipi possunt*).³⁰

Quintilian gives the suggestion no further attention. And ancient practice suggests no such general concern arose. Thus when Plato's Socrates discusses topics such as piety, or naming, or knowledge, *eros*, temperance, manliness, friendship, there seems to be a clear conviction that the discussion is worthwhile, it has a topic, and positions are articulated: but no “definition” of individual terms, their nuances, connotations, emerges. A present day commentator on Plato concludes, “To learn the truth we have to go behind words altogether.” “Each thing is to be understood through a full, lively awareness of its similarities and differences in relation to other things.”³¹ A first century BCE Platonist offered a very similar observation:

Speaking with multiple voices is characteristic of Plato, and even the subject of the *telos* is expressed by him in several ways. He uses a variety of expressions because of his lofty eloquence, but he is contributing to a single concordant item of doctrine. That doctrine is that we should live in accordance with virtue. (Τὸ δε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος. Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ τέλους αὐτῷ πολλαχῶς. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ποιχίλιαν τῆς φράσεως ἔχει διὰ τὸ λόγιον καὶ μεγαλήγορον, εἰς δὲ ταῦτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον τοῦ δόγματος συντελεῖ. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν.)³²

We find much the same in writing in and around the first century. All our authors have read or heard others evoking “the idea” each wishes to evoke in each one's own way: shorter, longer, better illustrated, more elegantly expressed, more or less persuasive, effective: the “same” idea, or near enough

²⁸ One may compare Musonius and Epictetus in their practice; cf. C. Atherton, *The Stoics on Ambiguity*, 457; J. Pinborg, ‘Classical Antiquity: Greece’, 98.

²⁹ Quintilian, *Inst.* 7.9.1.

³⁰ Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 11.12.1, as presented in C. Atherton, *The Stoics*, 298–301, suggesting ὅνομα as Chrysostom's likely original; see further below, and cf. M.D. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*, 68, n. 123, again; but, as noted above, Given does not pursue this line.

³¹ J.M. Cooper, “Cratylus”, in *idem* and D.S. Hutchinson (eds), *Plato. Complete Works* (Indianapolis IN/Cambridge: Hackett, 1997) 101–102, citing 101; and in ‘Sophist’, *op.cit.*, 235–236, citing 236.

³² Eudorus in C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense (eds), *Stobaeus, Anthologium* (Berlin: Weidmannos, 1884) 49–50, cited and translated by G.H. van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context, The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (WUNT 2.232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 146.

for current purposes (compare the discussion of ‘emulation’ in the previous chapter). But each and every one of these *is* itself an evocation of, say, ‘the idea’ (‘the “ideal” idea’) of tranquillity, which remains still undefined and undefinable, and with it words such *tranquillitas* or εὐθυμία. When Seneca discourses on tranquillity, providence, constancy, anger, clemency; or Plutarch on education, tranquillity, friendship, fortune, virtue and vice, marriage; or Dio of Prusa on kingship, tyranny, virtue, usefulness, or faith (ΠΕΡΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ), no word and no set of words “encapsulates” let alone itself defines “the idea”. It is always outside and beyond the words; and, *a fortiori*, there is no attempt to discriminate—let alone then to prioritize and exclude—various possible senses, connotations, of the various individual terms deployed, nor does there seem to be on any other topic.³³ (If exceptions there turn out to be to this present claimed absence of connotative definition and exclusion, they would assuredly seem to be rare.)

There certainly is no sign of any appetite for precise definitions in early Christian writings. When Paul in 1 Cor 13 discourses on ἀγάπη he lists a range of ideas the term brings to his mind; however, he does not, for instance, bother to exclude the patriarchal, patronizing usage available to the writer of Eph 5:33.³⁴ Indeed, we may usefully recall how many centuries it took for Christian intellectuals to agree in stipulating distinct and exclusive uses for terms such as οὐσία and ὑπόστασις; and even then not all were willing to accept the precisions. Precision, and any exclusion of overtones, had to be argued for, if wanted; unargued, they were presumably neither expected nor required. *To read ancient authors as though they “must” have shared the concern evinced by some among us for connotative precision risks making a category mistake, a mistake in the genre of verbal articulation deployed.*

It is to a more detailed discussion of ancient semantics, and the freedom that they (unawares) may seem to have encouraged that we now turn.

2. SEMANTIC RICHNESS IN ANCIENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

What follows surveys some ancient authors’ discussions of how words are held to work as ‘names’ (ὀνόματα, *nomina*), ‘names’ that are expected to evoke in hearers’ minds, ‘call to mind’, shared impressions of people and

³³ For a detailed example, F.G. Downing, “On Avoiding Bothersome Busyness”, discussing Seneca and Plutarch and others on tranquillity.

³⁴ At Rom 4:1–25, in his exegesis, Paul might just possibly be thought to be stipulatively defining λογίζομαι when deployed in the absence of overt reference to ‘work’, as specifically denoting an act of grace.

events and things, and shared ideas, generalities, abstract concepts. Evidence will be offered to show that, with the common acceptance of this model of ‘naming,’ there is, as already noted, little call for ‘disambiguation,’ but considerable scope for creative and appropriate imprecision.

In brief, and for example, “Diogenes,” “the Cynic,” “the Sinopean” and “the philosopher” are all held readily to call to mind the same person (however differently perceived by friend or foe); if others are also called “Diogenes,” an additional “name” (or sequence of names) can readily distinguish them, still retaining, undefined, much they have in common (they are Greek males born into Greek culture with its complex and varied talk of Gods and of continuity between Gods and humans ...).³⁵ And in a similar way a “name” or a short or lengthy sequence of “names” can be expected freely to evoke ‘the same’ but otherwise undefined thing or ‘the same’ idea (‘the same “ideal” idea’), be it of friendship, virtue, kingship, variously expounded, in hearers’ minds. There can also be a “transfer” (μεταφορά, *translatio*) of a name or names from one person or thing or idea to another, expecting a similar evocation without precise definition. In practice, it will be argued, as already indicated, that the corollary is a fluid semantic freedom and richness.³⁶

2.1. “Names” ὀνόματα, *Nomina*

Just such understanding of language as “naming” arises in all our ancient Greek and Roman discussions of rhetoric, at least in discussions of metaphor, yet seems not to be touched on in the (otherwise very thorough and useful) surveys of ancient rhetoric that have appeared of late.³⁷

One of the briefest and most telling accounts available, however, is not in a discussion of rhetoric as such, but in a much admired example of its practice, the *Olympicos* of the eclectic Stoic (and occasional Cynic) Dio of Prusa:

³⁵ Encountering “polysemiophobia” one is tempted to suspect a heritage of late mediaeval nominalism in modern theological unease with plural and overlapping connotations, suggesting the tacit assumption that nothing in common should be taken to be indicated by a shared term other than the sharing of the term itself.

³⁶ The reader may work with a sense/reference dichotomy, where names have reference, not sense. In this terminology, the ancient view is concerned with ‘the sense’ to which the ‘name’ (word) refers.

³⁷ G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); H. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric* (ed. and tr. D.E. Orton and R.D. Anderson; Leiden /Boston: Brill, 1998. [German original, München: Hüber. 1960]); S.E. Porter (ed.) *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1997); but see F.G. Downing, “Words and Meanings,” in *idem, Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century* (JSNTS 200; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000) pp. 57–74.

The human race has left unuttered and undesigned no single thing that reaches our sense perception, but straightway puts upon what the mind perceives [τῷ νοηθέντι] the unmistakable seal of a name [σφραγίδα ὀνόματος], and often several vocal signs for one item [πλείους φωνάς ἐνὸς πράγματος] so that when anyone gives utterance to any one of them, they convey an impression not much less distinct than does the actual matter in question. Very great indeed is the ability and power [ἐξουσία καὶ δύναμις] of humans to indicate [ἐνδείξασθαι] with words whatever occurs [τὸ παραστάν].³⁸

In Greek this model for the way words may be taken to work goes back, we gather, from before Plato, and is happily taken up by him and by Aristotle after him, and by their successors.³⁹ Plato is able to make a distinction between noun and verb, significantly (re-)using ὄνομα for subject (or noun), with ῥήμα for predicate (or verb). Aristotle introduces further distinctions (for sentences and connectors), and yet more distinctions follow over the centuries.⁴⁰

There are also discussions, as in Plato's *Cratylus*, as to whether words originate naturally, perhaps by resemblances of sounds (what we still term *onomatopoeia*); or whether, as most agreed, they are, or are for the most part, arbitrary. There are also discussions of homonyms and homophones, as already noted. However, the unquestioned model remains the same throughout. I quote Jan Pinborg's conclusions:

The semantic conception involved in [Aristotle's] definitions and their context is rather primitive. The written symbols are arbitrary signs of the spoken symbols, which are in turn arbitrary signs of the mental concepts which in turn are natural 'likenesses' of the things themselves. This conception presupposes a theory of natural 'forms' according to which the forms embodied in the things and giving them their nature is grasped directly by the intellect.⁴¹

³⁸ Dio Chrysostom, *Discourse* 12.65 (LCL, lightly adapted); cf. 12.28, and brief comment in H.-J. Klauck and B. Bäbler, *Dion von Prusa, Olympischer Rede* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000) 146, n. 323; and cf. S. Inowlocki, "Neither Adding nor Omitting Anything': Josephus' Promise not to Modify the Scriptures in Greek and Latin Context", *JJS* 56.1, 2005 48–65.

³⁹ See, e.g., D. Bostock, "Plato on understanding language" (1994), in S. Everson (ed.) *Language*, 10–27; and D. Charles, "Aristotle on Names and their signification" (1994), in Evason, *Language*, 37–73, and other articles in Evason, *Language*; and J. Pinborg, "Classical Antiquity: Greece", 69–126.

⁴⁰ J. Pinborg, "Classical Antiquity: Greece", 71–77, citing Plato, *Sophist* 262A, and Aristotle, *Interpretation* 1–2 but cf. also *Rhetoric* 3.2.5; and cf. D. Bostock, "Plato", and D. Charles, "Aristotle"; but also Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.4.18–20.

⁴¹ J. Pinborg, "Classical Antiquity: Greece", p. 76. More recently J. Barnes has noted, "no ancient text hints at an answer" as to how "names and the like signify" λεκτά, and can himself only "guess": in D.M. Schenkefeld and J. Barnes, "Language", in K. Algra et al., *The Cambridge History of Ancient Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005) 177–225, citing 208.

To quote Aristotle himself, as an example of the common view,

Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions [παθημάτων σύμβολα] in the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As in writing, so also is speech not the same for all peoples. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for all [τὰ πᾶσι], as are also the objects of which these affections are representations or likeness, images, copies [ὁμοιώματα].⁴²

Significant is the clear conviction that all humans will share *the same* mental impressions. As already discussed, Aristotle and his contemporaries and their successors were aware of ambiguity in practice, and others' actions, including 'inappropriate' verbal responses, would show that words had failed to evoke near enough 'the same' impression. To ensure success, to allow words their full 'power to evoke', speakers (and writers) might use a lot of words, of expansions and paraphrases (and gesture), to ensure that the intended response was effectively evoked. But 'meaning' is in the mind, not in individual words; and quite different sets of words may be expected to evoke 'the meaning' intended but not otherwise defined. Failure leads to more discourse; never, it seems, to individual words' senses being discriminated.

It is worth comparing this passage with Paul in 1 Cor 14.8–11, for its similar terminology (including awareness of other languages), for its treatment of ambiguity and for its stress at the end on the "power" (τὴν δύναμιν) of the word (compare Dio, above). It is the word's "power" to evoke that is at issue, not its 'meaning' (*pace* modern English translators):

... if the trumpet sound is uncertain [ἄδηλον], who will prepare for battle? In the same way, if what you say in tongues produces no clear utterance [εὔσημον λόγον], how can anyone tell what has been spoken [τὸ λαλούμενον]? You will be talking into the air. There happen to be any number of sound-systems [γένη φωνῶν] in our world, and nowhere are such lacking. If I do not know the force of the sound [τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φωνῆς], I shall be a barbarian babbler to the speaker and the speaker to me.

Later, for instance, among the Stoics, ὄνομα comes to be confined in some contexts to proper nouns, denoting named individuals or named things. However, the model remains the same, as one may see, for instance, in Philo:

⁴² Aristotle, *Interpretation* 1.4–8, in H.P. Cooke and H. Tredennick (eds and trans), *Aristotle: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics* (LCL; Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press/Heinemann, 1905).

Who does not know that every language, and Greek especially, abounds in terms [ὀνομάτων], and that the same thought [ταὐτὸν ἐνθύμημα] can be put in many shapes [σχηματίζει πολλοχῶς] more or less freely [μεταφράζοντα καὶ παραφράζοντα], suiting the expression to the occasion?⁴³

What for present purposes is most significant is the Stoic insistence that what an assertion asserts, τὸ λεκτόν, is something “immaterial, objective, and something which others can grasp”.⁴⁴ A word in common use, and used recognisably, may be *hoped*, *expected* to evoke an appropriate notion in any (Greek) hearer’s mind.⁴⁵ For most purposes, even among Stoics, there is no need for prior or further definition of individual words, for any restrictions or qualifications to their sense. In practice speakers in the ancient Mediterranean world, as already noted, learned to use all kinds of amplification and paraphrase in attempting to persuade others to see things nearly enough as the speaker expected. But such amplification, to which we shall return, did not usually include any pruning of semantic riches; if anything, it amounted to further enrichment. Of course, if you were sure you had something quite new and different to say, you would have to define some of your terms, as the Stoics did for their philosophical reflections, and as Galen later did for clinical reasons; but for ordinary purposes both, like everyone else, relied on ordinary language to work as well as they took it for granted it must. Yet, as all the recent authors on ancient semantics cited so far agree, there is in fact no such facility in words to evoke a precise common thought, idea, impression in all users of the language in question. The “naming” model is “primitive” (Pinborg) and unsustainable (Wittgenstein).⁴⁶ ‘Woman’, ‘father’, ‘dog’, ‘freedom’ can be shown to evoke very different ideas and mental images in varying contexts among current speakers of the language. It is worth quoting a later writer, Augustine (criticised by Wittgenstein), for his awareness of this openness:

To be sure, all of us readers try to discern and grasp what the author wished [*quod voluit ille quem legimus*]. [Yet] what harm is there to me if these words

⁴³ Philo, *De vita mosis* 2.38, F.H. Colson (ed. and trans.) (LCL; Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press/Heinemann, 1935) adapted, using Colson’s alternative rendering. The ‘idea’ of each and every thing can potentially be evoked by name; only God can not: God permits address, but remains incomprehensible, inconceivable, and so (alone) not in a proper sense ‘nameable’ at all: *De mut. nom.* 7–15.

⁴⁴ A.A. Long, “Language and Thought in Stoicism”, in *idem* (ed.) *Problems in Stoicism* (London: Athlone Press, 1971), 75–113, citing 85; also quoted by J. Pinborg, “Classical Antiquity: Greece”, 79.

⁴⁵ Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.60–61.

⁴⁶ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953) 1–13 *et passim*.

can be understood in different ways, so long as these ways are true? [express divine truth] ... even if it is not what the author meant [*etiamsi non hoc sensit ille*]? ... So, when one says, "Moses thought is mine", and another, "not at all, it's mine", I think it more faithful [*religiosius*] to say, "Why one more than the other, if both are true?" Or if someone sees a third or a fourth, or some truth quite different in these words [*si quid omnino aliud verum quispiam in his verbis videt*] why may it not be trusted that Moses saw them all [*illa omnia vidisse credatur*]?⁴⁷

Moses can be taken to intend to evoke 'an idea', or even a number of 'ideas', but it is not in, nor expected to be in the words: they may well evoke other ideas. Neither author nor reader is reprimanded for, nor defended against, any charge of verbal imprecision. There seems to be no thought of engaging in a more precise definition of the terms deployed.

2.2. Metaphor and Allegory

Ancient talk of metaphor and allegory emphasise the practical imprecision and semantic freedom the 'naming' model encouraged. In discussing μεταφορά, *translatio*, Quintilian in effect summarises some of the foregoing and prompts further reflection. He explains that μεταφορά, *translatio*

adds to the copiousness of language by the interchange of words and by borrowing, and finally succeeds in accomplishing the supremely difficult task of providing a name (*nomen*) for everything. A noun (*nomen* [*sic*]) or verb (*verbum*) is transferred from the place to which it properly belongs to another where either a proper one (*proprium*) is lacking or the transferred is better than the proper one. We do this either because it is necessary or because it is more indicative (*significantius*), or more acceptable (*melius*).⁴⁸

Obviously, Quintilian, too, took the model of 'naming' for granted. Although he could use *nomen* to distinguish subject from predicate (*verbum*), 'metaphor' was still in both cases the provision of a new 'name' (and the examples that follow include proper nouns and verbs). Just as 'Cynic' may be substituted for 'Diogenes' to make the reference clear (my example), so crops may be said to thirst. Significantly, another 'name' may do as well or even better.

That is not to suggest that ancient authors lacked concern for clarity, lucidity or effective persuasion and detailed agreement in practice. What is being argued is that the desired clarity was not sought by defining the

⁴⁷ Augustine, *Confessions*, 12.18.27 and 12.31.42; from M. Skutella (Teubner), in A. Solignac et al., *Les Confessions VIII–XIII* (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962).

⁴⁸ Quintilian, *Institutes* 8.6.4–6.

nuances of even the key terms deployed. “Clarity involves the employment of current words, and words bound together”, avers Demetrius.⁴⁹ Only, in agreement with Quintilian: “Some things are, however, expressed with greater clearness and precision by means of metaphors.”⁵⁰

This ‘transference of names’ model itself goes back at least to Aristotle (*Poetics* and *Rhetoric*), and appears in Cicero, and in the *Ad Herrenium*.⁵¹ And it does warrant more reflection than it seems to have received, not least among exegetes of the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures. Janet Martin Soskice, a few years back, argued persuasively that “metaphor is that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms suggestive of another”, and as such it is open and “irreducible” (and many have seemed persuaded).⁵² In a more recent general survey of metaphor Katrin Kohl affirms

Deutlich wird vor allem ihre Kraft, unser Denken, unsere Emotionen, unsere imaginativen Fähigkeiten und unsere Sprache produktiv interagieren zu lassen, sowie auch ihr Potenzial, unsere innersten Gefühle und abenteuerlichsten Vorstellungen eine Struktur und einen kommunizierbaren Sinn zu verleihen.⁵³

Much recent research in combined psycholinguistics and philosophy of language including pragmatics further confirms such conclusions, and strongly suggests that the use of language with this sort of freedom has been “hard wired” in human brains for many millennia more than the two that separate us from the first century CE.⁵⁴ That is how we for the most part make words

⁴⁹ Demetrius, *On Style*, 4.191–192; Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.5.1, 71; 8.2.22.

⁵⁰ Demetrius, *On Style*, 2.82, LCL.

⁵¹ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 21–22 and *Rhetoric* 3.2.6–7, 3.3.3 (of ones of which he disapproves), and 3.10.7; Cicero, e.g., *Orator* 24.80–82, 27.92–93; *Ad Herrenium* 4.34.

⁵² J.M. Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 15 and 93–96; compare the more recent discussion in B. Kuschnerus, *Die Gemeinde als Brief Christi. Die kommunikative Funktion der Metapher bei Paulus am Beispiel von 2 Kor 2–5* (FRALNT 197; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000). Although both Quintilian and Aristotle on the “transfer of names” are cited by Kuschnerus (16, 21, 28), the wider implications of “naming” are neglected.

⁵³ Katrin Kohl, *Metapher* (Sammlung Metzler, B. 352; Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2007) 119–120. Extensive attention is accorded to Cicero, Quintilian and Aristotle. Although noting in Quintilian the idea of words as “naming”, unfortunately this is overlooked in the discussion of Aristotle, 108–111, where *ὄνομα* is rendered by “Wort”, just as it is, conventionally, by ‘word’ in modernising English translations, and, arguably, the full force of Aristotle’s account is therefore also missed.

⁵⁴ On “hard-wiring”, P. Carruthers, “Thinking in Language. Evolution and a Modularist Possibility”, in Carruthers, P. and J. Boucher (eds), *Language and Thought*, 94–119; and cf. *Mind and Language* 21.3 (June 2006), the whole issue being devoted to metaphor and psycholinguistics.

work (allow words to work); it is only in some areas of scholarship that verbal precision is sought—or imposed. (On the issue of psycholinguistics, see further the final paragraphs of this essay.)

However, and just because the ancients were convinced that their words could name and rename and so evoke appropriate ideas in others' minds, they will have been particularly free, within the limits of 'good Greek' or 'correct Latin', to elaborate and innovate expansively.⁵⁵ And we have therefore no warrant for reduction in our interpretation of them. For the model of transferred naming used to explain what we still call 'metaphor' is logically symmetrical, reversible. If names are seen as exchangeable, and the transferred one likely as evocative as (or better than) the common one, there is nothing 'in' a name that affords precision; precision (if any) lies in the inefable λεκτόν evoked.

And then, of course, if we, *per contra*, take it there is no such λεκτόν or 'form', there is nothing precise to be named, renamed, evoked, and we now have to accept that in practice ancient verbal communication was as open and imprecise as post-modernists have of late argued all language is, but was perhaps even freer because unworried by fears of verbal imprecision.⁵⁶ (Inappropriate some words might be judged to be; that some might be imprecise seems to have been no general cause for concern.)

Further reinforcement for this argument is afforded by discussions of allegory. After a brief note on *catachresis*, the use of a term that is quite unexpected, albeit pleasing or otherwise appropriate, Cicero says: "When there is a continuous stream of metaphors, a quite distinct style of speech is produced, and so the Greeks give it the term ἀλληγορία. They are right as to the name, but from the point of view of classification Aristotle does better in calling it all metaphors."⁵⁷

The author of *Ad Herennium* uses the Latin term *permutatio* for allegory, but in much the same way explains, "It operates through a comparison when a number of metaphors originating in a similarity in the mode of expression are set together, as follows: 'For when dogs act the part of wolves, to what

⁵⁵ Cf. Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.5.1–17; and 8 Pr. 13–33; Plutarch, *Quomodo adolescens* 5–6, *Moralia* 22B–25B; Philo, *Congr.* 15, 148; Lucian, *Mistaken Critic* 11–12; *Teacher of Rhetoric* 16–17.

⁵⁶ I refer to Jacques Derrida's concern over endlessly "deferred meaning", which I would counter with Wittgenstein's confident pointer to the fact that language actually works because it is open; J. Derrida, *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); and, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1974); L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*.

⁵⁷ Cicero, *Orator* 27.94, LCL slightly adapted.

guardians, pray, are we to entrust our herds of cattle?"⁵⁸ Quintilian offers a kindred account, but judges the device often tedious, even no better than a riddle.⁵⁹

Stoics and others had long sought indications in Homer and Hesiod of how the world is. Allegory in Philo works rather differently, but shares the same underlying sense for how words work. So "pruning" (Lev 19.23) can be taken horticulturally, and then as betokening God's generous creative care; but also for ridding ourselves of self conceit, or doing away with pretence; various possible punctuations suggest yet further possibilities, and Philo interprets the two that most appeal to him: teaching that purifies, or eternal self-evident truth.⁶⁰

Much the same account of the way words work appears to be articulated in 1QH^a IX.27–31. Here "the mysteries" to which words refer rest not in them but in the divine mind.⁶¹ Much the same is implied in Rabbinic midrash.⁶²

However, all these examples are drawn from ancient academic discussions and from highly literate and educated authors. It is worth giving the argument a base in common and widespread practice.

2.3. *Paraphrase, Précis, Elaboration and Amplification*

A practical expression of the 'naming' model is to be found in the important part that paraphrasing played in learning to read and write. Children learned to retell 'the same' story from varying points of view, for various purposes, in varying styles, freely, first orally then in writing, as we are told by Quintilian, and by Theon and others.

Pupils should learn to recount Aesop's fables, the natural successors of the fairy stories of the nursery, in simple and restrained language and subsequently to set down this version in writing with the same simplicity of style: they should begin by analysing each verse, then giving its meaning in different language, and finally proceed to a freer paraphrase in which they will be permitted now to abridge and now to embellish the original so far as this may

⁵⁸ *Ad Herennium* 4.24.46.

⁵⁹ Quintilian, *Institutes* 8.6.4, 44–57.

⁶⁰ Philo, *Virt* 155–160; *Leg.al.* 1.52; *Plant* 104–116; cf. A.A. Long, "Allegory in Philo and Etymology in Stoicism", *StudPhilAnn* 9 (1997) 192–210; cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.36–41; 2.59–72; Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, *Moralia*, 363D, 367C; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.147, 187.

⁶¹ As translated by C. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space. Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (STDJ LII; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004) 227.

⁶² See J. Neusner, *What is Midrash?* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987); P.S. Alexander, "Midrash and Gospels", in C.M. Tuckett (ed.), *Synoptic Studies* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1984) 1–18; and cf. F.G. Downing, "Words and Meanings", 61–69.

preserve the poet's sense (*tum paraphrasi audacius vertere, qua et brevare quaedam et exornare salvo poetae sensu permittitur*).⁶³

The practice and theory together encourage and warrant the use of metaphor (transferring a name from one idea to another), and so also of allegory. There is no sign of instruction on defining your terms

To repeat, this is not to suggest that the choice of words was a matter of indifference or simply one of style and elegance. Speakers would have been able to tell from verbal and wider feedback whether 'the idea' (simple or complex) intended had been evoked, and had learned to paraphrase with great care. In Austinian jargon, speakers cared about the 'pragmatics' of utterance, their 'illocutionary force' and 'perlocutionary effect(s)'.⁶⁴ This ancient *practice* was not all that different from that of some postmodernists: you discoursed at length, with paraphrases, examples, illustrations, positive and negative comparisons, but in the—perhaps more confident—hope of attaining an effective resonance and evocation of 'the idea' you trusted was somehow 'out there' to be evoked. You could make the evocation, the reception of the idea more vivid, more effective, with all sorts of elaboration, just because you could be sure that 'it' itself could well be evoked intact.

2.4. The 'Intentional Fallacy'?

It might seem that 'ideas in the mind' land us back with a version of what was termed last century "the intentional fallacy": the romantic impression that meaning indeed lay inexpressibly in the mind of the author or artist.⁶⁵ The ancient conviction that 'meaning' was 'out there', in what the Stoics termed τὸ λεκτόν, ready to be evoked in people's minds, is not the same, but it is equally fallacious, as the commentators cited here agree. However, two

⁶³ Quintilian, *Institutes* 1.9.2, LCL, lightly adapted; cf. 2.4.12–15; Theon, *Progymnasmata* 3.12 (Walz p. 175, 1–10); cf. B.L. Mack, "Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School", in B.L. Mack and V.K. Robbins, *Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels* (Sunoma CA: Polebridge, 1989) 31–68, and especially 33–41, on Theon. There is a fine example in Philostatus, *Lives of the Sophists* 572, where a rhetor (Alexander) is said to have recast a whole speech "with different words and different rhythms" and without any apparent repetition (cited in van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology*, 332).

⁶⁴ See, of course, J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962); and, e.g., P.J. Hartin and J.H. Petzer (eds.), *Text and Interpretation: New Approaches in the Criticism of the New Testament* (Leiden /Boston: Brill, 1991); R. Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances*; F.G. Downing, "Words as Deeds and Deeds as Words" in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words*, 41–56; A. Cruse, *Meaning in Language*, 313–394.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., W. Charlton, *Aesthetics* (London: Hutchinson, 1970), referring to W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley.

counters are available. The first is an increased (or renewed) current interest in *genre*, *Gattung*.⁶⁶ A choice of *genre* is not a matter of some inner intent. And what it is hoped has been shown in the foregoing is that there is from the ancient Graeco-Roman world no sign of a genre of fine lexical precision, and no sub-genre constituting overtly distinguished connotations for individual terms. To read a first century Mediterranean document as though it deployed any such sub-genre is a category mistake, a serious anachronism. Secondly, we are not left with translation and interpretation as purely arbitrary, words meaning just anything in a Quinean or Derridean way.⁶⁷ Recent studies in pragmatics show that overt (not hidden) “intention” is inescapably integral to communication, and ensures that some interpretations are more persuasive than others, even though the pragmatics of ancient communication evidenced in texts rather than as originally performed are, of course, harder to discern than are current ones. However, the pragmatics of ancient rhetoric was discursive. It shows no sign of relying, let alone insisting on fine distinctions of meaning.

What is ruled out, then, it is here argued, is any hard precision, any clear lines between possible connotations of particular words, the kinds of ‘nice’ distinctions desired in some theological or ideological discourse. In interpreting sympathetically our ancient texts it will, rather and almost inevitably, be a matter of discerning family resemblances among uses of particular lexemes.⁶⁸

For an important illustration of the implications of the foregoing we return to the ‘family’ of terms with which we began: Faith, belief, faithfulness, trust, trustworthiness.

⁶⁶ Significant markers would be H. Dieter Betz, *Galatians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979); Klaus Berger, *Formgeschichte des Neuen Testaments* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1984); on earlier discussions, Detlev Dortmeyer, *The New Testament among the Writings of Antiquity* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998; German original Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), 19–25.

⁶⁷ W.V.O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 1953); and *Word and Object* (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1960), argued for the possibility of systematically coherent but distinct interpretations as a real possibility; from a different starting point, J. Derrida, *L'écriture et la différence*, and *Of Grammatology*, again. In further support I would now add M.M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, e.g., 106, “Any sign system (i.e., any language), regardless of how small the collective that produces its conventions may be, can always in principle be deciphered, that is, translated into other sign systems (other languages)”; cf. “Editors’ Preface” in *idem*, *Problems*, xxxi.

⁶⁸ On “family resemblance”, L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 32e.

3. FAITH, BELIEF, FAITHFULNESS, TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS ...

The semantic richness of πίστις and cognate terms (including περίθω) is widely acknowledged, and the wealth of usage is already made clear in the standard dictionaries, whether Liddell and Scott (with Jones and Mackenzie), Bauer (Arndt Gingrich Danker: BAGD), or *TDNT* (R. Bultmann).⁶⁹

I begin with one specialized context for the use of πίστις, one for which I can find no obvious foregrounded instance in Paul, but an example of which nonetheless helps to set the scene. The lexeme was used by Plato (and by others before him), and again by Aristotle, and then by their rhetorician successors, of endeavours to persuade in court; the conventional but unhelpful translation is “proof”.⁷⁰ This usage remains in (UK) English legal jargon in the phrase “proofs of evidence”; but the usual modern use of “proof” for a convincingly successful demonstration, “evidence sufficing or helping to establish” as fact (OED) is rather different from an attempt to convince. It is for an attempt to convince, to persuade hearers to trust evidence presented and/or interpreted, that Aristotle uses the term:

Rhetoric may be defined as the ability to discover possible means of persuasion (πιθανόν) ... As for ‘persuasions’ (πίστεις), some we do not have to construct [evidence from free or forced testimony, contracts, etc.], others we do, by our own [argumentative] efforts ... There are three kinds of these. The first depends on the moral character of the speaker, the second on putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it demonstrates a conclusion, or at least seems to (διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι). The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence (worthy of trust, ἀξιόπιστον); for we feel confidence (we trust, πιστεύομεν) in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth.⁷¹

To believe in someone and so in what they argue is, unsurprisingly, to trust them as trustworthy, be persuaded, convinced that she or he is faithful, and respond trustingly. Thus the passive and middle of περίθω (cf. πιθανόν, above),

⁶⁹ R. Bultmann, πιστεύω etc., *TDNT* 6, pp. 174–228, in particular illustrates amply the semantic richness, while insisting that numerous distinct meanings (suited to his own Lutheran take on Martin Heidegger’s existentialism) are nonetheless discernible. On semantic richness, see again T.D. Still, “*Christos as Pistos*”.

⁷⁰ Much is made of this usage by J.L. Kinneavy, *Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith. An Inquiry* (London: Oxford University, 1987).

⁷¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.2–4 (1355b–1356a) LCL, adapted; “in so far as it demonstrates, or at least seems to” substantiates my point that “proof”, absolute, is not an appropriate contemporary translation.

‘being persuaded’, ‘being convinced’, is tantamount to believing; indeed the pluperfect passive can be used with the dative or with εἰς or ἐπί for trust, rely on (cf. Wis 3.9, quoted below).⁷² The ideas merge into one another.

This complex of belief in, of trust, of trustworthiness, and of persuasion by one trusted, recurs in *Ad Herennium*, and in Cicero.⁷³ Again, in the first century CE, Quintilian notes, “All these forms of argument the Greeks name πίστεις, a term that, though properly we may render it *fides* (warrant), is better translated by *probatio* (proving, testing).”⁷⁴ And he, too, insists, that to persuade and gain trust a man must at least appear trustworthy:

Finally, ἡθός in all its forms requires the speaker to be a man of good character and courtesy. It is most important that he should himself possess or be believed to possess those virtues for whose possession it is his duty to commend his client, while the excellence of his own character will make his own pleading all the more trustworthy and will be of service to his cases (*Sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitatem faciet fidem*).⁷⁵

Philo is in agreement, as is clear in his appraisal of Abraham:

It is stated that he “trusted in God” (ἐπίστευσε τῷ θεῷ). Now that is a little thing if measured in words, but a very great thing *if made good in action*. For in what else should one trust? High office, fame, honours, abundant wealth, noble birth, senses, strength, bodily beauty? ... [All are] precarious. Faith in God, then, is the one sure and infallible good ... in him who is the cause of all things and can do all things yet only wills the best ... [Such active faith/faithfulness means you] press onward to God by visions of virtue, walking upon a path which is safe and unshaken ... God, marvelling at Abraham’s faith in him, repaid him with faithfulness (τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστεως ἀγάμενος ... πιστὴν ἀντιδίδωσιν αὐτῷ) by confirming with an oath the gifts which he had promised.⁷⁶

It is noteworthy that Liddell and Scott find far fewer instances of “believer” for πιστός than do BAGD. One such in the latter is Wis 3.9, clearly a mistaken choice, but itself significant: “Those who have put their trust in him [God] (οἱ πεποιθότες ἐπ’ αὐτῷ) will understand that he is true, and the faithful will

⁷² For Paul’s usage, often making explicit the trustworthy persuader who has convinced, see Rom 8.38 (God, Christ, 8.33–34), 14.14 (the Lord Jesus), 15.14; 2 Cor 1.9 (God, implicit), 2.3 (his addressees themselves), 5.11 (the Lord to back the attempt to persuade), 10.7; Gal 1.10, not by ordinary human means; 5.8, human, not God, 5.10, the Lord; Phil 1.6, God (implicit), 1.14, Paul’s example, 1.25, his sense of divine mission, 2.24, the Lord, 3.3–4, Christ, not humans; 2 Thess 3.4, the Lord.

⁷³ *Ad Herennium* 1.4.8, 1.10.18; Cicero, *De oratore* 1.19.87; 2.27.116–118.

⁷⁴ Quintilian, *Institutes*, 5.10.8 again.

⁷⁵ Quintilian, *Institutes*, 6.2.18; cf. all of 6.2.8–19.

⁷⁶ Philo, *Abr* 268–273, LCL, present writer’s emphasis.

attend upon him in love" (οἱ πιστοὶ ἐν ἀγάπῃ προσμενοῦσιν αὐτῷ). What is at stake in context, especially in Wis 2.10–20, is trust in the trustworthy God, a trust lived out faithfully in love: and to lose the latter strand, faithful living, here picked out by πίστος, is to misrepresent the text.⁷⁷

Precisely the same, really rather obvious logic is clear in earlier Jewish tradition. The temple furnishers are trusted because they are trustworthy (2 Kgs 12.15). There are no grounds for trust in untrustworthy Pharaoh king of Egypt (2 Kgs 18.21). To proclaim your trust in God is to proclaim his trustworthiness, or at least to attempt to reawaken it (e.g., Ps 25 [24], Ps 88 [89]).⁷⁸ Although it is possible to imagine someone loyally trusting someone known to be untrustworthy, by and large trust is elicited by trustworthiness, and implies it.⁷⁹

Paul's usage includes at various points at least the range just outlined. He is certainly deploys πιστός of the faithfulness, trustworthiness of God (1 Cor 1.9, 10.13; 2 Cor 1.18; 1 Thess 5.24; of Christ, 2 Thess 3.3). Paul hopes that he himself will be found trustworthy by God (1 Cor 4.2–3) just as he has himself found Timothy faithful, and hopes that Timothy will remind the hearers of Paul's own faithful way of life (1 Cor 4.17 with 4.2): and clearly, in context, this faithfulness constitutes a life of lived faith, lived trust. The manner of Paul's lived trust in God as enabler of growth (1 Cor 3.6), ensurer of life (1 Cor 3.22), granter of just commendation (1 Cor 4.5), sustainer in hardship (1 Cor 4.8–13), power in pastoral care (1 Cor 4.20), all display the trustworthiness Paul hopes will ultimately be acknowledged by God (cf. also 1 Cor 7.25). His faith, belief, trust and his faithfulness and trustworthiness cannot be separated.

When Paul speaks of "faithful Abraham" (Gal 3.9), perhaps H.D. Betz and others are right to prefer "Abraham the believer", despite noting that "faithful Abraham" is a commonplace, for here it clearly is 'active faith' that is in focus.⁸⁰ But it is perhaps also worth noting for comparison that in Matthew's

⁷⁷ Much the same, a lived trust in the trustworthy, is true of other passages from Hellenistic Jewish and early Christian writings cited in BAGD, such as Sir 1.14, Ps. 100.6, Herm. *Man.* 11. On the other hand, at John 20.27, belief and trust are indeed the focus of "μὴ γίνου ἄπιστος ἄλλα πιστός" even though "my Lord and my God" then constitutes a commitment to renewed faithfulness (cf. John 11.16).

⁷⁸ It is intriguing to find that the LXX in the Psalms prefers ἐλπίζω for בטח, where English translators prefer "trust" etc. God inspires (or should inspire) hopeful confidence, not just faithful commitment.

⁷⁹ Although the LXX does not support the AV translation of Job 13.15, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him", it was so interpreted before the AV, as in *m.Sotah* 5.5. However, this is explicitly exceptional: trust normally presupposes trustworthiness.

⁸⁰ H.D. Betz, *Galatians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 143; cf. R.N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC; Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1990), 116. J.D.G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*

version of Jesus' parable, the "unfaithful" slave is the one who distrusted his master (Mt 25.21–26; cf. Lk 19.17–21). Trust and faithful obedience run together. A first century hearer with any awareness of Abraham in Jewish tradition would most likely understand that faithful Abraham was being commended by Paul, here, for making explicit the trust in God implicit in his (Abraham's) unfailing faithfulness. In faithfully trusting God's promise Abraham displays a crucial aspect of his faithfulness, with still no payment due: thus πιστός as 'faithful' in no way contradicts the trust/grace nexus that Paul will clarify later in Rom.

But the gospel parable may prompt consideration of yet another strand in this rich (and unbounded) semantic field. The slave owner entrusted responsibilities to all three slaves: that is, he trusted them. Paul is convinced that God trusts him: that is, God believes in Paul (1Cor 7.25). God has "entrusted" a ministry to Paul (1Cor 9.17, 1Thess 2.4), as he had earlier entrusted his oracles to the Jewish people (Rom 3.2).⁸¹ But, of course, the same is said in other words much more widely. God entrusts gifts to us, entrusts others' burdens to us, entrusts love for one another to us. God's faith in us is an integral part of his faithfulness, his entrusting to us responsibilities and gifts meant for sharing. (And that may, on reflection, seem rather obvious: it is much easier to trust when trusted, hard in common experience to trust one who does not trust you.)

Clearly, at 1Cor 7.12–13, we are obliged to translate ἄπιστος as 'unbeliever', for here no 'unfaithful' outcomes of unbelief are at stake; and perhaps at 2Cor 6.14 Paul also talks of believer and unbeliever (as commentators seem to prefer), even though it would afford more consistency with the former passage if separation were here ordered for unfaithful behaviour (cf. 1Cor 5.6), not for the "unbelief" that earlier (1Cor 7.12–13) was said to constitute no reason for parting. Further, "unbelief" cannot be foremost in mind at Rom 3.3, where human ἀπιστία is contrasted with the πίστις, the faithfulness of God. At Rom 4.1–25, Paul insists that faithful Abraham's faithful trust in God's trustworthiness gratuitously met with "justification" by God. To clear every use he made of πίστις, πιστεύω of overtones of faithfulness, faithful trust lived out in faithful behaviour, would have been nigh on impossible. The terms in ancient use were too rich, the ideas they would evoke too

(BNTC; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 167, allows "faithful" while evincing some surprise at Paul's "boldness".

⁸¹ On 'entrust' and 'trusting', 'being trusted', 'trustworthiness', see Dio Chrysostom, *On Trust*, Discourse 73.

readily elicited together. It is not appropriate for us to impoverish in Paul's writing something his text sees fit to retain in its ordinary richness.

It may well be argued that in Pauline usage at least πίστις 'names' specific inner-Christian issues and attitudes not covered in more general usage; but that would not mean that for insiders the term was clear of its common connotations. There is no sign (for instance, in Romans) that earlier hearers had forced Paul to include clear contextual discriminations of this or any other often-recurring set of terms. No such demand figures among the "objections" he tries to forestall.⁸²

In his article noted earlier, Barry Matlock examines four passages in which a duplication of πίστις has suggested to some a deliberate attempt by Paul to include the distinct 'objective' and distinct 'subjective' senses alongside one another: both our faith in Christ and Christ's faith[fullness], respectively. Matlock may well convince others (as he has persuaded the present writer) that it is indeed our 'trust' or 'believing' that are to the fore in these passages. But Matlock also hopes to have helped to "disambiguate" the usage.⁸³ However, what it is hoped has been shown here is that in Paul's world, trust in someone was itself founded in, and displayed and presupposed belief in their trustworthiness (as well as, most likely, their willingness to trust you): faith in Jesus would necessarily imply (unless explicitly denied) at the least a trust in his faithfulness. Ancient expectations of words have them carry much of their semantic baggage with them, whatever part of their range appears in context to be foregrounded; that is, unless some elements of their range have been specifically discarded.

Taking into account ancient understandings of how language works, and noting ancient usage of the key vocabulary, and failing any explicit exclusions from the semantic field of πίστις, the faithfulness of the one trusted is inevitably also there, in the picture, albeit in softer focus.

4. GENERAL EXEGETICAL CONCLUSION

What all this does mean is that we can never justifiably assume that an author in this Greek and Roman culture has intended his or her individual

⁸² M.D. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*, 162–173, sketches possible alternative "readings" of Romans, Jewish-Christian and Marcionite. Paul evinces no awareness of any likelihood of having to face such analytic 'deconstruction'. Given's Paul, I suggest, could have slipped between usages because neither he nor his hearers expected verbal precision.

⁸³ R.B. Matlock, "Rhetoric of πίστις", n. 2, above.

words themselves to *contain* a precise ‘meaning’, let alone a clear and readily shareable distinct meaning. ‘Names’ are just not expected to function like that. They *contain* nothing; rather may they summon up, evoke ideas. Ideas of such topics as ‘faith’ or ‘virtue’ or ‘justice’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘law’, it is hoped, are coherent and shared or shareable to some worthwhile degree, but can only be named and more or less elaborately evoked, not in any other way conveyed.⁸⁴ And then no author can be claimed to have used a disambiguated connotation of a lexeme unless or until she or he has made that disambiguation fully explicit. And such disambiguation seems very unlikely in terms of what the ancients said about words and metaphor and translation. If you could trust that a common idea was already ‘out there’ to be evoked by one among perhaps many common names or sequences of names for it, there was no need to define further the names themselves; indeed, their rich ability in common usage to evoke varied impressions might well be part of, even integral to their power to evoke the particular idea assumed to be on call.

Words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, spoken and heard, written and read worked then (as they work now), but only by being free to flex and adapt in shared use in life lived together, free to adapt, and not ossified, hardened, made brittle. Sequences of words in our Christian scriptures where we in English (by *μεταφορά*, *translatio*) use ‘faith’, ‘believing’, ‘trust’ words, as with many other such clusters (‘love’, ‘justify’, ‘kingdom’, ‘knowledge’), should be allowed much the same free semantic wealth and varying emphasis as their Greek counterparts enjoyed in the passages we study.

This is, again, not to suggest that the ancients’ brains worked differently. It is very unlikely that any major genetic change has occurred over just two millennia. The human language function then was surely just as complex as it is today, as complex as is taken for granted in current debates over psycholinguistics.⁸⁵ Rather would it seem likely that “[h]umans behave like jugglers when they use the mental lexicon, in that they have to deal with

⁸⁴ Particularly noteworthy, on ‘freedom’ is W. Coppins’ recent *The Interpretation of Freedom in the Letters of Paul—with special reference to the “German” Tradition*, (WUNT 2.261; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), arguing that Paul evinces for us no coherent ‘concept’ of freedom (although he may provoke us to articulations for which we have then to accept our own responsibility).

⁸⁵ This is to allow that ‘language’ includes more than words and sequences of words spoken/heard, written/read. For a wide survey of the field, R. Dietrich, *Psycholinguistik. 2. aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage* (Sammlung Metzler 342; Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2007); or D. Crystal, *How Language Works* (London: Penguin, 2005).

semantic, syntactic and phonological information at the same time.”⁸⁶ In current discussion there seems to be no suggestion that in the midst of this juggling, between initial inchoate thought and final articulation, there is included a process of checking the range of connotations of each word—or even each leading word—and then preparing to ensure a context (itself also comprehensively scrutinized) that should implicitly preclude every undesired or potentially distracting sense for each term judged important. For sure, we are able to monitor and explicitly to correct our speech just prior to utterance, or soon after; and our writing more readily still, especially with the help of computers.⁸⁷ But there seems to be no empirical evidence for any prior weeding-out of nuances as a part of natural language production, today, or, *a fortiori*, back then. Granted, some scholarly communicators today do monitor some or most of their own and others’ written and some at least of their own oral performance and explicitly adjust it to match the norms discerned and announced by lexicographic colleagues—and then try to impose these or other such distinctions on the writings of forbears innocent of any such nicety. That, it has been argued, is a mistake. Rather do words then as today work precisely because their connotations allow them to be used in many settings, and to seem to speakers and hearers to sit comfortably and “at home” in the company where the speaker has settled them, with the context likely foregrounding some connotation(s), but mostly without that speaker feeling any need or desire either to purge or to impoverish the utterance by explicitly exiling others.⁸⁸

The preceding chapters may at least have confirmed the reader’s acceptance that people in the Graeco-Roman world of the first century CE were by no means ‘of one mind’ in any clearly definable way, however much they in theory valued ideals of unanimity, harmony, concord. Addressing one’s contemporaries, even members of one’s own circle, demanded adaptability, if only in finding common starting points from which to attempt to secure

⁸⁶ Jean Aitcheson, *Words in the Mind. An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 215. It is not only in explicit poetry that this is so; we are all ‘wordsmiths’, ‘makers of utterance’, *poetes*.

⁸⁷ R. Dietrich, *Psycholinguistik*, esp. 2.2, “Das mentale Lexikon”, 29–55, and 4.3.5–8, 182–208, on the mental lexicon and self-monitoring and self-correction.

⁸⁸ In 1971 Christopher Evans, in his *Is ‘Holy Scripture’ Christian?* posed the factual-and-evaluative question, “what kind of certainty does it [Christianity] have and what kind of ambiguity?” (ch. 2, 21–36, here 36), and left the question open. Perhaps this present essay may contribute something towards at least keeping it open.

agreement. In the next chapter the reader is invited to appreciate something of the extent to which Dio of Prusa, a younger contemporary of Paul, also attempted, like Paul, to be “all things to all people” (or, more realistically, at least “many things to many”).

CHAPTER SEVEN

“ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE”, ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΣΙΝ ΠΑΝΤΑ (1 COR 9.22). (DIS)ORDER IN THOUGHT: FREE-RANGE REFLECTIONS TO ENGAGE DIO OF PRUSA’S AND PAUL’S IMPLIED AUDIENCES

INTRODUCTION

If it were not already obvious to the reader before taking up this study, it is to be hoped that it is by now clear that first century Greek and Roman intellectuals were in fact by no means ‘of one mind’, at least not on the issues so far surveyed (and however much many of them affirmed an ideal of harmonious unity). But then, neither were their audiences. If you hoped to gain and retain the attention of a range of people, perhaps even ultimately to draw them to change their minds and agree with you on some major issue, then you would at least need to start where they were. Josephus cautions: “When the would-be popular orator mounts the platform, like a slave in the market, he becomes himself a slave rather than a free man, and through the recognition he receives, the captive of a thousand masters.”¹ The “implied audience” is formed by the audiences the speaker has had to learn to recognise.² So Paul, too, had discovered that he must needs become “like a Jew to Jews, ... to those outside the law, as if outside the law ... to the weak I became weak. I have become all things to all people, so that in one way or another, I may bring well-being to some” (1 Cor 9.20–22; cf the repeated πάντα πᾶσιν at 10.33). Paul would be aware that such a programme left you open to criticism, as so shiftily, fickle, “hypocritical” as to be unworthy of any serious attention—see his own “pre-emptive” defence in 1 Thess. 2.1–12.³ But

¹ Philo, *De ios.* 35; Dio, *Discourse* 32.9–10. For a less critical account of adapting to the audience, see, e.g., Dio, *Discourses* 4, *Kingship*, 124; 12, *Olympicos*, 66–69; Plutarch, *Praec. ger. reipub.* 803 A.

² So, of Dio’s *Discourse* 12, *Euboicos*, John Ma, “Public Speech”, 121.

³ On 1 Thess 2.1–12, see Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic Background to 1 Thessalonians 2” (repr. of 1970), in *idem*, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1989), ch. 3, 35–48; on 1 Cor 9 and the admired figure of “adaptable” Odysseus, F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 122–123, 138–140, 185–189, with further references there; also Clarence E. Glad, “Paul and Adaptability”, in J. Paul Sampley (ed.), *Paul*

because of such adaptability Dio and Paul may afford (and illuminate each other's) indications of something of the range of topics and opinions that a first century CE orator in the Greek east Mediterranean might have judged shareable with a popular audience.

Such attempts to engage with others could in fact be seriously defended, and, especially in Cynic tradition, with arguable reference to the figure of "adaptable" Odysseus. In Dio the reference to Odysseus is explicit. In an address delivered to a public gathering in Tarsus, he compares himself with Homer's Odysseus, as a man who:

Subdues his body with injurious blows,
casts round his shoulders sorry rags, in guise
a slave ...

One may obviously compare Paul, 1 Cor 9.26b–27, "I buffet my body and enslave (δουλαγωγῶ) it" and 19, "everyone's slave", and 4.10–13, ill-clad, scum of the earth; and further, Abraham Malherbe's discussion of much of the rest of 1 Cor 9 in the light of fragments of proto-Cynic Antisthenes' reading of Odysseus on a philosopher's adaptability and freedom; but also 2 Cor 10.4–6, on Paul's tactics.⁴

Admittedly, many of those addressed by Paul will have been less learned than he, and will have been certainly still less well versed in high Greek culture than such as Dio or Plutarch. Are we then really justified in looking at both 'high brow' Dio and 'middle brow' Paul and taking them together, as affording evidence for varieties of opinion being shared on a wide range of topics, among audiences of less educated townspeople in the east Mediterranean world of the first century CE?

in the Greco-Roman World (Harrisburg & London: Trinity Press International, 2003), 17–41; but on the risk taken, M.M. Mitchell, "'Hypocrisy' and Paul: Two 'Hypocrites' at the Foundation of Earliest Christianity", *NTS* 58.2 (2012), 213–234.

⁴ Dio, *Discourse* 33.15 (*First Tarsis*); cf. 13.4–6, 10–13, 55.19–22, 71.4–5, and A.J. Malherbe, "Determinism and Freewill in Paul", in Troels Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), *Paul in his Hellenistic Context*; and *idem*, "Antisthenes, Odysseus, and Paul at War", *HTR* (1983), 76.2, 143–159 (repr. in *idem*, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–120); also Sotera Fornaro, "Wahre und falsche Philosophen in Dions Werk und Zeit" (2009), in Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (ed.), *Dion von Prusa. Der Philosoph und sein Bild* (SAPERE XIII; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). (By this period, Antisthenes, disciple of Socrates, is taken as the founder of the Cynic movement.) As noted earlier, 2 (c), it is sadly all too easy for scholars to contrast Paul here with the undifferentiated ethos of the surrounding Graeco-Roman world, ignoring such as Dio, or other Cynic sources; so K. Ehrensperger's otherwise useful, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*; and, e.g., similarly useful but partial, Reinhard Feldmeier, *Macht, Dienst, Demut* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 30–38.

A convenient introduction is afforded by Helmut Koester's "The Public Character of Cultural and Intellectual Life", listing the performance of plays and poetry in theatres and lecture halls and other auditoria, but especially emphasizing the public colonnades and markets as places where lectures and discussions took place.⁵ As noted earlier, in the *Introduction* to the first chapter, the question was pursued further by the present author a few years after reading Koester's *Introduction*, with additional reference to assemblies and law courts and aristocratic homes, with clients and slaves present, as evidenced in accounts from such as Pliny, Seneca, Quintilian, Plutarch and Philo, but in particular, from Dio of Prusa.⁶

Often quoted or alluded to is Dio's description of the plebeian Cynics in Alexandria:

There are, as well, quite a few Cynic philosophers, so-called, in your city ... people whose ideals are genuine enough, but whose bellies need filling ... they gather at street-corners and in alley-ways and at temple gates and con youngsters and sailors and crowds made up of that sort ...⁷

Earlier, exiled from Rome, Dio tells us that he himself had wandered in Cynic dress, urging Cynic ideals. (It is certainly at least arguable that Paul was at many more points willing to appear Cynic and talk Cynic, if later becoming more respectably Stoic-like).⁸

In the theatre in Alexandria Dio would expect to see not just free citizens, but at least visitors from all parts of the Empire as well as from beyond, in a list reminiscent of Acts chapter two: Greeks and Italians, people from Syria, Lybia, Cilicia; Ethiopians, Arabs, as well as Bactrians, Scythians, Persians, even a few Indians; alongside Alexandrian male citizens and their wives and children. Elsewhere he can imagine a stranger attending a meeting of the popular assembly in Prusa, or a rowdy civic gathering in Euboea, but also among the Getae, across the border. (Paul stays within the boundaries of the Empire, but also apparently restricts himself to some major trading centres within it.)

In *Discourse* 15, on slavery and freedom, Dio depicts two men debating "at their ease at home", rather than "before the judges or in the market place", but they have a large crowd of followers with them. One is not a free man,

⁵ Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* (ET; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter and Fortress, 1982), 93–97.

⁶ F.G. Downing, "À bas les aristos'", and p. 9, above, and n. 1; and see P. Oakes, *Reading Romans in Pompeii*, with his discussion of the model employed, 56–68.

⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 32.9, LCL.

⁸ F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, summarised in ch. 13, below.

but he apparently wins the argument.⁹ (Paul has both and such concerns among those with whom he is concerned: I Cor 7.20–23 and 12.23; Gal 3.28; Phm.) It is with such instances in mind that one may not simply welcome Robert Knapp's eclectic assemblage of “non-élite” evidence for the ethos of the very poor and the slightly more secure poor, including early Christians, in the Roman world, yet remain rather less sure of the gap he still supposes obtained between them and the educated such as Dio.¹⁰ At least here, as I claim already to have shown, and now show further, there is much in common between élite Dio and non-élite Paul and his mostly poor or mostly very poor communities.

While Paul in his letters (contrary to Acts) never addresses governors, let alone kings, there seems to be not a lot of difference between addresses purportedly delivered by Dio in the Emperor's court from those in the assemblies of free citizens in Alexandria, Rhodes, Corinth, Tarsus, Nicea, or his home town of Prusa, or from the Cynic ones that Dio, it would seem, preserved for posterity to preserve for us, from when he had stood to talk to whoever might gather round. He further admits that he re-uses addresses delivered elsewhere, and notes that he expects them to be received at different levels by the better and the less well educated, while intending to talk in an ordinary register, not technically.¹¹ (Paul also claims to speak in an ordinary register, eschewing philosophical technicalities; e.g., 1 Cor 2.1–5; 2. Cor 1.12).

In his home town, Dio claims, almost everyone knows his speeches, reporting them to others, “with improvements”, he notes wryly, but adding, “they are as popular as song-sheets”.¹² When he imagines the Isthmian Games, it is with a mixed crowd expecting entertainment from sophists, individuals reading their own prose and poetry, lawyers settling cases out of court, all competing for attention with jugglers and the athletes themselves.¹³ Mikhail Bakhtin proposed the term “carnavalesque” for the the public scene both as described and as widely implicit in the works of authors such as Dio and others, classified, if with protest, under the heading of “the

⁹ Dio, *Discourses* 32.40; 7.22–53; 53.1; 15.1; cf. 27.1–6.

¹⁰ R. Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 105–106.

¹¹ Dio, *Discourse* 35.4; cf. 11.16; 12.1; 32.9; 42.4; 57.10; cf. Johannes Hahn, “Auftreten und Wirken von Philosophen im gesellschaftlichen Leben”, in Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (ed.), *Dion von Prusa. Der Philosoph und sein Bild* (SAPERE XIII; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 241–258, here 252–256.

¹² Dio, *Discourses* 1 and 3 with 32–50 and 4–10; cf. 57.10–12, 11.6, 12.1, 42.4.

¹³ Dio, *Discourse* 8.9; cf. *Discourse* 27; and see F.G. Downing, “‘À bas les aristos.’”, 220–221.

Second Sophistic".¹⁴ (Although the Paul of the letters, unlike the Paul of Acts, seems not to have engaged with crowds, the range of characters who appear in 1 Corinthians is still quite impressive.)

Further reflection on Dio makes it possible to point out more of the range of topics he felt he could deploy in a single speech, one given at Olympia, around the turn of the century; but in this, it turns out, his range can be matched fairly closely in Paul's Romans, occasionally supplemented from 1 Corinthians. I have offered a detailed comparison in a previously published study.¹⁵ Sometimes even using some of the same key words, Dio and Paul both ruminate on how words work; on imagery and self-presentation, including images of the divine; on human origins and contemporary society; on the natural world; on the history of their people; on contemporary physics; and on cosmological and providential arguments for deity. In both we find deity portrayed as parental, eliciting love (ἀγάπη), relating to law and ancestral tradition critically assessed—for deity exceeds our understanding and our human talk, yet is to be trusted to care for our human well-being; in both, with ethical and interpersonal implications noted. Even the aesthetics of communication appraised by Dio are similarly instantiated by both authors.¹⁶ This earlier two-part comparison is now further enlarged.

¹⁴ M. Bakhtin, *Problems*, ch. 4, 101–180, here 106–137; on "the Second Sophistic", Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Graham Anderson, *The Second Sophistic. A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); see also Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen, *Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia. The Small World of Dio Chrysostom* (Black Sea Studies 7; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2008), rather more skeptical on Dio's adaptability.

¹⁵ F. Gerald Downing, "God with Everything: Dio Chrysostom" and "God with Everything: Paul", chs 3 and 4 in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 20–63.

¹⁶ Dio, *Olympicos*, Discourse 12; the resonances between that and Romans for the most part, and other letters of Paul's, in supplement, is argued in F.G. Downing, "God with Everything: Dio Chrysostom", and "God with Everything: Paul", in *God with Everything*, ch. 3, 20–42, and ch. 4, 43–63, resp; and see D.A. Russell, *Dio Chrysostom, Orations VII, XII, XXXVI* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hans-Josef Klauck with Balbina Bäbler, *Dion von Prusa, Olympische Rede* (SAPERE 2; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000); H.-G. Nesselrath et al. (eds), *Dion von Prusa*; and H.D. Betz, "Paraenesis and the Concept of God according to Oration XII (Olympikos) of Dio of Prusa", in James Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (eds), *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (BZNW 125; Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 2004), 217–234; Gustav Adolf Lehmann et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschwürde*. On the range of topics, see also G. Anderson, *Second Sophistic*, ch. 9, 171–190. On Dio and Paul, see also Ilaria Ramelli, "Philosophon und Prediger. Dion und Paulus—pagane und christliche weise Männer" (2009) in Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (ed.), *Dion von Prusa*, 183–210, relying on Bruce W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists*; in detail of shared thought Ramelli discusses only Acts 17.22–31 (as by Paul's disciple, Luke); and George H. van Kooten, "Paul the Roman: Reading Paul's 'Letter to the Romans' in the light of Roman Historiography, Law and Politics" (to date unpublished Manson Memorial Lecture 2012, University of Manchester, UK).

Dio was born to a wealthy and influential family of Roman citizens, in Prusa in Bithynia, “not the least in reputation” on the Black Sea coast, near the port of Amisis, on a main communication route down to Tarsus (where he gave two recorded addresses).¹⁷ He was born around 40 CE, and died around 120 CE, according to common estimates. He lived in Rome for a while, perhaps as early as the late sixties, but certainly under Vespasian and Titus, perhaps engaging the public as an entertaining sophist, though later, so he claims, he moved to more serious philosophy, perhaps influenced by Musonius (with whom he may also have fallen out). Dio was exiled from Rome and from his homeland, Bithynia, by Domitian, and, so he tells us (as noted just above), convinced, then, he said, of a divine call, he wandered widely in towns and countryside as a Cynic. His banishment was rescinded under Nerva, when Dio became a (semi-official?) spokesperson for the new ‘enlightened’ policies of the Antonines, with time and energy—and resources—to get town ‘improvements’ under way (even thinking of building the town its own harbour).¹⁸ Most of his preserved oration come from this later period, when his philosophical thought is now largely Stoic with Platonising colours, although he seems himself to have preserved (or, at least, not repudiated) the Cynic pieces previously referred to—and still to have sported the rough cloak, staff and beard that would indicate a serious Cynic philosopher. Classicists see him as at least in part a sophist, despite his vigorous insistence to the contrary.¹⁹ (Though concentrating unduly on Paul’s engagement with sophistic concerns, Bruce W. Winter has argued persuasively that Paul—like Dio—was aware that he would be and was being seen in this light).²⁰

¹⁷ On Prusa, Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (eds), *Der Neue Pauly* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2001), 10, 490.

¹⁸ On Dio, Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century* (London: Methuen, 1937, 148–158); John H. Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom”, *JHS* 118 (1978), 79–100; *idem*, “Dio Chrysostom, Greece and Rome”, in Doreen Innes et al. (eds), *Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 177–192; Simon Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and *idem*, “Dio of Prusa”, in *idem*, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 187–241; T. Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic*, 60–73; Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (ed.), *Dion von Prusa*, again. On his pride in his city, e.g., Dio, *Discourse* 44.9.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Dio, *Discourse* 12.5–16; 34.2; in Prusa, long after exile, he affirms the Cynic tag—his task is “to rule people”, 49.13, with Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.13–14.

²⁰ Bruce W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists* (SNTSMS 96; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

As sophist Dio is capable of broad humour, irony, innuendo, leaving issues open, as well as arguing to two or even three mutually contradictory conclusions (as, for instance, on law and custom, as discussed below, ch. 9); as a philosopher claiming to emulate Socrates, he may well be taken to have hoped to arouse serious, not just playful thought and debate.²¹ The range is widely noted; the further conclusion that I am here arguing is that in all this he was able to display for us effectively something of the range of issues with which his audiences could be expected to engage and disagree, and the opinions and convictions that could seem open to being unsettled, left open, or even ridiculed and overturned. (Paul, too, could ironize, and could also deploy crude humour: 2 Cor 11–12; Gal 5.12; Phil 3.2, 8.)

According to Acts 21.39, Paul claimed to be a citizen of Tarsus in Cilicia, "no mean city", and a Roman citizen by birth (Acts 16.37; also like Dio, though not as influential in Tarsus as Dio in Prusa). The former claim is, I think, less often doubted than the latter, for at Gal 1.21–2.1 he talks of spending a long while in Syria, while Acts, though talking of members there, has no account of any church founding or building in the region. Tarsus, on the southern coast, with its centres of learning, was itself was much more important than Prusa (despite concessions won for the latter by Dio and his forebears). If Paul did grow up in Tarsus, he would have had plenty of opportunity to listen to the kind of speech that Dio, albeit half a century later, took it an audience there would engage with.²² Dio reminds people in Tarsus of the wide-ranging speeches they are used to enjoying, history, physiology, cosmos, deity, praise and rebuke.²³ As noted just above, I have tried to show elsewhere something of the extent to which Paul addressing Christ-followers in Rome engaged with many similar motifs, using often a similar vocabulary to that of Dio *Discourse 12, Olympicos*, in particular, delivered (though not in Rome) some forty years or so later.²⁴

²¹ T. Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic*, 60–73, again; Dio as Socrates, *Discourse 13*, 11–20; 55.1; irony, 47.20–23, 51.2; on law, 75, 76, and 80; and ch. X, below; on "serious playfulness", *σπουδογέλοιον*, *σπουδαιογέλοιον*, see G. Anderson, *Second Sophistic*, ch. 9, 171–190, again, and here, 179; Sotera Fornaro, "Wahre und falsche Philosophen in Dions Werk und Zeit", 166–169.

²² On Tarsus, H. Cancik and H. Schneider (eds), *Der Neue Pauly*, 12.1, 38.

²³ Dio, *Discourse 33*.1–15.

²⁴ See n. 14, above.

1. MOTIFS AND THEIR TREATMENT

1.1. *Slavery*

Dio begins the first of a pair of pieces “On Slavery and Freedom” with “Humans desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings.” Philo tells of audience applause at just such a sentiment in a play of Euripides.²⁵ In the discussion noted earlier, the second of the two pieces, it is on the original illegitimacy of enslaving anyone that the slave appears to win a lively argument with a free citizen: the only possible valid use of the term ‘slave’ is of someone servile by nature, rather than free-spirited (ἐλευθερίους), as many in legal bondage are admitted to be or have been. This is, of course, a standard Stoic or Cynic argument: Stoic if the freedom is simply internalised, Cynic if it is outwardly displayed.²⁶ The slave arguing with the citizen is, of course, to that significant extent, *overtly* exercising freedom.²⁷ The Stoic version could, of course, sustain some in servitude, and even challenge the free on their own compulsions; but it is essentially conservative: if inner freedom is open to all, there is no call to change the system—if any stay internally slavish, it’s their own choice, their own fault (cf. 1 Cor 7.23). And Dio himself can echo that ‘establishment’ stance, in, for instance, imagining Diogenes the Cynic discussing the loss of a slave portrayed as behaving true to type (even if he allows that it is the master who has made the slave so).²⁸ Elsewhere and for himself he values both the outer liberty to come and go as and where he pleases, as well as a philosophical inner freedom, not having to call another ‘master’.²⁹

One may here usefully compare Paul’s willingness to be slave to others, while maintaining his own liberty to refuse pay. “Am I not free?” he asks, indignantly, 1 Cor 9.1–19.³⁰

²⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 14.1; Philo, *Quod omnis probus* 141; cf. Dionysius, *R.A.* 6.7.2.

²⁶ This argument is Cynic, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.1, 4, 15, 29–30; Stoic in Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.40; 24.65–67; but cf. 3.26, where physical endurance does count importantly.

²⁷ Elisabeth Herrmann-Otto, in her useful “Armut, Arbeit, Sklaverei und Prostitution”, 227, unfortunately notes only internalized freedom in Dio. To put it bluntly, nothing in his text in *Discourse* 7, *Euboicos*, suggests that Dio meant there that a woman being forced to accept sexual intercourse could still ‘feel free within’. Neither, of course, does Paul, for the woman or her ‘client’, 1 Cor 6.12–20, though nor does Paul raise the issue of the woman’s social freedom or bondage.

²⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 10; compare Philo, *Quod omnis probus*, 155–156; Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.1.35–38.

²⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 80.1–3; 1.22; 3.40; compare the discussion of Odysseus, above.

³⁰ On which see Abraham J. Malherbe, “Determinism and Freewill in Paul”, 231–255.

Further, Dio can also powerfully contrast the Roman troops on the Danube frontier, as "strong men contending for the power to rule" others, with the Getae "contending for freedom and fatherland."³¹ Here it is much more than some inner freedom that is at stake, for, as will be argued in what follows, Dio's sympathies in this piece seem to lie with those threatened with subjection to Roman rule, just as they are with the wretches enslaved for prostitution.³²

Paul on freedom from chattel slavery is hotly debated, but, while 1 Cor 7.22, and Phm can certainly be read as encouraging emancipation, it is not part of Paul's mission.³³ On the other hand, in Christ there is neither slave nor free (Gal 3.28), and Paul seemingly expects slaves to exercise freedom to refuse either to honour pagan household deities, or to maintain a Jewish household's observances in their own unmonitored practice. Thus similar ambivalences already appear in both.

1.2. *Foreigners*

Although Dio is often content to accept the conventional disparaging dichotomy of "Greek and barbarian", he is on record as devoting a whole work to the Getae, another praising the Essenes, an idealised account of India, and a sympathetic appraisal of the near Scythian Borysthenians, and of Zoroastrianism (albeit imagined and recast in a heavily Hellenized form).³⁴

Paul, clearly, has no sympathy with the distinctive 'religious' practices and beliefs of other cultures; but the God of Abraham cannot be the God of Jews only, and Paul is under obligation to Jews and barbarians (Rom 3.29

³¹ Dio, *Discourse* 12.20. Philo can be just as ambivalent: cf. *Quod omnis probus* 79, 141.

³² Dio, *Discourse* 7.133–135. Joseph A. Marchal, "The Usefulness of Onesimus: The Sexual Use of Slaves and Paul's Letter to Philemon", *JBL* 130.4 (2011), 749–770, adduces a number of near contemporary authors who take such use for granted, but ignores contemporary objectors, taking it that a lack of overt objection by Paul betokens connivance—without discussing the "one body" argument of 1 Cor 6.12–20.

³³ See the discussion in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 112–113, but also J.A. Glancy, *Slavery*, 67–69, 91–92.

³⁴ Cf. Thomas Schmidt, "Sophistes, barbares et identité grecque: le cas de Dion Chrysostome", in Thomas Schmidt and Pascale Fleury (eds), *Perceptions of the Second Sophistic and Its Times—Regards sur la Seconde Sophistique et son époque* (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 105–119, and Dio, *Discourse* 10.4 ("Bad people are injurious to all who make use of them, whether Phrygian or Athenian, bond or free"); cf. 4.4–6; 9.12; 35.17–23 and 36.40–43; 73–74. On 36, the "Zoroastrian myth", see the careful analysis by Albert de Jong, "Dions Magierhymnen: zoroastrischer Mythos oder griesche Phantasie?", in H.-G. Nesselrath et al. (eds), *Dion von Prusa* (2003), 157–179.

and 1.14—though βαρβάρους here only, rather than the expected ἔθνεσιν or ἔλλεσιν; perhaps Spain is mind—Rom 15.24—and Egypt—Rom 1.23). Many other aspects of Graeco-Roman culture, of course, Paul accepts and takes for granted (as much research over the last century-and-a-half have shown, and as is illustrated here and elsewhere in this study), and as Paul will on occasion openly acknowledge (Rom 2.14–15, 12.17b, 1 Cor 5.1, 2 Cor 8.21, and probably Phil 3.8).

1.3. *Rome*

On Paul's seemingly ambiguous stance towards Rome, see above, ch. 2, section (I).³⁵ Rome's rule was only temporary, and had little time left (Rom 13.11; cf. 1 Cor 7.29–31), and that contradicts imperial propaganda. Yet, even if God's definitive rule and his well-being, salvation, is only imminent, still God is already in charge, and in the interim emperor and governors are God's agents, working for good (Rom 13.1–7).

We have preserved for us four full-length discourses from Dio on “Kingship” (*imperium*), together with two short pieces with that in the title, in one of which he writes of speaking before the Emperor—presumably, Trajan himself, and the first and third are not just about *imperium*, but purport to address the Emperor in person.³⁶ On the surface, at least, both of these flatter their addressee, “one who is disposed, in my opinion, to be not only a brave but also a law-abiding ruler ... a man endowed with a tractable and virtuous nature ...” “... you delight in truth and frankness rather than in flattery and guile.”³⁷ There is nothing in these sketches of an ideal that could seem openly subversive, either delivered directly, or repeated in some Greek city; yet, as Whitmarsh urges, one does well at least to look between the lines. If Trajan is already like this, does he really need to be told; could this be so fulsome as to be ironic? Does he, do other hearers, need to be warned that power corrupted Alexander—and, most recently, Domitian? Being told to trust those officially enrolled as ‘friends’ and be willing to delegate might even suggest that you seem not to; so too, being told to indulge your delight in generosity. That Trajan receives his authority and power from Zeus might not be so very

³⁵ Cf. also G.H. van Kooten, “The Roman Paul”; and James R. Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context* (WUNT 2.172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 227–234, and *idem*, *Paul and the Imperial Authorities*; but I am more persuaded by Peter Oakes and John Barclay, as outlined in chs 1 & 2.

³⁶ Dio, *Discourses* 1–4, 57 and 62; for discussion, T. Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic*, 60–63.

³⁷ Dio, *Discourses* 1.5, 8, 33, 36; 3.2.

reassuring when he is reminded that failing to match the divine perfection will be disastrous. The higher the aims presented, the less reassured might be the one expected to achieve them, and the more critical may be others in appraising the performance.³⁸

Further, the *Fourth Kingship Discourse* has Diogenes the Cynic strongly rebuking Alexander, in turn thought to be Trajan's own ideal. Alexander was "by common report the most ambitious of men and the greatest lover of glory"—the latter a trait excoriated later in the oration. At one point Diogenes mocks Alexander with, "Will you not throw off this armour, don a worker's tunic, and serve your betters?"³⁹ Among other things, Trajan is told that the ideal monarch "is warlike to the extent that waging war rests with him, and peaceful to the extent that there is nothing left worth his fighting for."⁴⁰ Recent scholars have been divided in their interpretation on this score of the *Olympicos*, *Discourse* 12. Russell has suggested that the peace Rome had imposed on factious Greece is here in mind, and Zeus as father and king legitimates Trajan. Klauck, however, sees an implicit critique of Roman imperialism, with Dio accepting Roman power as simply the lesser evil.⁴¹ More persuasive still, perhaps, is Swain, who concludes, on the basis of the four *Kingship Orations*, *Borysthenicos* (36) and *Olympicos* (12), that "it is extremely doubtful that [Dio] ever believed Trajan was an ideal, divine monarch, or even that Trajan was a particularly close imitation as such." Swain then adverts to the context of the quotation from Odysseus' words to Laertes with which Dio concludes his *Olympicos*, and suggests that at least the educated would know that it continues with the question, "Whose slave are you?" Greece is tending her garden, slavishly, for someone else's benefit. Ideal rule, on the other hand, is expressed in the traditional titles accorded Zeus as the kindly and caring protector of common well-being, civic harmony and shared prosperity for all people, if especially of "a faction-free and

³⁸ Dio, *Discourses*, e.g. 1.6–7, 20, 22–24, 29, 45–46; 3.4–11, 91–110, 128.

³⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 4.4 with 116–138, and 4.66; cf. Jn 13.2–5! But on *Discourse* 4, see further, below.

⁴⁰ Dio, *Discourse* 1.27.

⁴¹ D.S. Russell, *Dio*, 173 and 206, cf. also Maximilian Forschner, "Philosophie und Politik: Dions philosophische Botshaft im *Borysthenikos*" (2003), in Nesselrath et al. (eds), *Dion von Prusa*, 128–156, here 153, "der unverzichtbaren friedensstiftenden Rolle des römischen Reiches"; H.-J. Klauck, *Dion*, 120; cf. Peter S. Perry, "Critiquing the Excess of Empire: A Synkrisis of John of Patmos and Dio of Prusa", *JSNT* 29 (2007), 473–496; John H. Moles, "The Cynics and Politics", in André Laks and Malcolm Schofield (eds), *Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 120–158, suggests, 155–156, that Dio could still have hoped to improve Trajan the individual.

concordant Hellas.”⁴² Further, Klauck suggests that attentive listeners might have heard or recalled Hesiod, *Works and Days* 1–8, acclaiming Zeus who “readily abases the haughty and exalts the lowly.”⁴³

Dio’s self-presentation viz-a-viz Rome and the Emperor can, however, vary widely, depending on audience and circumstance. In Alexandria he can give the impression of speaking on behalf of ‘the good prince’ and the succession of “reasonable governors”, elsewhere indicating that he is a “friend” of the Emperor; yet on other occasions, as we have noted, he can be very critical of Rome’s representatives.⁴⁴ That is much the same as the double edge that many attribute to Paul.

1.4. *Civic Politics*

There are similarly mixed messages when Dio discusses political theory in more general terms. In the third *Discourse on Kingship* he repeats the now traditional, Aristotelian or earlier generalisation:

The first to come into existence, and the most practicable ... is where we have a city or a number of peoples or the whole world ordered by one man’s judgment and virtue. Second is so-called “aristocracy”, where not one man nor a considerable body, but a few, and those “the best” (τῶν ἀρίστων) are in charge. This form is far from being either practicable or expedient [on which Homer is quoted]. The third is probably the most impracticable one of all, the one that expects from the self-control and virtue of the common people some day to find an equitable constitution based on law, termed “democracy”—an attractive and mild term were what it refers to actually feasible.⁴⁵

In *Discourse 36, Borysthenicos*, as M. Forschner cogently argues, Dio elaborates a slightly ‘Stoicised’ version of Platonic hierarchical politics in support, rather, of local aristocracies such as his own.⁴⁶ In his *Euboeicos*, Dio has his ‘naive’ hunter discern a deal of mindless chaos in an urban assembly, though one like Dio can restore it to sanity and fairness; while speaking elsewhere, in Alexandria, and as a moral philosopher now in person exhorting a civic audience to more decorous behaviour, Dio can instead extol with unreserved enthusiasm a vision of a democracy of the virtuous and

⁴² Cf. Dio, *Discourse* 7.134, “Greeks live in bondage utter and complete.” See further, ch. 1, above.

⁴³ S. Swain, “Dio of Prusa”, in *idem, Hellenism*, 200–202, referring to Dio, *Discourse* 22.74–76; H.-J. Klauck, *Dion*, 121.

⁴⁴ Dio, *Discourses* 32.18, 71; and 47.21–22, with S. Swain, “Dio of Prusa”, 232.

⁴⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 3.145–147.

⁴⁶ M. Forschner, in “Philosophie und Politik”, at 149–153, noting Dio, *Discourse* 36.22, where Zeus works through subordinate “leaders”, ἡγουμένων.

self-controlled, however unlikely is its occurrence (see further, below). The issues are, of course, debated by others, with widely differing conclusions urged.⁴⁷

Paul, obviously, also addresses assemblies, ἐκκλησίαι, who have one 'imperial' Lord, Jesus, and the one God, but are left with ordinary humans graced with gifts of leadership (1 Cor 12.28–29; Rom 12.6–7), while as yet, with no supreme human ruler (certainly not governed by the wealthy and powerful, as such, 1 Cor 1.26–29); rather, they are a body open to all, bond and free, Jew and Greek, male and female (Gal 3.28, again; children, too? 1 Cor 7.14c), and at best open to rational persuasion.⁴⁸ It is not likely that Paul expected Corinthian Christians to submit to a flogging from him on par with the ones he himself received in synagogues – 1 Cor 4.20 with 2 Cor 11.24—the former a threat much less forceful in fact than Dio's of "cautery" for the assembled Alexandrians, should persuasion fail.

The civic analogy for Paul's usage of ἐκκλησίαι has been vigorously argued of late by George H. van Kooten, urging that it is implicitly in critical competition with town councils in general, and he compares that with Dio, according to whom "the philosopher holds council chambers, theatres and assemblies in low esteem".⁴⁹ One may note the obvious underlying tension when he addresses his own council, in Prusa.⁵⁰ Both Dio and Paul make a point of urging the abandonment of faction and the value of being of one mind (1 Cor 11.18–19).⁵¹

1.5. *Women and Men—and Children*

Although Aristophanes had imagined rule by a women's assembly (*Ecclesiazusae*)—though not the possibility of women and men sharing rule—neither possibility seems to be in the air in the period here under discussion.

⁴⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 7. 22–32; 32.27–28. Philo can say much the same, *De agric.* 45; contrast Plutarch, *Solon* 5.3, democracy is crazy; or Josephus, *Ant.* 4.223, rule by "the best" is best; Dionysius, *RA* 7.55.2–4, the mixed economy of republican Rome is best. Philo mostly urges, whatever creates rational order is best, e.g., *De somn.* 2.154, 286–287; for the critique, compare Luke's civic assemblies, in Acts 17 and 19.

⁴⁸ John M.G. Barclay, in his "There is Neither Old nor Young?" (2007), repr. in *idem, Pauline Churches*, (257–273) argues, 271–273, that Paul refrains from the common ancient assumption that age implies wisdom (even though his "Pauline" successors did). On this see now, especially, L.L. Welborn, "That There May Be Equality", esp. 81–85; and K. Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, with the proviso entered at 2 (c), n. 8.

⁴⁹ George H. van Kooten, "'Εκκλησίαι τοῦ Θεοῦ': The 'Church of God' and the Civic Assemblies", 538; van Kooten cites Dio *Oration* 80.2.

⁵⁰ Dio, *Discourses* 40–51.

⁵¹ Dio, *Discourse* 2.22, 44.10, 48.2.

The nearest would probably be Dio's suggestion that the ideal monarch would "regard his wife not merely as one who shared his bed and love-making, but as a partner in decision making and action and the whole of life."⁵² We don't, however, meet Dio's own wife, nor learn how she coped with his exile; though we do gather that she had a colonnaded grave at their villa. (His mother, as a widow, had also been influential.)⁵³

Elsewhere, in another (probably imagined) dialogue, Dio debates with a woman the character of the Chryseïs who appears briefly early on in the Iliad, and his interlocutor is allowed to hold her own, and apparently remain unpersuaded by him. Elsewhere he is happy to tell of a old woman (imaginary, we take it), "strong and tall", who prophesied "with self control and moderation."⁵⁴ In a charming pastoral Dio imagines peasant couples who hold unsegregated open house for a male visitor in distress, who then witnesses a shared discussion of a marriage between their offspring, where the latter's engaged affections are decisive; and this is contrasted with the expensive formalities of town betrothals.⁵⁵ The ethos here is close to that of the hellenistic romances; but then so can Paul be (1 Cor 7.3–9), as Loveday Alexander has argued.⁵⁶ More generally, Dio, comparing the lots of men and women, confidently asserts,

Everyone will admit that the man is stronger and more fitted to govern. So to the woman falls the larger share of household tasks. For the most part she remains unacquainted with storms and wars and dangers in general. It's the man's part, on the other hand, to serve in the army, to sail the seas, and do the hard outdoor work. Yet no one on that account would deem women more blessed than men.

Give a wife a house-slave, opines Dio's Diogenes, she'll simply have the leisure to annoy him and you, her husband; better keep her busy looking after you.⁵⁷ Still, Dio can also insist that there is no more reason to treat a

⁵² Dio, *Discourse* 3.122. Josephus leaves us conflicting views on the Hasmonean queen Alexandra, *BJ* 1.107, 112 with *Ant.* 14.430–431. On what follows see Richard Hawley, "Marriage, Gender, and the Family in Dio", in S. Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom*, 125–139: a picture "very similar to that offered by Plutarch or Musonius Rufus", 126.

⁵³ Pliny, *Letters*, 10.81; Dio, *Discourse* 44.3.

⁵⁴ Dio, *Discourses* 61; 153, 56; compare, e.g., Eumetis, in Plutarch, *Sept sap conviv* 3, *Moralia* 148CD.

⁵⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 7.64–80.

⁵⁶ Loveday C.L. Alexander "Better to Marry than to Burn': St. Paul and the Greek Novel", in Ronald F. Hock et al. (eds), *Ancient Fiction and Early Christian Narrative* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 235–256.

⁵⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 10.12.

woman with more mistrust than a man (while being wary of both!)⁵⁸ When personifying virtue and vice Dio can have both βασιλεία and τυραννίδις as female figures; nonetheless, elsewhere he conventionally contrasts ἀκράτεια (disoluteness, feminine) with male νοῦς (mind, masculine), where σωφροσύνη (self control, feminine) would have suited as well or better than νοῦς. And, of course, he warmly approves of the women of Tarsus wearing veils, though it does not seem to protect them from indiscriminate hearing and seeing. Women should be beyond reproach in public, at least—and men should distinctively look and behave like men, eschewing ‘effeminacy’. On this latter, popular or not, he makes no concessions. However, homosexual love as such he can accept, in a Platonising sort of way, as with the Borysthenic Callistratus, horse-rider, properly cloaked and accoutred “with a great cavalry sabre”. (In contrast with his favourable references to barbarians elsewhere in the same *Discourse*, he thinks them unlikely to assimilate homosexuality without engaging in abusive behaviour [ἄνευ ὕβρεως].)⁵⁹

Paul opposes homosexual relationships, but only incidentally (Rom 1.26–27, 1Cor 6.9). As careful readers are aware, Paul relies for this on conventional lists and conventionally understood ‘nature’, not on his Scriptures, and thus would have sounded more consistently Cynic than does Dio. Inconsistently, Paul does not, however, take nature lessons from dogs or other brutes (and so sounds more Stoic than Dio is at times; cf. 1Cor 9.9, where obviously animals don’t matter to God.)

Paul’s ambivalence on women in the surviving most widely accredited letters is notorious—compare Gal 3.28, 1Cor 7.3–4, Phil 4.2–3, Rom 16.1–15 with 1Cor 11.2–10 (despite 11–12!), and (if authentic) 14.33b–35.⁶⁰ For Paul women can, of course, prophesy in the assemblies of the saints, and all prophets are expected to be in control of their prophesying (1Cor 11.4; 14. 32), and comparisons with Dio on hair and head-coverings are commonplace.

In these letters Paul has little to say directly about children. Having one Christian parent makes a child one of the hallowed (1Cor 7.14, again), but does not affirm any household code, and offers no encouragement to produce families. Christians are all children addressing God as a loved

⁵⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 3.70–71; 74.19.

⁵⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 1.73, 76; 30.36, 33.48–49, 32.32 and 33.62–63; cf. 12.36. With these, compare Philo, *De opif.* 165. On Callistratus, Dio 36.7–8; S. Swain, “Dio of Prusa”, 214–215, with notes.

⁶⁰ See the case against authenticity in F.G. Downing, “Women and Men, Mary, and Woman-Talk”, in *idem*, *God with Everything*, 190; and above, ch. 2, n. 3. On this see Ismo Dunderberg, ‘Moral Progress in Early Christian Stories of the Soul’ *NTS* 59.2 (2013), 247–267; for further bibliography, see ch. 2, p. 75, nn. 82, 83.

parent (Gal 4.6–7, Rom 8.14–16). Less affirmatively, the Corinthians are like jealous quarrelsome kids (1 Cor 3.1–4; cf. 13.11, Gal 4.3) but we may contrast 1 Thess 2.7.

Where children come to mind, Dio can be gentle (or sentimental), as with the adolescents mentioned just above, and in his simile for prayerful yearning, “as infant children when torn away from father or mother are filled with terrible longing and desire, stretching out their hands to their absent parents, often in their dreams,” (as do we pray to the Gods); and children respond readily to parents’ encouragement as they learn to talk. They can play-act assiduously together while aware that it is still play, and sing together. Dio also evinces concern for women and children sold into sex-slavery.⁶¹ But he can even more easily be censorious or dismissive: children are rash and ungovernable, to be frightened into compliance, timid, easily spoiled by a slave, easily palmed off with sadly fragile toys, easily beguiled, easily bribed, persist in playing with fire, can drive a man mad with banter, make a fuss about nothing, and dislike the teachers who try to improve them—but then, so do adults.⁶² Again we encounter a similar range of not entirely consistent attitudes.

1.6. *Education*

Dio offers quite varied reflections on education. In his home town of Prusa he tells of encountering the people of Borysthenes, on the “barbarous” Scythian edge of the Hellenistic world, and celebrates their maintenance of devotion to Homer (on which, more below), and even to Plato. Yet in an address in Athens he pours scorn on conventional Greek *paideia*, in favour of a Cynic training in manly simplicity, an education that could as well be offered by Scythians or Indians, and for which Romans may well by tradition be more fitted.⁶³

Paul affects contempt for Greek culture (“the wise, the learned, the skilled rhetorician”, 1 Cor 1.20), but can still deploy (if slightly maladroitly) a Cynic metaphor for true education, training to live (1 Cor 9.24–27), in a passage

⁶¹ Dio, *Discourses* 12.61, 35.8, 4.46–47, 42.4, 7.133–152; infant exposure is not mentioned here, but assumed at 11.3.

⁶² Dio, *Discourses* 5.16–17, 9.7, 10.12, 31.153, 38.37, 55.11, 77/78.37, 16.5, 35.7, 38.21, 72.10.

⁶³ Dio *Discourse* 36, *Borysthenicos*, e.g., 26; and 13, *Athenicos*, 14–28, 31–32; on which see John Moles, “The Thirteenth Oration of Dio Chrysostom: Complexity and Simplicity, Rhetoric and Moralism, Literature and Life”, *JHS* 125 (2005), 112–138; and Cécile Bost-Pouderon (ed. and tr.), *Dion de Pruse dit Dion Chrysostome, Oeuvres* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2011), 103–164.

which runs roughly parallel with Dio *Discourse* 8.11–26.⁶⁴ Paul clearly makes no reference to the Greek classics; yet, as with this example (and Odysseus, above), can be seen to have assimilated much, both in detail and in style, sufficiently for his epistolary compositions to impress his Corinthian critics despite his personal failure as a performer (2 Cor 10.1–11). In this use of conventional rhetoric, while self-distancing from elite cultural norms, Paul is, yet again, like other Cynic-influenced teachers, and Dio in particular (as Abraham Malherbe argues in further detail).⁶⁵ Paul's chosen worker-preacher role has long been usefully compared with some Cynic traditions.

1.7. *Work and Workers*

Whether leather work (Acts 18.3) had always been Paul's trade or was a hitherto unaccustomed and so was now a humiliating experience is debatable and debated.⁶⁶ He encourages others to work for a living (if without asking about their employment opportunities; 1 Thess 4.11), and offers his own example, while himself refusing, as already recalled, to be hired by those he teaches, and that despite what the Lord ordained (1 Cor 9.14).

Perhaps after his experience in exile, Dio seems at least to eschew the customary aristocratic disparagement of craftsmen, and Philostratus claimed that the exiled Dio himself found paid employment, though never does he allude to any such (but neither does he admit to begging). Perhaps his pastoral sketch alludes to the welcoming beneficence of the impoverished that he had encountered.⁶⁷ In fact Dio thinks it worth offering a vivid and detailed account of the technical skills employed by artists and sculptors.⁶⁸ He firmly takes the side of the linen weavers of Tarsus, long resident, important to the town's economy, and long denied citizenship: "It cannot be that if a man is a linen worker he is inferior to his neighbour and deserves to have his occupation cast in his teeth and to be reviled for it, whereas, if he is a dyer or a cobbler or a carpenter, it is unbecoming to make these occupations a reproach."⁶⁹ In much the same way, in his *Euboicos*, *Discourse*

⁶⁴ Discussed in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 133–135, with reference to H. Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus", *Hermes* 98 (1970), 459–471.

⁶⁵ Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse'", again, and *idem*, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*.

⁶⁶ Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Contexts of Paul's Ministry* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980).

⁶⁷ Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*, 488; see further, below.

⁶⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 12.44; contrast Epictetus on shoemaker or carpenter, *Diss.* 2.14.4–5. Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.* 488, says Dio himself in exile engaged in menial, physical work.

⁶⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 34.21–23 (cf. 36.38); contrast Cicero, *De officiis* 1.150–151.

12, Dio proposes land distribution for the urban poor, and supplements this with a specimen list of gainful employ which he deems respectable and sufficiently rewarded for any remaining caught in a town's cash economy: not to be disdained are being a hired house-servant, grape harvester, wet-nurse, instructor in literacy, or minder of a school child. On the other hand again, he is against luxury trades, including entertaining as actors, mimes, dancers, instrumentalists; and, perhaps significantly, against the poor becoming wordsmiths, "tongue-technicians" (who might compete for attention with philosopher-sophists like himself in the law courts and elsewhere?). Perhaps *Euboicos*' announced a programme of land reform that he hoped to realise in Prusa, and he emphasises his seriousness.⁷⁰

However, when challenged to justify his conduct during a corn famine, or elsewhere in discussing his role in his home town of Prusa, Dio at no point adduces any attempt to get any such local programme of land distribution, nor of grant of citizens' rights to *meteks* under way.⁷¹ Serving his city has involved negotiations with the Emperors, and helping to sponsor civic buildings, obviously more important than "old so-and-so's smithy" (although elsewhere he can also disparage the worth of building projects).⁷² In relation to this issue, Paul on sharing and equality (2 Cor 8–9) seems by contrast more consistent.⁷³

Dio's real profession was spoken words, and he invited his hearers to marvel with them at their power (δύναμις).⁷⁴ Words have the power to call to mind—our own and one another's—all kinds of objects, such as peacocks and owls, and all kinds of ideas. Pheidias' art is marvellous; but poets and orators have so much more freedom and flexibility, led by Homer, himself enraptured by words, free to choose, free to invent, to evoke a sense of mind and intelligence which is beyond any visual art, especially when in

⁷⁰ Dio, *Discourse* 7.104–123, noting 81, 103. On Dio on poverty and work and the dignity of workers, see Gustav A. Lehmann, "Einführung", in *idem* et al. (eds), *Armut—Arbeit—Menschenwürde*, 3–23, and Dorit Engster, "Fiktion oder Realität? Dions *Euboikos Logos* in der althistorischen Forschungsdiskussion seit Eduard Meyer", *op.cit.*, 143–165.

⁷¹ Johannes Hahn, "Auftreten und Wirken", 249–252, points out how different Dio appears in his home town speeches from his self-presentation in most other ones. Only in *Discourse* 49 does he play the philosopher, and that to excuse his refusal of a costly civic office. See also M. Forschner, "Philosophie und Politik", and n. 36, above.

⁷² Dio, *Discourses* 42–51, noting 46 on the corn supply; also 40.8, 47.11. On buildings, 33.28, 48.9.

⁷³ See, again, J.M. Ogereau, "The Jerusalem Collection as Κοινωνία", and the discussion in ch. 2, above.

⁷⁴ Dio *Discourse* 12, *Olympicos*, 65; 1 Cor 14.7–11; and ch. 6, 2.1, above, pp. 152–157.

question is the divine intelligence, the mind of God. Of course what we see is wonderful, and our own minds are embodied, so a sculpted representation of Zeus is surely acceptable; but to appreciate the sculptor's great work at all fully, even the sculptor (as interpreted by Dio) has to deploy words. And yes, Dio's own visible appearance does matter, soberly clad, with beard and long hair; but it matters because it does not call attention away from the words, as the distracting finery of more fashionable sophists does. Verbally praising Pheidias' magnificent work above Homer's craft as a wordsmith, yet having the sculptor interpret his work in words, Dio magnifies his own rhetorician's craft above that of the sculptor and the poet (as well as that of his own showy sophist competitors).⁷⁵ Paul, as noted earlier here, shares both those traits. His weapons of defence and attack are purely verbal (if aided by his dress? 2 Cor 10.2–6 with 11.27).⁷⁶ He could verbally (again, if aided by his own battered body) bring openly before people's eyes Jesus Christ crucified (Gal 3.1 with 6.17; cf. 1 Cor 1.18–24).⁷⁷ But he could also be even more critical than was Dio of attempts to display in solid matter what is only discernible to reasoned reflection on the visible (Rom 1.20, 23).

1.8. *Authoritative Texts*

Dio cites Homer frequently, though, perhaps surprisingly, less than a third of his citations (99, as counted in *Discourses* 1–34) seem to be metrical; almost as many are in paraphrase, with others in allusion or in bare reference.⁷⁸ As surprising is the conclusion that none of these citations seems to be taken to be authoritative or decisive.⁷⁹ It is much more the case that Homer provides a common "imaginary", images, ideas, words and phrases, which may allow an audience to engage with the issues raised. For this service Homer can be very important. Of course, there is no one more persuasive—nor, for that matter, more pervasive—in Dio's world, as noted earlier, and as he makes

⁷⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 12, with special attention to 1–8, 28–30, 65–70, 77.

⁷⁶ An aspect of Antisthenes' deployment of the image of Odysseus that, however, seems not to be taken up by Dio; see, again, A.J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus".

⁷⁷ Cf. B.S. Davis, "The Meaning of προεργάφη in the Context of Galatians 3.1", *NTS* 45.2 (1999), 194–212.

⁷⁸ Jan Fredrik Kindstrand, *Homer in Zweiten Sophistik. Studien zu der Homerlectüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximos von Tyros und Atilios Aristides* (SGU 7; Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1973), 28. For a more general survey of ancient citation practice, see C.D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture*; and S.E. Porter and C.D. Stanley (eds), *As It Is Written: Studying Paul's use of Scripture*.

⁷⁹ J.F. Kindstrand, *Homer*, 32–33; in agreement, Suzanne Saïd, "Dio's Use of Mythology", in S. Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom*, 161–186, citing 180.

clear in his *Borysthenicos*: even on the very edges of the Hellenic world he finds “Homer ranks almost next to the Gods in honour.”⁸⁰ In *Discourse 12, Olympicos*, Homer, as just noted, is still the standard against which other art and insight is to be assessed, and is quoted or alluded to frequently, and provides the final provocation, as Simon Swain has argued: ending with Odysseus’ words to Laertes, Dio would expect the learned at least to recall their continuation with the question, “Whose slave are you?”⁸¹

Nonetheless, Dio can also be very critical of Homer. He risks on one occasion comparing him unfavourably with Phocylides, claiming the latter could say more worth hearing in three lines than Homer in five thousand (while elsewhere he is more conventional).⁸² He and a woman interlocutor can, as noted above, debate the plausibility of Homer’s assessment of Chryseïs. And Dio can argue at length that Homer is completely wrong in his account of the Trojan War. Further, he can re-tell more Homeric and other legends in very individual ways.⁸³

Dio, of course, was not alone in criticising Homer. Others questioned Homer’s historical credibility, and many joined Plato in condemning his portrayal of the Olympian Gods.⁸⁴ It is then intriguing to discern the virtual absence of that latter critique in Dio as preserved for us (on my reading, just twice, each briefly in passing, in the *Troïcos*, 19, and *On Homer*, 53.2), but also his failure to elaborate any of the standard Stoic reinterpretations of the myths in terms of physical phenomena (noted only in passing at 53.3), even though Stoic physics as such appear (if in Magian guise) in *Discourse 36, Borysthenicos*.

Though Paul cites his scriptures as though authoritative, he could be as selective and as ready to rephrase and reinterpret what he selected. Deut 25.4 could not mean that God cares for oxen (1 Cor 9.9–10, again); the law (despite Leviticus) not only leaves no way out for offenders, but actually incites them, and is meant to (Gal 3.19, 21–22; though Rom 3.9–20 softens this, 7.7–14).⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Dio, *Discourse 36 Borysthenicos*, 14; cf. all of 9–15.

⁸¹ Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 187–241.

⁸² Cf. M. Forschner, “Philosophie und Politik”, 138, arguing that this contrasts the destructive chaos of Homeric society with the peace of even an isolated law-abiding town.

⁸³ Dio, *Discourse 36, Borysthenicos*, 12, with *Kingship* 2.3–6; and 61, *Chryseïs*; 11, *Troïcos*; see the discussion in Suzanne Saïd, “Dio’s Use of Mythology”, 174–186 (where, however, “legend” might be preferable).

⁸⁴ Suzanne Saïd, “Dio’s Use of Mythology”, 178, 163.

⁸⁵ See again C.D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture*; and S.E. Porter and C.D. Stanley (eds), *As It Is Written: Studying Paul’s use of Scripture*, as at n. 58.

1.9. *Called*

Both Dio and Paul can claim an individual divine call, while both retain a strong sense of remaining free to interpret it in practice.⁸⁶ Both can talk of divine foreordaining, providence, Paul much more forcefully, but also with a much greater sense of divine close involvement in individual events, answering individual prayers, with no apparent conflict perceived by either. For Dio, too, presents himself as devoutly pious, saying his morning prayers (προσηυξάμην), offering prayers to the Gods for peace and harmony, with the conviction that they hear what is whispered to them, and relying on divine inspiration in his wanderings in exile.⁸⁷ He celebrates human attachment to the Gods for their parental benevolence, loving them in return (ἀγαπῶντες).⁸⁸ Yet, rather than by offerings and sacrifices, he insists that it is by good deeds that the Gods are truly honoured; and one may compare this conventional Stoic conviction with Rom 12.1–2.⁸⁹

1.10. *Deity*

Although Dio takes it for granted that offerings of value will be made at the statues of Gods, he finds seriously questionable, as has already been noted, the propriety of an image for the divine which can only transcend its referent.⁹⁰ And, while he refers often to "the Gods", and affirms traditional festivals, he only rarely mentions particular deities.⁹¹ The only divine figure on whose beneficent action he focuses attention is Zeus, and by the time he has listed the latter's attributes and functions, there seems little left for any other deity to do or even represent. "Zeus alone of the Gods is entitled 'Father and King', 'Protector of Cities', 'God of Friendship' and 'God of Comradeship'; and also 'Protector of Suppliants' and 'God of Hospitality', 'Giver of Increase', and countless other titles, all indicative of his goodness." Organising the entire basic substance of things is surely in the power of this

⁸⁶ Dio, *Discourses* 13.9–10; 32.21; 34.4–5; cf also 12.20, perhaps, and 1.53–55.

⁸⁷ Dio, *Discourses* 52.1; 38.9, 51, and 39.8.

⁸⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 12, *Olympicos*, 42–43, 60–61; 38.22, 40.28, cf. 43.11–12.

⁸⁹ Dio *Discourse* 3.52, 36.54. H.-G. Nesselrath, in id. (ed.), *Dion von Prusa*, 90, note 207 on 36.54, rejects the aside (LCL text) on "reverencing the the greatest God by noble deeds and pious words" as a Christian interpolation, but ignores 3.52, and, e.g., Cicero, *De nat. deo*. 1.116–117, Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 95.47; it is a commonplace (cf. also Philo, *De spec. leg.* 1.271–272).

⁹⁰ On Dio's diffidence over God-talk, cf. *Discourses* 3.52; 31.10–11, 36.54, 60–61, with *Discourse* 12, *Olympicos* again, 52–83; G.H. van Kooten, "The Roman Paul".

⁹¹ Dio, *Discourses* 39.8 (Dionysus, Heracles, Zeus, Athena, Aphrodite, Nemesis); 32.12, 14 (Serapis).

God alone; and Dio notes, it seems with approval, “Some people maintain that Apollo, Helios and Dionysus are one and the same ... and many even go so far as to combine all the Gods in one single force and power.”⁹²

The underlying conviction is, obviously, a Stoic pantheism.

The universe, the entirety of well-being and wisdom embodied, proceeds along through endless ages in infinite cycles without cessation, guided by good fortune, divine power, foreknowledge and a most just and noble purpose, assimilating us to itself as kin to it, ordered by the same rule and law and citizenship.

And then it is with Zeus alone that each cosmic cycle is to end, as Dio explains in his “Magian myth”, in his *Borysthenicos*. Even with this one might compare 1 Cor 15.28b, ἵνα ᾗ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πάσιν; see further, below.⁹³

1.11. *Decline and Fall*

And then, despite this Stoic metaphysical optimism, Dio is willing on occasion to note and criticise the foolishness, unruliness and wickedness at least of humankind. Sometimes this is in the persona of Diogenes, excoriating the mythic decline from the Golden Age into a life “infested by a host of maladies”, incurable because of their excesses and wickedness, when “humans crowded into cities to escape wrong from those outside, only to wrong one another and commit all sorts of the most dreadful misdeeds, as though that has been the purpose of their coming together”. The common father of all, “both of Gods and humans”, cannot check or prevent human injustice.⁹⁴ And so, even in a “myth” proposing the Stoic “city of the Gods”, it has to be admitted that most abuse the privilege which they are granted, and only a very few deserve promotion to a divine role.⁹⁵ But not only so, Dio is willing to elaborate a still more pessimistic, Orphic myth, where the world is a penal colony for humans as descendants of the Titans, ordered so as to keep them alive and so to continue to suffer, with self-discipline as the only palliative.⁹⁶ What is going to happen to individuals between death and the *ekpyrosis* is

⁹² Dio, *Discourses* 3.52–53; 12.75–77, 81; 31.11.

⁹³ Dio, *Discourses* 1.42, LCL adapted; 36.39–61, focusing on 57, cf. Michael Trapp, “Plato in Dio”, in S. Swain (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom*, 213–239, the gist is Stoic, if the style is Platonic, 215; contra, M. Forschner, “Philosophie und Politik”, who argues more cogently for the piece’s Platonic character, with Stoic “rationality” added. On Paul, see p. 59, above.

⁹⁴ Dio, *Discourses* 6.23–25; 74.27.

⁹⁵ Dio, *Discourse* 30, *Charidemus*, 26–44, with 36, *Borysthenicos*, 22.

⁹⁶ Dio, *Discourse* 30.10–24, 25–28, 29–44.

left open: release from the present penal colony with a share for a select few in divine governance, or abandoned by the Gods, or, if we behave well, welcomed still further into the city of the Gods.⁹⁷

Again one may usefully imagine the reception of Paul's eschatology in the rest of 1 Cor 15, 2 Cor 4.16–5.10, and (differing in detail) 1 Thess 4.13–18; even the assurance that the Corinthians will "judge angels" (1 Cor 6.3), together with his sketch of "the depravity of human kind", Rom 1.18–32, again.⁹⁸ At 1 Cor 15.24–28, Paul asserts, as already noted, that when the end comes Christ will surrender his rule, and himself be subject to God the Father, so that "God may be all in all" (ἵνα ᾗ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν παύσει). Taken as it stands, this phrase might well have been heard, and been allowed to be heard as quite like Dio's myth in *Borysthenicos*, where the whole universe is absorbed back into Zeus.⁹⁹ However, Paul's assurance to the Thessalonians, "then shall we for ever (πάντοτε) be with the Lord" (1 Thess 4.17) seems, in context, to affirm a continuing or renewed relational, personal existence, not absorption, for individuals, and, a fortiori, for the Lord Jesus; so, too, at Rom 8.19–23, where the "subjection" of the whole creation seems to emerge into liberty for all people and all things, rather than further subjection. On eschatology Paul is as inconsistent in the upshot as Dio explicitly chooses to be.

1.12. *Changing Tune*

Although I have argued that Paul became more Stoic in ethos by the time of writing Rom and Phil, there is no evidence that he explicitly repudiated his more radical and Cynic-like earlier letters; and 1 *Clement* indicates that 1 Corinthians retained considerable authority.

Dio's first option for our future, with its bleak outlook on life, has often been attributed to the period of Dio's exile, and his adoption then of a Cynic guise and message, the latter articulated in a small selection of his surviving *Discourses*.¹⁰⁰ It has, nonetheless, to be assumed that Dio himself

⁹⁷ Dio, *Discourse* 30, 11–25.

⁹⁸ Compare Stanley K. Stowers, *A Reading of Romans: Justice, Jews and Gentiles* (New Haven and London: Yale, 1994), 85 and 121–125; and G.H. van Kooten, "The Roman Paul", again.

⁹⁹ For Stoic and other resonances, see G.H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology*, 104–109; any such suggestion is swiftly discounted by A.C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1239; and ignored by Wolfgang Schrader, *Der Erste Brief an die Korinthe*, 220–231 and see p. 59, above.

¹⁰⁰ Dio, *Discourses* (4), 6, 8, 9, 10; for the opinions, J.W. Cohoon (ed. and tr.), *Dio Chrysostom II, Discourses XII–XXX* (LCL; Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1939), 395–396.

preserved and perhaps still performed these when restored to Prusa and imperial favour. Certainly, as noted above, he continues to present himself as a shabby philosopher, and continues to urge simplicity and self-control; he may castigate the plebeian Cynics of Alexandria for their manner, but still approves their principles.¹⁰¹ He clearly expects audiences at least to entertain the possibility that he, in the tradition of Diogenes, really has accepted a divinely inspired

mission.¹⁰² At times he deals with this ironically—he is old, shabby, unprepossessing.¹⁰³ Yet, on the other hand, he seems at other times quite happy to mention his own wealthy life-style (carriage and horses for a gentle early morning ride) and acknowledge his landed property.¹⁰⁴ He has used his wealth to enhance the town's reputation, though, as noted just above, this was in building projects which he could expect to redound to his credit, and much more important than some old smithy.¹⁰⁵

Paul also emphasises his shabby down-trodden appearance, as integral to his mission and message (1 Cor 4.9–13, 2 Cor 4.8–9, 6.4–5, 11.23–29), even though by the time of writing Romans and Philippians he was now not longer calling attention to his dress, and was instead starting to sound more Stoic and respectable, ready to claim he knew how to cope with plenty as well as want (Phil 4.12–13).¹⁰⁶

The variety in Dio's attitude to reputation, glory, honour, warrants attention.¹⁰⁷ Introducing the *Fourth Kingship Discourse*, an imaginative expansion of the legend of Alexander's encounter with Diogenes, arguably composed after his exile, Dio asserts,

All without exception are naturally delighted when they see wisdom honoured (τιμωμένην ὁρῶντες φρόνησιν) by the mightiest, the most powerful ... more than that, they strip their wise men of all else—wealth, honours (τιμὰς), and physical strength, so that the high regard in which they are held may appear due to their intelligence alone. And so I would now like to tell what might well have been their conversation.

¹⁰¹ Dio, *Discourses* 33.14–15, with 23; 34.2 with 19; 32.9.

¹⁰² Dio, *Discourses* 13.9, cf. 12.20; 1.53–58, again.

¹⁰³ J.H. Moles, 'The Thirteenth Oration', 127, 133; Dio, *Discourse* 13.29; 12.5–11.

¹⁰⁴ Dio, *Discourse* 46.3–7.

¹⁰⁵ Dio, *Discourses* 40.3–11; 44.

¹⁰⁶ See the fuller discussion in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 141–159, 267–282.

¹⁰⁷ On this theme, see Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Louisville KT: Westminster/John Knox, rev. edn 1993); more critically, F. Gerald Downing, 'Honor among Exegetes', *CBQ* 61.1 (1999), 53–73; repr. in *idem, Making Sense in (and of) the First Christian Century* (JSNTS197; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 19–42.

Honour and honouring will matter to his hearers; but Diogenes criticises the quest for it, in the shape of the Alexander who, as noted earlier,

was by common report the most ambitious of men and the greatest lover of glory. He was anxious to leave his name the greatest among all the Hellenes and barbarians, and longed to be honoured, not only—as one might say—by humans the world over, but, if it were at all possible, by the birds of the air and the beasts on the mountains.¹⁰⁸

His Alexander, Dio tells us, himself despised barbarian rulers and Greek city states as "slaves to money and pleasure"; but the love of reputation, to be the slave of reputation, Dio/Diogenes will argue, is even more discreditable than subservience to pleasure and wealth. In the final third of the piece three malign 'spirits', daimons, are then portrayed at length, with the worst being the love of glory, often also finding itself battling it out with the other two.¹⁰⁹ Of course, one can posit a distinction between seeking honour on the one hand, and receiving it unsought (and even valuing it) on the other. But Dio's Diogenes is implacable. And this stance clearly contrasts with Dio's implicit acceptance elsewhere that concern for honour and reputation are appropriately shared, as acknowledged above, and, for instance, with emphasis in the *Rhodian Discourse*, defending honorific statuary.¹¹⁰

Paul's fellow Christians are to expect "glory and honour" from God, a glory for which they are already being prepared (2 Cor 3.18), although he and his colleagues now invite, and certainly expect, disgrace (1 Cor 4.10, again; 1 Thess 2.6). But Paul, too, (unless he is being very ironic) can allow that honour is owed to some in power (Rom 13.7).

1.13. *Benefaction*

While critical, then, at times, of looking for glory, for honour, Dio insists elsewhere that benefactors deserve their honour, and should receive it. He castigates the citizens of Rhodes for recycling old honorific statues for new do-gooders, rather than due reciprocation, an insult to both past and present benefactors, he insists. Paul, too, insists that divine benefaction ought to be reciprocated, gratitude not switched to no-Gods (Rom 1.21, 2.4).¹¹¹ But Dio can on another occasion hold up for admiration a refusal to

¹⁰⁸ Dio, *Discourse* 12.2–4, LCL, adapted; on the dating, n. 17, above, and Giovanni Salmeri, "Dio, Rome and the Civic Life of Asia Minor", in S. Swain (ed.) *Dio Chrysostom*, 53–92, citing 89 and n. 177.

¹⁰⁹ Dio, *Discourse* 4.1, 5–6, 60, and 116–138; cf also 34, *Second Tarsic*, 29–30.

¹¹⁰ Dio, *Discourses* 31, *Rhodian*, *passim*, but cf. 78, 138; 32, *Alexandrian*, 2, 93; 38.42; 39.1–4.

¹¹¹ J.R. Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace*, 214–249.

expect reciprocity of any kind, specifically in the instance of his (presumably imagined) impoverished Euboean peasant. The peasant says he has been used to rescuing shipwrecked travellers, feeding and even clothing them, and sending them on their way, expecting no return for the deed, not even expecting ever to meet them again; and Dio also counters the oft cited duty of children to their parents.¹¹² The tale of the “Good Euboean” offers the closest resonance that James Harrison could find for Paul’s insistence in 1 Cor 9 on giving freely, as well as trying to let the Corinthians, disgracefully failing to make good their promised repayment of their debt of gratitude, off that hook (2 Cor 9); but also to Paul’s reminder of the impoverished benefactor, Jesus, “who, though he was rich, yet, for your sakes became poor, that you through his poverty might become rich” (2 Cor. 8.9) and Christ’s Macedonian “graced” Christian emulators (2 Cor 8.2–6). Further, Paul also reverses the child-parent direction of beneficence (2 Cor 10.14b).¹¹³

1.14. *Law and Custom*

Also linked with civic life are expressed attitudes to law and custom. These are discussed in a little more detail in Part II, in chapter 8, “Law as Social Engineering”, and 9, “Critiques of Law”; but it is worth noting here that *Discourse* 74 praises positive, written law; 75 prefers custom, categorising written law as tyrannical, creating a community of slaves; while in 80, all civic ideals are dismissed, in favour of the “law of nature”, of Zeus, of liberty.¹¹⁴ Paul’s apparent ambivalence on law has been noted above, and is also discussed in chs. 8 and 9.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped, then, that something of the scope and also of the diversity of attitudes that Dio and Paul, respectively, can evince *and share* in engaging hearers, themselves variously educated, has been indicated. These are two communicators who have in their respective pasts assimilated some very varied inputs, ideas, attitudes, varyingly persuasive, ready to “come to mind” on differing occasions, without either feeling the need (and, anyway, lacking

¹¹² Dio, *Discourse* 7, *Euboicos*, 51–53, 56–63; 68–69, 83.

¹¹³ J.R. Harrison, *Paul’s Language of Grace*, 337–342. In fact Aesop’s kindness to a priestess of Isis, *Life of Aesop* 4–8, the legend of Philemon and Baucis, in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.618–723, and Josephus’ “Good Witch of Endor”, *Ant.* 6.340–342, do afford other illustrations.

¹¹⁴ Dio, *Discourse* 80.4–6.

the technology) to correlate decisions on what, if anything, themselves to offer and affirm of what their store offers them, and what level of coherence to seek. We for our part are given no excuse for imposing our coherence on either.¹¹⁵

Just above, and earlier in passing, we have touched on issues of 'law', and its importance for affirming and creating order. To this topic we now turn, in Part II, in a little more detail, if somewhat selectively, the reader prepared, I hope, for negative as well as positive assessments of legislation and the courts and enforcement.

¹¹⁵ The foregoing, affords, I trust, further confirmation of the case for taking Dio as evidence for popular ideas and convictions in his day, and for appreciating more fully the range and variety of the ideas and beliefs Paul will have encountered among his hearers, and will have needed to acknowledge, if he was to be at all persuasive.

Apropos this discussion, it has been a little disappointing to find how few scholars among those discussing the Graeco-Roman intellectual/ideological context of the early Christians pay any extensive attention to Dio, by comparison, for instance, with recourse to Epictetus, Plutarch, Seneca, (Plato and Aristotle, even). Significant exceptions include Abraham Malherbe, of course, Margaret Mitchell, Bruce Winter, George van Kooten, Troels Engberg Pedersen, James R. Harrison. Yet even Hans-Josef Klauck, in his study of *Oration 12, Olympicos*, pays little regard to resonances with early Christian writings, despite his own work elsewhere in that field. G. Mussies, *Dio Chrysostom and the New Testament*, in the *Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti* project (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1972), concentrates on details of usage, rather than ideas. In relation to the foregoing, it was pleasing to find during proof-reading Anna C. Miller's "Not with Eloquent Wisdom: Ekklēsia Discourse in 1 Corinthians 1–4", *JSNT* 35.4 (2013), 323–354, using Dio (along with Plutarch), and, independently of G. van Kooten, "Ἐκκλησίαι τοῦ Θεοῦ", in exploring 'popular assembly' discourse. However, I would suggest that Paul would have no special "rhetorical advantage" in deploying divine alongside worldly wisdom; others could, as Dio shows, and 1 Cor itself seems to indicate.

PART TWO

LAW

CHAPTER EIGHT

LEGISLATION AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN THE NEW TESTAMENT WORLD

1. TORAH AS INSTRUCTION

In the previous chapters we have already in passing touched on issues of 'law', and its importance for the affirmation and maintenance of order. In the second part of this survey of attitudes we consider varieties of appraisals of 'law' and approaches to its enforcement. But we begin with a brief discussion of 'νόμος' as translated by commentators on Jewish and Christian usage.

In his 1998 volume, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, and under the heading "*Torah, nomos and ho nomos*", James D.G. Dunn, citing, among others, Solomon Schechter, wrote,

First, there is an old claim that the Hebrew torah is a much broader category than the Greek *nomos*, and that Paul's rendering of the former by the latter (following the LXX) distorted the Jewish concept of torah and gave unjustified foundation to the accusation of Jewish legalism.¹

Dunn prefers to paraphrase *nomos* by "Israel's covenant obligations". Obviously, non-Jewish Greeks were unlikely to use *nomos* in that sense; but it is not clear from Dunn's discussion why *nomos* as such might have of old been held to be an inappropriate rendering.

In the 1920's, G.F. Moore, also citing Schechter, insisted that "'Law' must not be understood in the restricted sense of legislation", as it denotes "all that God has made known of his nature, character and purpose, and of what he would have man be and do"; but could offer no better English word.² G.W. Bromiley, translating pieces by H. Kleinknecht and W. Gutbrod (*TWNT*), under "νόμος" offered "divine direction", or (revealed) "valid

¹ James D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 131–132. Dunn cites among others S. Schechter, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (New York: Schocken, 1961, original 1909), 117.

² G.F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era. The Age of the Tannaim*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), I. 263.

teaching”, or simply “instruction”.³ This still leaves it unclear why *nomos* is or was held to be particularly misleading. To be sure, Kleinknecht could point to the Stoics at their most metaphysical, arguing that at the deepest level the “law of nature” determines everything, inescapably. Yet, in practice, Stoic moralists are fully aware that people contravene that law as they, the Stoics, understand it, and so they attempt to challenge and change their hearers with its demands, as I shall illustrate in due course.

E.P. Sanders, in *ABD* (1992), explained, “It was once thought that the translation of Heb *tôrâ* by Gk *nomos* resulted in a narrowing of the conception of law from God’s way in general to specific requirements. This has now been shown not to be correct. The semantic range of the words is approximately the same”; and he cites in support, Laurent Monsengo Pasinya, *La notion de nomos dans la Pentateuque grec*.⁴ Pasinya draws attention to a passage from ps.Demosthenes,

toute loi est une invention et un don des dieux, une décision des hommes sages, un correctif apporté aux erreurs volontaires ou involontaires, un contrat (συνθήκη) commun de la cité selon lequel doivent vivre tous les citoyens.⁵

With that and much else Pasinya shows that the LXX translators had a wide semantic field available to them when choosing to deploy the term *nomos*, and then argues that a careful examination of usage in context shows a conservation of much of the range of the original Hebrew. There is no constriction to law as regulations; rather “les auteurs alexandrins ont ... réservé à *nomos* et *logoi* (ou *rhêmata*) *toû nomou* le sens de révélation globale, pour confier aux autres termes de la loi le sens de lois individuelles et particulières.”⁶ My concern here is with usage closer in time to the composition of the New Testament documents, and I have not attempted to examine Pasinya’s arguments in detail; it may be that others here have done that, or know where that is done.

However, Pasinya does argue that in later Jewish writing, 3 and 4 Maccabees, *Psalms of Solomon*, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, the *Letter of Aristeas*, and in Philo and Josephus, there *is* to be found a constriction to

³ H. Kleinknecht and W. Gutbrod, “νόμος”, in G.W. Bromiley (ed. and trans) *TDNT* 4, 1045, 1055.

⁴ E.P. Sanders, “Law”, in D.F. Freedman (ed.), *ABD* (New York: Doubleday, 1992), IV 255; L.M. Pasinya, *La notion de nomos dans la Pentateuque grecque* (Analecta Biblica 52; Recherches africaines de théologie 5; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1973).

⁵ Pasinya, *La notion*, 36, quoting, with Greek text, ps.Demosthenes, in *Orationes* 25.16.

⁶ Pasinya, *La notion*, 140.

“law” as a set of regulations, and to law as local national tradition; rather than *nomos* conveying a rich sense of God-given instruction on matters divine and human.⁷

More recently, and *apropos* Second Temple Judaism, C.A. Newsom has noted,

It is—significantly—difficult to find a definition for the term *torah* ... To say that it is always used in relation to instruction in norms of conduct or to the norms themselves is to provide a minimalist definition that only underscores the extent to which the social significance of the term depends on the particular discourse in which it is embedded.⁸

In what follows, and in fact in line with a further suggestion from Newsom, I shall argue that there is discernible in a range of writings (Jewish and other) from the period of late Second Temple Judaism, a discussion of ‘law’ that is certainly wider than a concern with individual bits of legislation, but is also more than ‘instruction’, whether divinely given or not.

2. LAW AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING: ARISTOTLE, AND PHILO AND JOSEPHUS

I want to argue a rather different reading of Philo and Josephus, and lead from that into a consideration of positive appraisals of ‘law’, specially interpreted as community-building instruction: in effect, legislation proposed as social engineering, in authors around the first Christian century (having myself elsewhere discussed negative critiques of law in the same period).⁹ And I shall argue that this rather different formulation, legislation as social engineering, may help our appreciation of both the wider first century socio-cultural context and of some of the New Testament writings themselves.

Rather than aiming to encourage superficial observance of regulations, and then, perhaps, the hope of winning divine or social favour and/or material gain, talk of law, *nomos*, *lex*, in the Mediterranean world in and around

⁷ Pasinya, *La notion*, 178–200.

⁸ C.A. Newsom, “Torah, Knowledge, and Symbolic Power: Strategies of Discourse in Second Temple Judaism”, in *eadem*, *The Self as Symbolic Space. Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (STJD 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 23–75, citing 23.

⁹ F.G. Downing, “What, then, of the Law? (Galatians 3.19). Appraisals of Law in Paul and in Other New Testament Writers and in the Wider Graeco-Roman World”, in *idem*, *God with Everything. The Divine in the Discourse of the First Christian Century* (SWBA 2/2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 115–134; and this also now appears as the chapter following.

the first Christian century, is, often quite distinctly and distinctively (sometimes, often, even usually) a matter of ‘virtue ethics’. The concern in discussion of ‘law’ and ‘laws’ is with teaching on matters divine and human, and that as inculcating a practice that has character formation as its main aim, with communitarian gain implicit.

This way of looking at law in society is articulated, classically, by Aristotle, of course. He has predecessors, and among them Plato, in particular. But it is Aristotle who sees the internalisation of laws as the primary aim (even though not their inevitable result). In the *Politics* he says:

Excellencies (ἀρεταί) we gain by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the other arts and crafts (τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν) as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing: e.g., people become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so, too, we become just by doing just deeds, temperate by doing temperate deeds, brave by doing brave deeds. And this is confirmed by what happens in city-states: for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits (ἐθίζοντες) in them; and this is the wish of every legislator. And those who do not effect it miss their mark; and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.¹⁰

By comparison with Plato, *The Laws*, Aristotle pays attention not just to explanation, but much more to encouraging those legislated for in pondering and internalising the laws, so that their obedience becomes free and willing; not simply automatic but an excellence of their own.¹¹

I take it that here as elsewhere Aristotle is supportively and clarifyingly articulating a traditional commonplace, not proposing a novelty; one may compare what I take to be his commonplaces on women and slaves and household management. And Aristotle was certainly available around the first century CE, either directly, or in doxographies.¹²

However, it is along similar lines that Philo, at the start of his *De decalogo*, ponders Moses’ likely intentions in promulgating his [sic] laws in the desert. He suggests,

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.1, 1103ab (J. Ross and J.O. Urmson, trans), in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Bollingen Series LXXI.2; Princeton NK: Princeton University Press, 1984); cf. LCL.

¹¹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3–5, 112a–113b; 10.8, 1179ab; 10.9, 1180a; *Politics* 8.1, 1337a. I have not studied at all widely Aristotle in the ancient world, despite reading quite a lot of modern Aristotelians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, and I am not a devotee; but I note as relevant, a recent staunch defence of the communitarian approach: Kristján Kristjánsson, “An Aristotelian Critique of Situationism”, *Philosophy* 83.323, Jan 2008, 55–76. On Plato and explanatory “preambles”, see *Laws* 722–723.

¹² H.B. Gottschalk, “Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD”, *ANRW* 36.2 (1987), 1079–1174.

Moses did not think it good that the people should just take their portions and settle in cities and then go in quest of laws to regulate their civic life, but rather should first provide themselves with the rules for that life and *gain practice* in all that would surely enable their communities to steer their course in safety, and then settle down to follow from the first the principles of justice lying ready for use, in harmony and fellowship and rendering everyone their fair share.¹³

Philo also explains that the desert is a good place for absorbing instruction, with mind/soul purified; and there the peoples' dependence on God could be brought home to them. But the point is that laws are to be absorbed by practice and so form character, a conviction repeatedly symbolised by the figure of Jacob, "the ascetic" (ἀσκητής), the one who by strenuous practice assimilates and interiorizes the deeper truths symbolised by the laws, and so "gains the virtue which is perfected through practice."¹⁴ The emphasis on *askesis* could suggest Cynic resonances, or at least the Cynic-affirming strand of Stoicism, and Philo can quote Cynic views with approval elsewhere; but he does not support a Cynic reliance on *askesis* alone.¹⁵ Elsewhere, of course, he also insists in Stoic mode that the Mosaic legislation is in accord with nature; but not at this point.¹⁶ Philo can in theory envisage someone able to interiorize the divine reality to which the laws point, without enacting them, (rather as the ideal Stoic might attune himself inwardly to the true nature of things by mental effort); but, argues Philo, we are truly bodily persons, and the physical performance of the laws as a whole is the only valid way to our full appropriation of that divine reality.¹⁷

We may doubt whether Philo expected outsiders to hear or read his work; but may well suppose he intended to provide educated fellow Jews with answers to the challenges of critical Greek thought, and, perhaps, to be able themselves to talk knowledgeably in mixed company. Whether Philo is here directly dependent on Aristotle I cannot tell; contemporary preference for paraphrase makes unascribed attribution difficult to ascertain. Philo does acknowledge Aristotle elsewhere, but might here be just as much echoing a

¹³ Philo, *De decalogo* 14, LCL, adapted; emphasis mine.

¹⁴ Philo, *Mig.* 214; *Cong.* 35; *Cher.* 46; *Sac.* 120, etc.

¹⁵ Cf. *Fug.* 33–36, *Cong.* 25–28; and F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches* (London: Routledge, 1998), 72–73, 78–79.

¹⁶ E.g., Philo, *Op.* 3; *Ab.* 5–6; *Jos* 30–31; on the Stoics, cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 7.87–89.

¹⁷ Philo, *Mig.* 88–93.

cultural commonplace, as I have suggested Aristotle himself was; or Philo could depend on Aristotle by way of some doxography, as also already suggested.

Josephus clearly hoped that his own work would be read by at least some non-Jews. In similar vein to the passage just quoted from Philo, he claims,

All schemes of education and moral training fall into two categories: instruction is imparted in the one case by precept, in the other by the practical exercise of moral convictions (διὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως τῶν ἡθῶν) ... Our legislator took great care to combine both systems ... I think it will be apparent that we possess a code excellently designed to promote piety, friendly relations with one another, and philanthropy towards the world at large.¹⁸

Earlier Josephus has insisted, "Above all, we pride ourselves in the education of our children, and we regard as the most essential task in life the observance of our laws and the pious practices based on them."¹⁹

In many contexts, of course, Josephus stresses the divine origin and basis of the laws: "Our lawgiver ... having shown that God possesses the very perfection of virtue, thought that humans should strive to share in it."²⁰ But, like Philo, he insists that the practical observance of the rules (the ones we today are used to terming 'ritual' or 'identity markers', or some such), constitutes the necessary practice that promises to enable the piety and the social harmony intended. Although both authors elsewhere affirm in general a Deuteronomic trust in divine favour towards those who conform with what God is held to require (penitence and sought forgiveness included), neither of the passages here quoted suggest reward as a motive or stimulus for the practical assimilation of those detailed demands. The virtue of the community is its own reward.²¹

Again, there's no evidence to demonstrate direct dependence on Aristotle. Josephus only mentions him once, in an anecdote from Clearchus; but another of his sources, Nicholas of Damascus, in addition to historical works, "wrote a wide-ranging compendium of Aristotle's thought."²²

In discussing the education of children and common knowledge of the law Josephus would seem to be alluding to Deuteronomy and Ezra. I find it intriguing that in her discussion of the latter, and of Law in general in Second Temple Judaism, Carol Newsom can write

¹⁸ Josephus, *Ap.* 2.145–146, LCL, adapted.

¹⁹ Josephus, *Ap.* 1.60, LCL; cf. *Ap.* 2.204; but also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.9, 1180a.

²⁰ Josephus, *Ant.* 4.123, LCL, adapted.

²¹ Philo, *Praem.*, e.g., 64–66 (on repentance, 15–21); Josephus, *Ant.* 1.14 (and 2.145–146).

²² *Ap.* 1.176–183; and Gottschalk, "Aristoteleian Philosophy", 1122–1125.

Persons develop a sense of who they are in many ways. Social norms for bodily practices are one significant means, because of the close identification of a person with his or her body. How one positions and moves the body helps to form a sense of the self in terms of gender, social position, religious identification, and so forth.²³

Although her own emphasis is on “language as symbolic power” (Pierre Bourdieu), her analysis as a whole of what she discerns as the intention of the texts seems very Aristotelian without Aristotle. It is then significant that she can deploy it in still more detail in her discussion of the *Manual of Discipline*, 1QS:

Figured worlds, along with the character roles they offer and the structures of meaning they provide, are not just given realities but must be entered. Whether the process is formal or informal, persons enter into figured worlds as novices and become both more proficient and more shaped by the worlds as they continue to engage in their discourses and practices.²⁴

Whereas the underlying political conviction was, I take it, a widespread and traditional commonplace, its articulation in Philo and Josephus would seem to depend directly or indirectly on Aristotle, or on the commonplace conviction that Aristotle articulated. I now proceed to illustrate the latter's influence in the wider world of the first Christians.

3. THE WIDER FIRST CENTURY WORLD

Important for Josephus (and Plutarch), and anyway, it would seem popular, was the late first century BCE Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Roman Antiquities*. Dionysius praises Romulus as a legislator, and concludes,

He wished to order the lives of the whole body of citizens, the greater part of whom are hard to guide. He wanted to induce them to lead a life of moderation, to prefer justice to gain, to practise perseverance in hardship (χαρτερίαν τε τὴν παρὰ τοὺς πόνους ἀσχεῖν), and to look upon nothing as more valuable than virtue. He found verbal means of little use. Only the habitual practice of such employments as lead to virtue held out any promise of success, knowing that the great mass of people come to practise such skills of necessity rather than choice.²⁵

²³ C. Newsom, “How to Make a Sectarian”, ch. 4 in *The Self as Symbolic Space*, 91–190, citing 92. Newsom refers to Dorothy Holland et al., *Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). On Deuteronomy and matters of motive, cf. also Bernard Jackson, *Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law* (JSOTS 314; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 112.

²⁴ C. Newsom, “Sectarian”, p. 94.

²⁵ Dionysius, *R.A.* 2.28.1, LCL, adapted.

Dionysius later offers a very similar conclusion for Numa: “His regulations tended to induce (ἄγοντα) frugality and moderation in the life of the individual citizen and to create a passion for justice which preserves the harmony of the state.”²⁶

Writing around the same time on “Laws”, Cicero, eclectic New Academician and Stoic, can insist that “nature” has endowed all humans with right reason and so with both justice and law; but he can still also take it that a detailed discussion will involve “laws for living and a system of training (*disciplinam*) both for nations and for individuals”, where, in context, *disciplinam* seems clearly to denote our sense, ‘discipline’ rather than simply teaching.²⁷ We may compare an earlier aside in his *Republic*, where to the theorising of the Greeks he prefers the practicality fostered by Rome, “the art of government and the training (*disciplinam*) of people, which, in men of ability and character, calls into being ... an almost incredible and divine virtue.”²⁸

More than a century later, Plutarch, a Platonist, and by no means uncritical of Rome, can deploy very similar criteria in assessing the achievements of Numa by comparison with Lycurgus, both legislators. “By force of persuasion alone he changed the whole nature of the state ... without appeal to arms or any violence ... but by his wisdom and justice won the hearts of all citizens and brought them into harmony.”²⁹

My final illustration before moving to the New Testament, is drawn from Dio Chrysostom, of Prusa. Three discourses of his on Law survive. *Discourse* 80 is highly critical, and I quarried that in a previous piece on critiques of law in the first century world.³⁰ Another, *Discourse* 76, prefers unwritten custom to positive, statute law. *Discourse* 75, *On Law*, by contrast, praises the latter:

The law is a guide for life (τοῦ βίου ἡγεμών), an arbiter cities have agreed in common, a straight-edge that remains true (δίκαιος) throughout our affairs, one each of us must use to rule our own line through life—or else we’ll go wickedly (πονήρος) astray. So those who keep (φυλάττοντες) the law have gained salvation (σωτηρία). But those who transgress (παραβαίνοντες) begin by destroying (ἀπολλύουσιν) themselves and then destroy other people, offering them example and excitement to anarchic (ἀνομίας) violence ... Law does away with force; rather does it rule by persuasion and governs willing subjects. For it is because it first persuades people and secures their approval that law

²⁶ Dionysius, *RA*, 2.74.1.

²⁷ Cicero, *De legibus* 1.22.57, where LCL gives “discipline”.

²⁸ Cicero, *De re publica* 3.3.4.

²⁹ Plutarch, *Lycurgus and Numa*, 4.8 (LCL, adapted).

³⁰ F. Gerald Downing, “What then, of the Law?”, ch. 9, below.

comes into being and acquires its own power ... a school-teacher for the young (διδάσκαλος νεότητος) ... if anyone expels the law from his life, it is just as if he had lost his mind.³¹

4. PAUL, MATTHEW, AND OTHERS

It appears fairly likely that those Paul opposed in Galatia had been emphasising the importance of law in much the same terms as those deployed by Dio. It was “the law” that stood against transgressions (παράβσεις) (cf. Gal 3.19) and afforded true piety; it was the law that enabled life and ensured justice/righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) (cf. Gal 3.21 for both) and was our teacher (Gal 3.23; 4.1–2). It was just such an Aristotelean evaluation of the law that Paul seems to have thought he had to combat, using the same or similar key terms as those Dio used half a century later.

It would seem to me that this trust in the social potential of law remains in the background in Romans. Actual results, on Paul’s current assessment, show that laws have not achieved their aim. The Jewish law has not been an effective instructor nor made the Jewish people exemplary and effective instructors of others (Rom 2.18–19, 8.3–4; cf. 2 Cor 3.4–6). And even if ethical self-questioning and ethical debate show that law, of a sort, has been in some measure interiorized by non-Jews (Rom 2.14–15), a generally effective assimilation remains unevidenced (Rom 2.29, despite Paul’s self-assessment at Phil 3.6).³²

It is worth noting that Aristotle can allow for law becoming ‘mere convention’, simply a referee in disputes, if the community does not use it to encourage “excellence”.³³ The Letter of James makes, I take it, a similar point at 1.22–25: “One who looks into the perfect law, the law that makes us free, and does not turn away, remembers what he hears; he acts on it, and by so acting, he will find happiness” (v. 25).

I have to confess that for the moment I am unable to place Hebrews or 1 Timothy within this ideology, either explicitly or even implicitly. However, I would suggest that Matthew fits well, along the implicit lines suggested by Carol Newsom. Matthew’s Jesus insists on tithing, even of mint, dill and cummin. Yet the point of the observance is the interiorization and practice

³¹ Dio, *On Law*, Discourse 75. 1, 4, 9, 10; LCL, adapted.

³² On Paul on Israelite failure to interiorize the law, in 2 Cor 3.4–6, cf. Gerd Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology* (ET of 1983; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), 140–143.

³³ Aristotle, *Politics* 3.9, 1280b, noted by Pasinya, *La notion*, 38.

of “justice, mercy and good faith” (Mt 23.23). Just so, earlier, Mt’s Jesus has insisted that none of the law’s demands should be set aside; yet the point is an encompassing justice/righteousness (Mt 5.19).³⁴ With a much looser attachment to detail, the same would seem true of Luke’s insistence on early Christian compliance with ancestral Jewish law, and response to Roman and civic law, as I have argued elsewhere.³⁵

I have been suggesting that a sense for legislation as at least potentially social engineering may have been commonplace in the ancient east Mediterranean, but articulated and refined by Aristotle. And I have argued that this articulation has probably influenced at least some Jewish and Christian authors from around the first century CE. Such a communitarian ideology is debated these days, but espoused only by a minority. J.W. Harris, in his survey, *Legal Philosophies*, does not even accord it a chapter on its own, merely passing comment on it along with liberalism and feminism. He summarises the matter as follows, without further comment:

Surely it is not enough that people refrain from wrongs or the breaking of contracts. Rather we should engender a sense of community in which people are concerned with each other’s welfare as part of their own conception of what it is to live good lives. A society which promotes a sense of belonging and shared public concerns is a worthy aspiration. Participation in public decision making, at all levels, should not be seen in terms of mere political rights, but as an index of social excellence. Seek first the good society, and enriched individual living will follow.³⁶

Here Aristotle is an acknowledged source. But with or without any direct influence from Aristotle, I suggest that some such reflection underlies a range of our early Jewish and Christian texts. Nonetheless, as already noted, law, written and/or customary, could be subject to searching critiques, to which (reader consenting) we turn in the next chapter.

³⁴ Cf. U. Luz, *The Theology of the Gospel of Matthew* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 92–93.

³⁵ F.G. Downing, “What then of the Law?” below, pp. 211–230.

³⁶ J.W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies* (2nd edn.; London: Butterworth, 1997).

CHAPTER NINE

“WHAT, THEN, OF THE LAW?,” “ΤΙ ΟΥΝ Ο ΝΟΜΟΣ;” GAL 3.19. APPRAISALS OF LAW IN PAUL AND OTHER NEW TESTAMENT WRITERS, AND IN THE WIDER GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD

1. A WIDESPREAD DEBATE

In his 1997 introduction to jurisprudence J.W. Harris writes:

Jurisprudence is a ragbag. Into it are cast all kinds of general speculations about the law. What is it for? What does it achieve? Should we value it? How is it to be improved? Is it dispensable? Who makes it? Where do we find it? What is its relation to morality, to justice, to politics, to social practices, or to naked force? Should we obey it? Whom does it serve? [These questions] can be ignored, but they will not go away.¹

Paul was not alone in posing the question, “τί οὖν ὁ νόμος;” (Gal 3.19). As H.D. Betz notes, the point of having law, its aim and justification, were widely debated in the ancient Mediterranean world. However, the Graeco-Roman debate itself hardly figures even in Betz’s exposition, still less in J.D.G. Dunn’s; and other commentators consulted seem to ignore it entirely.² Earlier, in *TDNT*, H. Kleinknecht had offered quite an elaborate exposition of restricted aspects of law in Plato together with rather less on later Hellenism, and then insisted that this debate was not really relevant, for “the Greek world missed the true meaning of law from the NT standpoint.” (The “true meaning,” apparently, is inducing despair.)³ Betz himself emphasizes

¹ J.W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies*, 1. Further reference will be made in the notes to issues that are raised both in ancient jurisprudence and in our own day, as outlined by Harris.

² H.D. Betz, *Galatians*, 162–164; J.D.G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 190; however, not noted by P. Bonnard, *L’épître de Saint Paul aux Galates* (CNT ix; Neuchatel & Paris 1953); R.N. Longenecker, *Galatians*; nor by R. Bergmeier, “Welche Bedeutung kommt dann dem Gesetz zu?” (Gal 3, 19a) *TZ* 59.1 (2003), 35–48; R. Jewett, *Romans*.

³ H. Kleinknecht, “νόμος,” *TDNT* IV, 1022–1035, citing 1035. Limited aspects of the Graeco-Roman debate in Jewish writers are presented by W. Gutbrod, *ibid*, 1036–1091. For more recent discussion, M. Ducos, *Les Romains et la loi. Recherches sur les rapports de la philosophie grecque et de la tradition romaine à la fin de la République* (Paris 1984); and B. Blumenfeld, *The Political Paul. Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Context* (JSNTSS 210; Sheffield 2001).

positive appraisals of civic law in the Graeco-Roman world, while allowing that Cynics and Epicureans felt they could cope without it. Individual points of law on such matters as marriage, adoption, inheritance, do figure in the commentaries. But by and large the general debate, and especially suggestions that people might be better off without accepted laws and legal systems, or for strategies for coping with apparently inflexible codes, seem to escape attention.

It is clear that in composing Galatians and Romans Paul is concerned with attitudes to compliance with Jewish law, or with aspects of it, and commentators rightly concentrate on that issue. But it is, I suggest, a mistake to forget that Paul in Galatians says he is addressing non-Jews, for whom in the past the wider debate will have been much more formative than any inner-Jewish one (itself open to the same wider influences); and in Romans Paul's focus, again, is mainly on a Gentile audience. It is "pagan" civic law, and Graeco-Roman attitudes to civic law, that Paul and his first converts in Galatia (and Macedonia and Achaëa) will first have confronted when he urged these ordinary Greek citizens and *meteks* to break with civic convention.⁴ And it is not only the litigious new Christians of Corinth who will have been familiar with the courts and their rhetoric; it is clear that civil trials were Empire-wide a popular spectator sport.⁵ Further, although Betz may have been over-confident in his analysis of Galatians as typically "forensic" (for genres seem much less precisely and distinctively structured than his argument allows), yet Paul in Galatians and elsewhere does seem to echo public oratory, which was mostly encountered in the courts.

It seems to me that much of Paul's pagan near contemporaries' appraisals of law are of interest in themselves, but are so specifically in relation to arguments about law in Paul and also positions on law taken by other NT authors, especially Luke. I have discussed some of this in previous writing; my aim here is to summarise that and extend it, and draw together strands that I have previously treated separately.⁶

⁴ Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 277, 314–318; and, e.g., ps.Aristotle, *On Virtues and Vices*, 5.2–3, "to preserve ancestral customs and institutions and established laws ... duties to the Gods, then to daimons, then to country and parents ...", quoted in T. Penner, *In Praise of Christian Origins*, 198; but also ch. 2 above, p. 54, and n. 14, with reference to B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*.

⁵ Cf. F.G. Downing, "À bas les aristos", 21–40.

⁶ Most recently in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 55–84, and *Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century*.

2. LAW AS LIFE-ENHANCING?

The divine intention, the objective divine purpose of law was not, according to Paul's understanding, to give life. "If a law had been given that had power to bestow life, then righteousness would indeed have come from keeping that law" (Gal. 3.21; compare Rom. 7.10). I suggest we need to realize that if Paul's opponents in Galatia were explicitly or even tacitly asserting the contrary, they had more persuasive force in their arguments than is often supposed. It is not simply that they could point to the Jewish context from which Jesus (and, of course, Paul himself) came, and the delight in Torah as God's gift evidenced there.⁷ They would have their hearers' prior awareness of much of the weight of literate Graeco-Roman opinion to tell them that law—inherited custom with the force of law and inherited positive law together—constituted an indispensable 'good thing', life-enhancing, assuring *eudaimonia*, *vita beata*. Generally utilitarian arguments for law continue to be deployed today, of course.⁸ Nonetheless, Paul had been persuading people to break with much of their inherited Hellenistic civic convention, with which *cultus* was integral; and, as his opponents now made forcibly clear, he had not even allowed them the alternative Jewish code in any way seriously practiced, to take its place. Yet, as said, almost everyone else was agreed, the general observance of a code of tried and tested law was an essential good for society and for individuals.

This latter point, the general agreement that law is good and life-enhancing, is indeed well illustrated by Betz and earlier by Kleinknecht and by others, though not, I think, its full implication for Paul's negative response. Among examples of the high evaluation accorded law we may note the Stoic passage inserted by Diogenes Laertius into his account of the teaching of the Cynic Diogenes, insisting "It is impossible for society to exist without law".⁹

⁷ If illustration is needed, one may note Ps. 119; Sir. 24, 45.5; John 5.39.

⁸ J.W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies*, 40–45.

⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.72. On this as a Stoic insertion, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, "Un syllogisme stoïcien sur la loi dans la doxographie de Diogène le Cynique. A propos de Diogène Laërce VI 72," *Rheinisches Museum* NF 125 (1982), 214–240; and in eadem, *L'ascèse cynique* (Paris 1986), 33; unfortunately taken as genuinely Cynic by Betz; one may compare Cicero, *Laws* 2.4.11; and compare, also, Hierocles, *On Duties*, in Stobaeus 3.39.34–36 = 3.730.17–734.10, Hense, as given in A.J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation. A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia 1986), 89–90. For an alternative interpretation of *Lives* 6.72, as Cynic but ironic, J. Moles, "The Cynics" (2005), in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 415–442, here 424.

On this Epicureans would agree, as would the Platonists, of course.¹⁰ Even more fulsome, on occasion, is Dio of Prusa:

The Law is a guide for life (τοῦ βίου ἡγῆμῶν), an arbiter cities have agreed in common, a straight-edge that remains true (δίκαιος) throughout our affairs, one each of us must use to rule our own line through life—or else we'll go wickedly (πονηρός) astray. So those who keep (φυλάττοντες) the law have gained salvation (σωτηρία). But those who transgress (παρβαίνοντες) begin by destroying (ἀπολλύουσιν) themselves and then destroy other people, offering them example and excitement to anarchic violence.¹¹

Echoes of some of the issues Paul confronts in Gal. 3–4 are clear even here, and not only in the shared terminology displayed, as noted in the previous chapter.

If one needs further illustration, we may note Philo, roughly contemporary with Paul:

He who gave abundance of the means of life also bestowed the wherewithall of a good life; for mere life they (the Israelites in the wilderness) needed food and drink ... for the good life they needed laws and ordinances which would improve their souls. (De decal 17)

Josephus, a few years later, was sure of the apologetic value of the Jews' reputation as a people adhering to a firm and ancient legal tradition seen as life-enhancing:

It will be apparent that we possess laws superbly designed to promote piety and sociability, and *philanthropia* towards the world at large, as well as steadfastness in hardship and contempt for death ... I would say that those who have adopted enthusiastically the cause of shared order and law ... may fairly be admitted to be civilized and virtuous by nature. (Ap. 2.146; 151; cf. 184)

The word '*philanthropia*' is particularly significant, expressing the received view that given laws are benign and life-enhancing, a point Richard Bauman amply illustrates in his *Human Rights in Ancient Rome*.¹² Paul's breach both with pagan civic law and with 'barbarian' Jewish law must be understood in this context. And this ruling ideology is also significant for our interpretation of Luke-Acts, as I argued some twenty years ago, and here summarise.

¹⁰ Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 5.1136–1151 (LCL); cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 10.150–151; Plato's *Laws* remained influential, not least through Cicero.

¹¹ Dio, *Discourse* 75.1; cf. the rest of the *Discourse* and the discussion in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 60–67. One may compare 1 Tim. 1.9–10.

¹² R.A. Bauman, *Human Rights in Ancient Rome* (London 2000) (though his quotation from Josephus, p. 3, is mis-ascribed to *Antiquities*); and cf. Dio, *Discourse* 75.6, but also B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, 113, 181, 202.

3. JEWISH AND ROMAN LAW AND CUSTOM IN LUKE-ACTS

Luke-Acts presents the Christians as heirs to ancient Jewish tradition in law and custom, where antiquity is seen as itself a good thing. But his Christians had also been willing to shed restrictions that in the wider world were often held to be demeaning or exclusive, or both. The 'superstitious' restrictions shed were, of course, circumcision and Sabbath and a restricted table-fellowship.¹³ Daniel Marguerat makes the valid point, that the Lukan Paul's claim to continuity with his people's ancient traditions is never unanimously rejected by his fellow Jews. However, all this attention to Jewish law remains primarily an affirmation of a claim to that respectable ancestral tradition, and only secondarily as 'keeping the door open' to Paul's fellow Jews.¹⁴

The Christians in Acts were also content to abide by Roman law and by local law and custom, accepting their value, but that too, not uncritically. Maladministration could occur (see below), but despite that negative reality, the system could still on the whole be trusted.

This reading of attitudes in Luke-Acts to law both Gentile and Jewish shows that double work clearly responding to the ethos displayed in the panegyrics on law and custom adduced above. Luke is reminding his hearers that they have an eminently respectable pattern to follow, and a respectable case to make in conversation with curious friends, or even hostile acquaintances. Luke's fellow-Christians, like Josephus' ideal fellow Jews, are firmly on the side of 'philanthropic' order and law. It is this, it seems, that is Luke's main point, rather than defending Christians, Gentile or Jewish, against the criticisms supposedly levelled by other contemporary Jews; on which Jacob Jervell's alternative arguments fail to convince.¹⁵

However, in case the mixed attitude ascribed to Roman law seems implausible, it is important also to realize that pro-Roman authors were willing to criticize, and trenchantly, the actual administration of Roman law and civic law in general. Josephus himself, for instance, has his good guys, such as Petronius; but is content to offer a mixed assessment of Pilate, and a highly

¹³ This latter issue, of commensality, is overlooked in F.G. Downing, "Law and Custom: Luke-Acts and late Hellenism," in B. Lindars (ed.), *Law and Religion* (Cambridge 1988), 149–158; but for the issue's sensitivity compare Josephus, *Ag. Ap.* 2.210 with various accounts of commensality in Luke-Acts.

¹⁴ D. Marguerat, *The First Christian Historian* (SNTMS 121; Cambridge 1996), 129–154, especially 147–154.

¹⁵ J. Jervell, *The Theology of the Acts of the Apostles* (Cambridge: Cambridge 1996), 16, 58–59; cf. idem, *Luke and the People of God* (Minneapolis 1972), 147.

critical one of Gessius Florus. Later, Dio, as a semi-official spokesperson for Trajan (and recalling ch. 1), can remind quarrelling cities of the “tyrannical power” their disputes can afford a governor: “Anyone coming intent on abusing his power needs only ally himself with Nicea against you, or you Nicomedians against the Niceans” and get away with anything.¹⁶ Of course, the local courts themselves are also open to criticism. As Philo says, “The great ones of the earth ... think it right to give great justice to the great and little justice to the little.” One may compare asides in Quintilian, and Trajan on anonymous malicious accusations.¹⁷ In fact, among the ancient commentators preserved for us it has not been possible to find any as optimistic over the actual administration of justice in the Empire as Paul seems to be in Rom 13:1–7, or the author of 1 Peter seems to be (1 Pet 2:13–15).¹⁸

4. PAUL DISTURBING GOOD ORDER

However conformist Paul sounds in Rom 13:1–7, in Galatia, Macedonia and Achaia he had encouraged people to break with civic good order by breaking with the civic cults, as we’ve already noted (and see, further, ch. 14, below). His converts were to abandon all their more obvious social markers—festivals, dietary and other purity rules, and codes regulating social rank, race and gender (Gal 3:28), the rules that structured civic life. And they were not even to substitute for these Jewish law and custom as time-honoured “barbarian” alternatives.

There seems to have been no Jewish precedent for such a stance. Philo is often cited in this connection, for his reference to “some who take the positive laws as pointers to intellectual realities. They are unduly precise in their interpretations of these latter, while quite casually belittling the laws as stated.”¹⁹ But these ‘allegorizers’ do not, by Philo’s account, argue that observance is actually counter-productive, destructive of any good human relationship with Israel’s God; they simply find practical observance unnecessary. Josephus’ Zambrias comes closest to Paul’s response, in his designation of the Mosaic legislation as tyrannously enslaving; but Zambrias does

¹⁶ Dio, *Discourse* 38.36; cf. Cicero, *De officiis* 2.26–27; Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 87.23.

¹⁷ Philo, *De mutatione* 104; cf. Quintilian, *Institutes* 3.8.2–3; 5.7.32; Trajan, in Pliny, *Letters* 10.97; cf. P. Veyne, *The Roman Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1997; ET of “L’empire romain” in *Histoire de la vie privée* [Paris 1985]).

¹⁸ Not everyone takes Rom 13:1–7 as conformist; but see above, ch. 2, 57–58.

¹⁹ Philo, *De migratione* 89; cf. the discussion in J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean*, 177–178, noted above.

not object to traditional rules as such, only to being forbidden to make his own choice of which nation's laws he is to follow.²⁰ He is a sophistic relativist, and Paul is much more radical.²¹

When Paul arrived in a town in Galatia (or in any other province) he would have needed to have had some very telling arguments with which to counter the prevailing ethos, arguments honed to cut through the standard defences of positive law of the kind Dio in the role of sophist would trot out. It would then seem that only from among the Cynics could Paul have been able to find countervailing words and ideas that people were likely to understand and respond to, and we return to the Cynics shortly.²² But the readiness with which some of Paul's converts were now responding to *Torah*-observant Jewish Christians seeking to recall them to the realization of what they had lost in deserting their own ancestral codes without transferring to any fresh framework of traditional law, would seem to show just how powerful the old ethos remained.

On reflection it appears fairly likely that those Paul now opposes in Galatia had indeed been emphasizing the importance of 'the law' in much the sort of vein instanced by Dio's encomium part-quoted earlier (above, and in the previous chapter).²³ It was, they seem to have been insisting, then, 'the law' that stood against παραβάσεις, transgressions, and afforded true piety; it was law that gave life, that ensured δικαιοσύνη, justice, that was the teacher directing us to our ultimate well-being (compare Gal 3:19–25). In place of Paul's Cynic-like anarchism his Galatian converts were now being offered the Jewish-Christian *Torah* as law which would afford as much as and more than had been assured in the abandoned laws of their traditional civic communities.

The companion piece by Dio, *Discourse* 76, then in turn commends custom (ἔθος) and criticizes codified law. For our immediate purposes this sophistic contrasting of the two is not important.²⁴ In many other contemporary writings the two are seen as complementary, and in what follows we shall note that both may be rejected together. But some of a sophist's

²⁰ Josephus, *Ant.* 4.145–149; cf. the discussion in P. Borgen, "‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ and ‘How Far?’: The Participation of Jews and Christians in Pagan Cults", in T. Engberg Pedersen (ed.), *Paul in his Hellenistic Context* (Minneapolis 1995), 30–59, citing 33–39.

²¹ Compare H.D. Rankin, *Sophists, Socratics and Cynics* (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

²² Cf. H.W. Hollander & J. Holleman, "The Relationship of Death, Sin and Law in 1 Cor 15:56", *NovT* XXXV 3 (1993) 270–291.

²³ Dio, *Discourse* 75, and esp. 75.1.

²⁴ Customary law recurs as a theme, for some, even an important one, in current discussions; cf. J.W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies*, 242, 267–268.

disparagement of enacted law is itself worth registering. Law works by compulsion, force, tyrannously (*Discourse* 76.1–2; compare Paul’s “confined”, “under restraint”, Gal 3.23). It is a human invention (*Discourse* 1; compare Paul’s “by angels through an intermediary”—not directly from God—Gal 3.19–20). “Laws create a community of slaves” (*Discourse* 76.4) “no better than a slave”, says Paul (Gal 4.1, 3).²⁵ Laws can always be changed, their power is evanescent (*Discourse* 76.3); the period of the law’s sway is over, insists Paul (Gal 4.4). “The law is for the wicked” (*Discourse* 76.4); “for the sake of transgressions”, says Paul, even more strikingly (Gal 3.19).

The availability to Paul of Dio’s common vocabulary of terms and ideas elsewhere is further shown in 2 Cor 3.3 and 3.7: “the dispensation of death ... not on tablets of stone, but on tablets of human hearts”; “laws”, says Dio, “inflict punishments on our bodies ... laws are preserved on tablets of wood or stone, customs are guarded in our souls” (76.3–4). Clearly, some of Paul’s critique is common currency.

5. CYNIC DISPARAGEMENT OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS

The fifth century Sophists had contrasted law and custom on the one hand with human nature on the other, relativizing the former. Positive laws and conventions were there to be used, accepted or avoided, skilfully.²⁶

Stoics in response had proposed an underlying “law of nature”, supposedly mirrored, albeit imperfectly, in the positive laws that are essential for life in community (as noted earlier).²⁷ This had itself been dismissed in the second century in Rome by Carneades, head of the sceptical New Academy, on the basis of the contradictions between codes, but with little effect.²⁸

The main overt, principled *and practical* critique of both the laws and the customs of civic societies came, later, from the Cynics.²⁹ They were disparag-

²⁵ It is worth noting that conservative writers could also accept the idea of slavery to law, albeit a servility that ensured freedom, as in Cicero, *Pro Cluentio* 53.146, “omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus.” Cf. M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 23–81.

²⁶ Rankin, *Sophists*, 13–91.

²⁷ I put the term ‘law of nature’ in ‘scare quotes’, on the basis of H. Koester, in his “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ. The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought”, in J. Neusner (ed.), *Religions in Antiquity. Essays in Memory of Eerwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521–542 showing it only becomes frequent in Philo (allowing the one instance in Dio 80.5).

²⁸ Stoics, e.g., See Cicero, *De republica* 1.27, 3.33, and *De legibus* 1.18–23, 33–34; with Dio-genes Laertius, *Lives* 7.87–88; and for Carneades, Cicero, *De republica*, 3.8–28; and George H. van Kooten, “Paul the Roman”; and see next note.

²⁹ Epictetus could write critically of “these miserable laws of ours, laws of the dead, not

ing in practice, not just in theory, of most or all observance of traditional and positive law, and particularly those relating to family, property, status and authority as well as to dietary, excretory and sexual customs and tabus, and to prescribed purificatory rites.³⁰

Thus Antisthenes in the tradition found laws ineffective.³¹ Diogenes rejects νόμος in favour of φύσις, law in favour of nature. For Diogenes, in effect, all belongs to the Gods, who of course share all with their friends: everything is common property for common use by those who live "naturally", as divinely intended;³² and this is worked out in terms of sexual relations (any consenting woman with any man), in terms of food (any living thing could be food for any other) and in terms of 'dedicated' items. And many of the anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius show Diogenes and others not just enunciating but enacting these convictions, deliberately flouting convention, whether encoded or not.³³ This is to "falsify the currency", conceding nothing to "law".³⁴

So, closer to Paul's time, Demonax dismisses the laws as useless. Plutarch's Cynic Onesecritus is told by the Indian Calanus that Socrates and Pythagoras had too much regard for the laws.³⁵ Pseudo-Diogenes rejects the laws the Greeks have contrived for themselves as delusive and corrupt; "bad laws for

laws of the Gods" (*Dissertation* 1.13.5); cf Cicero, *De legibus* 1.42. But Stoics still seem to have looked expectantly to the laws of states, especially to their common features, expecting some genuine reflection of "the law of nature" (Musonius 15). And in practice, the Stoic position was to obey, anyway; cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.72, quoted above. State law only dealt with externals, irrelevancies (Epictetus, *Dissertation* 1.29.9–10). A Stoic obeys the law of nature in what really matters, his inner consent or refusal; for the rest, as Epictetus insists in Socratic vein, whether the order came from Caesar or a governor or from the city council, "I must always obey the state law in every detail"; and "good citizens submit to the law of the state." Might a Stoic's reserve make him despise the laws? he is asked, and replies, what could make one readier to obey? *Diss.* 1.12.7, 3.24.107 and 4.7.33; cf. S. Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Freiheit bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen 1989), 82–96.

³⁰ A critique of laws for the kind of 'unjust' society they enforce comes these days from Marxist, feminist and post-colonial thinkers; cf. J.W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies*, 268–274, 293–297.

³¹ Plutarch, *Publicola*, 4.2–3; Diogenes Laertius 1.58.

³² Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.11 (Antisthenes); and 6.38, 6.72–73 (Diogenes).

³³ E.g., Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.29, 32, 34–36, 38, 46, 48, 61, 62, 64, 69; 82, 87–89, 94, 96–97; ps.Lucian, *The Cynic* 10; cf. R.B. Branham, "Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism," in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé & R. Goulet (eds), *Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris 1993), 445–474.

³⁴ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.56 and 71.

³⁵ Lucian, *Demonax* 59; Plutarch, *Alexander* 65.3.

bad people”, concludes Dio.³⁶ And later, Maximus of Tyre chides Socrates for being a slave, obeying the law, in contrast to Diogenes, who was free.³⁷

Cynics reclaim the Golden Age before men’s evil deeds led to laws being imposed, laws which curtailed freedom and institutionalized wickedness. The point is made overtly by Seneca, relying initially on the Stoic Posidonius: when wickedness intruded on the Golden Age, laws became necessary; but Seneca then commends the Cynic insistence that the life-style of the Golden Age exemplified by Diogenes with his cupped hands, is still practicable and preferable.³⁸ For a still more consistently Cynic position, one may compare pseudo-Anacharsis 9, and again Maximus of Tyre 36.4.³⁹ Cynics expected to live here and now, and well, a life independent of the laws and customs of cities and peoples.

Again we need to take note of Dio. We have seen him praising ‘law’, and then lauding custom in preference. Elsewhere he compares existing laws very unfavourably with divine law, and he agrees with Demonax that laws are ineffective: humans are so wicked, and so corrupted by social pressures, there is no possibility that laws will make them live properly.⁴⁰ But elsewhere again, in *Discourse* 80, he introduces himself as a wandering philosopher who has abandoned all thought of wealth, fame and pleasure, behaving much as he has elsewhere pictured Diogenes (but also Odysseus). As a Cynic, then, he is a free man among slaves. Others quarrel over the rival codes of Solon and Draco, Numa and Zaleucus; but their own authors admitted theirs were imperfect, bad laws to suit bad people, imposing slavery on themselves and then building city walls to protect their servitude.⁴¹ Dio continues:

People even nowadays say that justice lies in whatever laws the poor unfortunates write out for themselves or inherit from others no better than them-

³⁶ Ps.Diogenes 28.1; Dio 80.4; cf. H.W. Hollander and J. Holleman, “Death, Sin and Law”, again, 286–289.

³⁷ Maximus of Tyre 36.6; H.D. Betz, *Galatians*, 166, n. 37, quotes Philo, *De ebrietate* 198, on “slavery to customs and laws” (non-Jewish ones, that is); and Josephus’ Zambrias, as noted above. Two Cynic writings, on the other hand, allow grudgingly a positive function for law: ps.Crates 5 (but philosophy is much more effective), and ps.Heraclitus 7.10 (laws may influence behaviour, but not character).

³⁸ Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 90.5–6; cf. 7–14.

³⁹ Cf. A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (1935; repr. Baltimore: Octogan, 1965), 117–152; and F.S. Jones, “*Freiheit*” in *den Briefen des Apostels Paulus* (GTA 34; Göttingen 1981), 93 and 206–207, n. 154.

⁴⁰ Dio *Discourse* 36.23; 69.8.

⁴¹ Dio, *Discourse* 80.1–4, in precise disagreement with the Stoic Posidonius (Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 90.6–7).

selves But with the law of nature abandoned, totally eclipsed, and bedevilled as you are, you keep tight hold on your tablets and scrolls and stone slabs with their pointless squiggles. (80.5)

We shall return to 'nature' and Rom. 2.14–15 in due course. (Elsewhere, obviously, Paul's positive alternative to νόμος is not φύσις, but faith, grace or Spirit.)

6. PAUL'S CYNIC ONSLAUGHT ON LAW

Paul, then, as we have more than once recalled, induced people in Macedonia and Achaia, and in Galatia, to break with fundamental civic laws and customs, without enculturating them into alternative Jewish ones. When Galatian Christians were later being urged by others now to adopt Jewish law (or elements at least of the *Torah*), Paul has, of course, now to adduce arguments from (carefully re-interpreted) Jewish Scripture, from Abraham and Moses (Gal 3). Yet even so, many of the key terms he takes it are being used in favour of 'law' are, as we saw earlier, similar to those of Dio's sophistic pro law-and-order piece, and much of the logic of Paul's counter-argument, many of the issues touched on, are in fact very similar to those of Dio in opposed, Cynic mood. Though his illustrations are from the Torah (Abraham and Moses), it is Cynic-like language that Paul still deploys, the language we may best imagine he had used when first he made contact in the Galatian towns. In Dio's case, this is what someone who knows the arguments in favour of settled law and custom also knows must be said to counter them. If Paul were now effectively to counter the law-and-order propaganda of the 'Judaizers', it would almost inevitably have to have been with the logic of the Cynic anarchistic counter-propaganda with which he had in all likelihood at first come to 'think-and-express' his arguments: law in enacted codes has no direct divine origin, law enslaves, law is ineffective, law makes no one righteous, law merely condemns, law encourages wickedness, or is at best a harsh discipline to be abandoned as soon as possible. (On these last two themes, see further below).

Of course Paul was not a replica run-of-the-tub Cynic (allowing, too, that Cynics were never uniform). No designated Cynic of the first century that we know of proclaimed a crucified Galilean Jew as the focus of his challenge to all inherited custom and law. Yet when Paul writes to new Christians in Galatia who are being lured back into a high regard for 'the law' in Jewish guise he does little or nothing to hide the Cynic resonances of his case.

With the Corinthians Paul had to be more circumspect, apparently moving towards a rather more Stoic position.⁴² Yet even so, he can say “sin gains its power through the law” (1 Cor 15:56).⁴³ But at this juncture, in addressing the Galatians, Paul retains much more of his early radicalism. What he—presumably—had originally said against the laws and customs of their civic communities he now maintains as firmly when the laws and customs of his own people are proposed to replace them. Nothing in the field of right, righteousness, justice, is gained by the kinds of law-observant behaviour proposed (Gal 2.16; 3.11). Admirers of the law (like Dio in *Discourse* 75) might claim that we can rely on the law to foster peace (εἰρήνη), righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), kindness, temperance, faithfulness (πίστις); it prevents violence, and exalts virtue, excellence (ἀρετή) in general. Paul, by contrast, insists it is only by renouncing any such reliance that we can allow the Spirit to bring love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control to fruition (Gal 5.22).

Paul’s own first response to his question, “Why then the law?” is to say it was τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη: it was added for the sake of transgressions (Gal. 3.19). The standard interpretation is in terms of v. 22 and then Rom 4.15 and 5.13: law has the positive function of making wickedness deliberate and culpable and so, punishable.⁴⁴ Certainly Stoics and Epicureans could argue that laws were brought in, “added” (προσετέθη), to cope with human decline.⁴⁵ It could be that the image of the παιδαγωγός (to which we turn in a moment) might reinforce this interpretation. But, as we have just seen, Paul in Galatians allows no other positive results from law in any sense, there are no positive effects of law observance; there is no reassurance at all in this letter that the law is “not sin”, but “holy and just and good” as it becomes in Romans (Rom 7.7, 12). It seems we should accept that here in Galatians Paul is advancing a consistently negative criticism of law (or ‘the law’).⁴⁶ It was indeed added to produce transgressions. And if this is what Paul meant, then the closest analogy is in some of our Cynic sources.

⁴² Cf. F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches*, 88–127, 267–282.

⁴³ Compare, again, H.W. Hollander and J. Holleman, “Death, Sin and Law”.

⁴⁴ Cf. Hubert Hübner, *Law in Paul’s Thought* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1984), 26; H.D. Betz, *Galatians*, 165–167, again; R.N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 138–139, prefers to leave it vague. J.D.G. Dunn, *Galatians*, 188–190, argues for “in order to provide some sort of remedy for transgressions (cf. the value placed on law in Hellenistic society ...)” [citing Betz, 164]. But nothing else in Galatians suggests this.

⁴⁵ Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 90.5–14; Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 5.1136–1160, again.

⁴⁶ So H. Hübner, *Law*, 26–30; H.D. Betz, *Galatians*, 164–167.

Thus, as we have seen, Dio has Solon promulgate "bad laws ... laws to suit bad people" (πονηροὺς ἔγραψε νόμους ... τοὺς ἀρέσοντας πονηροῖς ἔγραψεν).⁴⁷ This would seem to entail not simply that the laws are seen as ineffective (as in pseudo-Heraclitus 7);⁴⁸ here they actually suit wickedness, codify it, encourage it. People are enslaved by these laws: not just bound by rules, but bound to live counter to "the commands of Zeus" ("natural law"), under a curse (ἀρά; cf. κατάρα, Gal 3.10)—until some wandering Cynic arrives to display the only genuine freedom.

So, too, pseudo-Diogenes tells "the Hellenes", "In devising laws for yourselves you assigned yourselves the greatest, the most extensive delusion. All they afford is a witness to your ingrained wickedness."⁴⁹ The invective that follows is much as in Dio: the society these laws reflect and structure is corrupt throughout; gluttonous, drink-sodden, envious, violent. Such a society affords no peace, joy, justice, self-control; (compare all of ps.Diogenes 28 with Gal 5.19–23).

Cynics have, of course, no monopoly on vice-lists. Their significance here, however, is to show that customary laws are seen as an important part of the problem of human societal wickedness, and no part of the solution. As we have seen, this is far from any other conventional view of law (or law and custom). Not even all Cynics went as far in their criticisms, and non-Cynic writers, too, could criticize individual laws and even entire (foreign) codes.⁵⁰ But, if Paul had been as forthright in his first approach to people in Galatia as he is in this letter, the similarity on this issue between his message and that of the more radical Cynics would have been hard to ignore; and here he is (presumably) reaffirming this unsettling stance.

This is not to propose that the argument is identical in both, but it is to note that the attitudes to 'the law' articulated in Galatians, in Dio 80 and in ps.Diogenes 28 have much that is significant and that would have been seen as significant, in common.

The closest that Paul in Romans comes to such an assessment is at Rom 7.9–11, where sin uses the commandment to seduce. Interestingly, the

⁴⁷ Dio 80.4–6; cf. H.W. Hollander and J. Holleman, "Death, Sin and Law", 283.

⁴⁸ Ps.Heraclitus 9 is as dismissive of public life as currently regulated and administered as are Dio 80 and ps.Diogenes 28; but ps.Heraclitus 9 is more optimistic in theory about the likely effectiveness of 'good' laws which mirror "the law of nature" (9.1, 7); cf. ps.Heraclitus 7.10. Here as elsewhere Cynics differ—as, to some readers, Paul himself seems to in his evaluations of the law in Romans as compared with Galatians.

⁴⁹ Ps.Diogenes 28.1.

⁵⁰ See n. 36 above, and Ducos, *Les Romains* 245–247.

possibility that laws may prompt misbehaviour is discussed among less radical circles, either citing a saying attributed to Solon, or independently. A law that prohibits an action risks suggesting it, as remarked by Cicero, Seneca and Philo.⁵¹ However, τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν in Galatians seems much more trenchant.

7. THE LAW AS A HARSH PEDAGOGUE

I have discussed in detail elsewhere the harsh παιδαγωγός image of the Law in Gal. 3, and its Cynic resonances.⁵² Law is certainly seen as educative in contemporary debate, as for instance by Dio, noted above, where the law is a kindly διδάσκαλος for the young, one that rules by persuasion.⁵³ I have found the law as harshly educative only in Philo. The law, he says, is given in a place that means “bitterness”; God “afflicts” in the sense of “disciplines, admonishes, chastens”; and this affliction is a form of slavery. One becomes “a subject, a slave, obeying orders”. Then, quoting Prov 3.11–12 (“whom the Lord loves he rebukes, and chastises every son he acknowledges”), Philo in fact promises that the end of the law’s bitter slave treatment is one’s acknowledgment by God as a son: again, much as in Gal 4.1–7.⁵⁴ Although here the word παιδαγωγός does not occur, yet most of its associations are present, along with the harsh Cynic insistence on slavish toil.

Whatever the source or sources, then, of Paul’s child-minder model, he employs a clearly Cynic form of it as part of his very Cynic downgrading of “the law”.

8. FURTHER NEGATIVE THOUGHTS ON LAW

Paul’s radical challenge to accepted laws and custom, and so to ‘the law’ as such, was by no means restricted to Galatia, even though there is no such discussion of law in the Thessalonian and Corinthian letters as we find in Galatians and later in Romans. As was pointed out above, new Christians in Macedonia and in Achaëa, just as much as those in Galatia, had been

⁵¹ M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 372–374.

⁵² F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, 77–80.

⁵³ Dio, *Discourse* 70.9 with 4–5; M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 439–452, citing Cicero especially.

⁵⁴ Philo, *De congressu* 163, 165, 172, 175, 177 (and 179, it is the power of the law that enforces this chastening affliction).

drawn to break with the codes and conventions of their ancestors and of the towns where they lived as citizens, as resident aliens or as slaves (1 Thess 1.9; 1 Cor 12.2). Presumably, this relative silence is to be explained by assuming that at the time of writing no one had arrived to urge the adoption of the Jewish law—or aspects of it—to replace those inherited systems not long abandoned. Significantly, the Corinthians could be expected to make sense of Paul's brief but very negative aside, "the power of sin is the law" (1 Cor 15.56), whose echoes of a Cynic-sounding critique of Law have been pointed out by Hollander and Holleman. Here "Paul rejects any law, subscribing to the negative view of law that was current among the Cynics who regarded laws as part of the degeneration of humanity."⁵⁵

However much we may discern the continuing positive influence on Paul of his past formation by Jewish law and custom, nowhere in the Thessalonian letters does he base his appeal on the authority of Jewish (or of 'pagan') codes or conventions. As time goes by, however, there are changes.

9. SIGNS OF SOFTENING

As we have just noted, there is every sign that in his first approaches in Corinth Paul had been as radical as in Galatia. But by the time that he writes the preserved letters to Corinth, he is much more cautious about preaching overt freedom of action, and rather happier to urge an inner, more Stoic-seeming autonomy (1 Cor 6.12).⁵⁶ So, despite his rejection of "worldly wisdom" in 1 Cor 1–3, despite his refusal to be bound by the clear implication of a command of Jesus (9.14–15), and despite his insistence that he is "not under law" (9.20), and that "the power of sin is the law" (1 Cor 15:56, again), Paul in fact makes a number of overt appeals to convention (3.16–17; 4.2; 5.1; 7.20–24; 9.7–12). 11.1–16, on women's hair and head-dress, is just the most blatant. The insistence that "nature" here supports conventional gender distinctions echoes, as has often been noticed, the insistence of Stoics (and Philo) over against both sophists and Cynics. It is by facial hair, insists Epictetus, that "nature" distinguishes male and female humans, and "we ought to preserve the signs God has given."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ H.W. Hollander and J. Holleman, "Death, Sin and Law", 290.

⁵⁶ S. Vollenweider, *Freiheit*, 24–25.

⁵⁷ Epictetus 1.16.9–14; M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 244–258. T.M. Martin, "Paul's Argument from Nature for the Veil in 1 Corinthians 11:13–15: A Testicle Instead of a Head-Covering", *JBL* 123.1 (2004), 75–84, argues for a more than symbolic significance.

The repudiation of homosexual practice in Rom 1.26–27 may be held to be more in line with Cynicism, at least as it evolved, than with Stoic sexual ethics.⁵⁸ Be that as it may, the “natural theology” of Rom 1.19–21 is more Stoic than Cynic.⁵⁹ So, too, is the ‘natural conformity’ argument of 2.13–15. It is Stoic rather than Cynic to expect ‘natural morality’ to coincide with what ‘the law’ requires; Cynics would expect “nature” to induce a very different behaviour than that inculcated by any civic code.⁶⁰

In particular is Rom 13.1–2 very close to the stance of Epictetus. Though he can be very critical of individual emperors, he insists, as we saw previously, “I must always obey the state law in every particular”; and “a fine and good man subordinates (ὑποτέταξεν, cf. Paul’s ὑποτάσσασθαι) his will to him who administers the universe, precisely as good citizens [subordinate themselves] to civil law.”⁶¹ We may compare Dio in one of his Stoic pieces: “Kings derive their power and stewardship from Zeus.”⁶² On stressing the penalties of conscience over civic punishment we may compare Cicero, *Laws* 1.40, where Paul’s emphasis on external punishment would have sounded Epicurean. Over all, however, Paul to the Romans is Stoically undisturbing, firmly on the side of order and law.

While some aspects of the Cynic devaluation of codes and customs remain in later writing, much, then, is softened; and analogies with Stoic conservatism become more significant. In Romans and Philippians only traces of the old radicalism survive. Although it is the law, “the old written code” that arouses our passions (Rom 7.5–6), it is “sin” now that enslaves, rather than the law, it is really sin using the commandment that incites transgression, while “the law is holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good” (Rom 7.12, 16; cf. 8.3–4). Just once, much more trenchantly, counting “righteousness under law” as so much dung (Phil 3.6–8) does retain a strong Cynic resonance.

⁵⁸ See F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 52 and n. 97.

⁵⁹ Compare Musonius, *Discourse* 14.

⁶⁰ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.87–89, 99.

⁶¹ Epictetus, *Dissertations* 3.24.108 and 1.12.7; cf. 4.7.33; and Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.3–4, 118; and Musonius 15. Jewish ascriptions of divine authorisation for kings are never as unqualified as in Paul and these Stoics.

⁶² Dio, *Discourse* 1.45; cf. 3.8.

10. YET THE LAW IS TO BE FULFILLED

In passing, in an address to the Rhodians, Dio says,

If anyone chisels out one word from any official tablet, you will put him to death ... and if anyone should go to your public record office and erase one squiggle of any law (κεραΐαν νόμου τινός), or one syllable of a decree.

(Dio 31.86)

Similarly Matthew's Jesus insists, "So long as heaven and earth endure, not a jot, not a squiggle (ἰὼτα ἔν ἧ μία κεραΐα), will disappear from the law" (Matt 5.18//Lk 16.17). Josephus insisted that the sacred Jewish text must be preserved to the syllable; Philo, that "nothing be added or taken away", echoing Deut 4.2, 12.32.⁶³ David Daube notes that in Roman law a charge had to be pleaded in the exact words laid down in the statute, even if damage claimed involved items not specified.⁶⁴

Then the general authority of established enactments is insisted on by Paul when he asserts that a covenant- (διαθήκη) cannot be annulled by a law promulgated four hundred and thirty years later, even by promulgators acting, it would seem, as agents of the testator (Gal 3.17).⁶⁵

David Daube and Michèle Ducos bring to our attention a phrase in some Roman laws, to the effect that nothing in this legislation puts in question any prior legislation (*eius hac lege nihilum rogatur*). There seems to have been a long standing debate as to whether this intends to affirm all traditional civil and especially customary familial rights, or whether its scope is more limited. Ducos argues that it is only a verbal device to allow for annulment of any laws that explicitly insisted on their own sacred unchangeability. Otherwise any suggested change, until adopted, would constituted a proposal to break existing law.⁶⁶

Even if this correctly summarises the debate, this is no place to take sides. What we need to do here is to reflect on how it was supposed one could understand obeying, "fulfilling" in changed and diverse circumstances laws so "set in stone" (sometimes literally so).

⁶³ Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.27–42; Philo, *De spec. leg.* 4.143.

⁶⁴ D. Daube, "Greek and Roman Reflections on Impossible Laws", *Natural Law Forum* 12 (Notre Dame 1967), 1–84; repr. in D. Cohen and D. Simon (eds), *David Daube. Collected Studies in Roman Law II* (Frankfurt am Main 1991), 1129–1222, citing 1130.

⁶⁵ Commentators have discussed this in terms of διαθήκη understood as will, testament, but not, it seems, in terms of "law" more generally; cf. R.N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 128. On the latter, see now Bernard S. Jackson, "Why the New Testament?", to date unpub. paper, Ehrhardt Seminar, University of Manchester, Feb. 2013.

⁶⁶ D. Daube, "Impossible Law", 1130; M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 214–222.

Ducos argues that older Roman law, the Twelve Tables, was mostly brief and very general. The lawyers “créent le droit formaliste dont nous avons parlé plus haut et en même temps ils l’interprètent avec liberté. Les formules strictes qu’ils établissent sont utilisées dans bien des domaines, adaptées à des fins pour lesquelles elles n’étaient pas prévues.” Once people begin to attempt more precision, providing explicitly for more and more distinct circumstances, application becomes harder, rather than easier. A simple law, as most of the old ones were, allowed application to be argued in actual and specific circumstances, rather than demanding that circumstances fit prior detailed anticipation.⁶⁷ Be that as it may, the issue of interpretation was still as central in Quintilian’s day as it was in Cicero’s late republic. “Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention (*scriptis et voluntatis*) of the law, in fact a large proportion of legal disputes turn on these points”; and Quintilian proceeds to provide examples. It is significant that even where the letter is unquestioned, it still has to be argued that it clearly represents the *voluntas* of the drafter (on which Quintilian follows the author of *Ad Herrenium*).⁶⁸

His confidence that “the intentio”, *voluntas*, will be discernible, can best be illustrated in terms of the educational practice he earlier outlined. Pupils should learn to paraphrase in various styles, abbreviate and expand, while preserving the original sense (*salvo ... sensu*). And the same applies to translation from another language, even from poetry to prose, where we may still hope to convey “the same thing” (*eadem*).⁶⁹ (I have discussed this at greater length above, ch. 6, and elsewhere, with reference to Philo and Josephus in particular.)⁷⁰

For most purposes, however, it was enough to agree, some words are smarter, more fashionable than others (better Greek, better Latin), and some, if only by convention, more suitable than others as vehicles for one’s intended meaning. But speech by and large is thought to work by labelling

⁶⁷ M. Ducos, *Les Romains*, 154–161; 304–308, citing 305.

⁶⁸ Quintilian, *Institutes* 7.6, citing 7.6.1 (cf. 5.5–6), and *Ad Herrenium* 2.[ix].13–[x] 14; cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 2.116–117; cf also Dagoberto López Sojo, “Abraham, padre de todos nosotros”. *Análisis estilístico-argumentativo de Rm 4*, 1–25. *Abraham, paradigma de fe monoteísta* (CahRB, 64; Paris: Gabalda, 2005), 102–103.

⁶⁹ Quintilian, *Institutes* 13.2 and 10.5.3–4.

⁷⁰ See further, ch. 6, above, pp. 160–161, and F.G. Downing, “Words and Meanings”. In both I rely on J. Pinborg, “Classical Antiquity: Greece”, 69–126. The practice of Biblical interpretation at Qumran seems to show that a very similar understanding of ‘meaning’ obtained among writers in Hebrew (and Aramaic); cf. G.J. Brooke, *Exegesis at Qumran* (JSOT Supp 29; Sheffield 1985), 36–44 and 354–356.

the 'meanings' that the words simply signal, meanings that have to be grasped with the help of the words but are themselves logically prior to and other than the words. And then, of course, as intimated above, any given set of words may 'label' a number of objective meanings, including varied but still objective meanings, quite different meanings; and the obverse also holds: any given specific meaning or set of meanings can remain 'the same' when signalled by fresh words, even quite different words.

I suggest that this has important implications for our interpretation of talk of "fulfilling the law", whether in Matt 5.17–19, or in Paul at Gal 5.14, Rom 8.4, 13.8. We are dealing neither with the literalism we inherited from the Enlightenment, nor the creativity of each reader, as in some postmodernism. Rather will it have been assumed by these early Christian authors that God's law 'has', 'can evoke' God's definitive sense, which the one set of words authoritatively labels, but whose God-given content we may well still need to have clarified for us. In practice Matthew quite clearly took a different line from that advocated by Paul (Matt 23.2); but his insistence that the sacred verbal 'labels' be maintained intact left him much freer than he is often thought to have been to discern the supposed divine intention. And Paul is not arbitrarily playing with words when he talks of fulfilling the law. He is sure he has been guided by God to grasp the unchanging intention with which God promulgated it, the content that the sacred words distinctively label but may well not convey to those out of tune with the divine author.

Be it said, this (as also argued in ch. 6) is not quite the same 'intentional fallacy' as was discussed in the 50's in Anglo-Saxon philosophy, where it was 'subjective' meaning that was discounted, over against the objective text. Of course, the upshot in the ancient world was much as post-modernists now insist. As ancient disputes show, even people in the same philosophical school with its agreed terminologies achieved no agreed definitive access to objectively given ideas. Nor did ancient lawyers, including later Rabbinic disputants.

CONCLUSION

In Galatians Paul says negative things about 'law' that look very like attitudes characteristically—and often distinctively—enunciated and put into practice by Cynics: law in enacted codes has no direct divine origin, law enslaves, law is ineffective, law makes no one righteous, law merely condemns, law encourages wickedness, or is at best a harsh discipline to be dispensed with as soon as possible. It would seem very likely that he would have had to

deploy such talk from the very start, when he encouraged the abandonment of inherited codes without even substituting some other ancient tradition. But in doing this he will have been sure that he was being led to understand what God had always meant in these laws that he had allowed Moses to promulgate.

Yet, allowing that for Paul, 'righteousness', or 'being right with God' does not result from conventional observance of the injunctions of Mosaic or other law, might that not at least imply that those with 'faith in/of Jesus' are taken to be 'acquitted' of failing to meet any interpretation of its demands—as many interpreters aver? The following chapter argues otherwise.

CHAPTER TEN

JUSTIFICATION AS ACQUITTAL? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL PARLANCE IN PAUL'S WORLD

INTRODUCTION: ISSUES OF TRANSLATION

Dynamic equivalence may work well as a first step in interpretative translation, perhaps suggesting a whole range of warranted analogies.¹ 'April fool' for 'poisson d'avril' clearly works better than 'fish of April'; but how about 'Et ta soeur?'—'Dry up', 'Tell it to the marines', 'Keep your nose out of this' ... The trouble comes when the possibility of dis-analogy is ignored, and the familiar—perhaps, 'Tell it to the marines'—is read uncritically into the original. It will here be argued that traditional western law court talk of acquittal, of verdicts of 'not guilty', has too readily been assumed relevant for our understanding of ancient Mediterranean judicial practice, and in particular in relation to Paul on 'justification'.

Specifically, commentators in one important Christian tradition, and writing in English on the Pauline letters regularly, if not uncontroversially, render δικαίωσις and δικαίωω with 'justification' and 'justify', and then explain those terms as 'forensic', as deploying legal parlance, indicating 'acquittal' and 'acquit': and 'acquittal' is then itself interpreted by way of modern western common convention.² The actual system of law—UK Common Law, Napoleonic (continental European), or other is left unspecified.³ What one

¹ On "Dynamic Equivalence" see Eugene A. Nida and Charles R. Taber, *The Theory and Practice of Translation* (Helps for Translators VIII; Leiden: Brill, 1969), esp. 22–28.

² Cf. John A. Ziesler, *The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul* (SNTSMS 20; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 17–127, *passim*, but, e.g., 18, 28. Much of what follows depends on Ziesler's account of the evidence, while reading the latter differently. For this usage compare, for further instance, both Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., "Justification in Pauline Thought. A Catholic View", and John Reuman, "Justification in Pauline Thought. A Protestant View", in David E. Aune (ed.), *Rereading Paul Together. Protestant and Catholic Perspectives on Justification* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), respectively 77–94, citing 79, 84; and 108–130, citing 112.

³ Pietro Bovati's *Re-Establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible* (tr. Michael J. Smith; JSOTSup 105; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), originally in Italian (presupposing a "Napoleonic" system), seems to have been readily understood by scholars writing under different legal systems. I record my thanks to Dr. Francesco

is acquitted of is guilt, responsibility for an offence, “*la culpabilité du chrétien*”.⁴ In German in the same tradition we find “*Rechtfertigung*” and “*rechtfertigen*” glossed as “*Freispruch*” and “*freisprechen*”.⁵ Such talk of ‘acquittal’ is then taken to represent Paul’s own ‘forensic’ usage. It will be argued, however, that this commonplace seems to reflect varieties of contemporary western judicial systems, rather than ancient judicial discourse, whether Jewish or other.

1. CONTEMPORARY WESTERN COURT PROCEDURE

The model as spelled out recently by Tom Wright (but preferring ‘righteousness’ to render δικαιοσύνη) runs as follows:

‘Righteousness’, within the lawcourt setting ... denotes the status that someone has when the court has found in their favour ... it is possible for the judge to make a mistake, and to ‘justify’—that is, to find in the favour of—a person who is of thoroughly bad character and who did in fact commit the crimes of which he or she has been charged. If that happens, it is still the case that the person concerned, once the verdict has been announced, is ‘righteous’; that is, ‘acquitted’, ‘cleared’, ‘vindicated’, ‘justified’.⁶

In this model ‘acquittal’ focuses on the accusation and culpability, as clearly do “*efface la culpabilité*” and “*freisprechen*”. Then later, alongside “righteousness” as “the status of acquitted, forgiven, cleared”, Wright adds, “in good standing in the community as a result of the judge’s pronouncement.”⁷

Giglio, of the University of Manchester Law School, for a corresponding account of Italian judicial verdicts; and to Dr. Nuno Ferreira, also of the University of Manchester Law School, for an account of such verdicts in Portugal and Germany, and also Italy: all such focusing on guilt (or innocence).

⁴ Jean Héring, *La Première Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (CNT VII, 2nd edn; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1959), 45, on 1 Cor 6:11.

⁵ Gottlieb G. Schrenk, δίκη, δικαίος, κτλ, TWNT II, 216; Eberhard Jüngel, *Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens. Eine theologische Studie in ökumenischer Absicht* (Mohr [Siebeck]: Tübingen, 1998), 175 (citing Melancthon); Henri Blocher, “Justification of the Ungodly (*Sola Fide*). Theological Reflections,” in D.A. Carson et al., *Justification and Variegated Nomism II The Paradoxes of Paul* (Tübingen/Grand Rapids MI: Mohr [Siebeck] and Baker Academic, 2004), 465–500, citing 491; Christiane Tietz, “*Rechtfertigung*,” RGG 7, 98.

⁶ Tom Wright, *Justification. God’s Plan and Paul’s Vision* (London: SPCK, 2009), 69–70; cf. 112–113; compare Douglas A. Campbell, *The Deliverance of God. An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge, 2009), 659–666. It is disappointing that Campbell fails to “re-read” this forensic motif.

⁷ T. Wright, *Justification*, 187.

The model outlined seems clearly to be drawn from western criminal prosecution, where ‘acquittal’ is ‘release from an accusation.’⁸ The question arises, can this terminology of ‘verdict of acquittal’ be validly taken to represent first century or older Jewish or wider eastern Mediterranean judicial (apparently criminal) proceedings, so that Greek δίκ- or Hebrew צדק terms may be validly translated in the ways suggested. Perhaps surprisingly, there appears to be no clear supporting evidence, and plenty available to the contrary.

Modern western judicial practice, so far as I am able to discern, makes a clear distinction between a verdict of guilt or innocence, on the one hand, and a sentence of punishment (derived from detailed code and/or case law), or release, on the other. So, for instance, Pietro Bovati, in his detailed monograph, can take this distinction as necessary, even when he confesses himself unable to find it articulated in most of the First Testament materials examined.⁹ *This distinction between verdict on the one hand and sentence and its execution on the other, that is, between formal ‘status’ and practical effect, seems not to be mirrored in ancient usage.*

Further, just as questionable is the ‘perlocutionary effect’ posited by Wright and others for acquittal in a modern western court of law.¹⁰ It can by no means be taken for granted that either a formulaic verdict of ‘not guilty’ or a judicial discharge, or both, will in today’s practice give the accused an effective positive status, place him or her in, or even back in good standing in her or his community. The community may not notice; but, even if it does, it, or significant sectors of it do, many may not accept the decision of the court.¹¹ The only sure perlocutionary effect is within the relevant and impersonal judicial system: the accused is now not subject to *legally imposed* penalty, is acquitted so far as the court and its judicial system is concerned.

⁸ OED (1989) gives “discharge a debt” as the oldest English usage, *Ancren Riwle*, c. 1230; “to set free or clear from a charge or accusation, to exculpate, exonerate, declare not guilty”, in Chaucer. c. 1386.

⁹ P. Bovati, “Sentence and Execution”, ch. 7, in his *Re-Establishing Justice*, 344–387, esp. 345; for his only supposed instances, Job 34:18 and Prov 24:24, see further, below.

¹⁰ For the terminology, ‘performative’, and ‘perlocutionary’, ‘illocutionary’, see John L. Austin, *How to do things with words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a discussion of this approach in relation to Biblical law, cf. Bernard S. Jackson, “Speech Acts and Speech Behaviour,” in *id.*, *Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law*, 42–69.

¹¹ Any reader doubting this generalization might ‘browse’ ‘Lee Harvey Oswald’ or ‘paedophile acquittal’ or ‘Princess Diana’ on the Internet.

Finally, it is unquestionably true that status in the wider community is importantly at issue in ancient judicial proceedings; but, it will be argued, positive status is not itself constituted by any court's pronouncement, formulaic or otherwise, that might for instance be translated by us with 'not guilty' or '*nicht schuldig*' or '*non coupable*'; and certainly not by merely declaring someone צדיק/צדקה or δίκαιος/δίκαια. Status in the ancient world is not a formality, it is only real in its active recognition in the community.

'Acquitted', in our contemporary usage, is backward looking, the accusation has been agreed to be unwarranted, and the accused is, so far as the court is concerned, freed from it, held to be guiltless (or, in other, non-criminal contexts, the slate has been wiped clean, a debt discharged).¹² The contention here is that in the (emergent) Jewish canon and other writings relevant for our understanding of Paul's thought, there is no sign at all of a formal forensic verbal verdict that an accusation of misdemeanour has been shown to be unwarranted: there is nothing to be interpreted as an oral formula of acquittal that might then be translated by Greek δίκ- or Hebrew צדק terms.¹³ Of course, we might ourselves still say of someone unpunished by a court and resuming without further challenge her or his place in the community, that he or she has been acquitted; yet, with no institution for verbally announcing acquittal there is no context in which Greek δίκ- or Hebrew צדק terms used in our Scriptures invite, let alone insist on *translation* by 'acquit', 'acquitted', 'acquittal'. These clusters of Hebrew or Greek words are used in our texts, to be sure, but for something other than for verdicts of acquittal or for talk about such verdicts having been reached.

To substantiate the foregoing it is necessary to examine a number of instances that might plausibly have been formative for Paul and his hearers. (For good or ill, there are not very many that warrant attention.) Both Hebrew and Greek (LXX) are considered; Paul seems mostly to follow readings either close to or even identical with those of the emergent LXX, but allowance must be made for his having had access to Hebrew texts as well.¹⁴

¹² It is possible that LXX Sir 18:22 uses δικασαιωθῆναι where we might talk of being acquitted of a vow; or we might prefer to think of paying your vow as putting you in good standing with God; cf. 23:1.

¹³ P. Bovati, *Re-Establishing Justice*, 357, accepts that צדיק is not, as he would have expected, used for 'not guilty' in any of the biblical legal texts.

¹⁴ See Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture*, and S.E. Porter and C.D. Stanley (eds), *As It Is Written*.

2. IN SEARCH OF A PERFORMATIVE VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL IN THE SCRIPTURES

2.1. *An Acquittal Verdict Using צדק or δικ- Words?*

In Genesis 38 Judah is told that his widowed daughter-in-law Tamar has been “playing the prostitute” and become pregnant.¹⁵ We may be tempted to read the account in our terms, but have to resist categorizing the information given to Judah distinctively *either* as witness *or* as prosecution charge *or* as verdict (albeit as an informal, un-formulaic verdict, and from an [un-sworn] ‘jury’): in these terms, perhaps Tamar’s neighbours provide all three at once. In response, and as patriarch, Judah accepts one or two or all of witness, charge, and verdict, and condemns Tamar to death by fire. However, she is able to prove to Judah that he himself has had sexual intercourse with her; and then, recognising (implicitly) that she has been pursuing the overriding and extenuating aim of raising within his line a child to carry his own dead son’s name, and has been doing this in the face of his (Judah’s) own refusal to mate her with another son, he says, “she is more in the right than I am,” צדקה ממני (Gen 38:26); or, “Tamar is justified, rather than I”, δεδικαίωται θάμαρ ἢ ἐγώ (LXX).¹⁶

Tamar thus escapes sentence, and the right/just terminology sought is here deployed. However, Judah’s utterance cannot coherently be taken as a verdict of ‘not guilty’, for the narrative says explicitly that guilty as charged Tamar certainly is, and Judah does not deny it: the charge is not withdrawn. Rather do Judah’s words acknowledge the social fact, that Tamar has been pursuing an over-riding obligation that he for his part has shirked, and so, implicitly (with no formula of withdrawal of the accusation) the sentence is cancelled; or at least, it is not carried out. Perhaps Judah is to be held to have disqualified himself from acting as judge. Be that as it may, Tamar is not burnt to death. Yet the episode is not complete. Tamar bears not one son but two. Perhaps Yahweh has also shown his approval? He has been active retributively earlier in the story. But certainly, when Tamar has successfully given birth to Perez and Zerah, then her positive status in Judah’s family and in the wider community is assured (compare Ruth 4.12). Tamar received hope of vindication in Judah’s public acknowledgment, still more hope by not being punished, but was actually vindicated only when she has been

¹⁵ Cited by T. Wright, *Justification*, 49–50.

¹⁶ Compare 2 Sam 14.4–11; and cf. J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 43.

able to fulfil her familial obligation. Thus, if Judah had gone on to say, “But sadly, we’ve still got to burn her,” then, on its own, his acknowledgment would have been no vindication; so, too, if Yahweh had prevented a live birth. Of course, *we* may say, “she was acquitted”; but nothing in the text (including מְנִי צִדְקָה or δεδικαίωται θαμάρ ἢ ἐγώ) amounts to a pronounced verdict to that effect. These phrases say something quite other.

Fundamentally we must needs conclude that the process recounted is far too unlike our own court proceedings for our ideas of a moment of formal acquittal by a spoken verdict of ‘not guilty’ to be read into any part of it; but also that if English ‘justify’ or ‘right’ or some roughly equivalent other European words are used in translating Judah’s pronouncement, there is no warrant at all for glossing them with ‘acquittal’. In the Hebrew Judah says nothing like, “She is more acquitted than I am,” nor “You are acquitted rather than I” in the Greek. He is saying in effect, “You rather than I have been playing a part that warrants a continuing positive interactive role in the community.”

So, to repeat, importantly for this part of the argument, מְנִי צִדְקָה is clearly not a performative judicial formula, nor is it a performative verdict; in fact, no distinct verdict as such is pronounced. There is no obvious moment of acquittal, even though, *by the end of the account*, we might, if we so wished, conclude that Tamar was ultimately ‘vindicated’, and her getting pregnant within her dead husband’s family by subterfuge, perilous though it was, was ‘justified’ in the event. Only at the conclusion are such words appropriate. And no, Tamar was not acquitted, just the charge was not pursued, the threatened penalty was not inflicted.¹⁷

2.2. *In Search of Just Any Performative Formula of Acquittal*

It is important to recognise that the prosecutors in a case are almost certainly the chief witnesses, who themselves may stand under the threat of the penalty they seek to have imposed, should their testimony be proven false (Deut 19.19; cf. Prov 19.5, 9). And if the judges fail to punish a false witness

¹⁷ As noted by T. Wright, *Justification*, 49–50, similar phrases are used at 1Sam 24.17 and 24.18, by Saul to David; but here again it is to acknowledge observance of social obligation, contrasted with the speaker’s own failure; compare also 1Sam 26.21. At Ezek 16.51–52 Jerusalem is told that her sins make Samaria appear more in the right than she is (RSV). This is an assessment of their respective places in the community of nations (16.53–58), and it is not a verdict of acquittal for Samaria (though there is still hope of restoration for both).

then God may be expected to (1Kgs 8.31–32, cited below; Prov 21.28). The witnesses most likely bring the accused they have caught in the act or found with incriminating evidence and come with guilt already socially acknowledged, seeking socially sanctioned and socially executed rather than arbitrary and individual and unlimited retribution. David Daube suggested that we should view “the relation between witness and accused as a sort of single combat, duel, ordeal. When the witness is represented as ‘standing up’, this seems to denote not only a getting up in the assembly but also a rising to do battle.”¹⁸ It is normally a contest over punishment, not normally a contest over guilt; and it is between adversaries before an umpire with power to decide the form of punishment and to authorise it and have it inflicted. False witness is an acknowledged possibility, and the wrongly accused could escape punishment, but, as said, courts meet, not expecting to discuss guilt, but to impose socially agreed, rather than arbitrary and unlimited punishment, a punishment whose deservedness is already socially recognised. “Justifying the wicked” is refusing to authorise and execute the expected punishment; it is not uttering a false verdict of ‘not guilty’.

In Joshua 7 all Israel is suspected of harbouring “forbidden things,” consecrated booty. The tribes present themselves in turn, and the tribe of Judah is taken (by lot, it seems), and then the clan of Zerah, and then the family of Zabdi and then finally Achan is taken, confesses, and he is burned and stoned (with all his household, MT). Clearly everyone else is tacitly exonerated, but here is no mention of any formula of exculpation. Just not being chosen for punishment constitutes what we today could term acquittal, but no distinct verdict of acquittal as such is articulated.¹⁹

The judicial instructions in the “Covenant Code” in the Torah allow for disputes over the disappearance of chattels purportedly given into another’s safekeeping, to be settled in the same way (Exod 22.7–9); one party in the dispute is determined by lot to be in the wrong and is to make double restitution (either for theft or for the adjudged false accusation, presumably), and the one not chosen gains: but still there is no instruction to declare the latter’s innocence.²⁰ As with every other accusation, if the case is taken as

¹⁸ David Daube, in “Witness in Bible and Talmud”, paper delivered in the Oxford Centre for Graduate Studies, in Calvin M. Carmichael (ed.) *Collected Works of David Daube*, (2 vols; Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1992), 1.380–420, citing 411–412.

¹⁹ Compare the structurally similar 1 Sam 14.24–46.

²⁰ With beasts, more publicly obvious property, a solemn oath before God, allowing for

proven: the accused is to be punished. The only signification of innocence if the accusation were not upheld would be, so far as we can tell, the absence of punishment.

This is (or should be) particularly clear at 1 Kgs 8.31–32. RSV reads,

If a man sins against his neighbour and is made to take an oath, and comes and swears his oath before thine altar in this house, then hear thou in heaven, and act, and judge thy servants, condemning the guilty *by bringing his conduct upon his own head*, and vindicating the righteous *by rewarding him according to his righteousness*.
[present author's emphasis]

Punishment or reward *constitute* condemnation or vindication/acquittal; although the preamble talks of “sinning” as fact, the continuation indicates an accusation still to be established in a happy or painful outcome in socially experienced events. Intriguingly, REB adds further “ands”: “condemning the accused *and* bringing his deeds on his own head, acquitting the innocent *and* rewarding him as his innocence may deserve,” making each a set of distinct acts. But, significantly, there is nothing in the Hebrew to warrant the distinguishing additions:

להרשיע רשע לתת דרכו בראשו
ולהצדיק צדק לתת לו בצדקתו

In fact there is a very strict balance of terms, and the lines might better be rendered as “on the evil one bring evil on his head in accord with his evil, and on the righteous bring what is right in accord with his righteousness”, just as the LXX translator interprets each as a single act of punishment or reward, actually rendering *להרשיע רשע* by ἀνομηθῆναι ἄνομον. Where the passage is repeated at 2 Chr. 6.22–23, the LXX again maintains the single action in each case, but here has τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀνόμῳ καὶ ἀποδοῦναι ὁδὸς αὐτοῦ εἰς κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ δικάσαι δίκαιον τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ, There is, again, no distinct passing of sentence, of ‘guilty’ or of ‘not guilty’ ‘acquitted’.

In the insistence “I will not justify the wicked” (“will never acquit—*לֹא־אֶצְדִּיק*—the guilty,” REB; Exod 23.7; cf. 34.7), God is not refusing to make an unwarranted verbal proclamation of innocence (with one possible exception, see below, God never enunciates warranted ones, either), rather is God affirming a programmatic insistence on punishing each and every miscarriage of justice. Those not suffering divine punishment are (for the time

God to punish any taking of the divine name in vain suffices and no restitution is made; but with still no articulated verdict of innocence.

being) tacitly deemed guiltless, without any further ado. When God says he will “not hold guiltless” one who takes his name in vain (Exod 20.7), he is making “taking his name in vain” a punishable offence, not refusing a “not guilty” verdict.²¹

In Isa 50:8–9 modern translators are drawn to use declaratory language, where “one who will clear my name” is paralleled by “who will declare me guilty?”²² But the context still indicates a conviction that it is Yahweh’s power, not some spoken verdict that will counter any accusation of disobedience or disloyalty, precluding any punitive-seeming outcome, and will so actively vindicate his servant. While the metaphorical language may be taken to allude to a court’s sentence of condemnation to punishment, there is still no indication of a spoken verdict of acquittal (nor is there any such in the Greek).²³

Thus it must surely be seen as significant that alongside all the promises and injunctions not to acquit the wicked there is no promise and no injunction to acquit the innocent: innocence is tacitly but eloquently “declared” by a person remaining securely unpunished while the guilty by contrast suffer. Not even for the falsely accused is anything but freedom from punishment needed to affirm his or her righteousness. It is precisely this common conviction that presents Job with his problem: How can he effectively affirm his innocence in the light of the contrary evidence of his (obviously punitive) suffering? (On Job, see further, below.)

We are still looking for passages that (in Hebrew) might have influenced Jewish court practice in Paul’s day, or that (in Greek, LXX) might more likely have influenced Paul and some at least of his hearers. The closest I can find to possible talk of a spoken verdict of innocence is at Prov 24.23–25, where Bovati here discerns a verdict (although he is clear that this would be uncharacteristic usage). The context seems to be given as forensic, v. 23, במשפט, “in judgment,” and it is utterance that is at issue, אמר לרשע צדיק אתה, “he who says to the wicked, ‘you are righteous’ is accursed ...”, while the

²¹ LXX “οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀκαθάρτιστι” reads it as inexorable punishment; cf. Deut 5.11, but also 1 Kgs 2.9, οὐ μὴ ἀθωώσῃς, “not hold ineligible for punishment.”

²² So REB; for contrast, compare Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Isaiah 40–55. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 19a; New York: Doubleday, 2002), 321, who in comment proposes “a verdict of innocent ... a verdict of not guilty”, while himself in fact translating מצדיקי as “the one who will vindicate me”, partnered by “who is the one who will condemn me?” 317–318. The LXX deploys the forensic metaphor, but even less suggests any articulated verdict of acquittal.

²³ One may compare Prov 17.15, 18.5; Isa 5.23.

proverb continues, “but it will go well with those who condemn the wicked, and they will be blessed with prosperity.” The switch to the plural, however, appears to generalise the context to comments among the community at large, rather than restrict it to a formal pronouncement in court to a particular offender. At any rate, that is how the LXX translator seems to have taken it: ὁ εἰπὼν τὸν ἀσεβῆ δίκαιός ἐστιν, where τὸν ... ἐστιν is similarly a reported comment, and is in no way a verdict (however unc customary) in a case.²⁴

We may also note David saying to Shimei, “You shall not die” (2 Sam 19.23). But that is not a verdict of acquittal (cf. 1 Kgs 2.9), it is a (provisional) refusal of punishment for one who has confessed his guilt and has begged to be let off.²⁵ So, similarly, at Zech 3.1–5, the High Priest, Joshua, is reinstated by being clothed in fine vestments, having been told that this will demonstrate divine forgiveness in restoration to office. There is no performative declaration of pardon prior to the re-investment.

2.3. In Quest of Any Formally Articulated Acknowledgement That an Accusation Was Unwarranted

Narratives of false accusations, where we might imagine the possibility of a formal acquittal, are hard to come by. Joseph is falsely accused of attempted rape by Potiphar’s wife, and is imprisoned, only subsequently to be released and promoted to be vice-regent of all Egypt. He is certainly vindicated, but there is no indication of a formal acquittal (or retraction; Gen 39–41). Benjamin is falsely accused of stealing Joseph’s silver goblet; the brothers enjoy some sort of reconciliation with Joseph, but there is no formal acquittal for Benjamin (Gen 44–45). The brothers ask how they can clear themselves (Gen 44.16), not how they can acquit themselves. Joseph never formally ‘acquits’ the ten guilty brothers of his kidnapping; they ask for assurance of forgiveness, but what they receive, significantly, is an assurance of continuing wellbeing (Gen 50.15–21).

And when Joseph’s part in the story is retold the procedure presupposed is no different; cf. Ps 105.17–22. So *T. Jos* 1 summarises,

I was in bonds and he [God] loosed me,
falsely accused, and he testified on my behalf;
assaulted by bitter words of the Egyptians,

²⁴ “Uncustomary”—so, Bovati, *Re-Establishing Justice*, 356–357, as per n. 9, above; with Prov 24.24 Bovati pairs Job 34.18, but that seems even more clearly a comment, not a verdict.

²⁵ At Ex 9.27, Pharaoh says, “Yahweh is in the right, I and my people are in the wrong;” but this is hardly a verdict in court that Yahweh is not guilty of some offence, this is a culprit confessing his own misdeed; cf. Jer 12.1; Lam 1.18.

and he rescued me,
a slave,
he exalted me.²⁶

Joseph's freedom and promotion constitute God's "testimony" and there is no talk here of this as 'acquittal' as such; nor is there in Philo's later retelling of the happy outcome and also his reassurance to his brothers (*Jos.* 122–124, 266), nor in Josephus's re-writing (*A.J.* 2.74, 89–91, 197).

Although Jeremiah 37.11–14 is set in the context of a punitive war, that should not exclude it from consideration. Nebuzaradan's "I loose you from the chains on your hands" is perhaps an acquittal (in the light of Jeremiah's narrated favouring of Babylonian demands) rather than amnesty. However, there is no indication that this mirrors a regular judicial ritual; and when Josephus later echoes the account, for him it indicates freeing from punitive enslavement, not acquittal from admitted culpability (Josephus, *B.J.* 4.628–629).

Earlier, in Jeremiah as it stands (in MT), the prophet has uttered a psalm of complaint against being denounced, and it seems clear that he sees this as being falsely accused: but what he wants is divinely wrought vengeance, not a verbal acquittal (*Jer* 20.7–13, Hebrew and LXX).

There are other complaints in the Psalter focussing on accusations the psalmist claims are unfounded. In *Ps* 7 the poet disclaims any iniquity (vv. 3–5), and appeals for judgment (v. 8), which means protection for himself and the downfall of his enemies and all who are wicked. Only that will establish his innocence; cf. *Pss* 31.18, 23; 35.11, 26–27; 64.4, 7; 94.21–23. In every case it is wellbeing that establishes innocence, punishment that indicates guilt. In even more psalms, of course, the poet confesses fault, conscious or inadvertent, and asks first for forgiveness and only then for protection. Perhaps some mishap has suggested that unwitting infringement of an injunction is being chastised. Then it is forgiven-ness that wellbeing establishes. But in neither case is a formal verdict sought for its own sake or even as a preliminary.

The theme of the Susannah story (*Dan* 17, LXX) is warranted punishment and acquittal (v. 53). Susannah's accusers contradict each other's testimony, and they are punished according to *Deut* 19.19. Other than the punishment

²⁶ Howard C. Kee, "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. A New Translation and Introduction", in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 1. *Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments* (2 vols; London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1983), 775–828, citing 819, punctuation amended.

of the guilty, there is no formal acquittal of Susannah, though it is clear that “nothing shameful had been found in her behaviour” (v. 63).

Following Gerhard von Rad, John A. Zielser wonders whether God’s “he is righteous, he shall surely live,” concluding the sequence Ezek 18.5–9, might be a liturgical declaratory formula. We might then add, perhaps a priest is giving God’s response to an accusation in court submitted to him (cf. Deut 17.8–15). But as it stands this declaration is not addressed to or spoken of any particular individual nor in relation to any particular accusation or court action; rather is it a general divine assurance of set policy in accord with Ezekiel’s theodicy.²⁷

Nouns, adjectives and verbs in this צדק cluster appear frequently in the Hymns and Community Rules in the Dead Sea Scrolls. If they were to be used of acquittal it would seem most likely to occur when the character and behaviour of members or would-be members are being assessed. 1QS III 3 insists that anyone who refuses to accept the Community’s convictions and prescriptions “shall not be justified (ולא יצדק) while he maintains the stubbornness of his heart.”²⁸ There is a possibility of a change of mind and practice, and in that event his past offences would no longer be held against him; but the charge would hold. The punishment of exclusion would no longer be inflicted, the postulant could be included among the righteous, but that is despite clearly *not* being acquitted of the charge. Later there are rules for dealing with offending members.²⁹ Here again the factuality of the offences with which members may be charged are taken for granted. While a plea that the offence was unintentional may be allowed, there is no formula of acquittal even on that score recorded. In CD-A IX–X there is talk of accusations that will not be allowed, and these are charges made without supporting witness. But, again, there seems no occasion is imagined where an investigation might lead to a formal verdict of acquittal, even on the basis of a lack of corroborative evidence. The emphasis remains on recognised punishments for unquestioned offences. 11Q 19 [11QT] LXI simply repeats the ruling in Deut 19.19 on the punishment of a false witness: once more with no suggestion of formal acquittal for the one maligned.

There thus seems to be no evidence in what became canonical writings, nor others of the period, for a verdict of acquittal for Greek δίκ- or Hebrew

²⁷ J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 27, citing Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology* (ET, 2 vols; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1962), 378–379.

²⁸ Text and translation in F. García Martínez and E.J.C. Tigchelaar, *The Dead Sea Scrolls in English. Study Edition*, 1. 75.

²⁹ 1QS VI–VII.

קִדָּשׁ words to translate; nor, either, is there evidence for any distinct procedure of acquittal asking let alone demanding to be translated in such terms. The terms are used, and may even be used of people who happen to have been (in our terms) “acquitted”: but they are not used for announcing acquittal or of according acquittal. It is to their actual use that we now turn.

3. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF BEING TAKEN TO BE INNOCENT, RIGHTEOUS, JUSTIFIED IN PAUL’S (ARGUABLY) AUTHORITATIVE SCRIPTURES

The social reality of being in the right (and assumed to be so) is well illustrated by Job, a book of which Paul was certainly aware.³⁰ In Job 29–31, being in the right means being respected in a community in which people know one another and meet together. You are respected for the good you have done and for the socially acknowledged rewards that have accrued to you. You help to maintain the community, with a place for everyone, old and young, slave and free, with their accepted obligations and privileges.³¹ Miscreants are punished (Job 29:17) and their victims rescued. The acknowledged leader, in this case Job, presides, the older men acquiesce in what is decided, and the whole community follows (Job 29.7–10, 21–24). If there is punishment it is, at least in theory, and very likely in practice, affirmed if not executed by the community. Barring any accusation of wrongdoing brought against you, your place in the community is secure; and if an accusation against you (Job 31.35) is not upheld there is, of course, no punishment for you, and it is the whole community with its leaders that will have affirmed your righteousness, by refusing to punish you in continuing to honour you in practice. There is no separate judicial verdict waiting for the community’s future acceptance, for the function of our detached judge and disinterested jury is taken by your engaged community: in refusing to punish you for some/any suggested offence and in continuing to treat you with the respect to which are accustomed and are held to deserve, it acknowledges, makes obvious and reaffirms your rightful place in it. Indeed, a formal verdict of acquittal for Job in his plight, even if one such were conventionally allowed for, would be irrelevant while that clearly punitive, condemnatory plight

³⁰ See Rom 11.34–35; 1 Cor 2.11; 3.19; there may well be other allusions.

³¹ Cf. Walter J. Houston, *Contending for Justice. Ideologies and Theologies of Social Justice in the Old Testament* (2nd edn; London: T & T Clark, 2008), 126–131; but the whole monograph is relevant here.

continued (cf. Job 10.15, etc.). The fact that from Job's point of view it has all gone badly wrong does not affect the idealised picture, let alone its indications of procedure and its definition of social wellbeing, of 'enjoying your rights' in community.³²

Talk elsewhere of community enforcement of its codes then supports this picture in Job of the function of "the elders at the gate" (e.g., Exod 18.13–27; Deut 21.18–21; Ezek 10.14, Isa 1.23) and the concomitant immediacy of the benefits of being in the right, and assumed to be, deemed to be. Even when 'judges' are (also) appointed, whether alongside the elders (Ezek 10.14) or without reference to associated elders, appointment is from among the same group, leading male heads of household in the local community, speaking its mind (Deut 1.15–16; 16.18–20; 2 Chr 19.5–8).

What Job wants, and would like to argue for face-to-face with God (23.27) is to be "back in the old days". A spoken verdict of acquittal is nowhere sought. It is suffering God's rod (9.35; 13.21, 23, etc.) that convinces his community that he is wicked, and social-cum-bodily restoration is the only 'acquittal' (release) he desires. In the epilogue Job's friends are told that Job, not they, has said what should have been said about Yahweh; but there is no spoken assertion of Job's own innocence, no formal verdict of 'not guilty', no spoken vindication of what Job had said about himself. Vindicated he is, but that vindication lies in his social restoration (40.10b–17). And the same 'vindication' is repeated in the later retelling, *T. Job* 42.

The majority position in the preserved tradition available to Paul is that the threat of punishment hangs over the wicked, and one should not be misled by any temporary wellbeing that might suggest innocence (e.g., Sir 9.11–12; 18.20–26; 31.12). Conversely, that even the prosperous suffer minor mishaps merely shows that no one is assumed absolutely perfect in God's eyes; all should take minor reprimands with good grace, for "no one is assumed [perfectly] righteous" in God's eyes (e.g., Job 4.17; 9.2; 25.4). People perceive rewards and punishments on the basis of which they acknowledge, in social practice, that others are in the right or in the wrong; they do not hear verdicts. Righteousness (God's in particular) may be acclaimed as perceived, but the acclamation does not accord it. Underlying is the 'understanding' of one's society that is taken for granted, its "*habitus*" (cf. Pierre Bourdieu, "*le principe non choisi de tous les choix*").³³

³² Cf. J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 17.

³³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques: sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994), 102; "*cet espace de possibles*," 61; "*improvisations réglées*," 96.

That Paul and his contemporaries in practice maintained a similar view of wellbeing in mutual acceptance in community is supported by many recent studies and is clearly articulated, for instance, in his acceptance of the 'body' metaphor, his communitarian ethic (Rom 12–13), his insistence on a common table, as well as in 'forensic' passages such as Rom 14–15,

Who are you to pass judgment on someone else's slave? Whether he stands or falls is his own master's business—and stand he will, because his master has power to make him stand ... [so] accept one another as Christ accepted us to the glory of God. (14.4; 15.7)

Although 'all have sinned and are deprived of God's glory' (Rom 3.23),³⁴ God's acceptance and their mutual acceptance do not have to wait for a paradoxical verdict in their favour.

Two passages in ben Sira might, however suggest something closer to a spoken verdict, and a verdict using *δικαίωω*. At Sir 26.29 we have "a merchant can hardly keep from wrongdoing, and a tradesman will not be declared innocent of sin" (RSV; Greek, οὐ δικαιοθήσεται). This is not, however, strictly forensic (neither is on trial); and as there is no spoken, albeit informal verdict in the first line, probably none should be read into the second. Rather should we render it "will not be assumed righteous". The lines simply express aristocratic prejudice. The other, Sir 42.1–2, is explicitly forensic:

Of the following things do not be ashamed,
and do not let partiality lead you into sin:
of the law of the Most High and his covenant,
and of rendering judgment to acquit the ungodly
(καὶ περὶ κρίματος δικαιοῦσαι τὸν ἀσεβῆ).

As the copyists seem not to have found any difficulty here, τὸν ἀσεβῆ is not "the wicked," but the innocent non-Jew: there must be no discrimination, partiality, against such. The injunction is to refuse to inflict unjust punishment, and, in so refusing "to maintain the outsider in his (or her) rights", his or her rightful place in the community. There is still no question of a formal declaratory verdict of acquittal.

It is argued by Wright among others that the "status" of being acquitted is one thing and the enjoyment of it is something other, and being "justified" is a "relational" state. Yet, in a purely formal sense, it denotes a different

³⁴ For a recent survey of Paul and his social ethos, see Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell (eds), *After The First Urban Christians. The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five years Later* (London: T & T Clark, 2009).

relationship only with the court, and nothing more than that.³⁵ It has been argued instead in the foregoing, that there is no formal ‘status’ proposed in the canonical texts surveyed, no concern for any formal, abstract forensic relationship, but only for the enjoyment of wellbeing in the community.

What is expected of God is that he will maintain equable wellbeing in community, what in exilic and post-exilic thought often amounts explicitly to maintaining the covenant, as in the Psalter (Pss 44 and v. 17; 50, and vv. 5 and 23; 105 and vv. 8–11, Hebrew and LXX equivalents). This is to “judge the world with justice” and “try the cause of peoples with equity” (Ps 9.8; cf. Pss 96.11–13, 98.7–9, Hebrew and LXX equivalents). “Righteous judgment involves defeating enemies and upholding the faithful.” Here “righteousness” is “virtually equivalent to ‘salvation’”.³⁶ And this divine righteousness (δικαιοσύνη, or τὴν δικαιοσύνην σου) is the function delegated by God to the ideal king (Ps 72.1 [LXX 71.1]; cf. 45.7 [LXX 44.8]), for the assured and shared good of the whole community (and its land); on the latter, cf. Ps 85.9–13 [LXX 84.10–14].

This ‘righteousness’ or ‘justification’ as socially enjoyed, equably shared wellbeing, whose instauration or maintenance amounts to ‘salvation’, is particularly obvious to readers and translators of deutero-Isaiah and related passages in the Isaiah volume; eg. Isa 32.15–18; 33.5–6; 45.8, 13; 46.12–13; 48.18–19; 51.6–8; 54.13–17 (again, Hebrew and LXX). But a similar usage can be found elsewhere: e.g. Hos 10.12, Bar 2.18, 1 *Enoch* 10.18; or Add Esth 10.3i, God ἐδικαίωσεν τὴν κληρονομίαν αὐτοῦ, which John A. Ziesler renders “vindicated, did what was right for his inheritance” (not “merely forensic declaration”).³⁷ Not being ‘justified’ consists in punitive trouble for one’s household (Sir 23.11). Take the hint from trouble experienced, repent at once and you will regain divine favour, the well-being that constitutes justification (Sir 18.20–26).

Having what is deemed right happen (in God’s reactions, and others’), is there to be recognised in practice, whether articulated or not. It is not a matter of a status declared and awaiting acknowledgment and then further consequences; rather is it a social situation in which others are already engaged and already interacting more or less positively.

There is one intriguing passage noted by John A. Ziesler, *T. Dan* 3.3, on anger: “when the soul acts, it justifies whatever is done since it lacks

³⁵ T. Wright, *Justification*, 47, 180; J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 22.

³⁶ J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 29.

³⁷ J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 74, text as in Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta, Editio Minor* (2 vols.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelstiftung, 1936), I.973.

discernment.”³⁸ Here Howard C. Kee’s choice among English words might suggest forensic talk; but the text in fact indicates “making actions socially acceptable by force”, for it continues, “if he is a powerful person” he has persuasive underlings, his wealth and his own strength to back him up. There is no indication here of action in court.

In this setting, “to justify the wicked” is not to declare someone, contrary to good evidence, ‘not guilty’; it is to allow someone known to have behaved wickedly to enjoy undisturbed, unpunished (and unrepentant), a continuing favourable social role. Issues of maintenance or (just) punitive disturbance of positive social roles (rather than declarations of guilt or innocence) seem also to be to the fore in the legal systems of Paul’s wider world and its antecedents.

4. EVIDENCE FROM PAUL’S CONTEMPORARY AND WIDER WORLD

We have already noted some evidence from Jewish near-contemporaries of Paul’s, Philo and Josephus, who seem to have read the episodes in the sacred writings in much the same way as was argued above: that is, without any intrusion of performative verdicts of acquittal.

We may reasonably conjecture that Paul himself will have been aware of procedure in Greek civic courts, and as administered by Roman governors, either from general hearsay, his own audience participation, or as one arraigned (2 Cor 11.23, and frequently in Acts).³⁹ The evidence for our period, however, seems sparse, particularly for criminal trials (there is rather more on litigation), and to a large extent for Greek practice we seem to depend on better records from classical Athens.⁴⁰ In classical Greek and early imperial Roman forensic practice we do find panels of judges, which we might style ‘juries’, with a distinct presiding judge. Such juries (especially Greek ones) could have a very large membership.⁴¹ Their votes could, in our ‘*etic*’ terms,

³⁸ J.A. Ziesler, *Righteousness*, 74; ET, H.C. Kee, “Testaments,” 808.

³⁹ On public involvement in the courts, cf. Leanne E. Bablitz, *Actors and Audience in the Roman Courtroom* (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 13.

⁴⁰ “Actually, the only Hellenistic legal system we know—or believe we know—is that of Ptolemaic Egypt,” notes Joseph Méléze-Modrzejewski, “Law and Justice in Ptolemaic Egypt,” in Markham J. Geller et al., (eds), *Legal Documents of the Hellenistic World* (London: The Warburg Institute, University of London, 1995), 1–19, citing 1. Note also the acceptance (albeit very carefully qualified) of similarities between Egypt and evidence in Pliny at least, in B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, 330–331.

⁴¹ For Greece, Douglas M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), 35–40; for Rome, Olivia F. Robinson, *The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome*

'acquit' someone facing a criminal charge.⁴² What constituted such 'acquittal' would not, however, be a pronouncement of innocence, but a majority vote not to punish, announced by the presiding judge. Thus surviving Latin voting tablets read either A(bsolvo) or C(ontemno), "I free from punishment" or "I condemn to punishment."⁴³ The emphasis in criminal cases is firmly on the penalty, often codified, or its avoidance: as it turns out, this is very similar to the court ethos discerned above for the Jewish Second Temple period⁴⁴

I have to allow that two older commentators do in 'etic' style term the presiding judge's pronouncement "condemnation or acquittal".⁴⁵ The phrases used after the vote has been counted seem to have been "*fecisse videtur*" or "*non fecisse videtur*." The Latin is awkward, as no logical subject is given, no noun in the accusative to complete the perfect infinitive construction, "[x] is seen to have been done"; and "*videtur*," present passive, "it [x] is seen" can hardly refer either to the supposed malfeasance or the accusation. If the sense, then, is not literally visual, for the passive the dictionaries give "seem", and that would be rather tentative for a verdict on the offence ("it seems to have been done").⁴⁶ Rather must it refer to the proposed sentence:

(London: Duckworth, 1995), 4–6; Hartmut Galsterer, "The administration of justice", in Alan K. Bowman et al. (eds) *The Cambridge Ancient History X The Augustan Empire, 43 BC–AD 69* (2nd edn; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 12, 397–413; L. Bablitz, *Actors*, 32.

⁴² "Etic" denoting "outsider", contrasting with "emic", insider.

⁴³ Abel H.J. Greenidge, *The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1901), 497; cf. Alick R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 164–166; and Raphael Sealey, *The Justice of the Greeks* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 118; one may usefully compare the agonistic analysis of Jewish court procedure from David Daube, "Witness in Bible and Talmud," 411–412.

⁴⁴ Trials that were not for litigation took place to punish misdeeds, "*aut distrahendarum controversiarum aut puniendorum maleficiorum*," Cicero, *Pro Caecina* 6, cited in Adele C. Scafuro, *The Forensic Stage. Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New Comedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 92; Adriaan Lanni, "Relevance in Athenian Courts", in Michael Gagarin and David Cohen (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112–128, citing 118–121; cf. Christopher Carey, "Offence and Procedure in Athenian Law", in Edmund M. Harris and Lene Rubinstein (eds), *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 111–136; Jill Harries, *Law and Crime in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 28–58. Responsibility matters, but the court's task is to decide what punitive compensation, if any, is appropriate.

⁴⁵ A.H.J. Greenidge, *Legal Procedure*, 498; cf. Pierre Grimal, "*prononçant ainsi toi-même le verdict de ta propre culpabilité*", in *Cicéron, Discours XVI.1, Contre L. Pison* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966), 40.97, p. 152.

⁴⁶ *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Lewis and Short, *Cassells Latin Dictionary*. I thank Dr. Peter Oakes for this possible rendering, but the responsibility for it is mine. Olivia F. Robinson,

with the voting tablets counted and visible, “the sentence is seen to have been passed”—or not, as the case may be. There was no separate verdict of ‘not guilty’, and thus no formulaic performative utterance to that effect.

Again, as in our Jewish evidence, prosecution is by individuals, even in most criminal trials, not by a prosecution service, and is thus always very personal, and personal issues are aired in speeches made.⁴⁷ Also as in the Scriptural codes, accusation carried some risk to the accuser. A failed prosecution could lead to a case for defamation, *calumnia*, and the award of damages to reputation.⁴⁸ Further, in some Greek trials an accuser obtaining less than a fifth of the vote might be fined. Thus, again as in the Scriptural cases, criminal courts met expecting to punish. It is presumably significant that among (Greek) defence speeches that have come down to us there is much more emphasis on the harm the set penalty threatens this otherwise admirable citizen, than on proving his (*sic*) innocence as charged; and the public reputation of the accused was as important in the Roman courts.⁴⁹ There were in some instances appeal procedures, but they were, in our *etic* terms, appeals against sentence, not appeals against verdict.

The two Greek examples from nearer Paul’s day that have come my way are from Ptolemaic Egypt. One is from the 3rd century BCE, *Papyrus Lille* 1.29, in a transcript of a law governing action in a ten-juror court concerning a slave’s or the owner’s liability for damage caused by the former. If it has been decided that the prescribed compensation is to be exacted, the owner may still appeal and seek to shift retribution to the slave, if able to prove to the court’s satisfaction that the slave was not following owner’s orders. The owner may then be relieved of the court’s sentence: ἀπεισθα[ι τῆς κατα]δίκης. (The owner does, however, lose the slave, who is flogged, and then sold to the victim’s benefit.)⁵⁰ In *etic* terms the owner may be held

Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 33 n. 17, writes of “verdicts of ‘guilty’, ‘not guilty’, and ‘*non liquet*’”, but in email correspondence accepts that a distinct verdict is nowhere explicitly evidenced, and my interpretation of “*fecisse videtur* is probably correct” for the Ciceronian material, although later Roman practice moved towards our modern western one. On the distinction between “*facti*”, facts as assured, and what may be said to appear (*videri*) a plausible interpretation, Cicero, *De oratore* 2.25.106–107.

⁴⁷ Rome, H. Galsterer, “Administration”, 402; L. Bablitz, *Actors*, 71–81; ancient Greece, D.M. MacDowell, *Classical Athens*, 235–259; C. Carey, “Offence and Procedure in Athenian Law”, 114.

⁴⁸ H. Galsterer, “Administration”, 401; L. Bablitz, *Actors*, 195; A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, 85–94 and 168–180.

⁴⁹ A. Lanni, “Relevance”, 118–123, again; on Rome, O.F. Robinson, *Criminal Law*, 5.

⁵⁰ *Papyrus Lille* 1.29, in Stephen R. Llewelyn and R.A. Kearsley (eds), *New Documents*

to have been “acquitted”: but what is said in the text is that the owner is personally relieved of the penalty imposed. (It is perhaps worth adding that a distinction we might draw between ‘crime’ and [civil] ‘tort’ seems not to have held, at least not in Roman Egypt.)⁵¹

The second example is dated BCE 118. Three people had been accused, with others, of an attempted poisoning, but the accusers who had arrested them had failed to turn up for the hearing, and therefore the accused had been released. Afraid of further accusation they had asked for a court of enquiry, and by this “we were deemed guiltless (πεφύγαμεν ἀνάτιτοι).” But clearly that did not constitute a binding verdict, and the group further petitioned that no renewed charges or harassment be sanctioned by the court. English translators here have again used ‘acquitted’, though it really does not seem technically appropriate: the issue of guilt is raised, yet the accused do not see themselves as having been “acquitted” in a way in which someone in a modern western court might.⁵²

What Philo says more generally, and in passing, on court procedure in jury trials in Alexandria, seems to bear out the case here being argued:

A man who enters on his duties as a juror should realise that when he tries a case he is himself on trial. So, with his voting tablet he must also take with him good sense, to make himself proof against deceit, take justice to assign to each according to his (her) deserts, and courage to remain unmoved by supplication and lamentation over the punishments of those condemned.⁵³

Courts are for the socially approved imposition of sentences to prescribed punishment for those whose guilt is expected to be beyond question. Though a refusal to punish may in fact exonerate, the expected focus is on punishment’s imposition or withholding. There still seems to have been no convention for declaring innocent; one brought to court might be ‘acquitted’ in the sense of relieved of a prescribed penalty; but not, as such, formally acquitted of guilt.

Illustrating Early Christianity (7 vols; The Ancient Document Research Centre, Macquarie: Macquarie University, 1981–1994), VII, 168–180, citing 172.

⁵¹ B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, 16, 81–82.

⁵² Text and translation of *Tebtunis Papyrus* 43 in Bernard P. Grenfell et al. (eds and trs), *The Tebtunis Papyri*, (2 vols; London: Henry Froude, 1902), I, 146–149; cf. Raphael Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the light of the Papyri 332 B.C. – 640 A. D.* (Warsaw: Panstowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955), p. 431.

⁵³ Philo, *De spec. leg.* 4.57, LCL slightly adapted; cf. *Jos.* 72; compare also the frequent emphasis on the punishment urged for adversaries in the petitions surveyed by B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, vide “General Index”, 425–426.

Procedure in jury trials is relevant as part of the context of our inquiry; however, the only ‘trial’ that concerns Paul involves no jury, but God as sole judge (e.g., 1 Cor 4.1–5). Here, in fact, what Paul is looking for is being “justified” by God in being rewarded with praise (ἐπαίνοος, v. 5); rather than suffering the sort of loss noted in 3.12–17. And for that the only relevant contemporary model would be the tribunal of the Emperor or of one of his appointed Governors or some Herodian ruler, though God would be without even the assessors that the latter might employ.⁵⁴ And in imperial courts, even though there may be advisors, there is no preliminary vote, and we meet simply with the sentence of punishment or of dismissal, either of the case or of the one charged.

Thus Pliny the Younger tells the Emperor Trajan that he has offered any accused of being Christians the chance to deny such allegiance, and prove it by invocation of the Gods, offering libation and incense to the Emperor’s statue, and cursing Christ. Any complying, he has decided, ought to be dismissed (*dimittendos*). Though Trajan is not happy with anonymous accusations, the denial of past allegiance by others who are arraigned is not be taken as proof, even if backed up by invocation of the Roman Gods; rather are such to be treated as penitents, and pardoned.⁵⁵ For neither, again, is there any verdict of acquittal. The aim is a trouble-free administration, not judicial nicety, let alone painstaking investigation of guilt or innocence.⁵⁶

Luke’s Pilate is as free as was Pliny of the formalities that we for our part today might expect.⁵⁷ Twice Luke’s Pilate says he finds that Jesus has no case to answer (Luke 23:4, 14). Neither utterance counts as a verdict of acquittal; instead Pilate proposes an admonitory flogging. Even saying he has found “no case for a death penalty” (οὐδὲν αἵτιον θανάτου εἶρον ἐν αὐτῷ) does not pronounce acquittal (Luke 23.22); all these utterances are simply comment.⁵⁸ In fact Luke finds no need for any sort of formal verdict or even

⁵⁴ For the Emperor, L. Bablitz, *Actors*, pp. 34–39; O.F. Robinson, *Criminal Law*, 9–11. Or are the Corinthian saints to be assessors? 1 Cor 6.2–4.

⁵⁵ Pliny the Younger, *Letters* 10.96.5 and 10.97.2.

⁵⁶ This is argued effectively by Angelika Reichert, “Durdachte Konfusion. Plinius, Trajan und das Christentum”, *ZNTW* 93 (2002), 227–250, concluding, 231, 239: not so much juridical propriety as imperial stability.

⁵⁷ Cf. Adrian N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 5, 35. This is not to affirm the historicity of Luke’s account, but only to display the sort of procedure he expected hearers to find credible.

⁵⁸ So, correctly, Heiki Omerzu, *Der Prozeß des Paulus. Eine exegetische und rechtshistorische Untersuchung der Apostelgeschichte* (BZNW 115; Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 2002), 214, styles these “drei Unschuldserklärungen”, explanatory comments, not verdicts as such.

sentence. The only effective administrative acts are handing (innocent) Jesus over for crucifixion (v. 23), and releasing Barabbas (as *we* might say, ‘unacquitted’ of the charge of insurrection and murder: Luke 23.25).⁵⁹ In the Fourth Gospel Pilate similarly three times insists he has found no case for the accused to answer (John 18.38; 19.4, 6), and then makes explicit the legal procedure here explained. A reiterated “No case to answer” does not acquit: it still remains up to him as governor to choose between release and punishment—just this is the administrative decision he has to make (John 19.10). So, too (according to A.N. Sherwin-White), Mark and Matthew “are correct” in that they indicate no verdict as such, “but a condemnation to a particular punishment”.⁶⁰ Judicial procedure in Acts is then just as the Gospels would lead us to expect. Thus Claudius Lysias finds no case brought against Paul that warrants death or imprisonment, but still does not count him acquitted (Acts 23:29).⁶¹ Festus and Agrippa agree (Acts 25.25; 26.31), yet treat Paul’s appeal to Caesar in a manner we may see as analogous to the appeal to a higher court in Egypt noted just above. Decisions of innocence are indecisive; what one accused wants is an authoritative decision not to impose penalties.⁶²

For Emperors themselves we may take for example Claudius in Suetonius and Gaius (Caligula) in Philo. Claudius “administered justice most conscientiously both as consul and when out of office ... he did not always follow the letter of the law but modified their severity or lenity in many cases according to his own notions of equity and justice”, allowing appeals against excessive settlements or condemning lesser criminals to the beasts.⁶³ Philo, writing

⁵⁹ Josephus tells us that he ordered pardon or punishment in much the same way as a governor would (*Life* 168–173). On the lack of a clear distinction between administrative and judicial procedure, in Roman Egypt, with parallels in Pliny, see B. Kelly, *Petition, Litigation*, 81–82, again, and 330.

⁶⁰ A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society*, 26. Andrew Simmonds, “Mark’s and Matthew’s *Sub Rosa* Message in the case of Pilate and the Crowd”, *JBL* 131.4 (2012), 733–754, allows that dominant Gentile/Romans would not see it as parody.

⁶¹ Again, H. Omerzu, *Der Prozeß des Paulus*, 310, rightly speaks of “*weitere Unschuldsbekundungen*,” comments on guiltlessness, not verdicts of acquittal. H.W. Tajra, *The Trial of St. Paul. A Juridical Exegesis of the Second Half of the Acts of the Apostles* (WUNT 2.35; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1989), “found innocent” (170), is inappropriate.

⁶² In just one instance in Acts, at 13.39, recent translators seem agreed that δικαιωθῆναι, δικαιούται cannot be rendered by English ‘justify’ or ‘righteous’ terms. REB has “acquitted of everything for which there was no acquittal under the law of Moses.” However, as Luke himself does not use δικ- in court settings, and is here glossing “remission of sins” ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, v. 38, then “forgiven” is probably better (compare Rom 4.6–7), or RSV “released”. So, too, the more traditional “righteous” is better at Lk 23.47, rather than REB “innocent”.

⁶³ Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars V: the Deified Claudius*, 14 (LCL).

from personal experience as a member of the delegation seeking confirmation of the civic rights of the Alexandrian Jewish community, explains indignantly that when they met the emperor, Gaius did not behave at all like a judge in a court sitting with assessors and listening carefully to accusation and defence. Instead “the actual proceedings showed a ruthless tyrant with a menacing frown.” On meeting the Jewish delegation Gaius began by himself accusing them of being God-haters, leaving their opponents delightedly certain they’d already won their case.⁶⁴ Imperial decisions to punish some and favour others are as arbitrary as neo-Pythagorean philosophers and others had been arguing; but even here there is no suggestion of effective verdicts of acquittal as such.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION—IMPLICATIONS FOR
ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣΙΣ AND SO FORTH IN PAUL

A distinction between spoken (“performative”) verdict on the one hand and sentence and its execution on the other, that is, between “status” and practical effect, thus seems not to be mirrored in ancient usage. Courts assembled either to punish or refrain from punishing, not to determine guilt. If there is no contemporary or traditional courtroom practice of pronouncing ‘acquittal’ of guilt, of responsibility, to provide an interpretative setting for Paul’s usage of words in the δικαίωσις cluster, how else may his usage be understood? The only plausible (and necessarily brief) suggestion is in terms of what has been displayed in the foregoing. So we note that when Paul in his letter to Christians in Rome has announced his theme of God’s righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) made apparent (Rom 1.17), this is elaborated in terms of God’s just judgment—the punishment justly decreed for those refusing to acknowledge him (Rom 1.18–32).⁶⁶ Resuming the theme of God’s righteousness revealed, the opposite of punitive loss appears as liberation and expiation freely granted (Rom 2.24–25), forgiveness, blessedness (Rom 4.7), inheritance of the world (4.13), life for the dead, being for non-being (4.17), peace with God (ἔχομεν, cf. ἐκκέχεται, v. 5) and hope for glory with God (Rom 5.1–2), and a flooding awareness of divine love (Rom 5.5, 8), reconciled, exultant, secure from God’s wrath (Rom 5.9–11): removed are all punitive threats

⁶⁴ Philo, *De legat.* 349–354.

⁶⁵ On neo-Pythagoreans on kingship, see Glenn F. Chesnut, “The Ruler and the Logos”.

⁶⁶ Even if Rom 1.18–32 is taken to represent an opposed voice (D.A. Campbell, *Deliverance*, 530–547), it remains an elaboration of “justification”.

to present and future wellbeing with God.⁶⁷ In all this there is no formal status conferred with effects left to follow. Although more enjoyment of God lies ahead—it is a *hope* of glory—a rich enjoyment is immediate, it seems. All of this constitutes God acting as δίκαιον καὶ δικαιούντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ, and these are some of the terms for unpacking what God’s righteousness constitutes.⁶⁸ There is no warranted or unwarranted acquittal of guilt, not its transfer (let alone any implicit substitutionary punishment). It is simply and splendidly an exercise of divine royal prerogative. As Paul later notes, Rom 9.15, citing Exod 33.19, God is free to “justify the ungodly” (Rom. 4.5), to leave them unpunished, and so to enjoy a positive relationship with himself—still without acquitting them of guilt, or of charges that are or could justly be brought against them.⁶⁹

In the next chapter there is displayed in a single but significant instance (one touched on already, just above) of arbitrary Roman judicial action, an example of law made up ‘on the hoof’, showing how far practice could be from ideals of orderliness: but clearly, a matter of punishment or not, with no verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘acquitted’.

⁶⁷ Compare Walter Klaiber, “Rechtfertigung”, *RGK* 7, 98–103, here 101; or D.A. Campbell’s emphasis on Rom 5–8, e.g., *Deliverance*, 62–73.

⁶⁸ The focus of anyone’s acceptance of this blessedness is, pragmatically, faith, trust, belief, in Jesus, the trustworthy agent of God’s offer; see e.g., F.G. Downing, “Ambiguity, Ancient Semantics, and Faith”, *NTS* 56.1 (2010), 139–162, repr. ch. 6, above.

⁶⁹ Compare Susan Grove Eastman, “Israel and the Mercy of God: A Re-reading of Galatians 6.16 and Romans 9–11”, *NTS* 56.3 (2010), 367–395, esp. 376–380. In philosophical reflection Philo could cite the (neo-Pythagorean) commonplace that “the king is a living law” (*De spec. leg.* 4.143). He clearly did not find this conviction happily instantiated by Gaius, yet it still articulated his trust in his people’s God, as one who graciously forgoes punishment of the repentant guilty, albeit without any suggestion that they are thereby acquitted of their guilt, or of charges levied against them (e.g., *De decal.* 177; *Praemits* 116).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

DISORDERLY COURT PROCEDURE: PLINY'S PROSECUTIONS OF CHRISTIANS

In the previous chapter it was argued that courts met to decide punishments to be imposed or withheld, and for general social reasons, rather than to make declarations of innocence or guilt, and our clear distinction between administrative and judicial procedure did not hold. This present chapter instances something of the wider socio-political context within which such decisions were likely to be reached. Examining something of that wider context, it is here argued that there was no large-scale action against even potentially disruptive Christians in the courts of those parts of Asia Minor addressed in Revelation and 1Peter before the cases heard by Pliny and referred to in his *Letter* 10.96, and in his copy of Trajan's reply, 10.97. If Revelation and/or 1Peter were occasioned by the commencement of official judicial action, their 'publication' dates from this time; and this is most likely.¹ Their respective attitudes to the human world around, however, are in all probability much less "occasional", and are based on mature though divergent analyses of and attitudes towards current human social order in the light of their respective versions of early Christian life and faith.

I shall primarily be discussing the implications of Pliny's *Letters* 10.96 and 97.² The case I intend to make has to my mind a number of ramifications, and these I now list, along with some already introduced. I do not intend to argue all these supposed implications in detail; nor do I expect my primary argument on its own to be sufficient to settle these other issues, even supposing the main argument is itself persuasive. There may, however, be a certain amount of mutual support among the theses, if a coherent

¹ In her 2002 "Durdachte Konfusion. Plinius, Trajan und das Christentum", *ZNTW* 93 (2002), 227–250, *II. Auswertung: Das Plinius-Schreiben als Neuansatz*, 241–250, and independently of this earlier piece of mine, Angelika Reichert reached a similar conclusion on the relevance of Pliny *Letters* 10.96, 97, for Revelation and 1Peter, though without many of the supporting arguments here adduced.

² Betty Radice, *Pliny, Letters and Panegyricus* (LCL; Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 1969). There do not seem to be any textual difficulties affecting the argument here.

picture both of popular and of official Roman reactions to the nascent Christian movement emerges.

I list my points in reverse order to that in which I shall consider them:

1. Revelation may contain material that pre-dates 70 CE, but Rome has now by its destruction of the Temple become a second "Babylon", and Domitian has further enhanced the cults of Rome and Emperor, himself. Revelation knows of past martyrs (6.9–11—in Nero's time?) but only one recent one (2.13).
2. There was no co-ordinated persecution/prosecution of Christians qua Christians under Domitian: none such evidenced in Ireneus, nor in Luke (if dated here): they continued "unhindered" (Acts 28.31).
3. The 'fiscus iudaicus' issue is a red herring. Non-payment was no capital offence, Christians delated as 'Jewish non-payers' were not on that account executed, nor are they regarded as having been on any other count arising then out of such prosecutions.
4. Ignatius of Antioch is fixated on 'martyrdom', yet is apparently unaware of any such witness offered by members of the Christian communities of Ephesus, Smyrna, Philadelphia, (addressed in Revelation); nor of Tralles, nor Magnesia, nor his home, Antioch; nor even in Rome, in his own generation.
5. There is no danger apparent for anyone else in these churches arising from their being in touch with Ignatius, even though he is apparently already under sentence.
6. 1 Peter indicates a rather sudden ("unexpected", 4.12) new intensity of opposition. The theoretical possibility of general "suffering" has all at once become actual. What Christians face is described in very much the same terms as are deployed in Pliny 10.96; yet this provides no precedent for Pliny to look back to (see further, below). It seems to be the same situation.
7. There is no evidence for early persecution/prosecution involving executions, no such evidence available to early Christian writers later, other than from Tacitus and Suetonius, none in 1 Clement, Revelation and 1 Peter; none other than that in Pliny 10.96 itself. There may be little documentation because there was little to tell.
- 8a. Pliny it was who prompted the alarm we may discern in Revelation as we now have it, and in 1 Pet 4.12. 'The Beast' seems to be waking up.
- 8b. If Pliny had had precedents, formal or informal, he would have used them, or at least referred to them, even if he would also have asked for confirmation of his compliance or revised procedure from Trajan.

8c. Although both refer regularly to precedent for guidance on other matters, neither Pliny (10.96) nor Trajan (10.97) use any such supposed precedents to guide them on this issue, either formally or informally: nothing from their general knowledge of the courts and procedure elsewhere, and nothing from the local records or the memories of local officials. And the 'lapsed' Christians have not lapsed in response to any significant official pressure: Pliny drew out from them no such precedent, nor pointer to where a precedent might be sought. Recent cessation from meeting had been in response to an edict issued by Pliny himself, but not in response to some previous deterrent action.

I now go back through this summary of conclusions, in reverse order, with supporting arguments:

8c. Pliny certainly seems to be under the impression that there had been *cognitiones de christianis*, somewhere, sometime, somehow, in his adult lifetime. Some such impression must be implied by his note that he has not been present at any. But in gaining the impression that some such cases had occurred he seems to have picked up no information as to how, no hints to guide him, and no likely source of information to follow up before troubling the Emperor Trajan; nor had Trajan himself, nor his staff. At least, none such is claimed.

I want to be very guarded in my claims at this point, because the ground has been very well trampled over, and lots of quite diverse conclusions have seemed very obvious to various historians. At this stage I am only pointing out that Pliny does not claim to be basing his procedure on anything in the past other than a conviction that Christians had been subject to official court action somewhere, sometime, somehow. Of course, he could have had more information, and it could have been accurate, and he could just have been kidding Trajan, perhaps flattering him by asking for advice. He could even have been present at just such court proceedings, and have here been lying. But none of that seems at all likely.

A.N. Sherwin-White distinguished three approaches to the issue, and subsequent scholars have seemed happy to follow him in this division.³

³ A.N. Sherwin-White, "The Early Persecutions and Roman law again", *JTS* NS 3 (1952), 199–213; *The Letters of Pliny*; and also *Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). This division is accepted by, for instance, Marta Sordi, *The Christians and the Roman Empire* (ET; London: Croom Helm, 1986); and by P. Keresztes, "Rome and the Christian Church", *ANRW* 23.1.

(1) Some would argue that there was a general enactment, forbidding the practice of the Christian religion. Thus Marta Sordi,

The decision had been taken to allow the Christians to be accused of *superstitio illicita*, so that from now onwards they could be incriminated for their religious persuasion alone. Again [and] far more serious was the fact that the state authorities had allowed and even encouraged the spreading of slanderous rumours against the Christians.⁴

Sherwin-White detailed some of the difficulties involved in any such reconstruction: for instance, that any such enactment would have had to have been renewed at the start of each Principate, and so, I take it, brought to the notice of imperial officials relatively recently.⁵ At this stage I only want to point out that Pliny does not mention any such enactment, and does not say, “Unfortunately I do not have a copy of the text, could you have it sent to me”, nothing like that; nor does Trajan jog his memory. Pliny requests and Trajan creates a ruling.

There is then (2) what Sherwin-White has called the ‘*coercitio*’ theory.⁶ In this it is argued that there was instigated ‘police’ action (as it were), against Christians as “hostes humani generis”, on some sort of ‘common law’ basis. Sherwin-White could readily point out how unlikely that is, both in terms of the availability of ‘police’ (who would have to be soldiers), and in terms of normal procedures for which we have evidence. Rather was it the case that court action would be taken on the basis of information provided by some individual or individuals; whether private or by chance holding some civic office was immaterial. Certainly Pliny makes no mention of any such ‘police’ action, let alone noting that any had been occurring, or alleging that it had been, but ineffectively. It is private and so far anonymous informers who have been bringing cases to his attention.

Sherwin-White himself preferred, then, (3), the third position just referred to, for which I feel he certainly adduces convincing general procedural evidence. Here the Christians are vulnerable to public accusation, as having an established reputation for anti-social behaviour—the “*flagitia*” Pliny refers to without specifying them. Up to this point I would suggest

⁴ M. Sordi, *The Christians*, 35.

⁵ A.N. Sherwin-White, “The Early Persecutions”, 201; though contrast Pliny 10.58, and comment, below.

⁶ That is, action to confine, restrain or punish: A.N. Sherwin-White, “The Early Persecutions”, 199, 203. On “policing” (rather than “police”), see, now, C.J. Fuhrmann, *Policing*, chs. 3, and 6, esp. 161–163, and 7, 173–181, on Pliny and Trajan.

Sherwin-White has the best of the argument. But he then claimed—well, I think, took it for granted—that such delation on this basis had been going on regularly. Some locals are just getting the new governor to keep the pot boiling the way it has been over the years. To this I would for now only point out that Pliny makes no mention of any such action by his predecessors, nor of the accusers referring him to any such. Pliny does mention people who claimed to have apostatized, some recently and others in the distant past, and that is taken as evidence by most for their own particular interpretation. But Pliny shows no sign of considering that these hypothetical past cases might afford him some guidance. He does not even say that they present him with conflicting possibilities.

I suggest that Pliny refers to no precedents because neither he nor anyone else around has any that would be of any use. No kind of court action has been happening in his province or anywhere in the neighbourhood or in Rome, either. In the many cases to be reviewed below, where there are precedents he wants to follow or diverge from, he makes them explicit. But here he does not refer to any such precedents, nor ask for any such further search to be made for central archive copies.⁷ He asks Trajan to create a ruling.

Pliny's own actions to date against Christians brought before him have been made up out of his own head. At no point does he suggest that he is using tried procedures. He exercised his *ius gladii*, but starts to have qualms when he seems likely to be faced with lots of cases. It is within his discretion, but he is supposed to be discrete (he could be arraigned for *saevitia*).⁸ He does not excuse his action as following established custom, asking if he is right to follow it. He is asking if he is deemed right in what he thought up.⁹

Thus he tells Trajan that his procedure has been to ask those brought before him on suspicion of their being Christians, whether they were. Those who admitted it were warned of the penalty for persistence in such allegiance, and were asked a second, and, if need be, and again, with a warning, a

⁷ Martin Goodman, *The Roman World*, 91, notes such a search in Rome requested, *Letters* 10.66, and suggests that records were ill-managed. On the Christians, Pliny does not even ask. See also, Klaus Thraede, "Noch einmal: Plinius d. J. und die Christen", *ZNW* 95.1 (2004), 102–128, noting 113–114.

⁸ Cruel and pointless severity, A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society*, 14–17; *Letters*, 698.

⁹ A. Reichert, "Durdachte Konfusion", 229–241, offers a convincing analysis of Pliny's rhetorical arrangement of the issues he raises, to obtain the sort of reply he sought (although she does not note that Trajan does not simply agree, while perhaps Pliny carefully left room for that?)

third time. Any who still persisted Pliny had executed, on the basis of the suspicion that being a self-confessed Christian warranted it, but also consoling himself with the thought that "*pertinacia*", obstinate disobedience to a magistrate's command to desist was sufficient warrant on its own.¹⁰ Those of the accused who denied ever having been Christians, and those who claimed to have desisted from such allegiance were invited to offer incense and a libation to statues of the Roman Gods and of the Emperor, and to curse Christ. Pliny had gathered that this was likely to be a decisive test. He does not say that anyone told him this or any part of the procedure adopted had been used in court before.

Sherwin-White and Hugh Last, for instance, are surely right to have concluded that this was only a test.¹¹ A failure in the past to engage in one or more of these rituals is not presented by Pliny as the basis for his action, nor taken by Trajan as the basis for prosecution, and in fact he drops the use of a statue of himself from it. There is, then, no law that people are to do this sort of thing publicly. It is just that a refusal when directly so ordered is a sufficient if not a necessary sign that these are Christians, and their disobedience is perhaps a sign of more general disaffection, and warrants execution. There is no indication that Christians have been ostentatiously refusing to join in public celebrations of the Emperor's birthday or his accession; no hint that this is the whole or even part of the initial charge. As Lucian shows later, it is quite widely believed that Christians, like Epicureans, are a godless and irreligious lot, and are likely to show it.¹² But the main point is that, as said, there is no suggestion that this test has been established as a part of court procedure. Our efficient and humane financial administrator and his humane and efficient Emperor inaugurate and establish the pattern from scratch.

¹⁰ Sherwin-White places a great deal of emphasis on the Christians' *pertinacia*, paraphrasing it very soon with "*contumacia*". He is taken to task for this by G.E.M. de Ste Croix, in "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?", *Past and Present* 26 (1963), 18–21, to which Sherwin-White replied in, "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?—An Amendment", *Past and Present* 27 (1964), 23–27, with a rejoinder by de Ste. Croix, *ibid.*, 28–33. Despite the firm agreement of both M. Sordi and P. Keresztes with the latter, it certainly appears to me that Sherwin-White does more justice to Pliny's actual words: "If they persist, I order them to be led away to execution; for, whatever it is they are admitting to, I am convinced that the stubbornness and unshakeable obstinacy (sc., of their persistence in refusing to renounce their Christian allegiance) ought not to go unpunished", 10.96.3 (*perseverantes duci iussi. neque enim dubitabam, quaecumque esset quod faterentur, pertinaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri*). Sherwin-White maintained his position in his commentary, *Letters*, 698–699.

¹¹ A.N. Sherwin-White, "The Early Persecutions", 207–208; Hugh Last, "The Study of the Persecutions", *JRS* 27 (1937), 80–92.

¹² Cf. Pliny, *Letters* 10.35, 52, etc.; Lucian, *Alexander*, 25, 38.

It is also worth noting that none of the information laid has been suggested or adduced evidence (however shaky) for the alleged *flagitia*, nor is there any past court record of convictions or even of investigation in this area, to guide Pliny. The informants have themselves given him no guide here either.

The Christians who have maintained their allegiance say they have nonetheless given up meeting since the ban on *collegia/hetaeriae* (10.96.7). As noted earlier, they do not seem to have been aware of any court action as such that might itself have amounted to a prohibition, or that could have reinforced the prohibition promulgated. The ban on *collegia* was the first announcement of official disapproval for any of their admitted activities, and, as law-abiding subjects, they had complied.

8b. Sherwin-White insisted that there “must have been” more precise precedent of some kind for Pliny to have gone ahead, even granted all his independent authority: just suspicion and intransigence would not have been enough.¹³ But in the many instances where Pliny for other matters has precedents on which he has acted, but about which he is nonetheless unsure, he makes all that very clear. And even where he has not yet taken action, he again makes it clear that he has tried to find out what precedent there might be. His silence on this score in the single instance of action against Christians must even more surely be significant. *Letter* 10.96 is the longest of those addressed to Trajan that he has preserved. He may bother the emperor sufficiently to get the occasional testy reply; he shows no sign of willingness to appear lazy or incompetent, as the following examples illustrate:

At 10.8 Pliny is very punctilious in noting the rules about leave of absence, as Trajan acknowledges, 10.9.

At 10.18 he is rebuked for not obtaining other kinds of advice locally (cf. 10.40); at 10.42 he is told he should have checked with Lower Moesia first.

At 10.19 he has found a custom (deploying slaves as prison warders), changed it for the moment, but checks with Trajan.

At 10.29 he is presented with another problem concerning slaves: two have enlisted as soldiers. Pliny makes it very clear that he does understand most of the rules, but just does not know what to do now that they have got as far as taking the oath, though they have not actually been enrolled. He wants to know, because any action of his might well create a precedent

¹³ Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 694–695, “Early Persecutions”, 208–209.

(*exemplum*). Everyone knows that slaves must not offer for the army. If the fault lies with them, decides Trajan, they are to be executed.

At 10.31 Pliny has found a relevant precedent, is loath to change what his predecessors have left undisturbed, but knows it infringes explicitly authorized procedure: condemned criminals have been allowed to work as public slaves. Records of sentences for many years back are available for consultation. He has asked searchingly how this situation arose, has found no documentation for such people being released to these less exacting duties, other than the assurance that previous governors had allowed it. He clearly by now at least expected to ensure this level of investigation of past records before bothering the emperor, even though he is nonetheless still going to consult him.

At 10.47 he expresses unease at being faced with breaching long established custom. Trajan replies that he is to do just that, while establishing that this action (inspecting a free city's accounts—*plus ça change!*) is *not* to create a precedent.

At 10.56, an action by a previous governor (rescinding a banishment order of his own) has been brought to his attention. The documents are all available for inspection. Previous orders are not supposed to be contravened, as Pliny explains he is well aware. Trajan is so sure of this that he will in no way allow the rescinding by the man himself to stand until he has found out from him why he did it. (In a related case in the same *Letter*, 10.57, Trajan also emphasises the seriousness of *contumacia*.)

At 10.58 (despite what Sherwin-White had to say about '*damnatio memoriae*')¹⁴ letters and decisions of Domitian had been accepted by Nerva as being entirely relevant, and so were deemed to be so by Trajan as well. If decisions and precedence from actions had not been rescinded they were still in order and in force—as well as being presumed accessible.

At 10.65 Pliny writes, "There is a serious problem (concerning the support of foundlings) I was unable to find either a particular case or a general rule that applied to Bithynia ... I felt it was not sufficient to be guided only by precedents" (it was a financial matter). But even here, where he doubts the force of precedents, he quotes them. An edict relating to Andania in the Peloponnese and letters from Sparta and to the province of Achaia from all three Flavian emperors, including Domitian, have been brought to his attention as possibly relevant. He expects Trajan to have copies (if the

¹⁴ Sherwin-White, "Early Persecutions", 201–202: "Imperial edicts, especially of emperors who suffered '*damnatio memoriae*', died with their authors."

examples cited are genuine) in the files in Rome. Trajan accepts that the items cited do have force, but decides they do not affect the legal situation in Bithynia (10.66).

At 10.68 Pliny quotes previous practice in proconsular provinces, and is told to follow ancient local precedent, even if people there have not been following it recently themselves.

At 10.72 Pliny talks of looking up other Senatorial decrees relating to proconsular provinces for guidance, as well as local precedent in Domitian's time; only he forgets to give Trajan the references for him to have them checked in the central archives.

At 10.78 he again talks of following the practice of previous reigns, but is unwilling to do anything that would set further precedent for others, unless he has Trajan's confirmation.

At 10.110–111 recent practice is not to be undone; but while querying it, Pliny still details it.

At 10.114/115, where established law clashes with established custom, again both are detailed, as a basis for Pliny's query; the decision is similar to the previous one. The law that Trajan wants enforcing dates from Pompey (cf. 10.79, 112).

At 10.117 Trajan responds a little testily that Pliny can surely decide for himself whether the custom of the rich handing out small sums of money to mark a wedding is likely to be a cover for political corruption. But Pliny has thought fit to detail the custom (10.116).

In the light of all these instances, it seems very unlikely indeed that Pliny would have failed to mention that he had tried to find some guidance from past rulings or court decisions, and used them, had there been any. Sherwin-White was surely correct to insist that Pliny would not have been bound absolutely, even had they been available. But by this juncture if not sooner Pliny must have been fully aware that Trajan was very much averse to innovation unless it were clearly needed; even if he thought some precedent a poor guide, he would have felt duty bound to look for it, important to mention his search, if need be explain why it was fruitless, and imperative to justify in detail any departure from it on his part. It is much the most likely that he would have stated and followed established custom, had there been one, and either asked permission to change, had he felt change advantageous, or retain it, if that seemed best. At 10.96 he is neither claiming precedent nor asking permission to vary established procedures. He must be taken to be doing what his words state: he has been employing an *ad hoc* set of procedures that he has had to think up from scratch.

There have, then, been no cases of Christians being brought to the court in his province—ever. He does not simply fail to refer to them—there are none, none for him in Pontus and Bithynia, but also none in Trajan's archives, and none in any other context that he or Trajan might think relevant: no sign of “*x* is what has been done”, and it seems sensible; nor “*x*, *y*, *z* are what have been done, and *z* seems preferable.” There has been no action in the courts against Christians for their allegiance in Pontus or Bithynia, and none in neighbouring provinces for his local advisers to bring to his attention.

8a. So Pliny and Trajan are taking the first steps in opening up the courts to informers against Christians. Christians have already got a bad reputation, and they are clearly not Jews, who still have privileges, however much controverted by local communities.¹⁵ Christians are vulnerable to local enemies when a governor arrives who is intent on imposing order and law. It is very likely appropriate to describe the informers as “trying it on” with the new man; but this is the first occasion for such a try-on—or at least the first successful attempt.¹⁶

And, despite Sherwin-White's rejection of Elmer T. Merrill's argument, it does seem worth taking the decree against *collegia* into account.¹⁷ Pliny notes that the continuing Christians had seen it as having a direct relevance for themselves. Its importance to the imperial administration can be gauged by other well-known letters between Pliny and Trajan: the refusal to countenance a fire brigade for Nicaea (10.33/34), the very guarded permission for the free city of Amisus to retain a ‘benefit society’, so long as no suspicion of political unrest attached to its meetings; but point-blank refusal to extend that to any other town (10.112/113). This same decree would afford a handle to informers, and, clearly, it is about their meetings that Pliny questions those accused.

Pliny is there to tidy things up and settle things down, and the Christians are inconvenient, untidy: a threat to traditional religions' social bond-

¹⁵ Compare Josephus, *Ant.* 14.219–267, as evidence. I write claiming no general expertise in Roman law in the Principate, arguing above purely from Pliny's surviving correspondence, and secondary sources here quoted, but also noting Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.2 and 12.4.2, on precedent; and now am able to urge mutual support between this chapter and its predecessor.

¹⁶ Cf. de Ste Croix, “Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted”, 9; Sherwin-White, “Early Persecutions”, 209.

¹⁷ *Letter* 10.96.7; Elmer T. Merrill, *Essays in Early Christian History* (London: Macmillan, 1924), ch. 7; quoted by Sherwin-White, “Early Persecutions”, 205–206.

ing. Their *pertinacia* shows they must be taken seriously.¹⁸ In fact he is able to claim that his actions to date are already having the required effect (10.96.9–10).¹⁹ If the Revelation to John and 1 Peter in particular are occasioned by some crisis in their area, then this is it, and it is the first in their part of the world, very likely the first anywhere in the Roman world since Nero's action in Rome itself.

It is clear now that Pliny does not cite the latter as a precedent, let alone one in common use. Tacitus tells us that the Christians were accused as fire-raisers, and then glosses this with "hatred of the human race", the supposed attack on life and property bespeaking a malign attitude deserving punishment.²⁰ Pliny's Christians are not charged with any endangering of life or property. Not only is there no overt reference to Nero, there are no clear echoes of it as a popular memory, not even to a reputation for misanthropy. If Pliny knows of it, he judges it irrelevant, or ruled out on the basis of Nero's *damnatio memoriae* (or both). It has not been used as a precedent by anyone else, and is not available and/or appropriate for use by Pliny. So, as just suggested, if the Revelation to John and 1 Peter in particular are occasioned by some crisis in their area, then this is it, and it is the first in their part of the world, and apparently the first anywhere in the Roman world, since Nero's in Rome. The Beast is waking up.

We now take the next step backwards to consider other possible evidence.

7. There is in fact very little more evidence available to Christian writers in the succeeding centuries, for any other persecution or prosecution of Christians. Eusebius tells of one Cleophas suffering under one "Atticus" (*H. E.* 3.127), and refers to Ignatius.²¹ Relying on Hegesippus (*H. E.* 4.19–20), Eusebius refers to "Caesar Domitianus" interrogating members of the family of Jesus in Palestine. This story suggests no worries over Christian allegiance

¹⁸ See above, n. 8. The ideology of Trajan's reign is usefully summed up by Dio of Prusa as follows: "The good emperor ... regards moral virtue as the true sanctity and any wickedness as the real sacrilege. It is not just temple-robbers and those who blaspheme the Gods who are in his view accursed sinners: much more serious still is the offence of cowardly and unrighteous people with no self-control, stupidly running counter to the Gods' purposeful power", *Discourse* 3.52–53 (LCL, amended). It is that purposeful power, as exercised by Pliny on behalf of Trajan representing the Gods, that the Christians are obstinately and contumaciously resisting; see further chs. 1 and 2 above, and 26–28, 32–34, 53–54, 66–67, 68–69, 74–75, 76–77, 80–81 in particular.

¹⁹ Cf. again, A. Reichert, "Durdachte Konfusion", 239.

²⁰ Tacitus, *Annals* 15.44; repeated by Suetonius, *Life of Nero*, 16; see also the discussion in Ian J. Elmer, "Church and State", 51–55.

²¹ Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 695; Sordi, *The Christians*, ad loc.

to Jesus, only about possible royal pretensions of individuals. It seems clear, later, that Tertullian had no other source than our *Letters* of Pliny, and the notes of Nero's action in Rome from Tacitus and Suetonius.²² The most likely reason for the scant data available is that there had been little of the sort to record.

L.W. Barnard has argued that *1 Clement* 1 and 5–7 should be taken to refer to some persecution, with 7.1 saying “we are in the same arena” (ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσμὲν σκάμματι) as Peter and Paul and the host of their immediate contemporaries. This persecution, it is further argued, was directed only against eminent individual Christians: Flavius Clemens, Domitilla, etc. But their deaths had been a severe loss, a shock and a threat to the Roman Christian community. If one were convinced on other grounds that such persecution had been going on, then one might feel justified in reading *1 Clement* in this way. But it is very difficult to see the athletic imagery of 7.1, the struggle in the arena, as other than a conventional metaphor (in Cynic tradition at least).²³ If the Roman Christian Community were feeling it was facing real danger, but Corinth (*ex hypothesi*) were not, it would seem very odd for Clement to bracket them so readily. “In your much easier situation you ought to behave yourselves better”, is what we might have expected (cf. Heb 10.32–36). Yet if *1 Clem* 7.1 does look back to the sort of situation recalled in 5–7, then 60–61, with its happy reliance on divine guidance for splendid rulers, would also seem odd, for Domitian would have just been picking off eminent and even leading members of their community. One might read *1 Peter* as maintaining a similar paradox; but we come to that just below.

Hebrews, wherever we date and place it, talks of losing property, not blood (10.33; 12.4). If it is later than 70 CE, this might be a reference to being forced to pay the *fiscus iudaicus*. But executions are explicitly excluded.²⁴

6. On one reading (albeit disputed), *1 Peter* initially records a conviction that the Empire is a good thing, pretty effectively in God's hands (2.13–17), even though Christians have a bad public reputation (2.12; 3.16). Suffering is something that might possibly occur, though probably only to slaves

²² Tertullian in *Apologeticum*, *Ad nationes*, *De spectaculis*, etc.

²³ L.W. Barnard, “Clement of Rome and the Persecution of Domitian”, *NTS* 10 (1964), 251–260. For the metaphor, elaborated, see Diogenes in Dio, *Discourses* 8.11–35; 9.10–22; Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.8.24–43, noting 26 (σκάμμα); but also *1 Cor* 4.9. On this present discussion, see also ch. 2, 00–00.

²⁴ Taking it that Heb 9.8 uses “standing” abstractly, of “status”, “standing”, in God's eyes, not concretely; cf. Harold W. Attridge, *Hebrews* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1989), 240.

(2.18–25). And then, 4.12, the “fiery trial” descends in a manner and force that could well appear unexpected (ξένου). The theoretical possibility of *general* suffering for Christians has become actual, and has occasioned the publication of this reminder of what the community had always been taught.²⁵ If this “fiery trial” that has descended on the community involves the courts, it must be Pliny’s doing. There has been no other, no previous court action in the provinces (or areas) of Pontus and Bithynia, or, in all likelihood, the rest of the area addressed (1Pet 1.1).

Admittedly, the letter does not say in so many words that the fiery trial has involved court appearances. It could have amounted to no more than that faced by those addressed in Hebrews, hostility, maybe economic and social oppression, sporadic beatings, or even occasional deaths at the hands of a violent mob.²⁶ Yet, as John Knox pointed out some sixty years ago, the issues facing the Christians in 1 Peter are recounted in terms very similar to those in Pliny 10.96.²⁷ Are they to suffer for “the name” alone, or for some other accusation of wrong-doing? Pliny, as we have seen, does not specify the “*flagitia*” of which Christians are popularly supposed guilty, but seems to take “no theft, robbery, adultery or fraud” as relevant. 1 Peter lists among suspicions to be avoided, “murder, theft, and other wrong-doing”. Christians brought before a court to “make their defence” (ἀπολογία, 3.15) are to make it clear (as Pliny has found they try to) that there is no substance in such popular accusations. Indeed, in line with 2.13, they have even obediently given up any meeting together that might contravene the edict against *collegia*.

If the terms are much the same, the situation must most likely be that of Pliny’s *Letter* 10.96, for, as we have seen, nothing like this situation has occurred in the area before.²⁸ And it must have been official action through

²⁵ F.W. Beare, *The First Epistle of Peter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 7–9; per contra, E. Best, *1 Peter* (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1971), 25–27.

²⁶ The general social situation presupposed by the letter is well analysed by John H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless*. He argues against seeing the book’s theology as formed by overt official prosecutions (e.g., 143–145). Accepting that the theological stance pre-dates the crisis, it would seem, as argued, that it was occasioned by Pliny’s response to malicious informers.

²⁷ John Knox, “Pliny and 1 Peter: A Note on 1 Peter 4.14–16 and 3.15”, *JBL* 72 (1953), 187–189. Knox’s suggestion, followed by F.W. Beare, of “revolutionary” for ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 4.15 is less convincing, and ‘informer’ might even be preferable, if other arguments here prove persuasive.

²⁸ The situation presupposed in 1 Peter cannot have prompted the long past lapses from the movement, “some even twenty years ago” of Pliny *Letter* 10.96.6, for that would have provided Pliny with a precedent to discuss with Trajan; but, as we have seen, he found none at all.

the courts that was in question, for it is very unlikely that the author of 1 Peter would expect fellow Christians faced by a lynch mob to be able to mount a detailed verbal defence. It is also worth considering that the unlikelihood of a town mob feeling that they could get away with even an occasional lynching without the town suffering, but also the unlikelihood of it feeling any need to.²⁹ If (as in 10.96) it was thought that there were charges against this unpopular group that could be made to stick, then the most obvious move would be through the governor's court: that would impose the stigma of a criminal conviction borne by the whole movement, in addition to any punishments suffered by individuals, and all at no risk of the town being held responsible for a riot; rather might it be 'commended for doing right' (1 Pet 2.14!).³⁰

Yet another possibility to be discounted is the suggestion that 1 Peter was written for people, maybe two, maybe five decades earlier than here proposed, facing a threat of official action that in the event never occurred, and so failed to provide Pliny with a precedent. But the 'fiery trial' of the letter is already upon its hearers (γινόμενῃ), and the issues are too similar for coincidence.

There is, then, nothing in 1 Peter to count against the conclusions drawn from Pliny's correspondence with Trajan, and a great deal to corroborate them: there has been no prior action against Christians in the courts; and 1 Peter is most likely concerned with the identical situation—from the other side of the social divide.³¹

5. It is puzzling to find how little cross-reference there has seemed to be between scholars writing on Revelation and those discussing Ignatius. The only extensive coverage available at the original time of composing this

²⁹ A realization of the risks involved in riotous behaviour is plain in Dio *Discourse* 46.14 (cf. Acts 19.40), and in others of Dio's addresses to his fellow townsfolk and others; and it is important to note the general orderliness presupposed in Pliny's *Letters*; nowhere does he have riots to deal with, even though he has few troops at his disposal, and seditious fire brigades are a worry; and see the discussion above, ch. 1, on 'order'.

³⁰ Lucian, *Demonax* 16, for instance, shows how readily an appeal to a proconsul could be thought likely to be worthwhile, even on a small issue, as, again, does Acts; and how ready crowds were to attempt to use governors and others to secure their vengeance for them. One may also compare Philo, *De legatione* and *In Flaccum*. I think this must be accepted, despite Sherwin-White's valid point, "Early Persecutions", 212–213, on the limited availability of governors.

³¹ See further, below, (4), on the significance of Ignatius' failure to mention any previous "martyrdoms" in the province of Asia addressed in 1 Peter.

present piece was in Heinrich Kraft's commentary on the former; and though Kraft makes a case for linking the ecclesiastical situation of the *Seven Letters* of Revelation with that of Ignatius, he fails, on my reading, to relate their respective secular political circumstances.³² Yet it does seem obvious that if any frequent official or unofficial action had been taken against Christians as Christians, "for the name", it would have been extremely odd for Ignatius, under guard, to ignore the peril his own contacts with local Christian communities along his route would occasion. He foresees none and records none, even though—supposing Christians were officially proscribed—any in touch with him would be confessing their allegiance, delating themselves to representatives of the authorities actually concerned with this issue. One would expect a whole host of corpses along the way, and captives packed off to join him in the arena in Rome. Yet he remains in solitary about-to-be-martyred splendour—and expects to.

4. Ignatius, then, is doing something out of the ordinary. That seems clear. Suffering for Christ is special in itself. But his acceptance of this call is distinctive. There is no indication of its being commonplace. He is not joining a mass pilgrimage to martyrdom, he is joining Christ, and solo. With this in mind it would also be very odd for him not to note that the churches addressed in Revelation and now also addressed by him—Ephesus, Smyrna, Philadelphia—had a tradition of producing such heroes. If Revelation had been about conflict with the state in Nero's or in Domitian's time, as some suggest, or local pogroms, in which many more were to die, as many already had, we would reasonably expect at least some reference to their past examples, and some encouragement, perhaps, to emulation—or even, advice to them to leave such discipleship to special individuals such as Ignatius himself. But there is complete silence on these matters.

³² Heinrich Kraft, *Die Offenbarung Johannes* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974), 87–94. Colin J. Hemer, *The Letters to the Seven Churches of Asia in their Local Setting* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), arguing for a date under Domitian, has a number of incidental references to Ignatius, but none that I can find, to the bearing on Revelation of Ignatius' major concern, "martyrdom". Richard Bauckham, "Revelation" (2001), in J. Barton and J. Muddiman, *Oxford Commentary*, 1287–1306, writes only of "persecution sporadic and dependent on local conditions", 1288, but with no reference to Ignatius' silence concerning any such in the churches addressed in common. Margaret Barker refers frequently to Ignatius, but dates John's Revelation sixty years earlier, in her *The Revelation of Jesus Christ which God Gave to Him, to Show to His Servants What Must Soon Take Place* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000). Craig R. Koester, 'Revelation', *NIDB* 4, 785–798, dates it anywhere 70–100. Simon Woodman, *Revelation* (London: SCM, 2008), ignores Ignatius.

(The Roman province of Asia is also, of course, addressed in 1Peter 1.1; yet the situation addressed has also, it seems, failed to produce any martyrs there for Ignatius in his day to acknowledge.)

However egocentric we may judge Ignatius to have been (and confessing a not uncritical fondness for him), it does seem hard to imagine him getting away with—and expecting to get away with—neglecting past martyrs, if such there had been, in the churches of Asia Minor that he addresses on this very topic (and also having such insensitive letters preserved). And if we judge him, despite his egocentricity, sincere, any such silence does seem quite implausible.

Thus, there can have been no martyrs in that part of the world for him to acknowledge. His is, as the tone of his letters indicates, a pioneer ministry.

Rome, and Rome only, is where martyrdom happens, according to Ignatius (*Rom.* 101; *Eph.* 12.2). The only local threat is from “a few fools” (*Trall.* 8.2). Yet even in Rome there have been no recent martyrdoms, and it is to Peter and Paul only that he looks back (see also *Rom.* 4.3).

William R. Schoedel argues that Ignatius has been picked on by the authorities in Antioch, either in a situation of strife within the Christian community, or with that generating wider unrest.³³ His arrest, Ignatius allows, has left the church in Antioch in some disarray. He may well have hoped, Schoedel suggests, that his prospective martyrdom would resettle it, and re-establish his own authority, albeit at a distance. He is much relieved when good news reaches him (*Philad.* 10.1, etc.). His arrest had not, however, brought an automatically favourable response back home. There is so far no tradition of respect for those facing death for their faith. Neither actions from outside the community nor the ‘publication’ of John’s Revelation in the area has as yet not made an expectation of martyrdom an established part of Christian culture.

In the light of what has been accepted from Sherwin-White, we should probably question Schoedel’s assumption that Ignatius’ arrest would have been at the instigation of the authorities in Antioch, rather than arising from a private delation.³⁴ But the overall picture sketched of the situation facing Ignatius fits that in Pliny as argued above. Prosecution is a new and spectacular thing.

³³ William R. Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 10–14.

³⁴ W.R. Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 11.

George B. Caird notes that by the time of Polycarp's death, his is 'only' the twelfth martyrdom for both Smyrna and Philadelphia together; and that is some thirty years later.³⁵

It is then also worth recurring to Heinrich Kraft's case, that the ecclesiastical situation in Revelation is similar to that apparent in Ignatius. There is in both some "Judaizing", with the threat of a split; and he notes some seemingly common details, such as Ephesus remaining faithful in both, in both in the face of intruders from elsewhere, yet with some cooling in church attendance; and there is the link by assonance and contrast often noted between the inscribed temple pillar $\sigma\tau\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ of Rev 3.12 and the inscribed tomb stones, $\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\lambda\alpha\iota$, of Philad. 6.1. I would add that there seems to be a very similar interpretation of the cultic assembly in both: compare Rev 4–5 with, e.g., *Magn.* 6–7.

3. Some commentators on Revelation make considerable play with Domitian's severe exaction of the Jewish tax.³⁶ It would, they say, have split Christians from Jews, and would have removed the last vestige of toleration the Christians might have enjoyed as a kind of Jew. But there is no Roman evidence to suggest that action to obtain payment resulted in people being put to death (and so provide Pliny with a precedent at least to discuss).³⁷

2. Dio Chrysostom has harsh things, too, to say about Domitian, having been exiled by him (*Discourse* 45.1); but there is no indication in his surviving writings of any persecution of groups of provincial dissidents. It is noted that Ireneus, who dates Revelation in Domitian's reign, does not link it with any persecution.³⁸ The people Pliny encountered who had given up their Christian allegiance in Domitian's time had simply given it up. As we noted,

³⁵ George B. Caird, *The Revelation of St John the Divine* (BNTC; London: Black, 1964), 35; cf. Ian J. Elmer, "Church and State", 55–58, again.

³⁶ John Sweet, *Revelation* (SCMPC; London: SCM Press, 1979), 30; also Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *The Book of Revelation, Justice and Judgment* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1985), 194 (despite claiming, 19, to be much persuaded by H. Kraft's dating of Revelation in Ignatius' time); compare her "The Followers of the Lamb", *Semeia* 36 (1986), 122–147, here 135, linking Pliny 10.96 still more closely with Revelation, yet as illustrating conditions under the Flavians, without offering any argument for the latter conclusion; C.J. Hemer, *The Letters*, 9–11.

³⁷ None seems forthcoming in Suetonius; his *Domitian*, 12.2 does not suggest the abused elderly Jew was on trial for his life.

³⁸ Cf. B. Newman, "The Fallacy of the Domitian Hypothesis", *NTS* 10 (1964), 133–139 (accepting Ireneus' dating); and A.J. Bell Jr., "The Date of John's Apocalypse", *NTS* 25 (1969), 93–102 (though arguing for a date under Nero).

they afforded Pliny no clue to lead him to a precedent; and, as we also noted, even *damnatio memoriae* would not necessarily have rendered an example from that reign irrelevant. And if Luke is, for other good reasons, dated to the same period, he shows every sign of expecting imperial officials to be either neutral or favourable to his movement, despite Jesus' crucifixion and Paul's imprisonment.

1. Most commentators consulted seem convinced that Rev 11.1 must originally have been uttered during the siege of Jerusalem but prior to its fall. But, as Adela Yarbro Collins argues, the use of the code-name "Babylon" (in preference to "Edom") indicates that Rome has already played the part of the destroyer of God's Temple.³⁹ 13.4 is widely argued to post-date the boost given by Domitian in particular to the cult of Rome and of the Emperor. 11.1, then, is re-used in a metaphorical sense to refer to the Christian community as God's 'sanctuary'. (For my part, I cannot see why it should not have had that sense from the start.)

The various "heads" of 17.9–10 are awkward for any attempt to attach them to one of the preferred dates, and I would agree with Caird, for instance, that the sequence of seven is taken over as a given symbol, only slightly adapted.⁴⁰ Even if it did once have Nero in mind under Galba (seven plus one from Julius Caesar), one can find a similar sequence of seven plus one from Galba to Trajan—including a wounded sixth—if one wants to. But the suggestion that these are also the seven hills of Rome should dissuade us from over-pressing any interpretation.

There is no clear evidence that the John of Revelation had ever been exiled to Patmos, and none that it was a common place of exile, or a penal colony. Past martyrs are known of (under Nero, 6.9–11, we may assume) and more recently, there has been just one (Antipas, in Pergamum, 2.13). The author expects worse to come. The work seems to have been occasioned by a threat of physical violence, related to response to the cult of the Emperor—the situation first met in Pliny 10.96. But Revelation comes out of a much more penetrating analysis than just this threat of physical harm. It is about a clash of total cultures, a clash of comprehensive life-styles. The heart of Revelation's concern is expressed in ch. 18, with its picture of the oppression endemic in a society given over to the ostentatious wealth of the few. It

³⁹ Adela Yarbro Collins, *Crisis and Catharsis. The Power of the Apocalypse* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1984), 43–61, citing 57–58.

⁴⁰ G. Caird, *The Revelation*, 216–219; H. Kraft, *Offenbarung*, 219–222.

is that system that is the real Beast, the real enemy. Caesar and Roma are merely the obscene figureheads for an underlying and incurable corruption, one that remains hostile to Christian life and faith, whether or not it demands formal public homage.⁴¹

The author of 1 Peter is in favour of a much more quiescent subservience, even though the cost may be high.⁴² It should not surprise us to find two such divergent views among early Christians. A single near contemporary, Dio of Prusa, from this same area, could at times adopt a Cynic anarchism, and at others articulate a touching trust in a high-minded and divinely inspired and authorized emperor.⁴³

So, there was no official action, and no court action against Christians for their allegiance in the provinces of Syria, Asia, Pontus, Bithynia, and around, before a conscientious and (in his own eyes at least) humane governor attempted to establish on a firmer basis the social (including religious) order and efficiency and prosperity and tax-revenues of the two provinces committed to his charge by an enlightened emperor.⁴⁴ The author of 1 Peter appreciated the high-minded ideals claimed; the author of Revelation discerned, maybe long before, the underlying evil that now revealed its true colours. Perhaps the blood of the martyrs proves the latter more perceptive.

That Pliny was in his own terms justified in his concern is perhaps understandable when we consider how Christian movement began in dissidence and dissent, as the next, the concluding part III illustrates, in sketches of John the Baptist, Jesus and of Paul.

⁴¹ Compare ch. 2, above, and n. 8, p. 265, above. Something of this reading appears in the work of authors cited above, especially J. Sweet, E. Schüssler Fiorenza, A. Yarbro Collins; but compare also L. Thompson, "A Sociological analysis of the Apocalypse of John", *Semeia* 36 (1986), 62–83; R. Bauckham, *The Theology of the Book of Revelation*, 35–37.

⁴² Compare ch. 2, as in previous note; and J.H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless*, 142–144.

⁴³ Contrast "Diogenes" on Kingship, Dio, *Discourse* 4, with *Discourse* 1, offered to Trajan; but further, compare chs. 1, above, and 7.

⁴⁴ Compare, again, Angelika Reichert, 'Durdachte Konfusion', 241, in support of Tertullian's conclusion, the effect was now to criminalise commitment, 'the name', not any conduct that it might seem likely lead to; K. Thraede, "Noch einmal", argues differently.

PART THREE

DISRUPTIVE RE-ORDERING

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE BAPTIST'S NEW ORDER

“Since the time of John the Baptist the kingdom of heaven has been subjected to violence and men of violence have been deploying force against it” (Mt 11.12).¹ The Baptist certainly disturbed Herod Antipas, who, according to Josephus feared that he was disturbing his subjects.² Like Jesus, and like Paul, John saw his mission as arising out of a fresh interpretation of the old order. But any new interpretation is likely to disturb. This short chapter argues that we may have more clues to John’s disturbing programme than have usually been discerned in the few brief references to John that appear in the gospels and in Josephus.

It has for a long while been customary among commentators to note the important part elements from the canonical psalms among other scriptural texts play in the Gospel accounts of the trial and execution of Jesus.³ The contentious issues have been the extent and manner of their contribution to the narratives. Some conclude that incidents were imagined to match what was seen as prophetic. Others would point to the extent of matter in cited psalms not taken up in the Gospel narratives as indicating the priority of actual events remembered and then recounted in ‘colours’ selected on that basis from the Psalms and other scriptures. Either way, explicit quotations and implicit allusions are important for our understanding of the text as it stands, and, perhaps, also of the original author(s) and audience(s), and of earlier traditions, and even of original events, if we are willing to risk such reconstructions.

Much less attention is paid to echoes of the Psalter in our accounts of the baptism of Jesus. It is acknowledged that Mk 1.11, Mt 3.17 and Lk 3.22 echo

¹ This article originally appeared under the title “Psalms and the Baptist”, *JSNT* 29.2 (2006), 131–137, and appears here with permission.

² Matthew W. Bates, in “Cryptic Codes and a Violent King” (2013), has recently argued that the cryptic reference is to Antipas’ repressive measures.

³ See for instance R. Watts, “The Psalms in Mark’s Gospel”, in S. Moyise and M.J.J. Menken (eds), *The Psalms in the New Testament* (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 25–45; M.J.J. Menken, “The Psalms in Matthew’s Gospel”, in *op.cit.*, 61–82; P. Doble, “The Psalms in Luke-Acts”, in *op.cit.*, 83–117, and “Luke 24.26, 44—Songs of God’s Servant David and his Psalms in Luke-Acts”, *JSNT* 83.3 (2006), 267–283.

Ps 2.7, while Mark and Matthew, and Luke in most texts, combine Ps 2.7 with Isa 42.1. Some texts of Luke, however, quote only Ps 2.7, “My son you are; today I have begotten you”.⁴ This pronouncement is itself quoted again by Luke at Acts 13.33, where it seems, at least, now to refer to Jesus’ resurrection (albeit reaffirming the baptismal pronouncement). More importantly for our present concern, some significant texts of Acts here also term the source “the first psalm”, making one composite piece of ‘our’ Pss 1 and 2.⁵ It is certainly the case that “blessed” (Ps 1.1) and “blessed” (Ps 2.12) bracket the two psalms together; and, while admittedly we tend to classify them distinctively as ‘wisdom’ and ‘royal’ respectively, there is no fresh heading for our Ps 2. Be that as it may, as we have a clear if brief or very brief citation from near the opening of the Psalter, it seems worth looking more carefully at these neighbouring lines.

Psalm 1 contrasts the righteous and the wicked, proclaiming the former blessed, and pronouncing a judgment of expulsion from the community on the latter. The former are likened to a tree that produces fruit in season, the latter to chaff blown away by the wind. Individually, these metaphors are common. Jer 17.8 in particular apparently echoes (or prompts) much

⁴ Beza, old Latin, Justin, Clement possibly, and Origen are cited. We should also include Justin’s pupil, Tatian, for in his Commentary (4.3) on the latter’s *Diatessaron*. Ephrem Syrus explains that the baptism of Jesus, born of the house of David, was a “second birth” for Jesus, as a priest; in L. Leloir, *Éphrem de Nisibe: Commentaire de l’évangile concordant* (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 1966), 94, ‘priest’ reads Ps 2 alongside LXX Ps 109 (MT 110). F. Bovon, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas 1,1–9,50* (EKKNT, III/1; Zürich and Neukirchener-Verlag: Benziger Verlag and Neukirchener Verlag, 1989), 181, rejects the Western reading, on the grounds that the alternative seen as a scribal correction would have been expected to follow the Matthaean text, “This is ...”, rather than follow the Markan, “You are ...”, as the majority of Lukan texts do. This is not conclusive. The minimal correction would have involved retaining an original (unMarkan) direct address, starting “My son you are ...”, while substituting only the paratactic phrases from Isa 42.1, common to Matthew and Mark.

⁵ As concluded by J.H. Ropes, “Detached Note on [Acts] XIII 33”, in Frederick J. Foakes-Jackson and K. Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*. Part 1. *The Acts of the Apostles*. III. *The Text of Acts* (London: Macmillan, 1926), 263–265, citing Beza, old Latin in Bede, Justin, Origen and Hilary, Tertullian and Cyprian; and rabbinic sources referred to by Tischendorf and others “ad loc”. A.A. Anderson, *Psalms*. I (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1972), 57 cites b. Ber. 9b. There is no indication that the two psalms were combined in the LXX. I have not found any consideration of the possible relevance of Ps. 1, not even a dismissal of the suggestion, in older commentaries or in recent discussions. Among the latter are F. Bovon, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*; A.A. Anderson, *Psalms*. I (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1972); L. Cardellino, “Gésu e il Battista”, *BeO* 45.2 (2003), 65–127; J.A. Gibbs, “Israel Standing with Israel: The Baptism of Jesus in Matthew’s Gospel at 3.13–17”, *CBQ* 64.3 (2002), 511–526; M. Labahn, “The Psalms in Q” (2004), in S. Moyise and M.J.J. Menken (eds), *The Psalms in the New Testament*, 47–60, and P. Doble, “The Psalms in Luke-Acts” and *idem*, “Luke 24.26, 44”; taking, be it noted, a very different position from that argued here.

of Ps 1.3; and one may compare Num 24.6, Job 29.19 and Ezek 19.10. "Chaff" as a slur or threat or both is found at Job 21.18, Ps 35.5, Isa 17.13, 29.5, 41.15, Hos 13.3 and Zeph 2.2. However, only Ps 1.3–4 in the canon compares and contrasts them. And just such a contrast between fruitful trees and chaff that is to be blown away precedes the quotation of Ps 2.7 in the accounts of the Baptist's ministry as they appear in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke (Mt 3.7–10, 12; Lk 3.7–9, 17), where John is clearly threatening the unrepentant and unfruitful with exclusion from God's community.

Deploying both psalms as plausible 'intertext' for Matthew and for Luke (as one composite psalm, or even just as significantly contiguous texts) seems worth pursuing further. John is introduced with a quotation from Isa. 40.3, as a voice crying in the wilderness, "Prepare the way of the Lord". In Isaiah the way of the Lord is to be prepared because pardon and peace are declared. Clearly, in Deuteronomy, Proverbs, Jeremiah and Ezekiel "way" as a term for behaviour is so common as to be almost a dead metaphor. But that is not at all obviously the case in this passage in Isaiah. How might the literal preparations there ordered for an assured triumphal procession across the desert connect with the very unreassuring demand for change ("repentance") and threats of imminent exclusion that follow the quotation of these Isaian words in our baptism narratives? Let us suppose Ps 1 happened already to be in mind as a main text. Here we have in fact an absolute and unconditional contrast between "the way of sinners" and the "way of the righteous" who "delight in the law of the Lord": between those fruitful trees assured of inclusion and the chaff assured of exclusion from the congregation of the righteous. This might well seem likely to ensure a moralizing interpretation of any other "way" text, including "prepare the way of the Lord" in Isa 40.3.⁶

As it happens, a few lines later, though still in reassurance, Isaiah takes up another theme that then also appears in both our Gospel narratives: descent from Abraham (Isa. 41.8). Obviously the Matthaean and Markan texts move a little further on still in Isaiah for their conflated heavenly pronouncement.

In sum: in the light of "way" in Ps 1 (1–2) an otherwise far from obvious connection emerges between repentance to make positive preparations for the Lord (Isa 40.3) and the negative unconditional threat of rejection for those who refuse, irrespective of any Abrahamic descent (Isa 41.8).

⁶ It is perhaps also worth recalling the use of the Isaian text in 1QS VIII, where, albeit without any explicit allusion, the major concerns of Ps. 1 are also at issue: avoiding the ungodly, the study of the law, and the way of "the congregation of the righteous".

When Justin prepares to quote our Pss 1 and 2 as a continuous whole he concludes his summarizing introduction to it with “and how God calls all to repentance before the day of judgment comes. These things were uttered thus: ‘Blessed is the one who has not walked ...’”⁷ For Justin at least a call to repentance such as we find in this context in Matthew and Luke stems specifically from this psalm taken as one (perhaps focusing on Ps 2.10, “embrace instruction”).

If we are willing, then, to allow these notes from Pss 1–2 to resonate with our sequences in Luke in particular, but also in Matthew, we have the Baptist of these narratives portrayed as basing his programme and message in a combined psalm which threatens judgment and exclusion against the wicked, against any who refuse to serve the anointed ruler whose adoption as son has been pronounced by God. This appointment also explicitly threatens kings and earthly judges (Ps. 2.10). Aware of this, we would expect the Baptist to fall foul of Herod Antipas, as we are told did happen, with Josephus confirming that facet at least of the synoptic Gospels’ accounts.⁸ Later there was, according to Luke, a further fulfilment, when Jesus also fell foul of king and judges (Acts 4.25–28).⁹ And then in the Luke of the minority text a performative heavenly announcement is made in precisely the terms given (or is made in part from these terms, in Matthew, and in the majority Lukan text). The Baptist’s (inspired) choice of major text (Ps 1–2) is, in the narrative, divinely affirmed.

In the text of Lk 4, supported by Mt 4, still taken as they stand, more resonances follow. The divine adoption of Ps 2.7 is challenged by the diabolos: “If you are Son of God, turn these stones into bread.” Further direct citations from the scriptures as part of the sequence are obviously mostly from Deuteronomy. But there are also two further strong echoes from the two-part psalm. At Ps 2.8 God says, “Ask of me, and I will give you the nations as your inheritance, the uttermost parts of the earth as your possession.” The diabolos then usurps precisely this offer from God, promising power over all the kingdoms of the earth if Jesus will worship him. At Ps 2.6 God says he has set his king (vice-regent) on his holy hill of Zion. The diabolos counters this by taking Jesus to Jerusalem and setting him on a parapet or pinnacle of the temple.¹⁰ All three strands of temptation seem prompted by Ps. 2.

⁷ Justin, *Apol.* 1.40.

⁸ Lk 3.9–20; Mt 14.1–12; Mk 6.14–29; perhaps Q at Mt 11.2, Lk 7.18; Josephus, *Ant.* 18.2.116–119.

⁹ Cf. P. Doble 2004, “The Psalms in Luke-Acts”, 97–105.

¹⁰ Both Luke and Justin find still more in the second part of the combined psalm. At

Thus it seems possible that Pss 1–2 may have been more formative in the composition of the narrative of John's ministry and Jesus' early response than has to date been allowed. Obviously, as in many studies of this sort, there is no available clear-cut proof or disproof. There will be some unwilling to allow for unacknowledged 'influence'. And even if it is allowed that the voice from heaven in both texts cites Ps 2, and even if it be allowed that Pss 1 and 2 were a whole for Luke at least, many would insist that quotations are contextfree (as in my discussion above, taking the citation of Isa 40.3 as ignoring its context).¹¹ All I have at best done is suggest that more may have been noticed and used by the composer(s) of our narratives.

Is it possible to go further back than Matthew and Luke? I write as one who has written consistently (and often) in favour of discerning large traces of the now lost source "Q" in these two Gospels.¹² If Q is accepted at all, it is agreed to have contained the fruitful tree versus chaff contrast, and the threefold testings of Jesus. If it be accepted that all three of these latter echo part 2 of the joint psalm, then it would seem much more likely than some would allow that Q will also have contained the full adoption formula which is then challenged, and so also, as the context for it, hardly anything other than some explicit account of the baptism of Jesus by John.¹³ Read so, Q shows awareness of Pss 1–2 as composite, and as "pre-text" for much (not all) of what it says of John's mission, including his threat to the Herodian dynasty, and then for Jesus' response, including his dramatized interpretation of the joint psalm's message.

Allowing that each step back from the text adds conjecture to conjecture, uncertainty to uncertainty, is it worth trying to reconstruct a stage further back still? Josephus's account of John has him exhorting his fellow Jews "to lead righteous lives, to practice justice towards their fellows and piety towards God".¹⁴ There is little in the parallel matter in Matthew and Luke

Acts 4.25–28 Luke returns to Ps 2.1–2 and applies it to the opposition to Jesus as God's "holy servant/child" experienced from Herod and Pilate, making a specific link with the latter pair also made by Justin in the same passage. It is not simply single verses that may seem relevant.

¹¹ Cf. S. Moyise and M.J.J. Menken, "Introduction", in *idem* (eds), *The Psalms in the New Testament*, 3.

¹² F. Gerald Downing, "Disagreements of Each Evangelist with the Minor Close Agreements of the Other Two", *ETL* 80.4 (2004), 443–469; and "Writers' Use of Abuse of Written Sources" (2011), in P. Foster et al. (eds.) *New Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, 523–548.

¹³ Cf. the summary discussion in John S. Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes and Concordance* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1988), 16; and *idem*, *Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel* (Minneapolis and Edinburgh: Fortress and T & T Clark, 2000), 93.

¹⁴ Josephus, *Ant.* 18.2.116–119, LCL.

to illustrate this, and Luke's attempt at 3.10–14 strikes many readers as very Lukan. However, a programme epitomized for the Baptist in part 1 of Pss1–2, and perhaps known to be, would make the point much more clearly, just as the insistence on the 'Davidic' second part of the psalm, with its threats to kings and judges would, as noted earlier, obviously be likely to have worried Herod Antipas.

And a disciple of John's, Jesus of Nazareth, perhaps became convinced that he had been told by God that he was himself the Davidic figure that the combined psalm had encouraged John to expect and to prepare for, leaving this Jesus to sort out just how to respond in detail to the status the psalm accorded such a figure, his position and his power under God.¹⁵

In the next chapter the reader is invited to consider in more detail something of the way Jesus in turn may seem to have made his own selective and potentially disruptive interpretation of his people's ancient traditions, together with, perhaps, other disruptive proposals that were "in the air" in his day—or at least matched something of the gentler Cynic anarchism that some strands in the actions and ideas ascribed to him in the synoptic gospels so closely resemble.

There are, then, many other 'intertexts' that these passages in the Gospels invite us to consider, quite apart from the limitless number we may arbitrarily force on them. They certainly invite interpretative comparisons not least between John in his skin cloak and Cynic portrayals of Herakles in the desert coping with hunger and thirst and the allurements of bodily desires, glory, power and wealth, even though the primary *literary* inter-text here, as elsewhere in the Jesus traditions (as will also be further noted), is provided by the emergent Jewish canon.¹⁶ The oral 'intertext' would seem, at least to this writer, to have included much more of popular Cynic teaching.

¹⁵ These proposals compete with two others that have appeared relatively recently: C.K. Rothschild, *Baptist Traditions and Q* (WUNT 190; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), and R.S. Kraemer, "Implicating Herodias and her Daughter in the Death of John the Baptist", *JBL* 125.2 (2006), 321–349. On the former, see F. Gerald Downing, review of Rothschild, *Baptist Traditions*, in *SNT* 28.5 (2006), 35–36. In the latter Kraemer suggests that the two narratives of John baptizing Jesus and, in particular, of John later being beheaded were created to counter any suggestion that Jesus was John resurrected. (On this it should be noted that Kraemer adduces no evidence to support her crucial contention that beheading or any mutilation would have been seen as a preclusion of or even hindrance to later resurrection; on the contrary we may compare, for instance, 2 Macc 6–7, 4 Macc 6–17, and Heb 11.35–37.)

¹⁶ On which see F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 125–126, and references there, including, intriguingly, to Lucian's Herakles-like figure, Sostratus, "making roads in untravelled country and bridging places hard to pass", Lucian, *Demonax* 1 (LCL).

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

DISSIDENT JESUS

INTRODUCTION

That radical Cynic tradition had positive significance for Christian ethical reflection, and thus for reflections on Jesus' life and teaching as presented in the gospels, was widely acknowledged among the early fathers, even those who disapproved of aspects or variants of Cynicism.¹ It would seem that a predominantly positive, Christian, evaluation of Cynic ascetic life-style and teaching then emerged once more among western Christians in the early Middle Ages.² It may seem that it was only when Diogenes was enlisted as a critic of established Christianity by such as Valla, and later Rousseau, that a similarly measured response among Christian thinkers may have become less acceptable, despite a sympathetic appraisal by Kant. Nietzsche's avowal of Cynicism in his rejection of conventional Christianity may well have further discouraged any positive appraisal of Cynic resonances in the Jesus tradition on the part of continental European students of the New Testament.³

Nonetheless, it would seem that some English-speaking scholars in Britain at least, and up to the 1930's, were willing to make such connections,

¹ G. Dorival, "L'image des Cyniques chez les Pères grecs," in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet (eds), *Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 419–444, citing 432–439, "L'éloge du cynisme"; cf. *idem*, "Cyniques et Chrétiens au temps des Pères grecs," in M. Soetard (ed.), *Valeurs dans le stoïcisme. Du Portique à nos jours. Textes rassemblés en hommage à Michel Spanneut* (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993), 57–88; cf. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, "Le cynisme à l'époque impériale," *ANRW* II 36.4, 2720–2823, citing 2778–2800; and F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992), 169–301.

² S. Matton, "Cynicism and Christianity from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance," in B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds), *The Cynics* (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 240–264.

³ D. Kinney, "Cynic Selfhood in Mediaeval and Renaissance Culture" (1996), in Branham and Goulet-Cazé, *The Cynics*, 294–328; and H. Niehues-Pröbsting, "The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the Enlightenment" (1996), in Branham and Goulet-Cazé, *The Cynics*, 329–365, citing 353–365; but compare H.D. Betz, "Jesus and the Cynics: Survey and Analysis of a Hypothesis," *JR* 74.4 (1994), 453–475.

if only with idealised strands in Cynicism. We find instances in such eminently 'respectable' writers as Edwin Hatch, Samuel Dill, and W.R. Halliday.⁴ Among gospel scholars 1945–1980 we then seem to find that Cynics were granted at best walking-on parts.⁵ In more recent times the first attempts to sketch a more embracing comparison appear to have come from the present author, based on an initially very general exploration of available ancient Graeco-Roman sources for comparison, only slowly being made aware of the history of Cynicism and then of earlier reflections on Christian origins in the light of Cynic sources.⁶ Much more influential, however, have been publications on Jesus and Cynicism by North American scholars, especially members of "the Jesus Seminar".⁷ Proposals have varied, but attention has generally been focussed on apparent similarities in the itinerant life-styles, including dress, of Cynics and of Jesus and his followers, their espousal of poverty, their eschewing gainful employment and so their dependence on others, their reliance on models drawn from non-human 'nature', acting in a determined opposition to codes of civic respectability; together with particular attention to comparisons of their styles of communication and individual recorded actions and utterances.

⁴ E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity* (1890; repr. New York: Harper, 1957), 139–158; S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (1905; repr. New York: Meridian, 1956), 334–383, noting especially 355, 361; W.R. Halliday, *The Pagan Background of Early Christianity* (Liverpool and London: Liverpool University Press and Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), 126; 169–170; 190–191; compare D.B. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (London: Methuen, 1937), 172–174; 202–208.

⁵ E.g., C. Schneider, *Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums*, 2 vols. (München: Beck, 1954), I 21–35; G. Theißen, "Wanderradikalismus. Literatursoziologische Aspekte der Überlieferung von Worten Jesu im Urchristentum," *ZTK* 70.3 (1973), 245–271, citing 255–257.

⁶ *Inter alia*, F.G. Downing, "The Politics of Jesus," *The Modern Churchman* 25.1 (1982), 19–27; "Cynics and Christians," *NTS* 30.4 (1984), 584–593; "The Social Contexts of Jesus the Teacher," *NTS* 33.3 (1987), 435–491; *Jesus and the Threat of Freedom* (London: SCM, 1987); *Christ and the Cynics* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988); *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992).

⁷ E.g., J.D. Crossan, *The Historical Jesus. The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991); H. Taussig, "Jesus in the Company of Sages," in R.W. Hoover (ed.), *Profiles of Jesus* (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge, 2002), 169–193; L.E. Vaage, "The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence," (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, California, 1987); *idem*, *Galilean Upstarts. Jesus' First Followers According to Q* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1994); B. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence. Mark and Christian Origins* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988); *idem*, *The Book of Q and Christian Origins* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993).

1. OBJECTIONS TO A JEWISH CYNIC JESUS

These suggestions have, of course, met with criticisms, some more carefully argued than others.⁸ The most forceful seem to be as follows:

- (1) Much of the evidence adduced stems from dates too early or too late to be relevant, and Cynicism itself had lain dormant until a late first century CE revival.
- (2) There is no independent evidence for any Cynic presence in Galilee.
- (3) There are *essential* features of Cynicism missing in the Jesus tradition; especially 'shameless' behaviour, displays of 'indifference', and an urban base, and individualism; and despite this individualism, they all wore a uniform of cloak, staff and satchel, quite different from the habit(s) of Jesus' followers.
- (4) Cynics regularly deployed 'slogans', key words or catch-phrases that are absent from the Jesus tradition.

⁸ I note in particular, H.D. Betz, "Jesus and the Cynics"; C.M. Tuckett, "A Cynic Q?" *Bib* 70.2 (1989), 349–376 and *idem*, *Q and the History of Early Christianity. Studies on Q* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), esp. 355–391; B. Witherington, *Jesus the Sage: The Pilgrimage of Wisdom* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994); P.R. Eddy, "Jesus as Diogenes? Reflections on the Cynic Jesus Thesis," *JBL* 115.3 (1996), 449–469; M. Ebner, "Kynische Jesusinterpretation—"disciplined exaggeration"?", *BZ NF* 40 (1996), 93–100; and *idem*, *Jesus—Ein Weisheitslehrer?* (HBS 15; Freiburg: Herder, 1998), 26–31 and 399–416; and J.P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus* (ABRL, 4 vols; New York & London: Doubleday, 1991–2009), 3.90–91. There are replies to Betz and to Eddy by D. Seeley, "Jesus and the Cynics: A Reply to Hans Dieter Betz," *JHC* 3.2 (1996), 284–290; and "Jesus and the Cynics Revisited," *JBL* 116.4 (1997), 704–712; and from J. Kloppenborg, "A Dog among the Pigeons: The 'Cynic Hypothesis' as a Theological Problem," in J.M. Asgeirsson et alii (eds), *From Quest to Q. Festschrift J.M. Robinson* (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 73–118; largely repr. in his, "Social Characterizations in Theological Perspective," in *idem*, *Excavating Q. The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), ch. 9, 409–444; and F.G. Downing, "Deeper Reflections on the Jewish Cynic Jesus," *JBL* 117.1 (1998), 97–104; and "The Jewish Cynic Jesus," in M. Labahn and A. Schmidt (eds), *Jesus, Mark and Q. The Teaching of Jesus and its Earliest Records* (JSNTS 214; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 184–214; from the latter I have kind permission to reproduce matter here. John H. Moles, "Cynic Influence upon first-century Judaism and early Christianity", in Brian McGing and Judith Mossman (eds), *The Limits of Ancient Biography* (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2006), 89–116, accuses the present author, among others, of ranging too widely for evidence for Cynic attitudes and practices, yet presents a very similar sketch of "Cynic" traits in the Jesus tradition and in Paul's self-presentation, if without the more detailed critical assessment of the evidence for Cynic variety adduced by me in the works cited here. For a brief, but more measured critique than many, Kraig S. Keener, *The Historical Jesus of the Gospels* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 24–25; Bernhard Lang, *Jesus der Hund. Leben und Lehre eines jüdischen Kynikers* (Munich: Beck, 2010), argues for an older Jewish Cynicism and a more Stoic Cynicism than I find in either case persuasive.

- (5) Cynics frequently deployed 'apothegms' or 'chreiai'; and these constitute a consistent *Gattung* that rarely appears in the Jesus tradition, which itself deploys distinctively Jewish parables.
- (6) There are essential elements in the Jesus tradition that are incompatible with the supposed essence of Cynicism, such as an interventionist deity concerned with healing and with imminent cosmic renewal.
- (7) Such similarities as do appear are superficial, and there is an underlying difference of ethos. Jesus is gentle, and a *bon viveur* rather than a harsh ascetic.
- (8) If any similarities seem more striking, they are nonetheless coincidental, independent responses to similar socio-economic conditions.

All of these warrant a brief response before a positive case is outlined. First, however, it seems worth noting John Kloppenborg Verbin's comment on the debate, to the effect that the hypothesis of a Jewish-Cynic strand in Christian origins seems to be expected to meet much higher standards than the critics deploy in their own alternative reconstructions.⁹ It is also important to add that the defence that follows is of the present author's own procedures, and it will include an occasional distancing from some other writers' reconstructions of a Cynic Jesus, both for their accounts of Cynicism and their accounts of Jesus.

1.1. *Dating*

Excluding the historical Antisthenes as questionably Cynic, we start with Diogenes himself in the early fourth century BCE; and specialists work with the assumption that something of this original figure is recoverable, and that accounts of him, albeit added to and adapted, continued to be available, as were works by successors, including Menippus of Gadara (available to Varro in Rome, first century BCE, through to Lucian of Samosata in the second century CE), and Meleager of Gadara. Important is Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6, probably late second or early third century CE, but widely taken to have used much earlier sources. The (pseudonymous) *Cynic Epistles*, displaying variants on Cynic themes, also span our period. With care these, and Cicero, Musonius, Epictetus, Dio of Prusa, Oenomaus of Gadara, Philo, Seneca and others can be used, and are by specialists in the field in their reconstructions, including reconstructions of Cynicism in

⁹ Kloppenborg Verbin, "A Dog among the Pigeons?: A Cynic Q?"; and "Social Characterisations".

the first century CE.¹⁰ New Testament scholars also work with similar carefully reasoned conventional reconstructions, arguing for continuities where no physical evidence (for instance, of synoptic gospel texts) exists. Many New Testament scholars also use matter from Jewish writings becoming canonical to illustrate the culture of first century Galilee, without direct independent evidence that they were at all well known there, or, if known, understood as suggested. Rabbinic material from writings dated only very much later than most of the Cynic sources quoted is often also adduced. The procedures are the same in principal, and, carried out with care, no less and no more valid than one another.

It is true that we have for the first century CE no records of named Cynics, literate enough to be noted, until Seneca's friend Demetrius, and then Dio of Prusa, Demonax, Oenomaus, Peregrinus and others. Such literary figures are of course relevant, but it is not at that level that Cynic influence in Jesus' Galilee is imagined. M-O. Goulet-Cazé, on whose judgment scholars on all sides tend to rely, argues, with evidence, that popular Cynicism continued as an unbroken chain.¹¹ The currency of Cynic ideas in Paul's world has also been argued by many scholars.¹²

1.2. *Cynics in Galilee*

There is in fact very little independent evidence of any sort for popular culture in early first century CE Galilee.¹³ The only at all extensive documents we

¹⁰ Goulet-Cazé, "Le cynisme à l'époque impériale"; compare her *L'ascèse cynique. Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70–71* (Paris: Vrin, 1986), and *Les Kynika du stoïcisme* (Hermes 89; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003); and notes 1 and 2 above; and R. Hoistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Uppsala: Bloms, 1948); there is a fuller survey of sources accepted as relevant for "Cynicism" by various classicists, in Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 340–342. Despite all this, and a passing reference to F.G. Downing, *Christ and the Cynics*, by Amy-Jill Levine, in her "Introduction" to *eadem et al.* (eds), *The Historical Jesus in Context*, 1–39, at 12 and 38, Jesus' "context" is taken to be Cynic free, while including "pagan" sources on miraculous births, *chreiai*, Mithras, Apuleius, Aesop, Philo, Graeco-Roman associations, Joseph and Aseneth, and Homer.

¹¹ Goulet-Cazé, "Le cynisme à l'époque impériale", p. 2724, "la chaîne ne s'était point interrompue"; compare Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds), *The Cynics*, "Introduction", 13–14.

¹² One may also compare A.J. Malherbe, e.g., in his *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989); or M. Ebner, *Leidenlisten und Apostelbrief* (FzB 66; Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1991); and the evidence adduced in F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches* (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹³ Cf. most recently, Alexander J. Wedderburn, *Jesus and the Historians* (WUNT 269; Tübingen: 2010 Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 166; Maurice Casey, *Jesus of Nazareth. An Independent Historian's Account of His Life and Teaching* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 101–141;

possess that even claim relevance are the four gospels. The only other evidence adduced is mostly drawn from older (unlocated) canonical writings, or south Judaeian sectarian writings, or later rabbinica (as noted); and from accounts of nineteenth and twentieth century CE peasant communities. The relevance of these may be argued, but there is no independent evidence by which to verify (or falsify) the conclusions proposed, as is shown by the varied and often conflicting conclusions reached by those who do restrict themselves to the sources listed.¹⁴ There is simply a powerful conventional and often unreflective restriction to this choice of illustrative material.

We do know that over the centuries three named Cynics, Menippus, Meleager and Oenomaus, originated in Gadara. That is more than for any Greek city apart from Athens. We know that Gadara was proud of its intellectual tradition; and we know of just one Gadarene scholar of another school, the Epicurean Philodemus, a vigorous critic of Cynicism. Gadara is a few kilometres south-east of the Galilaean lake, and the easiest route to the coast would pass near Jesus' Nazareth. This *proves* very little: only that Cynic influence in Galilee, at a popular level, is not completely implausible. But it does mean that *if* we find that some gospel matter significantly resembles Cynic tradition, and the similarity is greater than with any known contemporary native Jewish traditions, then we are justified in considering an hypothesis to account for this as being other than 'pure coincidence'. One such hypothesis would be that strands of popular Cynicism had been orally (at least) assimilated in Galilee over the centuries since the time of Menippus, sufficiently so for such motifs to be communicable, to make enough sense for Jesus' own critical variant of some such popular Cynic-tinged Jewish culture to be understood. The synoptic gospels are then themselves to be taken as evidence for a measure of popular Cynicism in the culture of Jewish Galilee. Clearly this argument is circular, taking the gospels as evidence for their own context, but that is inevitable, short of arbitrarily refusing to take as potential evidence for Jesus' Galilee the only material that actually purports to emanate from there.¹⁵

Helen K. Bond, *The Historical Jesus* (Guide for the Perplexed; London & New York: T & T Clark, 2012).

¹⁴ This is argued at greater length in Downing, "The Jewish Cynic Jesus," 187–195, referring especially to work by S. Freyne and R.A. Horsley; compare F.G. Downing, "In Quest of First Century CE Galilee," *CBQ* 66.1 (2004), 78–97; repr. in F.G. Downing, *God with Everything. The Divine in the Discourse of the First Christian Century* (SWBA 2/2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 151–173.

¹⁵ I find unpersuasive A.J.M. Wedderburn's argument, *Jesus and the Historians*, 173, that Galilean Jews' hostility to their Gentile neighbours during the revolt precludes the possibility

1.3. *A Missing Essence of Cynicism*

Ancient Cynicism, like the early Christian movement, was very diverse, and many of our informants were overtly eclectic (Cicero, Philo, Seneca, Dio, Lucian's *Demonax*). Cynicism was "more a way of life than a philosophical system."¹⁶ Attempts to define an elaborate single and uniform 'essence' of the early Christian "way" will meet these days with incredulity. Unfortunately many of those who do posit Cynic influence on Jesus themselves maintain an unjustifiably monochrome picture of Cynicism, encouraging superficial rebuttals. What the evidence suggests are various 'family resemblances' within each grouping as discerned both by insiders and outsiders.¹⁷ Some commentators seem particularly fascinated by the sexual and excretory "shamelessness" of Diogenes in some strands of the tradition, ignoring the absence of these examples from accounts of other, later Cynics, but also ignoring other actions then also seen as shameless, such as eating in public and dressing badly. Cynic 'indifference' is thus taken, contrary to the texts, as indiscriminate.

Cynics do appear mostly in larger towns, where the literate who record them lived; but they also travel on foot between towns, and some are found staying in the countryside. And these are not solitary individualists, but teachers with groups of disciples, and with a socially disruptive message and practice (family, work, civic authority, cults), recognised as such by others.¹⁸ To demand that every item of all variants of Cynicism be matched in any Jewish Cynicism ascribed to Jesus is to ask for more to be included together there than is found together in any acknowledged Cynic source.

1.4. *Cynic Slogans*

In the ancient texts the key-words commentators pick on, such as ἀντάρκεια, ἀπάθεια, and even κυνικός occur mainly in comments by outsiders. They are

of prior Gentile influence: it did not among still more Hellenized Jews elsewhere; better is M. Casey, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 169, "The proximity of Gentiles to Jews could produce every imaginable Jewish reaction." It is disconcerting to fail to find any attention to wider Greek resonances in the entirely Greek sources accepted for our early portraits of Jesus, in Delbert Burkett (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Jesus* (Chichester: Wiley/Blackwell, 2011).

¹⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.103.

¹⁷ On "family resemblance," L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), 31–32.

¹⁸ In more detail, Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 18, 26–30, 50–56, 82–84, 148–149; and 79 on groupings, on which see Goulet-Cazé, "Le cynisme à l'époque impériale", 2736–2738.

rare or even absent in many writings normally taken to be Cynic.¹⁹ Their absence from the gospels is of but minor significance.

1.5. *Diverse 'Genres' or 'Gattungen'*

Scholars have picked on the definitions of the "*chreia*" form in ancient manuals, relating brief incidents where a speaker responds to a word or action with a further word or action, or with both. In the 'Q' tradition, the material common only to Matthew and Luke, and taken by most in the debate to stem from a mainly sayings collection, there are few such, although there is a slightly larger tally in Mark. Cynics, to be sure, very likely used this form; but that they spoke solely or mainly in this condensed style has by no means been demonstrated. Neither the *Cynic Epistles* nor Dio of Prusa's nor Lucian's imaginary Cynic dialogues suggest anything of the sort. *Chreiai* so defined constitute a large part of Diogenes Laertius' collection; but it is noteworthy that he also felt free to present Cynic opinions in much more "gnomic" form, without any account of circumstance.²⁰ What makes the 'utterings' and other significant actions distinctive and gives them their specific colour is their attribution to a particular figure.²¹ The same is true of the narration of speaking and of other actions in the synoptic gospels. Their length depended on circumstance; school children learned to condense and expand, and actions with or without words are ascribed to such as Diogenes in shorter and longer forms.

It has in fact not been shown, only asserted (and contrary to evidence) that ancient authors felt at all tightly bound by the 'forms' which they for pedagogic purposes discerned; and Cynic teaching on most matters of concern is preserved for us in various styles.²² Just as varied in form is matter ascribed to Jesus.

We have no independent evidence for anyone, distinctively Jewish or not, deploying shorter or longer still-life or narrative 'parables' in Galilee in the early first century CE.²³ We have evidence for later rabbis using illustrative

¹⁹ Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 45–50.

²⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI 22–24; 27b–31, 33, 35b (with a few exceptions; 70–73, 75–76).

²¹ As insisted by David B. Gowler, "The *Chreia*", in Amy-Jill Levine et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus*, 132–148, 133, "Once a proverb is attributed, it becomes a *chreia*".

²² Compare J.F. Kindstrand, "Diogenes Laertius and the *Chreia* tradition," *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 219–243; perhaps also, on scholars' inventions of genres, Pedro Pablo Fuentes González, *Les Diatribes de Teles*, (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 47–78.

²³ Compare B.B. Scott, "Essaying the Rock," *Foundations and Facets Forum* 2 (1986), 3–11,

parables; but neither Josephus nor Paul, self-styled contemporary Pharisees, do so; while Dio of Prusa could say that crowds would come up to people dressed as he was in his Cynic period, expecting vivid word pictures.²⁴ We shall return to parables below (2.5.7); but, if their presence in the gospel material is indicative of anything, it aligns the Jesus tradition with Cynicism, rather than distinguishing it.

1.6. *Elements in the Jesus Tradition
Supposedly Incompatible with "Cynicism"*

All reconstructions of Jesus' teaching allow, often explicitly, for his having made his own selection from diverse Judaism as represented. No known contemporary Jew—not even Josephus—could include every variant. Adherence to Torah meant to Torah as interpreted, if not as re-written (the *Temple Scroll*). But critics of the hypothesis of Cynic strands in Jesus' convictions seem to assume that from Cynicism he must be taken to have accepted all or nothing, rather than to have made his own selection (from what was also, as argued just above, itself also diverse). Jesus cannot be allowed to have left out elements, if such there were, that might seem to us incompatible with his ethos as we discern it. Yet Cynics argued among themselves, made their own selections; people on the fringes (Musonius, Epictetus, even Seneca) made their own individual selections; people with still less sympathy (Cicero, Philo) took positively some selections. But, it would seem, it cannot be imagined that Jesus of Nazareth might have picked and chosen from whatever of Cynicism might have come his way.

Talk of God or Gods is common in many Cynic sources, even while the Homeric myths are derided. Deciding how best to interpret this, including talk of Cynics as messengers of the Gods and friends of the Gods, is difficult.²⁵ But any notion of God over-riding human freedom would seem likely to have been unacceptable among any of the Cynics whose convictions have come down to us; so, if that scepticism came Jesus' way, he excluded it. On the other hand, seeing humans as receiving shared general divine care is, as we

citing 5, "nothing of the sort"; *idem*, *Hear Then the Parable. A Commentary on the Parables of Jesus* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 14; and Downing, "The Jewish Cynic Jesus," 197–198. More recently, Klyne R. Snodgrass, *Stories with Intent. A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 53–54; H.K. Bond, *Historical Jesus*, 97–99.

²⁴ Dio of Prusa, *Discourses* 55.9, 11, 22; cf. 72.13.

²⁵ Cf. J.H. Moles, "Le cosmopolitisme cynique" (1993), in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds), *Le cynisme ancien*, 259–208; repr. (ET) in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds), *The Cynics*, 105–120.

shall recall later, very much a common strand. One variant of the Diogenes story even allows him to seek oracular guidance, a practice contemptuously dismissed by a later Cynic, Oenomaus.²⁶

Cynics were expected to oppose what they saw as false, as pretence; and included in that could be insincere recourse to purifications, initiations, sacrifices, and localisations of God or Gods in temples or images. Much of this, as ascribed to Oenomaus, was welcomed by later rabbis, as it was by Eusebius.²⁷

Physical health was important to Cynics as it was to the Jesus of the tradition; but illness for a Cynic would probably be a hardship to be born, rather than a matter for divine healing (a stance Christian Jerome could accept, admiringly).²⁸ (Paul had to learn to put up with ill-health, 2 Cor 12.7–9). Here again, if Jesus met with Cynic scepticism on this issue, he chose to reject it (as the movement around the Cynic Peregrinus may have done in the next century, according to Lucian).²⁹

Along with refusing divine determination of human life, the Diogenes of the *chreia* tradition rejects any cosmological speculation, and this would seem to rule out cosmic eschatology.³⁰ Some North American proponents of a Jewish Cynic Jesus avoid this conflict by categorising any promise of an imminent end as part of a later intrusion (*stratum*) in the tradition. If one is not convinced that *strata*, let alone *strata* from differing sources are there to be discerned in the tradition, this ready solution is not available, and simply pruning the Jesus tradition to fit the Cynic hypothesis would be even harder to justify.³¹ So we would have to have Jesus reject one more element, if scepticism on eschatology was there in any selection of Cynic convictions available to him. It is still worth noting, however (if only as one more illustration of the variety in Cynicism as discerned around the time), that there are other Cynic motifs that might seem at least to use

²⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 6.20–21; Oenomaus in Eusebius, *Praeparatio euangelii* 4–7 and 13.

²⁷ Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 42–44 and, for Oenomaus, 147–148.

²⁸ Jerome, *Ad Jovinianum* 2.14, on Diogenes and his fever.

²⁹ Lucian, *Peregrinus* 28.

³⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.28a, 29a.

³¹ “*Strata*” in the Q tradition were proposed by J.S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), without judging the ultimate provenance of their contents; that was a deduction others made and that Kloppenborg has resisted; cf. *idem*, *Q. The Earliest Gospel. An Introduction to the Earliest Stories and Sayings of Jesus* (Louisville KY & London: Westminster John Knox, 2008); and see, further, F.G. Downing, “Word-processing in the Ancient World,” *JSNT* 64 (1996), 29–48; repr. in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century* (JSNTS 200; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 75–94.

language and images that may seem to resonate with motifs in apocalyptic eschatology. There are Lucian's Menippean dialogues involving travel to the realm of the Gods, and to Hades; and there are the assurances that great Cynic figures will have judicial authority after death.³² We may well suppose any original intention in these to have been metaphoric; but the imagery might well seem familiar.

With so much variety and internal disagreement among designated Cynic sources, and so much evidence for eclecticism across named schools of thought, we are in no position to decide in advance what sets of Cynic practices and ideas could have been around in Gadara or in other towns of the Decapolis; nor that any Galilaeen encountering any such variant set must have felt bound to take it or leave it whole and entire.

1.7. *A Difference of Ethos*

Lk 7:31–34 (//Mt 11:16–19), together with other notes of Jesus at shared meals, can be seized on to insist that this Jesus is no ascetic (even if John was). This simply ignores divisions between harsh and gentle Cynics, and differences of opinion among them on luxury foods.³³ Whether there are similarities which are more than superficial is a question to be considered in more detail, below.

1.8. *Coincidence?*

In biology, similar exigencies can produce similar responses. There are, it seems, around ten different kinds of 'eyes'. Mammalian eyes in fact share a common inheritance. Similar socio-economic situations may prompt similar social structures. But some similarities suggest a direct inheritance. Kraig S. Keener appositely quotes against me on Cynics a criticism of others that I myself advanced many years earlier, opposing "seizing a few elements in diverse cultures, describing them in very general and similar terms, and then positing a causal connection."³⁴ Whether the similarities between Jesus tradition and Cynic tradition suggest a direct inheritance has to be discussed in some detail (see further, below, § 3, pp. 301–311).

³² "The ethereal dwellings will receive me and I shall prosecute the Ephesians", *ps.Heraclitus* 5.2; compare *ps.Diogenes* 39.2; *Socratic Epistle* 25.1; Lucian, *Downward Journey* 23; cf. Epictetus, *Encheiridion* 15 (of Heraclitus and Diogenes).

³³ Cf. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 27–31, 68–69, 78–79.

³⁴ Kraig S. Keener, *The Historical Jesus*, 25, citing F.G. Downing, *The Church and Jesus. A Study in History, Philosophy and Theology* (SBT 2.10; London: SCM, 1968), 79, 84.

I have responded to eight theses hostile to the case for seeing Jesus as a Cynic of any kind, even a very Jewish one. If the reader is not persuaded, I still hope she or he will accept at least that there is a case to be made. I now advance some theses of my own, in more positive support of the case.

2. FURTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

2.1. *We May Have Much or Little Valid Data, but We Do Not Know for Sure*

It is entirely possible though by no means provable that the synoptic traditions include quite a lot of quite good information about the meaningful activities of Jesus of Nazareth. It is, of course, also imaginable that very little if any of what is recorded goes back at all closely to Jesus ("the Jesus Seminar"), and scholarly reconstructions of the traditions can be assembled which instead ascribe most if not all to later creativity in the Christian communities. The trouble with this choice of attribution is, as I argued some forty-five years ago, "*We do not know enough about Jesus to allow us to construct a clear account of the primitive church because we do not know enough about the primitive church to allow us to construct a clear account of Jesus.*"³⁵ But (as I also then went on to argue), neither do we have a clear enough picture of the contexts of Jesus (see also (2), above) or of the early communities to shed decisive light on either. We are left with rival 'global' reconstructions that compete in terms of coherence and inclusiveness.³⁶ There is nothing to tell us before we start drafting our reconstructions where the best balance of attributions must lie. The 'criteria' we may use, albeit often shared, have force only internally, within our reconstructions. If I (for instance) rule out some item from my reconstructed sketch of Jesus and his early followers by the "criterion of dissimilarity", that does not mean it must be ruled out of yours. What is 'dissimilar' or is contextually validated, 'plausible', in your reconstruction of Galilaean Judaism and of Jesus and of the communities that nursed the traditions of Jesus, may not be so in mine.³⁷ And, in

³⁵ F.G. Downing, *The Church and Jesus*, 51. This conclusion, I think first advanced by me, is quoted with approval by D.C. Allison, *Jesus of Nazareth. Millenarian Prophet* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 5. n. 17; A.J.M. Wedderburn, *Jesus*, 166, n. 83.

³⁶ Cf. F.G. Downing, "The Social Contexts of Jesus the Teacher"; and *idem*, *Jesus and the Threat of Freedom* (London: SCM, 1987), 147–160. For brevity my own previous work is listed, but it includes extensive interaction with others.

³⁷ Cf. F.G. Downing, *The Church and Jesus*, 93–131; and the references, n. 32, above, and *idem* "Shifting Sands," in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century* (JSNT

whichever way the attributions of authorship go, the Cynic-seeming elements still warrant attention.

2.2. *Actions Communicate, Words Perform*

In our reconstructions we do best to discuss intentional actions, with verbal communication as a major sub-group of actions, rather than divide 'sayings' from 'narratives' (even though many scholars do that). 'Speech-act' analysis (J.L. Austin) has been taken up quite widely, but it has to work both ways: actions communicate, words perform.³⁸ Intentional actions (whether involving speech or not) presuppose a community with a shared even if diverse culture, a 'language' of behaviour, including verbal behaviour. For innovation (innovative non-verbal/part-verbal action included) to register, be noteworthy, it must still reflect convention ("langue-parole-idiolect").³⁹ A chosen public life-style (such as that ascribed to Jesus) most likely presupposes its own social intelligibility in actions, including utterances.

So (to come a little closer to my announced subject matter), Jesus *could*, for instance, have deployed parable form(s) quite spontaneously, and/or chosen his particular range of subject matter (labourers, landowners, housewives, children, plants ...) without precedent; and the same could apply to his dress code. However, it is more or most likely that others had been doing and saying some things of similar kinds, for Jesus (or anyone else) to repeat and/or innovate on that basis, and be understood, and be taken seriously by some. We must needs always attempt to sketch a plausible context for public deeds (including utterances).⁴⁰

Sup 200; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), esp. pp. 220–224; and among other recent discussions of "criteria" (or "indices"), J.P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew: I. The Roots of the Problem and the Person. Rethinking the Historical Jesus*, 6, "Criteria", 167–195; G. Theißen and D. Winter, *The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria* (Louisville & London: Westminster/John Knox, 2002); A.J.M. Wedderburn, *Jesus*, 161–182. It is to be regretted that the critics of individual "criteria", in Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (eds), *Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2013), fail to allow that deployed *internally* to any reconstruction, the criteria can have some validity; it is only as 'free-standing, fit-all' that they lack cogency.

³⁸ Cf. F.G. Downing, "Words as Deeds and Deeds as Words," *Bib. Int.* 3.2 (1995), 129–143; repr. in *idem*, *Doing Things with Words*, 41–56; J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). Austin is taken up by, among others, J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: CUP, 1969) and by J. Habermas, (e.g.) *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (ET, London: Heinemann, 1979).

³⁹ J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts*, 17, with reference to F. de Saussure.

⁴⁰ "Plausibility" is a term favoured by Gerd Theißen. I acknowledge the value of many of his detailed suggestions, while disagreeing with the main thrust of many of his conclusions. See G. Theißen and A. Merz, *The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide* (London: SCM, 1998); and G. Theißen and D. Winter, *The Quest for the Plausible Jesus*.

However, as already argued at (2), above, we have little if any evidence independent of the gospels for the socio-cultural life of Galilee in Jesus' day. The absence of pig bones, and the presence of stone water jars (later said to resist impurity), and, perhaps, burial in shafts, indicates an observant Jewish population, but it does not tell us how the observance was interpreted.⁴¹

2.3. *Sociological/Anthropological/Economic Models*

Models may have considerable heuristic value, but they do not provide us with historical "laws". There are no such laws of a kind that may tell us that some events (including reactions of participants) otherwise unevidenced 'must' have happened, nor that events 'must have been' interpreted in a particular way even if unexpressed, nor that specific social pressures "must have been exerted" irrespective of the data available to us, nor that happenings apparently evidenced could not have occurred.⁴²

Physical laws are in a different category; even those who accept 'miracle' presuppose general physical regularities in creating their reconstructions.

2.4. *In Quest of a Plausible Fit*

In attempting to reconstruct an interpretative context for Jesus and his first followers we can still, of course, exclude by dictat any matter that does not bear a distinctive Judaic label. Or we may examine such Judaic

⁴¹ See S. Freyne, "Archaeology and the Historical Jesus," in *idem*, *Galilee and Gospel* (WUNT 125; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 160–182; M.A. Chancey, *The Myth of a Gentile Galilee* (SNTMS 118; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). *Miqwa'ot*, ritual baths, are noted, but only in towns; and ossuaries, bone-boxes; but these seem to appear only rarely and later in Galilee (contra many, e.g. J.D.G. Dunn, "Did Jesus attend the Synagogue?," in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), *Jesus and Archaeology* (Grand Rapids MI and London: Eerdmans, 2006), 209–210); see L.Y. Rahmani, *A Catalogue of Jewish Ossuaries in the Collection of the State of Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 1994), 21–27; and, more recently, M. Aviam and D. Syon, "Jewish Ossuaries in Galilee," in L.V. Rutgers (ed.), *What Athens has to do with Jerusalem* (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 151–187, have concluded, "It seems, therefore, that the custom of secondary burial in ossuaries arrived in Galilee towards the end of the first century C.E." (citing 183); with thanks to Dr. John Kane and doctoral student Tamlin Lizius, Manchester. For ultimate disposal in "shafts" of a main cave tomb, Jonathan L. Reed, "Archaeological Contributions to the Study of the Gospels," in Amy-Jill Levine et al. (eds), *The Historical Jesus*, 40–54, here 53. There is a useful recent discussion of the archaeological evidence and use made of it, in Morten Hørning Jensen, "Rural Galilee and Rapid Change: An investigation of Socio-Economic Dynamics and Developments in Roman Galilee", *Bib* 93 (2012), 43–67, arguing, *inter alia*, "urban relations were seemingly more reciprocal than has been argued from time to time", 58.

⁴² Downing, *The Church and Jesus*, 150–159.

matter with care, and see what sort of ‘fit’ it offers the Jesus tradition. And if elements, more or less extensive, of Jesus tradition seem to fit well with our Judaic matter, that is to be expected, and welcomed. But if a sizeable amount fails to fit at all comfortably, we may reasonably look round for any other (perhaps supplementary) socio-cultural contextual strands that may plausibly be held also to have been available. And we shall then attempt as objective an assessment of this further suggested context as we may attain. (In this I am taking initially something like Dale C. Allison’s approach: we take seriously what appear to be—loosely—kinds or sets of activities, attitudes, ideas ascribed to Jesus in the tradition, though I myself feel it is worth then critically sorting those elements.)⁴³

2.5. *Jesus the Jew*

First, as most of us interpret the evidence, Jesus is presented in the gospels as they stand, and in what seems to many as tradition on which the gospels depend, as a Galilean Jew (though not a Ἰουδαῖος, Judean), allowing for the varieties of practices and emphases in contemporary Galilee and Judea, diversities which would demand selection.⁴⁴

2.5.1.

Jesus has a very real concern (at the least) for Jerusalem and the Temple, even if the latter needs drastic renewal (Lk/Q 13.34; the Passion Narratives, etc.) There is no strong reason for excluding this matter.

2.5.2.

He is from time to time represented as attending congregational meetings (“synagogues”), in the gospels, though not in Q.

2.5.3.

He respects Torah; and even if he interprets it at times distinctively, so do other contemporaries (Lk/Q 16.16–17; Mk 7.1–13; 10.1–12).

⁴³ Dale C. Allison, *Constructing Jesus. Memory, Imagination, and History* (Grand Rapids MI and London: Baker Academic and SPCK, 2010), 10–30.

⁴⁴ Cf. Stuart S. Miller, “Stepped Pools, Stone Vessels and other Identity Markers of ‘Complex Common Judaism’”, *JSJ* 41.2 (2010), 214–243; and Daniel Boyarin, “Beyond Judaisms: Metraton and the Divine Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism”, *JSJ* 41.3 (2010), 323–365, “we need to think of converging and diverging strands and moments, of eddies and currents, whirlpools and backwaters in the vast river of the ethnic group we have come to call Jews”, 360.

2.5.4.

He is from time to time represented as citing scriptural traditions—very occasionally the text (most full quotations being editorial), more often allusively. Here I would agree readily with Richard Horsley, that Jesus is represented as alluding to a selection of orally retold and transmitted traditions, even elements with an Israelite (northern) bias (e.g., Elijah and Elisha).⁴⁵ It seems too readily assumed by many that every village (Nazareth included) will have had available for repeated reading most if not all the emergent canon of scriptures. Cost, and the absence of a community building for storing so valuable a collection would seem to have made it unlikely.⁴⁶ The only evidence adduced seems to point in a different direction. The Roman soldier executed, so Josephus tells us, for desecrating a scroll of the law he found in one village (*BJ* 2.229) found only *that* to burn, not a library. It would hardly have been all five books in one scroll, for that would have been far too cumbersome; compare the Qumran finds. If a village had only one book, one might conjecture that it would be Deuteronomy, the most frequently found at Qumran; and one may compare the one “copy of the laws of Moses” brandished by Jesus son of Sapphias in a confrontation at Tarichaeae (Josephus, *Life* 134–135). The other two books most frequently found at Qumran (Isaiah and the Psalter) also figure quite often in the tradition. But there seems no good reason to imagine Jesus immersed in reading and re-reading any extensive set of books. Even the traditions that portray him as literate (Mk 7.6; Lk/Q 7.27; Lk 4.16–21, 10.26; Jn 8.6–8) do not suggest he was bookish.⁴⁷ His intellectual–religious–cultural food would be received for the most part orally and visually and in other sensuous ways, and he would not have needed to be torn away from books to engage with it, absorb it, digest it, talk it over, live it, interact with others living it, ruminate on it, interpret it, sort it, select and reject within it, reinterpret it, recast it, elaborate it, expand it, add to it ...

However, since only quite a small proportion of the activity ascribed to Jesus finds a context clearly provided by Temple, synagogue, Torah and Scripture, we need to search more widely for what might have provided the

⁴⁵ R.A. Horsley, *Galilee: History, Politics, People* (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995), 148–156.

⁴⁶ Cf. C. Hezer, *Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine* (TSAJ 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001).

⁴⁷ Contra, e.g., Joachim Jeremias, *New Testament Theology* I (London: SCM, 1971; ET of *Neutestamentliche Theologie* I: *Die Verkündigung Jesu*, Gütersloh: Mohn, 1971), 205, “Jesus lived in the Old Testament”; cited with approval by R. Riesner, *Jesus als Lehrer* (WUNT 2.7; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2nd ed. 1984), 225; cf. W. Popkes, in “James and Scripture: An Exercise in Intertextuality,” *NTS* 45.2, 1999, 213–229—there was no ready access to texts.

“langue” and the stimulus for the rest of what he seems to have tried to do and share, by reproducing, adapting, innovating, in interaction with others.

2.5.5.

Jesus, according to the gospels, experienced revelations of divine reality, and expected a universal divine judgment and a new beginning.⁴⁸ The language in which this is expressed does seem to tally for the most part with the emergent canon of scripture, rather than stem from the surviving eschatological apocalypses (‘Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha’). However, “Son of Man” becomes a title with eschatological significance only later and “Kingdom of God” has few precise antecedents in surviving documents, but is anyway mostly editorial and so less significant than it is often made out to be. The gospel traditions with their comparative lack of elaborate details (even in Mark 13 etc.) seem only distantly related to surviving eschatological documents. Perhaps something like the traditions in *The Lives of the Prophets* was important to Jesus, but he does not use any of the most prominent prophetic forms; there is no ‘thus says the Lord’.⁴⁹ Geza Vermes’ attempt to discern a tradition of ‘charismatic’ Galilean wonder-workers has no *compelling* evidence to support it, and what is adduced has little if anything in common with Jesus the teacher as narrated. We have no independent evidence of other healers, though in the gospel traditions there are notes of other exorcists (Lk/Q11.19; Mk 9.38).⁵⁰

2.5.6.

Apart from allusions to Solomon Jesus does not seem to quote the literary wisdom tradition and his ethos is quite different (see below). Furthermore, there is no clear evidence for a living Galilean wisdom tradition of wandering sages continuous with some or all the very diverse stand-points and forms of Sirach, Qoheleth, Proverbs, Wisdom of Solomon, Pseudo-Phocylides ...⁵¹

⁴⁸ I find myself often in qualified agreement on the latter two themes with D.C. Allison, *Jesus of Nazareth, Millenarian Prophet* (Philadelphia PA: Fortress, 1998) and again in *Constructing Jesus*; however, Allison does not sufficiently allow for revelatory experiences.

⁴⁹ Against, for instance, *Migaku Sato, Q und Prophetie. Studien zur Gattungs- und Traditionsgeschichte der Quelle Q* (WUNT 2.29; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988).

⁵⁰ G. Vermes, *Jesus the Jew. A Historian's Reading of the Gospels* (London: Collins, 1973), 69–80. Onias/Honi is a pacific Judaeen rain-maker, Hanina ben Dosa survives snake-bite and heals by prayer (not word and touch etc.) and his link with Galilee is tenuous. Neither Honi nor Hanina teaches, collects disciples, nor wanders the countryside.

⁵¹ Against, for instance, B. Witherington, *Jesus the Sage. The Pilgrimage of Wisdom* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994); and, e.g., P.R. Eddy, “Jesus as Diogenes?” 460–461.

2.5.7.

We are not told of any first century Galilean other than Jesus using the various figurative speech-forms termed 'parables' in the gospel tradition. We may well imagine such forms were already in circulation, and that Jesus did not invent the forms nor introduce to the later (much later) rabbis those *genres* they also subsequently used; but we have no compelling reason to suppose such forms were used by contemporary Pharisees or by Scribes whether Pharisaic or not. Pharisees do not seem to have set out to teach as such, but simply to set an example of strict adherence to chosen norms of behaviour. In the gospels Pharisees appear in Galilee, but Josephus would lead us to suppose few if any lived there. Scribal lawyers helped to interpret law and apply it, perhaps on the staff of Jewish rulers and other wealthy landowners (especially the priests among them) and we may presume lawyers taught apprentice lawyers; but even the scribalism of the much later Mishnah does not deploy parable forms for its exposition.⁵² If parabolic communication was in circulation, affording precedent for Rabbis later, and for Jesus in the first century, it was circulating in other circles than those of the scribes or the Pharisees.

2.6. *Interim Conclusion*

So we have in quite specifically Jewish sources a reasonable fit for some substantial elements of the Jesus tradition. Yet there is much else; and for these remaining elements of the Jesus tradition lacking close analogies in other available near-contemporary Jewish sources, popular contemporary Cynicism, with some plausible roots in Palestine, seems to afford some quite close analogies, and thus a *possible* context.

But, it must be noted, if we do find in Jesus Cynic elements from the Greek tradition he remains no less a Jew than do Philo or Josephus or the author of

⁵² Some Sadducees respond to Jesus imaginatively (Mk 12.18–23); no one else does. On this (limited) account of Pharisees, see, e.g., M. Goodman, "A Note on Josephus, the Pharisees, and Ancestral Tradition," *JJS* 50.1 (1999), 17–20; B.B. Scott, "Essaying the Rock," 5, "as to such similitudes as master/servant, tower/war, lost sheep/lost coin, the heir, faithful servant, children at play, leaven ... we have nothing of the sort;" and in *Hear then the Parable*, 14, "in those layers of the [rabbinic] tradition that can be isolated as belonging to the Pharisees there are no parables" (citing J. Neusner, "Types and Forms in Ancient Jewish Literature: Some Comparison," *History of Religions* 11 (1972) 354–390). Paul, as a self-professed Pharisee uses figurative language, but none at all close to the synoptic parables. See also A.J. Saldarini, *Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian Society* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1988), for the scribes as "bureaucrats ... and experts on Jewish life," but nothing more, 266, summarising a detailed argument.

Wisdom of Solomon, or the writer of 4 Maccabees—or those responsible for the Mishnah, and the Talmuds, with the Greek influence discernible there.

3. CYNIC STRANDS IN THE GOSPEL TRADITION

3.1.

It has been quite often noted that itinerant Christians obeying some version of the synoptic mission—charge (Mk 6.8–10; Mt 10.9–10; Lk 9.3–4, 10.4–5) might well have looked to spectators somewhat like Cynics. The point was made by Gerd Theißen, for instance, in his 1973 article, “Wanderradikalismus”. Theißen then went on to argue that the specific prohibitions in Luke 9.3 were “probably intended to avoid the least shadow of an impression that the Christian missionaries were these [Cynic] beggars or were like them.”⁵³ This supposed deliberate difference in ‘uniform’ has then been widely accepted by others.⁵⁴

The evidence for a supposed uniformity in Cynic dress is in fact derived from a small number of caricatures derived from outsiders. If one looks at the Cynic sources themselves in detail (rather than at today’s or yesterday’s generalisations—Theißen quotes a few secondary sources and Diogenes Laertius 6.13 only) there was even more variety in Cynic get-up (and in the terminology for the various items of ‘equipment’ that might or might not be deployed) than we find among the sets of instructions in the synoptic gospels.⁵⁵ Mark allows both sandals and staff, which many Cynics would carry; Matthew forbids the staff, as Luke does in one list, and Matthew forbids sandals, as Luke does in his other list. Paul, of course, interprets the

⁵³ G. Theißen, “Wanderradikalismus”, 245–271, referring to 255–259, “Das Verbot von Tache und Stab zielt wahrscheinlich darauf hin, auch den geringsten Anschein zu vermeiden, die christlichen Missionare seien solche oder ähnliche Bettler,” as in the ET, “The Wandering Radicals,” in *Social Reality and the Early Christians. Theology Ethics and the World of the New Testament* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992), 47. This distinction is repeated without argument in G. Theißen & A. Merz, *The Historical Jesus*, 216; cf. R.A. Horsley and N.A. Silberman, *The Message and the Kingdom. How Jesus and Paul ignited a Revolution and transformed the Ancient World* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 58–59; J.P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew. 3, Companions and Competitors*, (2001), 187–188, n. 99; Craig S. Keener, *The Historical Jesus of the Gospels*, 24–25, despite his acceptance of the potential relevance of the “Greek background”, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ E.g., by R.A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1987), 230; C.M. Tuckett, variously, including *Q and the History of Early Christianity* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 385–389; P.R. Eddy, “Jesus as Diogenes,” 461–462.

⁵⁵ Goulet-Cazé, “Le cynisme à l’époque impériale,” 2738–2746. I am grateful to Prof. J.M. Robinson, for helping me, in conversation, clarify and strengthen (I hope) this and some of the following points.

tradition differently again: 1 Cor 9:14–15, with 4:11–12, γυμνιτευόμεν, probably only ‘half naked’. “Barefoot” is how Dio describes Diogenes; on this sculptors vary in their depictions of Cynics. (Particularly significant in fact are the photographs of (acknowledged) statues of Cynics available in various published collections, but perhaps now especially those in Diskin Clay’s 1996 essay.)⁵⁶ Some Cynics forgo a staff; for some the begging bag (or, for others, bowl) is a positive symbol, others would prefer to earn their keep. Though Jesus’ followers do not beg (αἰτεῖν), they are expected to depend on others’ hospitality, as some Cynics did.⁵⁷ The critics of any Jewish Cynic Jesus thesis tend to ignore or dismiss such inconvenient data, preferring, as noted earlier, a clearly defined Cynic appearance with which to contrast a clearly defined early Christian self-presentation. Yet to appear poorly dressed, to draw attention to yourself with a message encouraging poverty while relying on others’ support, is, in much of the first century east Mediterranean world, certainly quite enough to risk being seen as a Cynic.⁵⁸ The variegated Cynic tradition could provide an intelligible context for the variations the early Christians allowed themselves in response to these injunctions from Jesus.

Would this hold, however, in Galilee? Negatively we have no evidence from outside the gospels for *anyone* in Galilee around Jesus’ day behaving in any closely similar way. Josephus’ account of Essenes travelling light to visit other known or unknown members of their dispersed community affords no close analogy at all; nor, in ancient tradition, do Elijah or Elisha. But eye-catching actions of this sort are only at all fully significant, even in some measure recognisable, where they can presuppose a context in which people know how to interpret them (a commonplace of ‘sociology of knowledge’ so-called). We can of course always still posit coincidence—and that could be the correct assessment. Jesus could just have chanced on a method of approach with (apparently) no precedent in his own culture, but one that happened to have been adopted over the past few centuries by innumer-

⁵⁶ D. Clay, “Picturing Diogenes”, in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds), *The Cynics*, 366–387; especially fig. 9, p. 381, naked with bowl; and fig. 10, p. 384, with no cup, staff or satchel, but here with sandals and cloak draped around his midriff.

⁵⁷ F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 10–11, 32–33, 133–134 for some long lists; but cf. Dio Chrysostom 6.15, 60; Musonius 19 (Lutz 120–122); ps.Lucian, *The Cynic* 3; Teles, Stobaeus IVA, Hense 44; Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 488; ps.Crates 2, 19, 2; ps.Diogenes 38.4; R.F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul’s Ministry* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 37–42.

⁵⁸ On not begging, but expecting support: Luke 10:7; and cf. ps.Crates 2.19, 22; ps.Diogenes 38.4.

able others travelling through the countryside among the Hellenistic towns of the Mediterranean world, not excluding Gadara, a few kilometres to the south east of Nazareth: Gadara where two significant named Cynics, two famous sons, had originated (and at least one vigorous critic of Cynicism) and where another, Oenomaus would emerge. Well, coincidences do occur. Jesus himself may have thought he was innovating. And still no one (no more widely travelled merchant, soldier, artisan, scribe, Pharisee, Herodian or Sadducee, no one acquainted with the Greek-speaking world) told him or his followers what sort of itinerants they might be mistaken for, even without staff or shoes or satchel. Or, if anyone did exclaim, "Why get yourselves up like a Cynic? Get back to Gadara!" Jesus and his friends (or the later tradents at least) remained content with the image and *did nothing to preclude* that interpretation.

3.1.2.

Freyne and Horsley (as leading examples) have differed as to the extent and depth of poverty in Jesus' Galilee. We have no evidence in older or contemporary Jewish thought of poverty being commended as a condition for the good life. The dangers of wealth, of seeking it, placing too much reliance on it (Ps 49.6, 62.10; Prov 30.7–9), are noted; and there are scriptural references to 'the poor' who may be God's special concern, without our knowing the kind of poverty in question. But nowhere else in Jewish sources do we seem to find poverty as such commended, let alone commanded until we reach Philo in Alexandria.⁵⁹

Jesus in the tradition commends the blessedness of the poor, forbids the accumulation of wealth, and judges it incompatible with service to God, demanding dispossession (Lk/Q(?) 6.21–25; Lk/Q 12.22–31, 33–34; Lk/Q 16.13; Mk 10.17–26). So, again, we find Jesus, with no clear precedent in his own culture, hitting on poverty as constitutive of the good life, of blessedness: an approach that for centuries in the Hellenistic world had been exhibited and commended and talked about and related in lively Cynic anecdotes that could be part of the school curriculum for anyone learning to write Greek. But Jesus, we are asked to guess, reached this Cynic conclusion

⁵⁹ T.E. Schmidt, *Hostility to Wealth in the Synoptic Gospels* (JSNTSS 15; Sheffield, JSOT, 1987), 49, concludes that no canonical passages listed "puts poverty in a favourable light;" 73, "none can be said to laud poverty"; and on Philo, 82. Cf. also R.J. Coggins, "The Old Testament and the Poor," *ExpT* 99 (1987–1988), 11–14; R.N. Whybray, "Poverty, Wealth and the Point of View in Proverbs," *ExpT* 100 (1989–1990), 332–336.

independently, and expressed it in Cynic-like dress, also independently; and with no cultural precedent some Galileans accepted his lead, while no one with contacts in the world where Greek was the first language ever said, "You're just another Cynic!" or put him off by telling him it wasn't just non-Jewish, it was foreign, it was Greek. Well, coincidences do occur.

3.1.3.

It is not just the fact that Jesus adopted poverty and commended it (so we are told), but the way in which we are told he commended it that is also striking. He urged people to accept the example of birds and flowers, and not bother about food, clothes, or stores. In "On avoiding bothersome busyness: Q/Lk 12.22–31 in Graeco-Roman Context," I offer a very full discussion of this passage, one which can only be summarised here.⁶⁰ Commentators have noted some similarities between this passage, whether in Luke's or Matthew's version, and Greco-Roman expressions of concern about anxiety.⁶¹ Comparing it in detail with two nearly contemporary treatises, the *De tranquillitate* of Seneca, and that of Plutarch, respectively, as well as with a large number of shorter passages from various authors, brings out these affinities still more clearly.

One may discern over all in this material at least fifteen sub-themes: (1) bothersome concerns detailed; (2) body and soul talk; (3) inner resources; (4) wild beasts; (5) flowers; (6) opulence (7) human worth (8) women's work and men's work (9) busy toil (10) possessions (11) food's availability (12) divine provision (13) human limitations (14) the divine realm (15) sufficient to the day. Of these, all but (3), inner resources, occur in Matthew; and all but (3) and (15) in Luke. Various shorter selections of these themes occur in various settings in various orders. Dio of Prusa deploys eleven in his *Discourse* 6,

⁶⁰ F.G. Downing, "On avoiding bothersome busyness: Q/Lk 12:22–31 in Greco-Roman Context," in T. Holmén and S.E. Porter (eds) *Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus*, 4.3245–3268; repr. in F.G. Downing, *God with Everything*, 91–114. (Item 15, "sufficient to the day", Mt only, appears in Seneca and Plutarch, the latter attributing it to Epicurus.)

⁶¹ E.g., H.D. Betz, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995), 459–486; F. Bovon, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas 2, Lk 9,51–14,35* (EKK III/2; Zurich: Benziger, 1996), 292–318, but with disappointingly scant attention to the extent of detailed parallels. More recent writers seem even less attentive: e.g., J.P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew*. 3, *Companions and Competitors*, (2001), allowing only for unspecified "similarities"; 47 Dale C. Allison, *Resurrecting Jesus. The Earliest Christian Tradition and its Interpreters* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 38; in *idem*, *Constructing Jesus* (2010), and Alexander J. Wedderburn, *Jesus and the Historians* (2010), passing reference; Maurice Casey, *Jesus of Nazareth* (2010), 306–307, no attention to Graeco-Roman contemporary resonances, despite awareness of the latter's proximity, 169. For further references, Downing, "On avoiding."

Diogenes, or On Tyranny, and seven in *Discourse 10*, debating what counts as useful. Musonius (*Discourse 15*) has seven or possibly eight in a discussion of family life; Epictetus (*Dissertation 1.9.7–9*) uses seven in a consideration of human kinship with deity. Much later, Clement of Alexandria includes with an echo of the gospel passage others of the themes in forms much closer to those in our pagan authors, to discuss fussily obtaining exotic foods (*Paidagogos* 2.1.5–6).

What emerges as distinctive in this comparison is a divide between passages that stress inner resources (and thus are emphasising *feelings* of anxiety) on the one hand; and those that make no mention of inner resources, but are concerned with bothersome, fussy *activity*: toil. The gospel pericope is usually interpreted as dealing with the former, feelings of anxiety. Yet what the birds and flowers are commended for is none such. They are commended for not doing things, not doing toilsome things, not sewing, harvesting, storing, spinning, weaving. And that is a distinguishing mark of much Cynicism, the refusal of bothersome toil for results seen as valueless.

Might not Jesus or the tradition have produced this cluster of themes, complex though it is, out of 'native' Jewish resources? The search for such has not been very productive. Yes, ants may be admired (Prov 6.6): but precisely for careful storing. Certainly, God is seen as provider for beasts and for humans; but that encourages humans, at least, to work, not to abstain from it (e.g., Ps 104.21–23; Sir 39.30–40:7).

So, if this is not reliant on Graeco-Roman, and specifically Cynic tradition, we are asked to believe that Jesus, by coincidence, and quite independently, chooses thirteen or fourteen such strands, and to make what is a frequent Cynic point, unprecedented otherwise in his native culture.⁶² And, as it happens, this complex sequence, though lacking Galilean Jewish cultural precedent is meaningful enough to have been remembered, recorded, repeated, in detail. Coincidences certainly do seem to be piling up.

⁶² Many commentators agree on excising elements from the passage, as disturbing its logic. Without them the passage would still have more motifs than have any set noted by me, bar the two full dissertations cited, and the remainder would still be distinctively Cynic. However, the fact that so many such sub-motifs in various sequences, whether to our minds logical or not, can be evidenced suggests, as argued in Downing, "On avoiding bothersome busyness", that such insistence on a logic with which both Luke and Matthew were content is itself over fussy and anachronistic.

3.1.4.

Although in one strand Jesus affirms respect for father and mother (Mk 7.10–13) and for marriage (Mk 10.4–9), elsewhere he enjoins the fracturing of families (Lk/Q 12.51–53; Mk 10.29–30) and even forbids the pious duty of burial for a parent (Lk/Q 9.59–60). As Tom Wright notes, this presents “a shocking challenge to the Jewish world of Jesus’ day.”⁶³ It is significant that while D.C. Allison places considerable stress on voluntary celibacy as undertaken in the light of an imminent end, the only explicit passage he can cite in illustration is from 1 Cor 7:26.⁶⁴ Allison’s Jewish eschatological sources promote other kinds of renunciation, but not this. At Qumran there was a celibate resident élite, but the wider community maintained an orderly family life.⁶⁵ There is closer precedent for such radicalism, however, in Cynic teaching, where it is part of a considered and fairly coherent rejection of the civic values of which family values are an integral part, and this gives it sense.⁶⁶ We are again asked to imagine Jesus arriving at this apparently graceless irresponsibility within no supporting context known to us, yet he is (or is presented as being) understood and followed by some.

3.1.5.

To return to the issue of parables, where we noted (2.5.7) that we have no independent evidence for such communication being used in Jesus’ Galilee. We are assured, however, by one critic that “one of the most characteristic

⁶³ N.T. Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God* (London: SPCK, 1996), 402.

⁶⁴ D.C. Allison, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 188–197, referring to 190. It is a weakness of Allison’s argument that he places so much stress on sexual renunciation (and elaborate arguments to enhance its importance in the tradition) and simply lists in passing other items, 174–175. This emphasis fits Allison’s own estimate of the importance in the tradition of ‘intention’ whereas that is a Matthaean theme, and the other synoptic passages cited as instances of ‘intention’ are concerned with enacted commitment (186 compared with 47 § 12 and n. 151). The Jesus tradition as a whole (like those of many Cynics, and in this case, like some Jewish tradition) places its emphasis on what is done, not on intention on its own: Philo, *De mutatione* 241–243; 4 Macc. 3.3–5; cf. Mishnah, *Makk.* 3.15.

⁶⁵ See above, ch. 1, p. 39.

⁶⁶ Cf. W. Deming, *Paul on Marriage and Celibacy. The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians* 7 (SNTSMS 83; Cambridge: CUP, 1995), ch. 2, “The Stoic-Cynic Marriage Debate,” 50–61; and F.G. Downing, *Christ and the Cynics* (JSOT Manuals 4; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988, 44, 79). To supplement the latter on the break with family: Diogenes Laertius 6.20–21, 54, 72; ps.Diogenes 21, 38.5, 47; cf. Epictetus 3.22.47, 67–82; 4.1.153; see further, F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 133, 139. As in the Jesus tradition, one can find a counter-balance among Cynics, too: in favour of marriage, Diogenes Laertius 6.96–98; and respect for an abandoned parent, ps.Diogenes 7.30, 34.

forms of Jesus' teaching style—the parable—has no real Cynic parallels.”⁶⁷ In fact, most of the short metaphors and similes in the synoptic tradition do have close parallels in Cynic and related sources; and that is most of the material.⁶⁸ In the synoptic gospels we can also see longer and shorter versions (of, for instance, The Thief in the Night, The Sower, and The Mustard Seed; and different ‘expansions’ of The Pounds/Talents). Longer figurative constructions are admittedly not frequent in our Cynic materials (they are not frequent in the gospels); but when we do find such in Cynic sources, we realise how readily the short forms may have been condensed from the longer ones or shorter ones expanded. We may instance Antisthenes on ‘strongholds’ in Diogenes Laertius compared with the preserved fragment of his Odysseus; or the brief example of ‘athletic prizes’ in Paul compared with the treatment of the same model in Dio; and in Dio in particular do we find other ‘expansions’ of metaphors and similes found in brief elsewhere. The metaphor of “fighting with wild beasts” used with reference to controlling the passions can be used in Cynic writing as briefly as by Paul (1 Cor 15:32), or as expanded by Dio into his “Libyan Myth.”⁶⁹ Dio’s “Good Euboean” has formal as well as substantial similarities with Luke’s “Good Samaritan”. Dio here writes at very much greater length, but uses an everyday rural setting and an unexpected generous ‘hero’ to challenge narrowminded expectations (besides portraying a rural Cynic ‘natural’ simplicity).⁷⁰ Dio says that people come to men dressed as he was (as a Cynic) expecting such stories. To quote an earlier conclusion of my own, “the sheer quantity of parable, metaphor and simile [in the synoptic tradition] would strongly reinforce the impression that anyone repeating this material was some sort of Cynic.”⁷¹

⁶⁷ Eddy, P.R., “Jesus as Diogenes?”, 461.

⁶⁸ See Downing, *Christ and the Cynics*, *passim*.

⁶⁹ Arguing that the metaphor is shared, A.J. Malherbe, “The Beasts at Ephesus,” *JBL* 87 (1968) 71–80, repr. in his *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 79–89. Q/Luke 11.24–26 (the returning unclean spirit) also affords an interesting comparison with Dio’s *Libyan Myth*, *Discourse* 5.

⁷⁰ Malherbe discusses the Antisthenes passages in “Antisthenes and Odysseus and Paul at War,” now in his *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–119; H. Funke discusses the prizes, in “Antisthenes bei Paulus,” *Hermes* 98 (1970) 459–471; the passages can be found in G. Gianantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* II (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990); the “Good Euboean” is in Dio *Discourse* 7.1–80.

⁷¹ Dio 55.9, 11, 22; cf. 72.13; quoting Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 139; this entire present paragraph is drawn from Downing, “Deeper Reflections on the Jewish Cynic Jesus”, 100–101.

3.1.6.

It has also been difficult to find earlier 'purely Jewish' antecedents for Jesus' teaching on love of enemies (Lk/Q 6.27–29, 35), and on not judging (Lk/Q 6.37–38, 41–42). Again there are plentiful Cynic or Cynic-influenced instances. As I have in the past noted, there are also inconsistencies: Diogenes in the tradition can be very vindictive; but, in the wider tradition at least, so, too, can Jesus.⁷²

3.1.7.

Jesus speaks in his own name, and uses none of the canonical prophetic formulae ('the word of the Lord', etc.), and, as we noted above, rarely quotes and infrequently even alludes to scripture. Similar forthrightness, readily interpretable as self-opinionated, was characteristic of many Cynics, who also eschewed references to authority or technical arguments. The tradition assumes that Jesus' hearers were unfazed by his self-assurance; only once in the combined synoptic tradition is Jesus challenged on this score (Mk 11.27).

3.1.8.

Mark, Matthew and Paul in 1 Corinthians, together with some longer texts of Luke and also Justin Martyr, supported allusively by John, indicate that Jesus encouraged his immediate entourage to share bread and wine designated as his body and his blood. There is no plausible Jewish context, no otherwise suggested Galilaean Jewish context in which this might seem acceptable. Of course food and drink could be consumed in a way we might term 'symbolic', and "blood" might be used as a metaphor ("the blood of the grape," Deut 32.14; cf. Prov 5.15). But the idea of drinking blood, even symbolically, simply horrifies (2Sam 23.17), as is often noted.⁷³ Although pagan mysteries as an alternative context have often been canvassed for such an apparently 'Thyestean' feast, I have shown elsewhere that when such charges are later levelled at Christians, it is always in combination with 'Oedipean intercourse'; and this combination (cannibalism and incest) is only ever proposed for Cynics in our most nearly contemporary sources. In theory Cynics could accept both such possibilities as 'natural' (without there being any record of their putting theory into practice).⁷⁴ Again, Jesus

⁷² Dale C. Allison, *Constructing Jesus*, 355 and n. 141.

⁷³ H. Maccoby, *Paul and Hellenism* (London: SCM, 1991), 99, citing John 6.60–66; M. Casey, "No Cannibals at Passover," *Theology* 96.771 (1993), 196–205, at 203.

⁷⁴ F.G. Downing, "Cynics and Christians, Oedipus and Thyestes," *JEH* 44.1 (1993), 1–10,

could quite independently have hit on an idea—eating human flesh, drinking human blood—that only Cynics are known to have contemplated, even symbolically, with serious equanimity. Just one more coincidence.

3.1.9.

In all four gospels (and, for those who accept it, in Q, Q/Lk 14.27) Jesus goes knowingly to a death that is not only degrading but, in his tradition, accursed; and urges others to follow. Positively to provoke trouble, and such counter-cultural and costly trouble, is distinctively Cynic. A Stoic might hope to cope if some such fate impinged, but would not prompt it.⁷⁵ 4 Maccabees shows how a Greek-speaking Jew could assimilate the Stoic approach; Paul shows how foreign to his and to Graeco-Roman tradition had been the thought of crucifixion itself as other than a sign of divine rejection (1 Cor 1.23, Gal 3.13).

3.1.10.

As with all the above suggestions, the attribution of all these actions and ideas to Jesus is questioned by scholars, as is, of course, their interpretation. From strands in diverse Cynicism that I have discussed in more detail elsewhere⁷⁶ I have here picked out a number of very significant items and themes where activity including teaching ascribed to Jesus has no at all obvious known Jewish precedent to render it persuasive, let alone intelligible, even 'thinkable' or 'enactable' for him and his Galilaean audiences (or his followers and their audiences), and even runs counter to otherwise evidenced varieties of Jewish ethos. In these respects, Jesus is dissident—sufficiently so to oblige zealous Pharisaic Paul to persecute his followers. *An otherwise still very Jewish Jesus is displayed in the synoptic texts exhibiting and articulating dissident ideas, attitudes and practices resembling strands of Cynicism in recognisably Cynic ways: and being understood and found by some at least, persuasive.*

repr. in *idem, Making Sense*, pp. 134–147. Zeno and the earliest Stoics seem to have retained this twin motif, but by Jesus' day the Stoics had long abandoned it.

⁷⁵ As Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.2.18–20, said, you should not provoke your judges, but, "If you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come." On Cynic willingness to provoke trouble, see further, F.G. Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, ch. 5, "Troubles invited, troubles withstood", 128–173; and cf. Cook, J.G., "Crucifixion".

⁷⁶ Downing, *Jesus and the Threat of Freedom; Christ and the Cynics; Cynics and Christian Origins*; and other work listed there and in other notes here.

3.1.11.

There are many other issues on which known Jewish and Cynic sources together say similar things (as shown in my *Christ and the Cynics*). If these further common strands were recognised in Jesus' Galilee, they could have made assimilation of some of the more distinctive Cynic themes much easier. In fact in these areas, where there *are* non-Cynic Jewish analogies, teaching ascribed to Jesus is still often closer in content to the Cynic than to the non-Cynic Jewish sources.

3.1.12.

I have carefully noted in advance (2.5, pp. 297–301, above) areas where Jesus in the tradition *does* also recall for us close precedents in 'non-Cynic' Judaism, for which I have only been able to argue elsewhere that even these are not without some analogies among some Cynics. So, as observed, his eschatology is Jewish; yet eschatological themes are widely shared, and the rhetoric of his "subversive kingdom" talk can strike a fairly detached observer (L.G. Bloomquist) as similar in its drive to the kingdom language of Cynics.⁷⁷ This Jesus can speak of himself or of attitudes to himself as significant for a coming judgment (but so, as we saw, can some Cynics). He heals and exorcises (or heals exorcistically). We have only a very general analogy in Cynic concern for physical well-being, and one very partial later Cynic analogy noted in the apparent therapeutic value of relics of the self-immolated Cynic Peregrinus (but then we have no independent evidence for healers of any other kind in Jesus' Galilee). And so on.⁷⁸

3.2. Conclusion

How are we to interpret all this? We can stress (or invent by general re-description) dissimilarities between Christian and Cynic sources, stress or invent by general re-description, similarities between the Christian and

⁷⁷ L.G. Bloomquist, "Methodological Considerations in the Determination of the Social Context of Cynic Rhetorical Practice: Implications for our present Studies of the Jesus Traditions," in S.E. Porter and T.H. Olbricht (eds), *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture. Essays from the 1995 London Conference* (JSNTSS 166; Sheffield: SAC, 1997), 200–231, citing 222–230.

⁷⁸ See F.G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, 140–141 (on eschatology; now adding *Socratic Letter* 25.1 and Lucian, *Downward Journey* 23, to *ps.Heraclitus* 5.2 & 9, *ps.Diogenes* 39, Epictetus, *Encheiridion* 15; and F.G. Downing, "Common Strands in Pagan, Jewish and Christian Eschatologies in the First Century," *ThZ* 51.3, 1995, 197–211); and *Cynics and Christian Origins* 130–131 (on healing; for the miraculous relic of a Cynic, Lucian, *Peregrinus* 39).

non-Cynic Jewish sources. I prefer to try to allow for both similarities and differences on all sides.⁷⁹

We can allow that there are real similarities, but, as noted above (1.8) argue that they are culturally simply coincidental, they are epiphenomenal, simply a function of similar economic and social conditions (Theißen, Horsley, Vaage, and others, in their various ways.)⁸⁰ This seems to me hard to credit. Similar attitudes may well be evinced in similar socio-economic circumstances in different cultures; but we have no evidence elsewhere for as closely similar significant action-and-articulation as is discussed above simply arising spontaneously from parallel socio-economic conditions in distinct cultures. Why should we resort to such a “marvellous” conclusion here?⁸¹

We may, however, note, that the general socio-economic situation that we are able to reconstruct from our archaeological and other sources for Galilee in Jesus’ day would indicate that his attitude to wealth and security would at least be relevant, even if not necessarily popular, let alone inevitable.

*The gospel evidence (in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary) seems to indicate a sufficient presence of popular Cynic influence within Galilean Israelite culture, to allow Jesus to make his own selection and form his own dissident Jewish-Cynic synthesis, and be understood.*⁸²

It would also seem that Paul perceived the young Jesus movement as a sort of Jewish Cynicism (or Cynic Judaism), and so quite naturally, once he changed tack and joined the movement, he deployed major strands of Cynic praxis and articulation in living, developing and propagating his new commitment. A brief discussion of ‘disorderly’ Paul constitutes the next and final chapter.

⁷⁹ Cf. Kloppenborg Verbin, “A Dog among the Pigeons.”

⁸⁰ Theißen and Horsley as above; L. Vaage, *Galilaean Upstarts. Jesus’ First Followers According to Q* (Valley Forge, PA: TPI), 1994; and review of Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins*, CBQ 56, 587–589; and “Q and Cynicism: On Comparison and Social Identity,” in R.A. Piper (ed.), *The Gospel behind the Gospels. Current Studies on Q* (Leiden: Brill), 1995, 199–129; J.D. Crossan, *Jesus, a Revolutionary Biography* (San Francisco: Harper, 1994), 122, perhaps Jesus was “just re-inventing the Cynic wheel all by himself”; cited by M.A. Powell, *Jesus as a Figure in History*, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1998), 97.

⁸¹ So, when Allison, *Jesus of Nazareth*, argues that similar situations produce millenarian prophets with often very similar attitudes, but in instances quite independently of each other, we nonetheless note that the precise articulation argued is still culturally specific.

⁸² D. Fiensy, “Leaders of Mass Movements and the Leader of the Jesus Movement,” *JSNT* 74 (1999), 3–27, suggests that Jesus as a carpenter would have been in a good position to “network,” to encounter a variety of people, and so, of ideas.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

DISORDERLY PAUL

It would, then, seem, as I here argue, that Paul perceived the young Jesus movement as a sort of Jewish Cynicism (or Cynic Judaism), and so quite naturally, once he changed tack and joined the movement, he deployed major strands of Cynic praxis and articulation in living, developing and propagating his new commitment.

I have argued all this at length, in my *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*.¹ In that work I have attempted to show, on the basis of others' researches, and fresh work of my own, that the Paul of the Thessalonian and Corinthian and Galatian letters depicts and articulates a life-style in terms that would clearly look and sound a disruptive and disorderly Cynicism to the ordinary townspeople he met, so clearly that he must have been made aware of that, and content with it. What he had to say on "neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, no male and female" would sound Cynic, as would his active disparagement of law (both Jewish practice and gentile civic custom), and much of the discussion of roles and dietary tabus, along with the consuming of bread and wine as body and blood; but also his ostentatious poverty, half-naked, showing the scars of shameful beatings, in fact his entire self-presentation as a teacher working with his hands to gain a living, would look Cynic. A recognisably Cynic deviancy constituted much of the initial thrust of his invitation to a Christian deviancy.² It seems on reflection that it was in this Cynic-looking behaviour and appearance that Christ was displayed, "revealed" (albeit puzzlingly) "in" Paul.³ When Paul joined the Christians he seems to have supposed it not just appropriate but necessary to behave and talk in ways that must often have seemed Cynic, if he was to represent Christ.

¹ Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches*, ch. 10, 287–295. Along with my own researches I rely particularly on work by A.J. Malherbe (without claiming his support for my conclusions).

² See also F.G. Downing, "Paul's Drive for Deviants," *NTS* 49.2 (2003), 360–371; repr. in *idem, God with Everything*, 7–19, and ch. 9, pp. 216–218, above.

³ So, Gal 1.15, "ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν ἐν ἐμοί", together with Gal 2.20, 2 Cor 4.10–11 with 8–9, in the light of 2 Cor 3.18, 1 Cor 13.12, Phil 3.12; and Morna D. Hooker, "Conformity to Christ", *Theology* 116.2 (2013), 83–92.

Well before his letters, and as a zealot for his people and their sacred traditions, Paul had originally persecuted some early Christian communities (Gal 1.13–14; Phil 3.6). Presumably he saw their life-style and their announced views as a threat to the security and integrity of both nation and inheritance as he understood them. The insistence of these followers of Jesus that a man whom God had allowed to suffer crucifixion was nonetheless God's anointed leader, God's Messiah, on its own might well have disturbed Paul ("a stumbling-block," 1 Cor 1:23);⁴ but much more significant would have been the life-style these 'Messianic Jews' had adopted. As we are often reminded of Judaism over the ages, it is 'orthopraxis' that is central; ideas are secondary, important only if they threaten or actually disturb the faithful observance of the *Torah* as interpreted.⁵

Yet Paul became convinced that he had been encountered by (and himself been enlisted by) the Christians' crucified leader, now totally vindicated by God, glorified Messiah and Lord (as his disciples had been claiming). So what Jesus' followers had apparently been *doing* wrong, would now be seen by Paul as pre-eminently right. The life-style Paul had tried to eradicate he would now, himself, adopt and propagate. The Christian-Cynic way of life we can see Paul enacting and articulating must, then, be presumed to have been his version (even if not a precise imitation) of what he had up to then seen and detested. He now propagated the πίστις, the faithful response to God, that he had tried to destroy (Gal 1.23). At least in broad terms the conclusion seems irresistible; otherwise one would be imagining a Paul become convinced that what his erstwhile opponents had been doing was right, yet himself then in response still doing something quite different.

To live a life that matched his new convictions in a way that would also create the appropriate impression in the Greek towns where he was at home, he would seem to have had to adopt many facets of a fairly gentle but still rigorously self-disciplined and disturbing Cynicism. To draw people away from their ancestral gods (neither Jew nor Greek), and to proclaim an end to linked basic social conventions (neither bond nor free,

⁴ Philo says, "A merciful and forgiving God would never surrender an innocent man to be done to death," *De Spec. Leg.* 3.121; cf., again, J.G. Cook, "Crucifixion".

⁵ G.F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1927), 110–111; though in our period there was clearly less uniformity of practice than Moore supposed before the Qumran library had been discovered; cf., e.g., J. Neusner, *Judaisms and their Messiahs at the Turn of the Christian Era* (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), ix–xiii.

no male and female) could only be seen as a disruptive Cynic deviancy; yet this is what Paul espoused as the appropriate way to be a follower of the Galilean Jesus in some of the Greek towns of the eastern Mediterranean.

His praxis and its articulation can in fact be shown, at least in outline, to have mirrored quite closely, if not precisely, significant elements of that of those he had been opposing, but with whom he now had allied himself. The numbered subsections that follow correspond to those of the Jesus tradition (§ 3, pp. 302–309) in the previous chapter.

1.

It seems clear from 1 Corinthians 9 that Paul is responding to the Jesus tradition represented by the synoptic ‘mission charge’.⁶ Paul parading himself “hungry and thirsty, [half-]naked and homeless” is (as noted above) also displaying an image and deploying slogans from Cynic stock; but he does all this precisely because it is the appropriate working out of the new life he has been drawn into. It provides the appropriate “spectacle”, it is to imitate Christ so others may too, it is to allow Christ’s power (his characteristic power) to be effective. It may well be that it is by so living that Paul is “crucified with Christ” and thus able to portray him publicly (Gal 2.20; 3.1 cf. 2 Cor 8–9).⁷ Certainly it is by accepting tribulations in a Christian–Cynic way, he tells us, that he “carries round in his body the death of Jesus” (2 Cor 4:8–11).

2.

Paul himself, of course, maintains a Cynic freedom to adopt a variant method of obtaining a livelihood (one that puts him in effective touch with people, 1 Thess 2.1–12); but it is still “in poverty” that he and those with him make others rich (2 Cor 6.10; as in his own way his Lord has done, 2 Cor 8.9). Though quite obviously it is the match between his life-style and his understanding of Jesus Christ his Lord that is most important to Paul, he is fully

⁶ D. Wenham, *Paul—Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity?* (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1995), 190–200.

⁷ Cf. B.S. Davis, “The Meaning of *προεργασία* in the Context of Galatians 3.1”, *NTS* 45.2 (1999), 194–212.

aware that this Cynic-seeming way of living is rooted in a part of the wider church's Jesus tradition.

3.

1 Cor 7.29–34 Paul discourages the common civic social concerns with possessions and human relationships that will involve distracting busyness for men and women alike, though without offering brute animal examples. Divine providence is also not noted here, though it is elsewhere (e.g., 2 Cor 9.6–10).

4.

In 1 Cor 7, on marriage, Paul simply ignores the family as the basis for society. His motive, the shortness of the time, is not Cynic, but avoiding distracting busyness is.

5.

Paul uses metaphor quite widely, as did contemporaries of all persuasions, but nothing to match the parables of Jesus or the imaginative narratives of such as Dio of Prusa.

6.

Paul urges blessings on persecutors, doing good to enemies, if not as freely as these are urged in the synoptic tradition (Rom 12.14–21).

7.

Paul is much more likely to quote scriptural authority than is the Jesus of the gospels. But he still speaks authoritatively in many instances (e.g., 1 Cor 7.12; 11.34).

8.

Paul has taken on board the words of Jesus at his last meal, and writes with no qualms of sharing not only the Lord's body but also his blood (1 Cor 10.16; 11.23–26).

What we should conclude from this is that on many fundamental programmatic issues Paul is at one both with Cynic-seeming strands in the Jesus tradition but also with such strands among the wider Christian communities.

9.

Paul does not just accept trouble, he clearly provokes it (e.g., 1 Cor 4.9–13; 2 Cor 11.23–27); he preaches Christ crucified, displays Christ crucified (1 Cor 1.23; Gal 3.1, 2 Cor 4.10).

10.

Obviously these findings (if in fact found at all persuasive) are important for our understanding of Paul's perception of nascent Christianity but they are also highly significant for our understanding of other Christians' reaction to Paul's Cynic-Christian Judaism. Paul tells us that "after fourteen years" he checked out the message he'd been sharing with leading Christians in Jerusalem "lest somehow I should be running or had been running in vain" (Gal 2.2). It was apparently agreed that in essentials he was on the right lines. The implications for legal matters (circumcision, diet and Sabbath, in particular) of the "neither Jew nor Greek" in the baptismal formula did become controversial. On no other point where Paul appears Cynic in his behaviour and his articulation of it does he have to defend himself: in fact, quite the opposite. His Cynic-seeming practice and Cynic-sounding accounts of it are deployed as having considerable apologetic value in inner-Christian controversy, and especially in 2 Corinthians, in response to those who (even if not original apostles) represent a rival 'conservative' and Jewish strand among the early communities. Paul can match their claims both to Jewish inheritance and to Cynic life-style: "Hebrews ... Israelites ... descendants of Abraham ... ministers of Christ ... in laborious hard work, going without sleep, hungry, thirsty, fasting, cold, [half-]naked" (2 Cor 11:22, 27). For his response to have seemed to Paul himself to have worthwhile force, he must have seen the Cynic presentation of these central

strands in his practice as affording quite uncontrovertibly important and agreed common ground.

Already before Paul joined them around 33 CE, within a year or within at most three of the crucifixion of Jesus, the early Christian communities in many significant ways looked and sounded Cynic, to Paul, who responded in the light of this perception, and to others, and to themselves; and they went on appearing so. This Cynic Judaism (or Jewish Cynicism) must seem to have been part of the earliest origins of the movement, in the life, activity and shared thoughts of Jesus himself.

CONCLUDING THESIS

Deploying much the same standards with much the same rigour as serve other competing hypotheses (no easier, no harsher), Jewish and Cynic elements—both—in the early Christian movement, and specifically in the Jesus tradition and in Paul, seem clearly arguable, along the lines sketched above, and to deserve open-minded appraisal.

In this both Jesus and Paul appear in Jewish-Cynic colours, dissident and disruptive, with some quite specific critical questions disturbing any easy acceptance of conventional law and order.

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